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This thesis examines the transposition of Hellenistic philosophy into the medical sphere, 
with a focus on the Stoic, Epicurean and Pyrrhonian traditions. The intersection of 
Hellenistic philosophy and medicine is especially abundant; the Hellenistic philosopher, 
with his eudaimonic orientation, presents himself as a physician of the soul. The τέλος of 
the medical art – the production and maintenance of health – served as a practical template 
for the philosopher’s administrations. As the Hellenistic period fades into the centuries of 
Roman hegemony, Stoic and Epicurean doctrines find their way into the medical tradition 
per se via the theories of Athenaeus of Attalia and Asclepiades of Bithynia respectively. 
However, despite the oft-stated affinity of philosophical and medical objectives, Stoicism 
and Epicureanism are refashioned as they cross disciplinary boundaries – in the case of 
Epicureanism, radically so. My thesis is that these adjustments are most intelligibly read 
as attempts by doctors to signify the capacity of their τέχνη to generate new ideas by 
disentangling their theories from the philosophies to which they were intellectually 
indebted. The method by which this is achieved, I will argue, is in large part dependent 
on the nature of the philosophy at root, the ‘mother-doctrine’. Athenaeus was able, 
through selective adoption, to delineate a technical epistemology within the greater 
architecture of Stoic theory; Asclepiades, by contrast, was motivated to adapt the physical 
system he sought to appropriate. The Pyrrhonists, who interface with the medical sphere 
via their affiliation with the Empiricist sect in the second century AD, represent an 
alternative mode of interaction between the philosophical and medical traditions – the 
alliance of independent, differently oriented sects, the integrity of which, I will propose, 
depends upon the preservation of that independence. The Pyrrhonian Empiricists grant us 
further insight into the boundary between philosophy and τέχνη as disciplines in antiquity, 
a boundary which is also central to understanding the medical adoption/adaptation of 
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 Introduction  
‘Vain is the word of a philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man. For just as 
there is no profit in medicine if it does not expel diseases of the body, so there is no profit 
in philosophy either if it does not expel the suffering of the mind.’ 
- Epicurus1 
‘It is not true that whereas there is an art, called medicine, concerned with the diseased 
body, there is no art concerned with the disease of the soul, or that the latter should be 
inferior to the former in the theory and treatment of individual cases. Therefore, just as 
the physician of the body must be ‘inside’, as they say, the affections that befall the body 
and the proper cure for each, so it is incumbent on the physician of the soul to be ‘inside’ 
both of these in the best possible way. And a person might understand that this is so, 
since analogy with them was set up at the start. For the correlative affinity with them will 
also make evident to us, as I think, the similarity of the cures and in addition, the analogy 
that the two kinds of healing have with each other.’ 
- Chrysippus2 
0.1. This thesis examines the transposition of Hellenistic philosophy into the 
medical sphere, with a focus on the Stoic, Epicurean and Pyrrhonian traditions. I 
am interested in the adaptation of ideas which developed within one intellectual 
tradition – characterised, in this period, by its eudaimonic orientation, for the 
breadth of subjects it arranges in the gravity of a singular behavioural τέλος – by 
the specialised, technical occupation. The intersection of Hellenistic philosophy 
and medicine is especially abundant. The Hellenistic philosopher, with his sights 
on εὐδαιμονία, presents himself as a physician of the soul. The medical τέχνη 
acquires an analogic function; medicine’s τέλος, the production and preservation 
of health, along with its assumption that pain exists to be negated, provides the 
philosopher with a practical template for his own administrations – his therapies 
– to an afflicted soul. As the Hellenistic period fades into centuries of Roman 
hegemony, Stoic and Epicurean doctrines are filtered into the medical art per se 
via the theories of Athenaeus of Attalia and Asclepiades of Bithynia respectively, 
the founders of the Pneumatist and Asclepiadean sects. Thus, integrants of 
medicalised, ethically oriented philosophies are redirected into the medical τέχνη. 
And yet, this period is also characterised by the careful delineation of disciplinary 
boundaries, by doctors seeking to distinguish their craft from the philosophies to 
which they were intellectually indebted and for which their discipline served as a 
paradigm. Stoic and Epicurean physical doctrines are not transported without 
 
1 Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 31 = Epic. fr. D54 in Baily (1926) p.133 trans. Bailey (= Usener 221). 
2 Quotation from the fourth book of Chrysippus’ On Affections (Περὶ παθῶν) in Gal. PHP V.2.22-24 trans. 
De Lacy (1978). 
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alteration from one domain into another; they are trimmed and refashioned as 
they traverse disciplinary boundaries, sometimes radically so. My guiding 
question with respect to doctrinaire philosophy and its filtration into medicine is 
as follows: given the ‘correlative affinity’ of Hellenistic philosophy and medicine, 
the putative similarity of their τέλη, why do doctrines translated from the former to 
the latter undergo such modification? 
     The Pyrrhonists, through their affiliation with the Empiricists in the second 
century AD, represent an alternative mode of interaction between philosophical 
and medical traditions. Though Galen would portray the Empiricist as being to 
medicine what the Pyrrhonist was to life,3 the Empiricist sect originated centuries 
prior to Pyrrhonism (properly so-called) and adhered to an epistemology – one 
characterised as a dogmatic faith in the authenticity of sense-experience – that 
would appear, on first analysis, to be incompatible with the Pyrrhonist’s universal 
suspension of judgement (ἐποχή). Nonetheless, an alliance, of a sort, was 
enacted as the sun set on the Pyrrhonist sect, for which Sextus Empiricus, 
avowed Empiricist and our most informative source for Pyrrhonian scepticism, is 
the most well-known exemplar. I am concerned to discover how, and the extent 
to which, the disparities between the schools came to be tolerated. My contention 
is that the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance grants us further insight into the boundary 
between philosophy and τέχνη in antiquity, a disjunction which is also central to 
understanding the refashioning of Stoicism and Epicureanism at the hands of 
their medical descendants. 
     My task, then, is to clarify the boundary between the disciplines, the 
mechanism of filtration and conversion – selective adoption and adaptation – 
assembled where the branches of inquiry ought to meet. What motivates the 
enforcement of this boundary? What factors influence the nature of the boundary, 
its pattern of permeability, the severity of the transformation undertaken by ideas 
which are drawn across its threshold? Guided by these questions, I hope to 
further illuminate the complexity of medicine’s relationship with philosophy in this 
period, to advance our understanding of the history, morphology and 
accommodation of medical specialisation in the intellectual landscape of the 
 
3 Gal. Subf. Emp. 9, 82.28 et seq. Deichgr. 
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period spanning the foundation of the Hellenistic schools in the late fourth century 
BC, to the death of Sextus Empiricus in the third century AD. 
0.2. Medicine and philosophy in pre-Hellenistic antiquity 
That the body is a mirror to its environment, a fixture of Rationalist, theory-guided 
medicine, is established more or less from the outset of western philosophy’s 
inquiry into nature. Cosmic models sprung from universal ἀρχαί confuse the 
boundary between physics and physiology, whole and part. From the assumption 
of generality follows an inquiry into the relationship between complex organised 
systems. Theories of health and disease were the province of Presocratic natural 
scientists. Ideas which would linger throughout the theory-guided medical 
literature of subsequent centuries were seeded in Presocratic philosophy; the 
body’s status as a unified congress of different elemental mixtures, each uniform 
part differentiated by the proportion of its most basic constituents, has its roots in 
the physiological theories of Empedocles of Akragas, based on his analysis of 
the cosmos into the elements –  earth, air, fire and water.4 That health amounts 
to the salubrious equilibrium of bodily elements or qualities can be traced to 
Alcmaeon of Croton, a fifth century philosopher-physician, purportedly of 
Pythagorean schooling,5 who, elaborating from the Milesian proposition that the 
cosmos has a ‘preferred state’ characterised by balance,6 attributed disease to 
the excess of any one of the body’s constituent powers.7 Intriguingly, Alcmaeon 
also exhibits a hint of proto-empiricism, reportedly announcing that only the gods 
have certain knowledge of invisible things, where mortals must make inferences 
from evidence.8 We find no ἀρχή or ἀρχαί at the root of Alcmaeon’s medical 
theory, despite his Milesian influence. One wonders if the practice of medicine, 
being natural philosophy in application, unsheltered by the oft-illusive self-
affirmation of abstraction, confronted the physician with a boundary to human 
understanding.  
 
4 Aët. V.22.1 (DK 31A78). For the author of On Ancient Medicine (for which see shortly below), Empedocles 
was the chief representative of a medical practice guided by hypothesis, by cosmology developed 
independently of the medical art’s independently established methodology. See [Hipp.] VM 20. 
5 D. L. VIII.83. 
6 e.g. Simp. Phys. 24.13 (DK 12B1). 
7 Aët. V.30.1 (DK 4B4). 
8 D. L. VIII.83. This claim reflects similar pronouncements attributed to Xenophanes of Colophon. See e.g. 
S. E. M VII.49.  
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     But such caution is not common to all philosopher-physicians. Diogenes of 
Apollonia, philosopher of the late fifth century BC,9 posited air as the first principle 
of reality,10 and constructed a theory of health and disease based upon the 
primacy of his ἀρχή.11 Democritus of Abdera, also of the late fifth century BC, 
whose body of work included treatises on prognostication, dietetics and medical 
regimen,12 analysed bodily processes into the activity of atoms in void.13 
Questions of human physiology and the aetiology of disease fell within the 
purview of those who sought to resolve the totality of things into prima materia. 
What is more, the vitalist strain detectable in some Presocratic cosmologies14 – 
and revived in natural science by Diogenes of Apollonia15 –  prepares the ground 
for more sophisticated parallels between the microcosm and the macrocosm, the 
world enclosed by the flesh and world enclosing the flesh, which would come to 
fruition in the medical literature of the fifth century BC. 
     One may characterise the Hippocratic Corpus by the tension it exhibits 
between medicine’s subordination to natural philosophy and the doctor’s self-
conception as practitioner of an independent τέχνη. The Hippocratic authors, 
though united by their contributions to a distinctly medical body of literature, 
represent various perspectives on the value of philosophical speculation and a 
priori deduction to the realisation of the physician’s aims.16 Two texts are of 
particular relevance to this discussion. On the Nature of Man (Nat. Hom.) 
distinguishes in its opening sentences between those who, in expounding the 
nature of man, explore beyond its relation to medicine – clambering down to the 
most primitive rung of the epistemic ladder –, and those who confine their 
exposition to the territory pertinent to medical inquiry.17 The boundary of the 
medical art is set at the ‘obvious’ (φανερόν);18 man, insofar as he is characterized 
 
9 And something of an anachronism in the post-Parmenidean world, a throwback to Milesian monism. 
10 Simp. Phys. 152.18 (DK 64B4). 
11 Theoph. Sens. 43. (DK 64A19). 
12 D. L. IX.48. 
13 Arist. Resp. 471b30ff; Theoph. Sens. 60 (DK 68A135). 
14 Most clearly in that of Anaximenes of Miletus, who draws a direct parallel between the air with which 
our bodies are ensouled and the breath which permeates the world, identified with the ἀρχή (Aët. I.3.4.1-
8 = DK 13B2). We might also consider Heraclitus’ description of the world as ‘ever-living fire’ (Clem. Misc. 
V.104.2 = DK 22 B30). See Lloyd (1966) p.236-237. 
15 Simp. Phys. 152.18 (DK 64B4). 
16 Among the more philosophically inclined Hippocratic texts, On Breaths identifies air as the singular 
cause of both life and disease. Airs, Waters and Places conceives astronomy and meteorology as branches 
of medical inquiry. Contrast with On Ancient Medicine, introduced below. 
17 [Hipp.] Nat. Hom. 1. 
18 Ibid.  
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by his experience of health and disease, is analysed into four perceptible 
humours – blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile.19 And yet the theory of health 
Nat. Hom. expounds is conspicuously indebted to natural philosophy; man 
‘enjoys the most perfect health when these elements are duly proportioned to one 
another…and when they are perfectly mingled. Pain is felt when one of these 
elements is in defect or excess or is isolated in the body without being 
compounded with all the others.’20 The echo of medicalized Milesian cosmology 
and Empedoclean four-element theory can be felt. Moreover, Nat. Hom. locates 
the human body in a dialogue with the seasons; each humour is predominant in 
the season most sympathetic to its nature, thus, black bile – the  cold, dry humour 
– is abundant in the autumn; winter, bringing moisture, brings about a 
preponderance of phlegm.21 A taxonomy of diseases can be mapped onto the 
seasons as the worlds within and without permutate harmoniously.22 Nat. Hom. 
expounds a physiology based on a scheme of correspondences with wider 
cosmological implications. What makes Nat. Hom. distinct from a philosophical 
work is that it arrives at natural science through its analysis of the body, an 
analysis that is deliberately constrained to the body’s manifest constituents – the 
territory pertinent to medical inquiry. 
     On Ancient Medicine (VM), the second well-known Hippocratic text of 
particular importance to this inquiry, represents a crucial chapter in the history of 
medicine’s relationship with philosophy. The author of VM is hostile to all 
endeavors to systematize medicine, to subsume the practice of medicine into a 
unifying physical theory. He rejects the premise that medicine is an outgrowth of 
natural philosophy; it is rather, as the title of his work suggests, a venerable art 
with an independent, well-reasoned methodology.23 As in Nat. Hom., the starting 
point of medical inquiry is set at the readily apparent, in this case with a focus on 
what the human introduces into his/her body – what foods he/she ingests, what 
liquids he/she imbibes.24 The author grounds the history of medicine in regimen 
and dietetics,25 and argues that, in matters of therapeutics, only a τέχνη founded 
 
19 [Hipp.] Nat. Hom. 4. 
20 Ibid. trans. Jones (1931). 
21 Ibid. 7. Phlegm being the unity of coldness and wetness.  
22 Ibid. 8. 
23 [Hipp.] VM 1.1, 12. Similar ideas are expressed in the Hippocratic texts Loc. Hom. 46, 84.17-24 and De 
Arte e.g.  4.227.12-15. De Arte is devoted entirely to defending medicine’s status as an independent τέχνη. 
24 [Hipp.] VM 20.3. 
25 [Hipp] VM 3-8, 22. 
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on observation and experience can account for the variety of human 
dispositions;26 to develop a singular hypothesis from a primitive substratum is to 
neglect the layers of complexity which compound as one ascends the ontological 
gradient.27 Most striking – and most pertinent for our purposes – is the author’s 
claim that ‘it is impossible to have any clear knowledge about nature from any 
other source than medicine.’28 Where his opponents conceive medicine as 
subordinate to natural philosophy, as a τέχνη that reveals itself through an 
Empedoclean-style analysis of human φύσις, the author of VM argues the 
opposite; it is only through the medical τέχνη – the experience-guided 
systemization of what the body is (or can be) in relation to the integrants of diet 
and regimen – that a map of ‘what the human being is and by what causes it 
comes to be’ can be plotted with precision.29 The doctor’s epistemological ambit 
– long-established, experience-rooted, therapeutically guided – is conceived, 
when grasped in its entirety, as the gateway into more penetrating physical 
analysis; 30 philosophy itself, with its roots in cosmological hypotheses, is 
portrayed as ineradicably misguided. 
     But if the author of VM intended his work to insulate medicine from 
philosophical encroachment, his failure is conspicuous.31 In the fourth century 
BC, the physician Philistion of Locri developed a theory of disease from 
Empedoclean element theory;32 he assigned to each element a ‘power’ (to fire 
‘the hot’, to air ‘the cold’, to water ‘the moist’, to earth ‘the dry’) and identified 
disease with their imbalance.33 Plato, contemporary of Philistion and intellectual 
descendent of Empedocles, elaborates a similar elemental theory of disease in 
his Timaeus.34 But he goes further. A second category of disease is identified 
 
26 Ibid. 20. 
27 {Hipp.] VM 20-21. 
28 Ibid. 20.2 trans. Schiefsky (2005). 
29 Ibid. trans. Schiefsky (2005). See Ibid. p.30-31. 
30 [Hipp.] VM 20.2. 
31 When the Roman encyclopaedist Cornelius Celsus credited Hippocrates of Cos with the separation of 
medicine from ‘the study of wisdom’ (Cel. Med. pr. 8), it is possible that he was afflicted by a distorted 
perception of VM’s success. 
32 Anon. Lond. xx 25-50 = Longrigg VI.16. 
33 Ibid. Philistion, on the subject of disease, identified three species of cause: 1) those pertaining to the 
elements; 2) those pertaining to the condition of the body; 3) external causes. It seems, however, that the 
proximate cause of disease in most cases was an elemental imbalance. We learn from the Anonymous 
Londinensis that type 2 causes result from impeded breath which, on Philistion’s analysis, is undertaken 
by the whole body. Gal. ut. resp. 1 informs us that Philistion believed the function of breath was to cool 
the body’s innate heat, suggesting that type 2 causes result in heat’s excess.  
34 Plat. Tim. 81E-82A. 
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with decomposition,35 the ontological regression of the flesh to prior states which, 
in the theological context of the Timaeus, aligns disease with ‘decreation’, the 
breakdown of intelligent design.36 Where Plato blends medical ideas into his 
cosmology, his pupil, Aristotle, though he endorses the continuum between 
medicine and philosophy,37 was instrumental in formalising the methodological 
disparity between the two methods of inquiry.38 That Aristotle had medical 
interests is uncontroversial. He wrote on the subjects of digestion,39 nutrition,40 
and seminal production,41 and conceived his dissections of animals as a gateway 
to the secrets of human anatomy.42 Diogenes Laertius lists among Aristotle’s 
bibliography two books on medicine, the Ἰατρικά,43 Caelius Aurelianus quotes 
from an Aristotelian medical worked entitled De adiutoriis (‘On Remedies’, 
probably Περὶ Βοηθημάτων in Greek), and Aristotle was, of course, the son of 
Nicomachus, court physician to king Amyntas of Macedon.44 But Aristotle’s 
medical contributions must be understood in the context of the taxonomy of 
sciences he delineates in the Nicomachean Ethics (NE).45 Here, and elsewhere,46 
Aristotle distinguishes between theoretical and practical/productive sciences; the 
former is the science of discovery, of incorporating reality into mind;47 the latter is 
the science of begetting change, either by promoting certain patterns of behaviour 
(via φρόνησις) or purposefully generating products or states (via τέχνη).48  
Aristotle is acutely aware that different sciences, designed around the demands 
of their τέλη, require different levels of theoretical engagement from their 
 
35 Ibid.  82B-E.  
36 At Plat. Tim. 81B-E, the processes of growth and decay are explained in terms of Plato’s primary 
triangles. We are invited to read Plato’s second formulation of disease as a peculiar stain on the Creator’s 
painstaking, purpose-driven, mathematical design. No explanation is given as to what causes the second 
category of disease. Evidently, Plato’s attention is elsewhere. In the context of the dialogue, Tim. 82B-E 
reinforces the meticulousness with which the world has been constructed by leading the reader’s mind 
back down the ladder of creation. 
37 Most clearly evident at Resp. 480b22-31. 
38 Aristotle’s relevance to this thesis is too integral to be condensed into this introductory segment. A 
fuller exposition of his influence on Hellenistic doctors is found at III.3. 
39 e.g. Arist. De part. an. 650aff.  
40 e.g. Arist. De gen. an. 743a4ff. 
41 e. g. Ibid. 726b1-12, 735b32ff, 736a13ff. 
42 e. g. Arist. HA. 494b. 
43 D. L. V.25. 
44 Ibid. V.1. 
45 See esp. NE VI. I return to this chapter in more detail at III.3.1. 
46 e. g. Arist. Met. VI.1025b. 
47 Arist. NE. VI.3. 
48 Ibid. VI.4-6. See III.3.1. 
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practitioners.49 One must, of course, be apt to demonstrate how one’s practical 
administrations can be reconciled with theory, but exploring beyond the 
epistemological parameters determined by one’s τέλος is, definitionally, a 
fruitless act.50 Aristotle is crucial to this discussion for two reasons. Firstly, the 
hierarchy of sciences set out in NE can be read as the template for the ethics-
driven, eudaimonic structure that unites the philosophical schools of the 
Hellenistic period. The pursuit of εὐδαιμονία – the τέλος to which sciences are 
steppingstones – informs the philosopher’s self-perception as a doctor of the soul. 
It may also, I will argue, in particular cases,51 orient the philosopher’s attention 
away from the pathologies of the body. Secondly, as I hope to demonstrate, the 
doctors of the late Hellenistic period were in dialogue with the same hierarchy of 
sciences. The modifications to Hellenistic doctrine we will see effected by the 
Rationalists in this thesis are most intelligible when regarded as a response, of 
some kind, to medicine’s position in Aristotle’s hierarchy of sciences.  
0.3. Structure of thesis 
I begin with Stoic and Epicurean philosophy, their medical peculiarities and criss-
crossing curricula, then, with the pieces in place, pivot to their medical utilisations. 
How these philosophies are employed by the medical art informs the structure of 
the early chapters. Chapter I is an exploration of human psychophysiology in 
Stoic cosmology. Two details are brought to the forefront: 1) the 
psychophysiological structure of the Stoic cosmos; 2) the importance of 
macrocosm-microcosm parity – engendered by point (1) – to Stoicism’s ethical 
τέλος. I lay the foundations for the question which is taken up in chapter III, given 
the centrality of human psychophysiology to the Stoic project, coupled with its 
therapeutic τέλος, why did Stoicism only have a life within the medical sphere in 
a limited and rebranded form? In chapter II we turn our attention to Epicurean 
philosophy. Once again, the focus is twofold. My thesis is that Epicureanism’s 
medical appeal was located in its epistemology. This alure existed not because 
of, but rather in spite of, Epicureanism’s therapeutic affectation. Thus, I will 
emphasise the – at least, partial – inextricability of Epicurean epistemology and 
 
49 Most clearly illustrated by the analogy between the carpenter and the geometer at NE I.7 (See III.3.2). 
See Arist. Sens. 436a17-b2 for the methodological disparities between theoreticians and doctors in 
particular.  
50 e. g. Arist. NE I.7. 
51 See II.5. 
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physics, and suggest that Epicureanism’s relationship to medicine is more 
complex and problematic than is perhaps immediately apparent. We will note the 
capacity of τέλη to generate conflict between disciplines – in this case, when the 
practical realities of medicine per se conflict with the philosopher’s analogic salve. 
     Chapters III and IV address the medical adoption/adaptation of Stoicism and 
Epicurean philosophy respectively. In chapter III, we examine the relationship 
between Stoicism and Pneumatism, the medical sect founded by Athenaeus of 
Attalia in the first century BC, whom Galen names as a student of Posidonius of 
Apamea, the most prominent Stoic philosopher of the period.52 We answer the 
question posed in chapter I, explore the mechanisms by which Athenaeus defined 
his discipline against the philosophy to which he was intellectually indebted, and 
analyse the boundary between Stoicism and Pneumatism in the appropriate 
Hellenistic, and post-Aristotelian context. We will also examine the parallels 
between physiological pathology in Athenaeus’ theory, and psychological 
pathology in the extant fragments of Chrysippus’ ethical-therapeutic treatise On 
Affections. I will argue that, to the extent that Stoicism’s transposition into 
medicine was frictionless – as it surely was when compared to the mutations 
undertaken by its rival –, it can be explained by the philosophy’s unified 
curriculum.  
     In chapter IV, we examine the relationship between Epicureanism and the 
medical theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia, Greek medicine’s first celebrated 
exponent in Rome, dated to the late second, or early first centuries BC.53 
Asclepiades is a complex figure; his debt to Epicureanism remains the subject of 
dispute.54 Because of the complexities involved in disentangling Asclepiades’ 
philosophical heritage, I have elected to address this question after the boundary 
between Stoicism and Pneumatism has been expounded and some of the 
contextual foundation has been laid, eschewing a chronological structure. I will 
argue in chapter IV that Asclepiades did develop his medical theory from 
Epicureanism, and that the modifications he introduces to Epicurean physics 
should be read, in part, as motivated claims to intellectual independence, both for 
himself and for his discipline. I treat Asclepiades’ modifications to Epicureanism 
 
52 Gal. CC 2. 
53 For the controversy surrounding Asclepiades’ dates, see II.1, n.3. 
54 For an overview of the scholarly debate concerning Asclepiades’ Epicurean heritage, see IV.I.2. A brief 
introduction to this debate is given at 0.4 below. 
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individually – for each is independently revealing –, and argue that his most 
famous innovation, his rejection of a localised ἡγεμονικόν, stems not from his 
philosophical pretensions, but from his desire to reconcile the rudiments of 
Epicurean psychology with contemporary discoveries in neurophysiology. By 
attending to the features of Epicurean physics which Asclepiades sought to 
preserve, we learn the source of Epicureanism’s medical appeal, which 
determines the pattern of permeability ingrained into the boundary Asclepiades 
sought to enforce between his medical theory and the physics that inspired it. I 
will argue across chapters III and IV that the radical nature of Asclepiades’ 
modifications to Epicureanism, contrasted with the adjustments Athenaeus 
makes to Stoicism, is determined by the properties of the adapted philosophy. 
     In chapter V we turn our attention to the Pyrrhonian Empiricists. What does 
the cross-disciplinary alliance of the anti-doctrinaire have to tell us about the 
conjunction/disjunction of medical and philosophical inquiry in the waning 
centuries of the period under study? We explore the disparate – and to a degree, 
oppositional – origins of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism. We examine how these 
disparities manifest and are accounted for in the work of Sextus Empiricus and 
inquire as to why, given these disparities, the alliance was preserved. I pose the 
question: what accounts for the novelty of Pyrrhonian Empiricism, when 
contrasted with the fate of Pyrrhonism’s doctrinaire rivals as their tenets were 
filtered into medicine? The question contains part of the answer; Pyrrhonism 
expounds no doctrines for doctors to appropriate. But why the marriage to 
Empiricism? The answer, I will suggest, may lie in the current of influence from 
the medical sect to the philosophy with which it would – for some exponents – 
grow partially aligned. Empiricism, through its replacement of λόγος with a 
plentiful species of ἐμπειρία, a means of pursuing health without breaching the 
surface of phenomena, provided Aenesidemus on Cnossus, the founder of first 
century Pyrrhonism, with a mode or argumentation which could be reformulated 
non-dogmatically. In the context of my thesis as a whole, my contention is that 
the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance further clarifies the boundary between τέχνη 






0.4. Preliminary overview of the scholarly landscape   
While the study of ancient medicine has seen its popularity flourish in recent 
decades, and while the intersection of medicine and philosophy has been a 
feature of the subject for as long as it has generated interest, both the impact of 
Hellenistic philosophy on the medical tradition and the emergence of medicine as 
a distinct discipline in the late Hellenistic and early Roman periods have received 
comparatively little scholarly attention. Whereas scholars such as Philip van der 
Eijk have drawn attention to the ‘substantial overlap’ that existed between 
medicine and philosophy, and have (rightly) cautioned against restrictive labelling 
in both domains,55 less attention is afforded to how ancient physicians sought to 
define themselves, how they navigated this substantial overlap without seeing 
their professional identities dissolve into the wider, epistemic architecture of 
philosophical inquiry. This is an inquiry into the mechanisms of professional self-
classification. For the physicians of our period, this involved the enforcement of 
epistemic boundaries against philosophical incursion. These boundaries are the 
focus of this thesis.  
     Overviews of the scholarship which accompanies each of our case studies – 
Athenaeus and Stoicism, Asclepiades and Epicureanism, Sextus Empiricus and 
Empiricism/Pyrrhonism – are provided at the outset of the appropriate chapters.56 
In the case of Athenaeus, the brevity of this section is reflective of the doctor’s 
limited scholarly treatment, which is itself a reflection of the paucity of evidence 
surrounding Athenaeus and his school. Though there are signs of a revitalized 
interest in both Athenaeus’ medical theory and its Stoic pedigree – particularly 
Coughlin (2018), ‘Athenaeus of Attalia on the Psychological Causes of Bodily 
Health’ and recent as-yet-unpublished work by David Leith57 – interest in 
Athenaeus has hitherto focused primarily on the status of his taxonomy of causes, 
recorded in Galen’s De causis continentibus 2, as a source for, or elaboration of, 
the Stoic analysis of causation.58 Though I devote a lengthy section (III.4) to the 
intersection of Stoic and Athenaean causal theory, it is, in the context of my 
 
55 van der Eijk (2005) p.10.  
56 III.1, IV.1, V.1 respectively. 
57 Leith’s analysis of Athenaeus’ medical theory was foundational to my own exploration of this topic at 
III.2, wherein his contribution to this subject is set out. Coughlin’s work, as I set out in III.5.3.2, helped 
clarify the elaborate trisection of Chrysippean, Posidonean, and Athenaean notions of psychological 
pathology.  
58 esp. Frede (1980) and Hankinson (1987b). 
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research, a single aspect of a broader inquiry into the disjunction of Stoicism and 
Pneumatism, the epistemological dimensions of the latter within the 
encompassing structure of the former. 
     Asclepiades is a very different case. The relative breadth and complexity of 
Asclepiadean testimonia has, in recent decades, inspired a more rigorous 
scholarly tradition. Since the publication of J. T. Vallance’s The Lost Theory of 
Asclepiades of Bithynia (1990), the first text to give Asclepiades’ theory the 
independent attention it deserves, scholarly interest in Asclepiades has focused 
acutely on the physician’s relationship to Epicureanism, with Vallance himself 
arguing for the discontinuity of Epicurean and Asclepiadean physics, and others 
such as Casadei (1997) and most recently Leith (2009, 2012) arguing contra, that 
despite the significant differences between the two systems, Asclepiades’ 
medical theory – where health and disease are resolved into the activity of 
ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι, ‘seamless masses’, apparently in void – owed a considerable debt 
to Epicurean atomism. David Leith’s forthcoming book59 should go some way 
towards progressing Asclepiadean scholarship beyond the question of the 
doctor’s Epicurean heritage, and my own adventures in this territory are reflective 
of this spirit. I am less interested in the question of whether Asclepiades was 
influenced by Epicureanism – I believe, as I set out at IV.2.3 below, that the 
similarities between the two systems are too apparent to ignore –; I am interested 
in the question of why, given this influence, Asclepiades modifies Epicurean 
doctrine to the extent that he does. Chapter IV represents my contribution to this 
developing conversation. 
     The conjunction of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism has received more considered 
attention in recent decades. Roberto Polito’s 2007 article,60 ‘Was Skepticism a 
Philosophy? Reception, Self-Definition, Internal Conflicts’ is, in part, an address 
to the question of why the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance was advantageous to the 
Pyrrhonian school. James Allen’s 2010 article, ‘Pyrrhonism & Medicine’, 
examines the relationship between Pyrrhonian scepticism and both the Empiricist 
and Methodic schools of medicine, inspired by Sextus Empiricus’ somewhat 
anomalous endorsement of the latter school in a controversial passage of his 
 
59 Unpublished at the time of the completion of my thesis. 
60 Recorded as (2007b) in the bibliography and footnotes henceforth. 
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Outline of Pyrrhonism.61  Allen’s earlier work on sign-inference, the landmark 
Inference from Signs: Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence (2001), is 
indispensable to my analysis of Sextus’ work, illuminating, as it does, the internal 
contradictions which arise from the disunity of his identities – his professional 
persona, ‘Sextus the Physician/Sextus the Empiricist’, and the persona under 
which he writes the Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Mathematicians, 
‘Sextus the Philosopher/Sextus the Pyrrhonist’. In chapter V, I further explore the 
boundary between these identities, with Allen’s (2001) text as my initial guide.  
0.5. A note on Galen 
Antiquity’s most prolific medical writer – if not its single most prolific contributor – 
has an ancillary role in this thesis. Though Galen has much to impart on the 
relationship between medicine and philosophy, to incorporate his disquisitions on 
this subject into my thesis would be to expand its parameters beyond the optimal 
dimensions of inquiry. Galen’s principal philosophical influences – his Aristotelian 
element theory, his Platonic psychology62 – will be touched upon in this thesis; 
understanding Galen’s philosophical inclinations is integral to the process of 
navigating around the distortive proclivities that complicate his value as a source 
for oppositional theories. But they are supplementary to my purpose. I constrain 
my analysis to the medical adoption/adaptation/accommodation of the 
philosophical schools that emerged during the Hellenistic period of antiquity – the 
Stoics, the Epicureans and the Pyrrhonian sceptics. To the extent that Galen was 
engaged with these schools, the tenor of that engagement was (for the most part) 
oppositional. The limits I impose on the scope of my inquiry, motivated, as set out 
in 0.1, by the therapeutic dimension that unites the schools in question, have the 
secondary advantage of narrowing my focus to doctors who – at least, until very 
recently – have received comparatively little scholarly attention. Galen, owing to 
the fertility of his bibliography, is perhaps too frequently regarded as 
representative of post-Hippocratic, Graeco-Roman medicine as a whole, at the 
expense of his contemporaries and physicians of generations prior. I use Galen 
in my research for his value as a commentator on the medical schools and 
practitioners on whom my focus falls. 
 
61 S. E. PH I.236-241. 
62 For Galen and Aristotle see III.2.1.2. For Galen and Plato see III.5. 
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0.6 Summary  
In the following thesis, I examine the juxtaposition, in antiquity, of philosophy-as-
therapy and the medical τέχνη per se, of administrations to the soul, conveyed by 
language, and administration to the body, imparted through practical 
therapeutics. Exploring this juxtaposition confines my thesis to under-researched 
territory along two vectors. The first: in the case of Athenaeus and Asclepiades, 
the relevant physicians and their schools have garnered comparatively little 
scholarly attention. The second: to the extent that these physicians have been 
explored, the mechanisms by which they defined themselves against what I shall 
henceforth refer to as their ‘mother-doctrines’ – the philosophies to which they 
owed a conspicuous intellectual debt – and their motivations for employing those 
mechanisms, have received limited attention. As for the Pyrrhonian Empiricists, I 
hope to bring the complexities of the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist relationship into 
sharper relief, to demonstrate not only the extent to which the medical and 
philosophical schools became entwined, but how the coherence of this 
intellectual alliance depended on the enforcement of rigid disciplinary distinctions 
















On the moral value of organic cosmology 
* 
I.0 The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the ontological character of the 
human body/soul duality in early Stoic philosophy. My intentions are as follows; 
1) to present the physical ideas whose medical application I explore in chapter III 
in their original, philosophical context; 2) to foreground the centrality of human 
psychophysiology to all three branches of Stoic philosophy – ethics, physics, logic 
– in order to appropriately frame our inquiry into why Stoic doctrine, in its medical 
application, is disconnected from its heritage. I lay the foundations for the 
following question. Given how the nature of the body/soul duality is integral to the 
structure and behaviour of the Stoic cosmos as a whole – a behaviour that 
imparted to the Stoic sage his τέλος1 – why did Stoicism only have a life within 
the medical sphere in a limited and rebranded form? Why are there no Stoic 
doctors, who might constrain their epistemological ambit according to medical 
necessity in a technical/professional context, but otherwise embrace the 
philosophy that underpins their theory?  
     In light of their absence, I will examine what it means to incorporate human 
psychophysiology into every component of a philosophy, and how the 
explanatory potential of the body to philosophy engenders a holistic 
understanding of the body/soul duality apropos of its environment which, though 
it may furnish the doctor with the underlying structure of a theory of health, may 
also, on contact with the practical realities of medicine, require reconfiguration. 
Stoicism sets its sights on boundary disintegration. The closer one comes to 
achieving virtue (ἀρετή, identified with εὐδαιμονία), the more one is dissolved into 
a greater organism. While Stoic physics, as we will see, is fertile enough to 
 
1 Plut. St. Rep. 1035 C-D (LS 60 A), quoting Chrysippus’ Physical postulates: ‘There is no other or more 
appropriate way of approaching the theory of good and bad things or the virtues or happiness than from 
universal nature and from the administration of the world…for the theory of good and bad things must 
be attached to these, since there is no other starting point or reference for them that is better, and 
physical speculation is to be adopted for no other purpose than for the differentiation of good and bad 
things.’ For an overview of Stoic ethics, including its Aristotelian influence as expressed in its teleological 
structure, see Inwood & Donini (1999) p.675-73 esp.684-687. A more focused account of teleology in 




accommodate the medical τέχνη – that is, sufficiently abundant to allow internal, 
technical epistemologies to take root – Stoicism per se is fixated on ‘the whole’, 
the entity whose perfection accounts for its status as the moral paradigm. In 
anticipation of chapter III, we must consider how, in light of this distinction 
between ethics-oriented ‘cosmobiology’ – the attribution of human characteristics 
to the cosmos in order to facilitate an instructive relationship between nature and 
its myriad reflections – and the doctor’s more immediate τέλος, it might profit the 
physician to distance his profession from the philosophy to which he is indebted, 
even if, in this case, he finds little in the physics of the mother-doctrine to be 
directly in contention with his craft. 
     Concerning the structure of this chapter, in contextualising the body/soul 
duality in Stoicism it is necessary to begin by examining the qualitative nature of 
the totality – with all its psychophysiological peculiarities – before narrowing our 
focus to the individual human body, and individual human soul, within the context 
of the whole. I.3-5 comprise an analysis of physiology in Stoic physics. I.3 deals 
with the principles, I.4 the whole, and I.5 the ontological character of the human 
body/soul duality. In service to my argument that, for the Stoics, exploring human 
physiology was a means to a cosmological, theological, and ultimately ethical 
end, it is important to consider how, and to what extent successfully, the Stoics 
contrived to demarcate the discrete human aggregate within a cosmos that was 
physically analogous to, and could therefore theoretically be summarised by, the 
human microcosm. I.1 is an introduction to Athenaeus of Attalia, physician and 
founder of the Pneumatist school whose theory was derived from Stoic physics. 
I.2 is an overview of our evidence concerning early Stoicism. Concerning the 
omission, in this chapter, of details which the reader will think pertinent to this 
thesis, though aspects of the Stoic causal theory will be touched on in this 
chapter, a more detailed exposition of causality in Stoicism is withheld until 
chapter III.4 where we will examine it in tandem with its medical elaboration. Our 
analysis of medical analogy in Chrysippus’ On Affections is withheld until III.5. 
I.1 Athenaeus of Attalia 
The following exposition is constrained by the nature of Stoicism’s adaptation into 
medicine. Stoic doctrine finds its way into the medical sphere via the theory of 
Athenaeus of Attalia, founder of Pneumatist sect. Though an in-depth analysis of 
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the boundary between Stoicism and Pneumatism awaits us in III, a brief 
introduction to the doctor and his school will clarify the tenor of this chapter. 
     A Greek physician standardly believed to have established his school in the 
latter half of the first century BC,2 Athenaeus’ influence is inadequately reflected 
in the attention he has received in modern scholarship; greater academic interest 
has been dissuaded by the relative paucity of testimonia for Athenaeus and his 
school.3 We know nothing of Athenaeus’ life save for his birthplace in Attalia, a 
town in the ancient region of Cilicia in southern Asia Minor, and that he was, 
according to Galen, a pupil of Posidonius of Apamea, the most prominent Stoic 
philosopher of the period.4 The connection between Athenaeus and the Stoics is 
explicitly attested by Galen in De causis continentibus (CC), wherein Galen 
asserts that Athenaeus’ preference for discussing diseases in terms of their 
‘sustaining’ or ‘cohesive’ causes (αἴτια συνεκτικά, see esp. III.4.2), resulted from 
his having based his theory of disease on Stoic doctrine and studied with its most 
significant contemporary exponent.5 
     As a Rationalist who developed his medical theory from Stoic precedents, 
physical theory was integral to the exposition of medicine as he conceived it; the 
importance of physics to his conception of his art is attested in a passage from 
the pseudo-Galenic Introductio sive medicus (Int.). In this text, Athenaeus is 
reported to have claimed that the starting point of the exposition of medicine – of 
instruction as to its practices and their appropriate justification – is physical theory 
(ἡ φυσικὴ θεωρία).6 The theory undergirding Athenaeus’ medical exposition was 
 
2 This estimation is based on Galen’s account in CC. 2.  Kudlien (1962) argues for the dating of Athenaeus 
derived from this account. Flemming (2012) p.75-76 provides a more recent defence of the dates derived 
from CC 2. An alternative dating, now largely discredited, placing the establishment of the Pneumatist 
school in the early years of the Roman Principate, is argued for in Smith (1979) p.230-233 (particularly 
p.230, n.72), derived from Wellmann (1895). 
3 See III.1.1 for an overview of the evidence for Athenaeus and Pneumatism. 
4 Gal. CC 2. Galen’s testimony, which we should note is preserved only in later Arabic and Latin 
translations, does not explicitly specify that the Posidonius of whom Athenaeus was a ‘pupil and a disciple’ 
is the Posidonius of Apamea, but the context in which he is mentioned makes this conclusion a natural 
one. Athenaeus was conversatus with Posidonius in Niccolò de Reggio’s Latin translation of the Arabic 
[CMG Suppl. Or. II. 134.3-6], indicating that he had a direct, personal relationship with the Stoic 
philosopher. As Flemming (2012) p.75 points out, the proximity of Attalia to Rhodes, where Posidonius 
was established from the beginning of the first century BC, lends plausibility to the claim that Athenaeus 
studied with him personally for a period of time in the early part of the first century BC, rather than him 
having been acquainted with Posidonius’ teachings through his works as suggested in Smith (1979) p.230-
233 and later Nutton (2013) p.207-208. 
5 Gal. CC 2 
6 ps.-Gal. Int. 2.1. (= XIV.676-678 K.). The author proceeds to outline the justification advanced generically 
by the Rationalists for grounding their medical theory in natural philosophy: only by understanding what 
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a blend of Stoic physics and the traditions of Rationalist medicine; he developed 
a theory of health and disease that combined the Stoic doctrines of four element 
theory (I.3.5), sustaining causes (III.4.1), through-and-through coextension (I.3.7) 
and pneumatic tension (I.5.1) with what was, by the first century BC, the well-
worn assumption that physical health resulted from the salutary equilibrium of 
internal bodily elements or qualities which were sensitive to environmental 
changes and could be rebalanced with a doctor’s guiding hand.7 
      For the purposes of medical inquiry, Athenaeus proposed that the body be 
analysed into hot, cold, wet and dry qualities. These, to quote the definition 
attributed to him in the pseudo Galenic Definitiones Medicae (Def. Med.), are ‘the 
first, apparent, simplest and least things from which a human being has been put 
together, and the last, apparent, simplest and least into which [the human body] 
has its resolution’.8 In addition, he was an exponent of the Stoic theory of πνεῦμα 
(I.3.8-9, I.5) as the creative-cohesive substance (I.3.5,8), characterised by its 
tension (ἕξις, I.5.1), which penetrates the cosmos in its entirety and ‘by which 
everything is held together and regulated’.9 πνεῦμα is the mediator of health and 
disease in Athenaeus’ theory; it pervades the human body through-and-through 
(I.3.7) and acts upon each of its parts directly.10 The physical states which emerge 
from its agency are susceptible to the influence of qualitative alterations in both 
the external environment, such as changes in temperature, and within the 
composition of the body, such as those brought about by drugs or venom.11 Any 
 
is in accordance with nature can a doctor understand what is contrary to it. A reliable physical doctrine is 
required against which any deviations from a desired norm can be recognised and, in accordance with 
which, measures can be taken to re-establish equilibrium. It is unclear whether the author is drawing 
specifically on Athenaeus in his summary of the Rationalist position, but the structure of the passage 
leaves this possibility open. The importance of physical theory to Athenaeus’ approach to medicine is 
nevertheless unambiguously attested; he was a doctor who understood medicine to be a process which 
one developed from the germ of natural law.  
7 This model, as we shall see at III.5 below, is also prefigured in Chrysippus’ conception of psychological 
health. Indeed, as we shall see, the ‘well-worn assumptions of Rationalist medicine’ are already present 
in Stoicism’s therapeutic orientation. They are applied, however, to psychological, rather than 
physiological pathologies. I will argue in III.5 that the analogy Chrysippus draws between philosophy and 
medicine is dependent on the structural parallelism of physical and bodily health in Stoic physics, a 
consequence of the Stoic conception of harmony, self-similarity and mutual coextension. 
8 ps.-Gal. Def. Med. 31 (= XIX.356 K.): ‘τίνα ἐστὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα; στοιχεῖά ἐστι τῆς ἰατρικῆς, ὡς τινὲς 
τῶν ἀρχαίων ὑπέλαβον, τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων φαινομένων 
καὶ ἁπλουστάτων καὶ ἐλαχίστων ὁ ἄνθρωπος συνέστηκε καὶ εἰς <ἃ> ἔσχατα φαινόμενα καὶ ἁπλούστατα 
καὶ ἐλάχιστα τὴν ἀνάλυσιν λαμβάνει.’ 
9 ps.-Gal. Int. 9.5 (= XIV.698 K.): ‘…ὑφ’ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ συνέχεσθαι καὶ διοικεῖσθαι.’ 
10 Gal. CC 2; ps.-Gal. Int. 9.6. (= XIV.699 K.). 
11 Gal. CC 2. 
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of the four qualities – the hot, the cold, the wet and the dry – could have an 
ultimately deleterious effect upon the body’s health if their excess or deficit, 
induced by changes originating within or without the human body, upsets the 
body’s natural, salutary, qualitative equilibrium.12 Such an imbalance impairs the 
quality of the body’s πνεῦμα which, owing to its presence in every part of the 
body, manifests as disease.13 Disease is therefore the ultimate condition in a 
sequence of (sometimes overlapping) events whose causal relationship required 
systematic classification. Athenaeus posited a three-part system for classifying 
causes in medicine which, as we shall see (III.4), owes a substantial intellectual 
debt to the Stoic analysis of causality.14 These are the cohesive/sustaining cause 
(αἴτιον συνεκτικόν), the antecedent cause (αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν), and the 
‘preceding’ cause (αἴτιον προηγούμενον).15 As this is the area where Athenaeus 
is, I will argue, most innovative, and also the area where we are most reliant upon 
Athenaean testimonia in our reconstruction of the original Stoic doctrine, the 
taxonomy of causes in Athenaeus’ theory of disease and its Stoic precedent are 
dealt with separately in chapter III. 
     What I wish to foreground at the outset of this chapter is the anti-cosmological 
nature of Athenaeus’ element theory. Where the Stoics analysed the cosmos into 
the traditional elemental substances: fire, air, earth and water, Athenaeus 
concerned himself only with the elemental qualities: the hot, the cold, the wet and 
the dry.16 I will argue at III.2 that Athenaeus did not propose an alternative 
element theory to rival that of Stoic physics, but instead constrained his 
epistemological ambit to that which was germane to medical inquiry. His 
insistence that the body be discussed in terms of qualities, not substances, 
indicates that he was moved to enforce the boundary of his discipline, to insulate 
himself, his school and his τέχνη from the philosophy to which he owed a debt. It 
is in considering the motivation behind Athenaeus’ enforcement of medicine’s 
epistemological perimeter that it becomes necessary to understand not only the 
physiological character of Stoic cosmology – which may, in the first instance, 
have contributed to its medical appeal – but the philosophical – and more 
 
12 Gal. CC 2.  
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid.  
16 e.g. ps.-Gal. Int. 9.5 (= XIV.698 K.); Gal. Hipp. Elem. 6.1. 
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particularly, the ethical – character of Stoic physiology, which may underly the 
physician’s inclination to autonomise his profession, to emancipate Stoicising 
medicine from its obligations to the mother-doctrine. We must understand how 
Stoicism’s τέλος prefigures the school’s conception of the body/soul duality in 
order to understand how medicine’s τέλος prefigures Pneumatism’s retreat from 
the origins and wider context of its theory. Natural though it may have seemed to 
analogise Stoicism’s ethical project to the τέλος of the medical art (III.5),17 
philosophers are not doctors; doctors are not philosophers.18 Their divergent 
goals constrain the breadth and character of their inquiry. Where instances of 
overlap occur, in the case of doctrinaire Hellenistic philosophy, their actions are 
instrumental to the realisation of ‘correlatively affinitive’, but ultimately distinct 
τέλη. 
I.2 Background and evidence 
Founded in Athens by Zeno of Citium in the final years of the fourth century BC 
and named for the Painted Colonnade (ἡ ποικίλη στοά) on the north side of the 
agora where their doctrines first found form, the Stoic school remained one of the 
most influential schools of philosophy throughout the Hellenistic period and later 
antiquity. Although precedents for the varied aspects of its teachings are many 
and wide-ranging, the Stoic school, along with its Epicurean rival, is customarily 
identified with a paradigm shift in western philosophy accelerated by the cultural 
upheaval that characterised the Hellenistic period; the new model prioritised the 
subjectivity, status and wellbeing of the individual over the more abstract inquiry 
into the external world that had typified the practice of natural philosophy from its 
Presocratic, Milesian roots.19 The revolution begins with Socrates, but it is in the 
 
17 As in e.g. Chrysippus at Gal. PHP V.2.22-4. See esp. III.5.2. 
18 This is true, at least, of doctrinaire philosophers and rationalist doctors. As indicated in my introduction, 
and we shall see in chapter V, the relationship between Pyrrhonism and Empiricism presents us with a 
different model of the philosophical-medical intersection. But even the case of Sextus Empiricus, foremost 
among the Pyrrhonian Empiricists, internal contradictions arise from divergent τέλη (see esp. V.3.1). I will 
argue throughout V that the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance was facilitated by the disjunction of the 
Pyrrhonian Empiricist’s professional and philosophical identities. 
19 Early twentieth century scholarship made much of this transition. Bevan (1913) p.32 described Stoicism 
as ‘a system put together hastily, violently, to meet a bewildered world.’ cf. Wenley (1925) p.vi in which 
Stoicism is ‘a protest rather than a science, an outgrowth of emotional stress rather than of intellectual 
curiosity.’ While such categorisations are grossly insufficient – reflective, as they are, of a long outgrown 
historical perspective that located the pinnacle of Greek philosophy in the teachings of Plato and Aristotle 
(see Zeller (1870) p.1, who states this plainly in the first line of his (apologetically written) work Stoics, 
Epicureans, and Sceptics) – scholars of the period were nonetheless correct to identify a causal 
relationship between the transformation of the Greek world at the end of the fourth century BC and the 
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Hellenistic period that philosophy acquires its therapeutic peculiarity.20 Stoicism 
orients itself towards the question of the correct mode of human behaviour; the 
philosopher acts in pursuit of εὐδαιμονία, 21 life’s intrinsic τέλος. Chrysippus of 
Soli, the third head of the Stoa and the school’s most influential theorist, states 
expressly that the study of nature is undertaken in pursuit of an ethical ideal.22 
This is not a claim that subordinates the study of physics to the study of ethics; 
rather, it is a claim that softens the distinction between the philosophy’s 
theoretical and practical/behavioural components, between ‘what is’ and ‘what 
ought to be expressed through our behaviour’.23 The cosmobiological justification 
for this interconnectivity of philosophical pursuits is treated at I.3-5 below, but we 
should make clear from the outset that the human being – his/her physical 
composition and behaviour – pervades Stoic philosophy as the Stoic soul 
pervades the body. Biological analogy eventually finds its way into the Stoics’ 
presentation of their own philosophical curriculum; Diogenes Laertius reports that 
the Stoics compared philosophy itself to ‘an animal, logic corresponding to bones 
and sinews, ethics to the fleshier parts, and physics to the soul.’24 
 
new philosophical emphasis on subjectivity; in light of social transformation engendered in the wake of 
Alexander’s conquest, Hellenistic philosophy orients itself towards the conduct of the individual. 
20 Nussbaum (1994) p.16-24 expounds the distinction between Hellenistic, medicalised ethics and its 
Platonic precedent. 
21 A word often translated as ‘happiness’ but understood as a state of activity – i.e. happiness-as-verb 
rather than happiness-as-noun. For the Stoics, this equates to ‘living in agreement with nature’ (Stob. 
2.75, 11-76, 8 (LS 63 B)). The goal-oriented ethical template is formalised in Arist. NE I (see III.3.1). Where 
the Stoics part from Aristotle’s framework is in their identification of εὐδαιμονία with ‘living in agreement 
with nature’ thus conceptualising ethics, contra Aristotle, as an ‘exact science founded on the nature of 
the world’. Long & Sedley (1987) p.374. See also Inwood & Donini (1999) p.684-687. 
22  Plut. St. Rep. 1035 C-D (LS 60 A). Note that the quotations preserved are taken from Chrysippus’ work 
on Physical Postulates. The study of physics is justified in ethical terms in a text which takes physics as its 
subject. Rather than being parasitical on physics, ethics is in the foundations. Correspondingly, as we shall 
see in our discussion of Chrysippus’ On Affections in III.5, physics is no mere foundation for Stoic ethics; 
the two are not so easily distinguished. See further n.24. 
23 Annas (2007) p.58-87 argues against interpreting Stoic physics as foundational to Stoic ethics. Living 
according to nature, she concludes, is the same thing as living according to virtue in Stoic philosophy, 
which does not permit us to organise the various philosophical fields in terms of linear dependence. 
24 D. L. VII.40. Trans. Hicks (1925). He continues: ‘Another simile they use is that of an egg: the shell is 
logic, next comes the which, ethics, and the yolk in the centre is physics. Or, again, they liken philosophy 
to a fertile field: logic being the encircling fence, ethics the crop, physics the soil or the trees. Or, again, to 
a city strongly walled and governed by reason.’  
     The various analogies in the list imply conflicting degrees of unity between the three parts of Stoic 
philosophy, which are probably reflective of the lack of agreement within the Stoic school over its many 
centuries of existence. The allegorical animal, for example, whose bones and sinews are identified with 
the logical component, suggests a more central role for logic in Stoic philosophy than the garden or egg 
analogies in which logic plays the role of the perimeter – arguments advanced in defence of a core 
philosophy, with a degree of separation from the ideas themselves. Moreover, not all the analogies 
recorded in D. L. VII. 40 are internally coherent; ‘soil’ and ‘trees’, identified with physics in the garden 
analogy, are synonymised despite seeming to have vastly different implications for the relationship 
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     The influence of Stoicism on the greater architecture of western thought and 
culture has proven as enduring as it was and is pervasive. Yet despite its reach, 
and the eclectic nature of the extant testimonia, the picture we construct is far 
from perfect. We are reliant, for the most part, on peripheral sources, the earliest 
of which date from the mid-first century BC, roughly two and a half centuries after 
the Stoic school was founded.25 With a couple of exceptions, though none 
themselves fully intact,26 Stoic texts survive to us only as fragments preserved in 
much later, typically hostile works, such as those of Plutarch and Galen. The 
distortive nature of their Stoic expositions must always be respected, but both 
authors’ preference for verbatim quotation has nonetheless made their works 
invaluable to the historian of Stoic philosophy.27 We are in want of a sympathetic 
secondary text - à la Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura – that demonstrates Stoic 
physics systematically and argues for its merits; the tenor of our sources ranges 
from the undisguised hostility of Plutarch to the performative neutrality of Cicero, 
whose philosophical treatises comprise our earliest accounts of Stoic doctrine. 
Diogenes Laertius’ Lives, typically dated to the third century AD, is the latest text 
which we will frequently cite; its peculiar value derives from the catalogues of the 
works of the early Stoic philosophers which Diogenes Laertius has preserved, 
and which enlighten us to both the scope of early Stoicism and the areas to which 
individual Stoics might have afforded special emphasis.28 Such considerations 
are necessary, for there is a paucity of sources that delineate the specific 
 
between physics and ethics. Complicating matters further, Sextus Empiricus writes at M VII.17-19 that the 
Stoics identified ethics with the yolk of the egg, and physics with the white, that they identified physics 
with the height of the crop, and ethics with the yield. Such disagreements in our sources likely reflect 
those of individual Stoics – Sextus writes at M VII.19 that Posidonius (reportedly, recall, Athenaeus’ 
teacher) favoured the animal analogy over that of the garden, for example, on the grounds that it better 
encapsulated the unity of the parts. I would suggest that the disagreements pertaining to the relative 
prominence of the parts in these analogies (or the order in which the philosophy should be taught (D. L. 
VII.40-41)) speak to the extent to which the branches were entangled; attempts to identify the limits of 
each part and communicate them by analogy arrived at no definitive image. In the case of physics and 
ethics, at least, the branches, rather appropriately (e.g. I.3.7), are coextensive. For this holistic conception 
of Stoic philosophy and its parts, see Annas (2007) p.58-87. The question of the unity of Stoic physics, 
ethics and logic as depicted in D.L.39-51 and S. E. M 17-19 is also touched upon in Inwood (2012) p.231-
233. 
25 Mansfeld (1999) p.6-13. 
26 The verses of Cleanthes have fared better than most. The longest of the verses is the Hymn to Zeus, 
preserved in Stobaeus SVF 1.537, cf. Epict. SVF 1.527, Clement SVF 1.557, 550. We also have part of 
Chrysippus’ Logical Investigations (P. Herc. 307) preserved in the library at Herculaneum. 
27 This is particularly true of Galen’s On the Doctrines of Plato and Hippocrates (PHP), whose value as a 
source for Chrysippus’ philosophy of mind will be explored in chapter III.5. 
28 Though unfortunately these are not always complete; the bibliography of Chrysippus, for example, 
breaks off half-way due to damage to the source text from which the extant manuscripts derive. See 
Mansfeld (1999) p.6. 
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innovations of each of the three heads of the Stoa in the third century BC. Where 
distinctions can be made between the doctrines of the three originators of Stoic 
thought I shall endeavour to make them, for it would appear that the 
anthropomorphisation of Stoic cosmology was a process that developed in 
sophistication over the course of the school’s inaugural century, with each head 
of the Stoa contributing something towards its realisation.29 More specific textual 
problems will be treated as they become relevant to the discussion. In summary, 
we are left to reassemble Stoic cosmology from the peripheries, a practice with 
intrinsic limitations one would be remis not to acknowledge from the outset.30 
I.3 Mixture and self-similarity in Stoic physics  
We begin our investigation into the physiological peculiarity of Stoic cosmology 
with an analysis of its underlying principles. Mixture and self-similarity are the 
focus of this section. My thesis, with respect to these properties, is twofold. 1) the 
discontinuity of Pneumatism and Stoicism is explained by disparities in breadth 
of focus. Stoicism, with its ethical orientation, is fixated on the structure and 
behaviour of the whole. But what emerges from its doctrines is a system of micro-
harmonies, each reflective of the whole, evident at different scales and across 
different locations, in whose gravity one may delineate a technical epistemology. 
It is, however, for the specialist to determine the epistemic ambit of his craft (see 
esp. III.2-3). I will argue in III that the branding of Stoicising medicine as 
‘Pneumatism’ is an effort to consider Stoic physics independently of Stoic ethics, 
however 2) because of Stoicism’s self-similarity, Athenaeus’ theory of health is 
‘correlatively affinitive’31 with the physical expression of Stoicism’s ethical τέλος 
(see III.5). This physical parallelism, I will argue throughout chapters I-IV, is 
partially responsible for Stoicism’s relatively frictionless filtration into the medical 
 
29 We trace the evolution of this process in I.4 below. 
30 In keeping with the theme of holism in Stoic philosophy, Erskine (1990) p.4-5 makes the point that the 
interrelatedness of the various branches of philosophy in Stoicism is a boon to the historian seeking to 
reconstruct Stoic thought from any point in the greater architecture of their philosophy, as their political 
thought, to take the focus of Erskine’s work as an example, must be consistent with what we can assemble 
of their physical and cosmological doctrines, which must in turn cohere with Stoic ethics etc. Theoretically, 
at least, the holism of Stoic philosophy should make each recovered piece of information relevant to the 
philosophy as a whole. 
31 De Lacy’s (1976) translation of ἀντιπαρατείνουσα οἰκειότης at Gal. PHP V.2.22-24 in which Chrysippus’ 
justification for his use of medical analogy in On Affections is quoted. See III.5 and esp. III.5.2 for how 
Chrysippus employs this analogy. 
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τέχνη, as a comparison with Epicureanism’s adaptation into medicine will 
illuminate (see esp. II.5). 
I.3.1 Harmony 
The Stoic cosmos was celebrated by its adherents and admirers for the 
coherence of its parts. The Stoic aspiration was to exemplify cosmological 
harmony in microcosm, identified with perfect reason, which is in turn identified 
with virtue (ἀρετή).32 When Cicero, drawing on the Stoics, writes in the fourth 
book of the Tusculan Disputations (Tusc.) that ‘virtue is an equable and 
harmonious disposition of the soul…best summed up as right reason’, and that 
‘viciousness’ (vitiositas) is its antithesis, the root-cause of psychological 
disturbance, his presentation of internal harmony requires a physical component 
to be intelligible.33 Reason, for the Stoics, is a physical thing. To embody it is to 
marry the physical disposition of one’s soul to that the macrocosm, the whole – 
to ‘live in agreement with nature’, a process Zeno identified in his work On the 
Nature of Man with ‘living in accordance with virtue’.34 Cicero’s pathologizing of 
psychological disharmony in Tusc. IV.XV.34-35 echoes an analogy Zeno 
reportedly drew between diseases of the body and soul – both arise from 
disproportion, the root-cause of all manifest imperfections;35 weakness, softness, 
ugliness, ill-health and the unsettled soul, all emerge from disproportionality, 
whose negative connotation results from its status as a deviation from what is 
exemplified by the whole.  
     Two points, though obvious, must be made at the outset. The first is that the 
goal of ‘living in agreement with nature’ is only tenable if human psychological 
processes are such that they can harmonise with comparable transformations 
integral to the behaviour of the whole. A psychological – which is to say, an active, 
physical – link between the human and the cosmos is assumed.36 The second is 
 
32 Stob. 2.75, 11-76. 8 (LS  63 B); D. L. VII.87-9 for the identification of ‘living in agreement with nature’ 
with the Stoic τέλος. Sen. Ep. 76.9-10 (LS 63 D) for the identification of reason with virtue. See also Plut. 
St. Rep 1050F, 1051A (LS 61 R) in which Chrysippus is quoted as explaining vice as a deviation from the 
rationale of nature. 
33 Cic. Tusc. IV.XV.34-35 trans. King (1945). 
34 D. L. VII.87. 
35 Gal. PHP V.231-33. Here, Galen quotes Chrysippus quoting Zeno. The passage is revisited in more depth 
at III.2.2 and III.5.3.1. 
36 Sen. Ep. 124.13-14 (LS 60 H) distinguishes man and God/the cosmos in two ways. 1) God is immortal. 2) 
God’s perfection is a natural occurrence; man strives for perfection via practice, but he can emulate 
natural perfection because his psychological composition is sufficiently intricate to harmonise with that 
34 
 
that harmony itself provides the Stoic philosopher with his τέλος.37 To embody 
reason is to embody harmony; to harmonise with the cosmos is to mirror its 
structural and behavioural concinnity in the disposition of one’s soul. Just as 
virtue is a physical disposition, nature is the moral paradigm. 
     Harmony is predicated on the idea that every part of a superior phenomenon 
is dependent on, and augmented by, its relationship to every other constituent. 
The harmony of the parts ensures the integrity and moral-aesthetic value of the 
whole. Micro-harmonies can be delineated within the cosmos – the Stoics 
associated wisdom with a love for music and literature38 – but their value, such 
as it is,39 lies in their aesthetic affinity with the perfection of the whole. The human 
body and soul can never be understood separately from the environment in which 
they are parts in Stoic physics; they exist in service to the preservation, and 
simultaneously to the accentuation, of a greater structural cohesion.40 As we shall 
see, the unity of the human aggregate and his/her environment is consequent of 
the physical properties which he/she shares with the natural world, properties 
 
of the whole. Plants and animals, the two lower forms of life in Stoic psychophysiology, lack the 
appropriate complexity. See I.5.2 below. 
37 Cic. Fin. 3.21: ‘Man’s first attraction is towards the things in accordance with nature; but as soon as he 
has understanding, or rather becomes capable of ‘conception’ – in Stoic phraseology ἔννοια – and has 
discerned the order and so to speak harmony that governs conduct, he thereupon esteems harmony far 
more highly than all the things for which he originally felt an affection, and by exercise of intelligence and 
reason infers the conclusion that herein resides the Chief Good of man, the thing that is praiseworthy and 
desirable for its own sake’. Trans Rackham (1911). In the quotation of Cleanthes at Clem. Protr. 6.72.2 (LS 
60 Q), the first adjective Cleanthes uses to describe the good is τεταγμένον, ‘well-ordered’. Stob. 2.66, 14-
67, 4 (LS 61 G) reports that the Stoics compared the behaviour of the Stoic sage to the playing of the flute 
or lyre by an accomplished musician. As long & Sedley (1987) p.383 point out in their brief commentary 
on this source, the Stoics demonstrate their debt to Plato in their treatment of virtue as an expertise 
concerned with the whole of life as professional pursuits embody the same process, only more narrowly 
defined. The musical analogy seems to have particular relevance to the Stoic’s pursuit of a harmonious 
psychological disposition. When Stobaeus goes on to write (2.67, 5-12 (LS 26 H)) that the Stoics say that 
‘only the wise man is a lover of music and literature etc.’, the implication is that professional/artistic 
pursuits embody the Stoic pursuit of ἀρετή in microcosm, with music and literature being concerned with 
realising an aesthetic τέλος that is somehow correspondent to the natural order. 
38 Stob. 2.67,5-12 (LS 26 H). 
39 Asserting that micro-harmonies – that is, localised occurrences of ‘agreement with nature’ – have value 
at all in Stoicism is potentially problematic. They belong – at least, in orthodox Stoicism (cf. S. E. M XI.65-
67) – to the category of ‘preferred indifferents’ (D. L. VII.101-103; Stob. 2.79,18-80; 82,20-1 (LS 58 C)). 
They are not essential to the attainment of ἀρετή (D. L. VII.103, 128, concerning Posidonius, is an anomaly) 
but are ascribed ‘value’ – i.e. the status of being preferential – on the basis of their accordance with the 
whole (e.g. Stob. 2.83,10-84,2; 2.84,18-85, 11 (LS 58 D-E). See further I.5.3 and III.3.3 for the – I think, 
significant – implications for the Stoic analysis of indifferents on Stoicism’s medical adaptation. 
40 Cic. ND II.37 – ‘For as Chrysippus cleverly put it…man himself…came into existence for the purpose of 
contemplating and imitating the world.’ Trans. Rackham (1911). See I.4.4 below. 
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which permeate the cosmos in its entirety. We begin with the principles into which 
‘the whole’ can be resolved. 
I.3.2 Corporeality41 
For the Stoics, existence is bodily.42 Body (σῶμα) is defined as ‘that which has 
threefold extension, together with resistance.’43 This is the traditional 
mathematical definition of body, recalling Aristotle’s definition of body as ‘that 
which is bounded by surfaces’,44 supplemented with the additional criterion ‘with 
resistance’ (μετὰ ἀντιτυπίας), which marries the geometrical definition to that 
which indicates the power to interact.45 This property is fundamental. Body, for 
the Stoics, is anything ‘capable of acting, or being acted upon.’46 This definition 
is an inversion of a well-known anti-corporealist argument of Plato, proposed in 
the Sophist.47 Plato argued that ‘being’ was predicated on an entity’s capacity to 
act or be acted upon.48 That justice and wisdom are observed, through their 
effects, to act upon the soul lead Plato to conclude that corporeality could not be 
an essential criterion for being.49 The Stoics accepted Plato’s definition, but 
insisted that ‘the incorporeal is not of a nature either to act or to be acted upon.’50 
Physical expressions of psychological transformations, such as the body’s 
capacity to redden with shame or turn pale with fear, are advanced in defence of 
the corporeality of psychological functions.51 Since virtue and justice are 
dispositions of the soul, evident through one’s interactions with one’s peers and 
 
41 With respect to Stoic physics, a distinction has been made in recent scholarship between ‘corporealism’ 
and ‘materialism’ and works which treat these terms as synonymous have been criticise for offering only 
a partial reconstruction of the Stoic system. See Gourinat (2009) p.46-47. References to ‘corporealism’ 
with be applied preferentially throughout this thesis. 
42 See Brunschwig (1994) p.92-157 for a comprehensive analysis of Stoic ontology, including the enduring 
relationship between ‘existents’ and ‘subsistents’ throughout the history of the school. Both belong to 
the genus ‘Something’ – subsistents, though incorporeal, satisfy the criterion of reality –, but ‘something’ 
is an ‘existent’ only if it is a body. The four incorporeal subsistents (see further I.3.4) standardly 
acknowledged by Stoic ontology – place, void, time, and the λεκτόν – need not distract us too greatly for 
the time being, though we will have something to say about ‘place’ and ‘void’ shortly below at I.3.4, and 
λεκτά at I.5.4. Sedley (1999) p.395-402 provides a succinct analysis of how the Stoics conceived of 
incorporeal ‘subsistence’ is a corporeal cosmos. For an overview of λεκτά, see Schenkeveld & Barnes 
(1999) p.197-213. 
43 Ps.-Gal. Qual. Inc. 19.483, 13-16 (LS 45 F). Cf. D. L. VII.135. 
44 Arist. Met. XI.1066b. 
45 Hahm (1977) p.10-11. 
46 Cic. Acad. 1.39 (LS 45 A). Cf. S. E. M VIII.263; Nemes. 81, 6-10 (LS 45 C). 
47 Sharples (1996) p.33-34. 
48 Plato Soph. 247e1. 
49 Ibid. 247d-e. 
50 S. E. M VIII.263. 
51 Nemes. 81, 6-10 (LS 45 C). 
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broader environment,52 they must be corporeal. The distinction we intuit between 
abstractions and tangible bodies evaporates when we consider how Stoicism 
regards every nominally discrete component of the cosmos to be a disposition of 
ψυχή, of the cosmic soul (I.4). 
I.3.3 Continuum 
The Stoic cosmos is a structural and material continuum. It is infinitely divisible 
and contains no interior limits outside the realm of thought.53 What constitutes a 
part in such a system is not intuitive. Chrysippus reportedly wrote in On Motion 
that while the world is complete body, ‘the parts of the world are not complete 
because they are disposed in certain ways relative to the whole and are not per 
se.’54 The conception of part as defined by its limit is replaced by the ontological 
classification of disposition relative to that of the whole. Boundaries are constructs 
in thought.55 Plutarch, in On common conceptions, objects to this counter-intuitive 
doctrine. He asks how it can ‘fail to be self-evident that man consists of more 
parts that man’s finger, and the world than man?’ then indicates the Stoics as the 
only faction who maintain that ‘man does not consist of more parts than his finger, 
nor the world than man.’56 Plutarch’s polemic conflates the absence of ‘complete 
parts’ in Stoic ontology with the Stoic theory of mixture,57 blurring the distinction 
not merely between part and part but between part and the whole. His choice of 
‘man’ as the microcosm is not arbitrary, however; as we have already seen and 
 
52 D. L. VII.53, 89; Plut. Virt. mor. 440E-441D (LS 61 B). 
53 Stob. I.142, 2-6 (LS 50 A); Proc. In. Eucl. El. I 89, 15-18 (LS 50 D). Thought constructs appear to be external 
to the corporeal-incorporeal dichotomy that otherwise defines Stoic ontology. They belong, therefore, to 
the genus ‘Not Something’. See Brunschwig (1994) p.92-157, esp. 95-104. Seneca Ep. 58.12-15 (LS 27 A) 
attributes to the Stoics the idea that non-existents ‘such as Centaurs, giants, and whatever else falsely 
formed by thought takes on some image despite lacking substance’ are included within nature. If we take 
the view that limits are imaginary rather than incorporeals as Plutarch (Comm. not. 1078E-1080E (LS 27 
C)) suggests then limits can be likened to fanciful constructions developing cladistically from sense-reality.  
     In the Chrysippean cosmos, examined at I.4.4 and I.5 below, the question of limits is more complex. 
Heterogeneity of tenor (ἕξις, I.5.I below) may account for a certain type of limit in Stoic ontology: that 
between objectively discrete parts. The mind, however, is free to wander beyond the structures of 
objective cosmophysiology and make imaginary parts of whatever it chooses; said parts are deprived of 
their corporeality by the structural nature of the continuum. Scade (2013) p.82-87 makes this distinction. 
It is worth noting, however, that the providential nature of the Stoic cosmos and the all-penetrative nature 
of the rational principle (I.3.5-8) would seem to make rationality ontologically prior to heterogeneous 
tensile dispositions of πνεῦμα. Tensile boundaries are ultimately the thought constructs of the Stoic God, 
expressed in motion. 
54 Plut. St. Rep. 1054E-F (LS 29 D). 
55 See supra n.53. 
56 Plut. Comm. not. 1078E-1080E (LS 50 C). See S. E. M XI.22-6 for a more measured account of the Stoic 
conception of the relationship between parts and wholes. 
57 See below I.3.5. 
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will continue to see, there is plenty in Stoic cosmology that permits this macro-
microcosm parity. It is not a confusion of boundaries but a thoughtfully 
constructed self-similarity of constitution and behaviour. The absence of internal 
limits assists in the realisation of this symmetry.58 
     The properties of the Stoic (specifically, the Chrysippean) cosmos that allow 
for internal heterogeneity will be expounded at I.5. For now, we note that Stoic 
ontology distinguishes three kinds of body in a material continuum. These are 
bodies comprised of separate elements which act as a singular entity such as an 
army or a fleet, bodies comprised of contiguous parts such as a house or a ship, 
and unified bodies such as sticks and stones of which organic entities, 
heterogeneously qualified yet sprung from a singular seed, are a subset.59 Note 
that, on Chrysippus’ reasoning, unified bodies inside the cosmos are not 
themselves complete; their claim to being unified is contingent on their disposition 
relative to the unified whole.60  
I.3.4 Void and Place 
Void provides the cosmos – the whole relative to which discrete entities are ‘parts’ 
by disposition – with its external boundary. The perfection of the entity depends 
upon its finitude; the corporeality of the cosmos is juxtaposed against the 
incorporeality of its τόπος. In their facilitation of cosmic behaviour, void and place 
are integral components of the All – i.e. the cosmos and environs – but do not act 
and are not acted upon.61 The Greek astronomer Cleomedes, reporting Stoic 
orthodoxy, writes of void and place as states of ‘subsistence’, an ontological 
category distinct from ‘existence’. 62 They are incorporeal ‘somethings’. ‘Void’ 
describes that which can be occupied by body, where ‘place’ is the name given 
to occupied void.63 They represent the emptiness into which, and back from 
which, the cosmos expanded and contracted periodically.64 Void extends without 
 
58 The removal of internal boundaries makes human behaviour a disposition of the whole, not a facsimile 
of it. To perfect logic, for example, is not to mimic the rationality of nature in speech but to embody it. 
See Amm. In Ar. An. pr. 7.19 (LS 26 E) for the Stoic’s rejection of the conception of logic as instrumental, 
which I am suggesting is born of this self-similarity. 
59 Plut. Con. Praec. SVF 2.366. Long (1982) p.37-38. 
60 Plut. St. Rep. 1054E-F (LS 29 D). 
61 Sedley (1999) p.397. S. E. M IX.332 for the distinction between ‘whole’ and ‘all’, that which prevents 
‘cosmos’ from being synonymous with the modern conception of ‘the universe’. The principle distinction 
is that the former has structure, the latter, being indeterminate, has not. See Scade (2013) p.87-88. 
62 Cleom. Cael. I.1.20-24. See Bowen & Todd (2004) p.23, n.12. 
63 S. E. M X.3-4 i.e. void is potential place, place potential void.  
64 See below I.3.10.  
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limit in every direction from the cosmos since Stoic physics permits no other 
substance to delineate its boundary.65 The cosmos is the singular body. 
I.3.5 Principles 
Body can be analysed into two conceptually distinct but physically inseparable 
principles (ἀρχαί): the active and the passive, God and matter, soul and body.66 
No straightforward Stoic definition of ἀρχαί is extant but we know that their 
properties of being ungenerated, indestructible and without form distinguished 
them from the ‘elements’ (στοιχεῖα) in Stoic ontology – from fire, air, water and 
earth.67  
I.3.6 Permanence 
Sense-impressions result from the activity of these binary, basic, corporeal, 
indestructible determinants. Impressions of generation and destruction are no 
more than that. By the Hellenistic period, a consensus had emerged among 
doctrinaire philosophers that ‘nothing either comes to be out of nothing or 
perishes into nothing.’68 Generation and destruction are misclassifications of 
recombination; ‘…birth arises out of existing things and passes away into what 
exists because it is bounded by things which abide as immortals…that by which 
 
65 Cleom. Cael. I.1.112-123. 
66 D. L. VII.134. See I.4 for the soul-bod dichotomy. ‘God’ is also identified with reason (λόγος) in D. L. 
VII.134. Sedley (2002) p.41-83 remains the most thorough exposition of the nature and origin of the Stoic 
conception of God. 
67 D. L. VII.134. For the elements, see Ibid. VII.137; Stob. I.129, 2-130, 13 (LS 47 A). By adhering to this 
conception of the elements, the Stoics locate themselves in a tradition in ancient physics that started with 
Empedocles and included both Plato and Aristotle. That the elements are not ‘elemental’ – that is, not 
fundamental – locates Stoic ontology within a contemporary orthodoxy. Aristotle introduced ‘matter’ 
(ὕλη), the unqualified universal substrate, into the domain of natural philosophy (e.g. Aris. Met. 8.1042a). 
Plato distinguished the four elements (each a matrix of convex polyhedra, resolvable into triangles) from 
their first cause, the providential demiurge (Plat. Tim. 53-57. See Gourinat (2009) p.49.). The elemental 
substrate is variously referred to as the ‘receptacle’ (ὑποδοχή, Plat. Tim. 49a, 51a) of the first cause or as 
a malleable substance (ἐκμαγεῖον, Plat. Tim. 51a) awaiting impression (see Sedley (2002) p.55). In a 
parallel tradition, Democritean atomism would have fire, air, water and earth reduced to sense 
impressions sprung from the groupings and collisions of primitive corpuscles. Positing sub-elemental 
principles, be their transformations mechanistically or intelligently ordained, is a common property of 
classical Greek thought, one that binds all discrete entities together at the level of their prima materia. 
     In its insistence that the unqualified passive principle retains its corporeality after all additional 
qualities have been removed (an impossible scenario in actuality), the Stoic conception of principles has 
more in common with the Platonic model of the material substratum than its Aristotelian parallel. 
Although I agree with Sedley (2002) that Stoic physics owes more to Plato than to Aristotle (and that what 
it shares with Aristotle’s physics can be explained by their shared debt to fourth century Platonism), how 
the Stoics conceived of philosophy’s purpose is perhaps better conceived as a continuation of Aristotle’s 
legacy, with implications for how the philosophy would be received in the medical domain. 
68 Calc. In Tim. 293 (LS 44 E).  
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and that from which generated things come into being.’69 The lifecycle is a 
localised measurement of the moving image of the cosmos. It is reflective – 
perhaps variously so (I.3.10) – of the lifecycle of the whole. 
I.3.7 Mixture 
The principles are two: that which acts and that which is acted upon.70 They are 
opposites, but they are codependent (the simplest harmony). Creativity would go 
unexpressed without a substrate; unqualified matter would be shapeless and 
unmoving.71 Their polarity is integral, but they are physically inextricable.72 The 
Stoics ‘say that god is mixed with matter, pervading all of it and so shaping it, 
structuring it, and making it into the world.’73 The active principle acts on the world 
from within. Significantly, for the purpose of this exposition, we find the signature 
of providential manipulation recurrently likened to ‘seed’. Diogenes Laertius 
describes the Stoic God as ‘the seminal reason of the universe’.74 Calcidius, 
reporting Stoic doctrine, likens the passage of ‘complete and universal reason’ 
through prime matter to that of ‘seed through the genital organs.75 Ongoing 
transformation is likened to perpetual generation; the world proceeds from an all-
pervasive seed. Physics and theology are grounded in embryology. Unlike Plato’s 
demiurge, the Stoic God/active principle is present in the world, manifest in 
transformation; his role is more than merely cosmogonical.76  In Stoicism, God is 
nature. He is a unified organism, moral paradigm, and universal seed, an imprint 
of embryology on reality’s transformations in consort with the elevation of 
harmony to the status of essential good. 
     Mixture is integral to Stoicism (as it is to Stoicisms’ medical expression (III.2)). 
The Stoic theory of ‘blending’ (κρᾶσις) has two essential components; 1) 
constituents of mixture retain their original properties, they are not altered 
 
69 Ibid. 
70 D. L. VII.134. 
71 S. E. IX.15-6. 
72 That more than one ostensibly distinct physical principle could occupy the same space provokes 
Plutarch’s hostility in Comm. Not. 1077D (SVF 2.396). He argues that if two individually qualified entities 
can occupy the same space then notions of spatial restrictions disintegrate. Chrysippus, however, states 
plainly in On the Growing Argument (SVF 2.397) that ‘two individually qualified entities cannot be present 
in the same substratum.’ Body is binary, the interplay of substance and qualification. See Reesor (1989) 
p.14. 
73 Alex. Aph. Mixt. 225,1-2 (LS 45 H). 
74 D. L. VII.136. 
75 Cal. In Tim. 193 (LS 44 E). See also Aristocles in Eus. Pr. ev. 15.14.2 (LS 46 G). 
76 Bénatouïl (2009) p.24, n.4. Sedley (2002) p.42. 
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indefinitely; 2) constituents are mutually coextensive. According to Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, Chrysippus,77 following Aristotle,78 distinguished between the 
juxtaposition of substances, whereby the qualities of the constituents are 
preserved, and fusion, whereby a third body is generated from the mutually 
destructive union of prior substances.79 Chrysippus posits κρᾶσις as a third 
species of mixture which resembles fusion in its through-and-through 
coextension and juxtaposition in the capacity of blended constituents ‘to be 
separated again from one another.’80 In preserving the constituents of the blend, 
the Stoics devised a species of mixture that allowed for perennial reconfiguration; 
the principles remain constant throughout the transformations.81 Plutarch 
describes mutual coextension as a state in which ‘the constituents must come to 
be in one another, and the same thing must both be enveloped by being in the 
other and by accommodating it, envelope it.’82 He objects that ‘since the blending 
forces both things to pervade each other and no part to lack any part but every 
part to be filled with all’, neither substance is truly enveloping or being enveloped 
by the other,83 thus stumbling into the doctrine’s purpose. Positing though-and-
through coextension is the answer to the question of how an apparently tenuous 
active principle could pervade corporeality entirely.84 Both Plutarch and Diogenes 
Laertius refer to Chrysippus’ postulation that a drop of wine could pervade the 
sea,85 a challenge to Aristotle’s argument that ‘dominant’ materials – i.e. materials 
in larger quantities – transform lesser materials into themselves.86 Stoic physics 
preserves the wine, and makes a claim for its existence in every part of the sea. 
 
77 Our sources for mixture in Stoic physics tend to restrict us to arguments associated with Chrysippus, 
though there is strong evidence to suggests that the Stoic conception of ‘blending’ predates him. Plut.  
Comm. not. 1078B-D (LS 48 E) records an incident of this particular doctrine being memorably attacked 
by Arcesilaus, the founder of Academic scepticism, whose lifetime predates the death of Cleanthes, and 
thus Chrysippus’ ascent to prominence: ‘…for if blendings are through and through, what prevents not 
only the armada of Antigonus, as Arcesilaus said, from sailing through the leg that has been severed, 
putrefied, thrown into sea and dissolved, but the 1,200 triremes of Xerxes along with 300 Greeks from 
having a battle within the leg?’  
78 Arist. GC I.10 
79 Alex. Aph. Mixt. 215,14-218,6 (LS 48 B). The example given of the former is a juxtaposition of beans and 
wheat. Medical drugs are said to be generated via the latter process.  
80 Ibid.; Stob. I.155,5-11 (LS 48 D) preserves an example of how wine might be separated from water 
with a sponge as a visual representation of this doctrine. 
81 See supra I.3.6. 
82 Plut. Comm. not. 1078B-D (LS 48 E).  
83 Ibid. 
84 The nature of active principle is explored immediately below, I.3.8. 
85 D. L. VII.151; Plut. Comm. not. 1078E (LS 48 B). 
86 Arist. GC 328a26-8. 
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I.3.8 Creativity  
God is activity. The seed-model of activity (I.3.7) makes of God an omnipresent 
creativity, mixed with his creation; every point, however small, is sprung from his 
intention. Since the active principle is inextricable from the passive, God and 
cosmos may be synonymized in Stoicism.87 Diogenes Laertius records three 
Stoic definitions of κόσμος: 1) God the artificer, consisting of all substance; 2) the 
world-order i.e. the product of creation; 3) both.88 That a distinction, in language, 
can be made between artefact and artificer depends on material’s binary nature. 
Attending to the hylozoic peculiarity of Stoic cosmology, born of this synonymy of 
nature and God, the three definitions of cosmos in Diogenes Laertius might be 
expressed, respectively, as soul, body under soul’s manipulation, and God, the 
organic cosmos. Psychophysiology provides God/the cosmos with his structure.  
     As to the nature of the creativity, there are two Stoic traditions.89 Zeno, the 
founder, identified the active principle with ‘designing fire which methodically 
proceeds towards creation of the world, and encompasses all the seminal 
principles according to which everything comes about.’90 He distinguished two 
kinds of fire: sublunary fire which ‘is undesigning and converts fuel into itself’, and 
designing fire ‘causing growth and preservation’, the ‘fire which constitutes the 
substance of the stars.’91 His successor, Cleanthes, deviated little from his 
teacher’s model; he identified the active principle with fire and heat.92 Imbuing fire 
with creative power is not unique to the Stoics. The roots of this association are 
Heraclitean,93 and parallels with Aristotelian αἰθήρ have also been noted.94 Note 
that the precedent for the Zenonian tradition is exclusively philosophical. The 
influence of the medical τέχνη on Stoic physics/theology is not yet detectable. 
 
87 Sharples (1996) p.45. 
88 D. L. VII. 
89 Aët 1.7.33 (LS 46 A). 
90 Ibid.; Stob. I.213,15-21 (LS 46 D) for the attribution of this doctrine to Zeno. 
91 Stob. I.213,15-21 (LS 46 D).  
92 Cic. ND II.23-34, 28. The biological justification for this designation is revisited at I.4.3 below. 
93 Heraclitus (DK 22 B30): ‘Order was not made by god or man. It always was and is and shall be an ever-
living fire, flaring up in regular measures and dying down in regular measures.’ Trans. Waterfield (2000). 
See Long (1996) p.35-57. 
94 Sedley (1999) p.388. Although much effort is made on Aristotle’s part to distinguish his quintessence 
from Empedoclean elements, he nonetheless proposes a rarefied, primary substance that is ungenerated, 
unalterable, indestructible and divine. It is defined by its perpetual motion, and thus susceptible to 
misidentification with fire. e.g. Arist. De cael. I.3.270b, 1-31. 
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     The second tradition identifies creativity with πνεῦμα, ‘a breath pervading the 
whole world, which takes on different names owing to the alterations of the matter 
through which it passes.’95 It is the substance for which Athenaeus’ medical 
school was named. The Stoic doctrine of πνεῦμα is attributed to Chrysippus.96 
πνεῦμα has two parts, air and fire, the substances defined by the qualities cold 
and hot respectively.97 The motive for this innovation is revealed by an 
assessment of the historical context. There is some evidence to suggest that the 
function of πνεῦμα in Stoic physics predates Chrysippus’ premiership, but this 
function was restricted to biology; Diogenes Laertius traces a Stoic tradition of 
identifying the agent of bodily motion with ‘warm breath’ back to the school’s 
founder.98 We note also the Aristotelian precedent that analogised πνεῦμα to the 
substance of the heavens.99 However, for an arguably more decisive influence, 
we reorient our attention to medicine. 
I.3.9 Medical interlude 
At the expense of the preeminent status of heat in Hellenistic physiology, πνεῦμα 
was in ascendance. Herophilus of Chalcedon and Erasistratus of Ceos, 
pioneering anatomists of the third century BC, both identified the mediator of 
motion and perception with πνεῦμα.100 But the root proponent of this new phase 
in medical thought was Praxagoras of Cos, a practising physician of the late 
fourth and early third centuries BC and teacher of Herophilus of Chalcedon.101 
Praxagoras maintained that πνεῦμα, with which the arteries are replete,102 
transfers motion from the heart, the seat of intellect,103 to the sinews.104 The 
attribution of diseases which entail sensory disfunction to disruptions in the flow 
of πνεῦμα points to Praxagoras having identified a role for the substance in 
 
95 Aët 1.7.33 (LS 46 A). 
96 Whose theory of soul/πνεῦμα is the subject of Galen’s objections at PHP V.3. 
97 Gal. PHP. V.3.8; Alex. Aph. Mixt 224,14-17, 23 -6 (LS 47 H) for πνεῦμα as fire and air. 
98 D. L. VII.157. We might infer, owing to the providential role of fire in Zeno’s cosmology (e.g. Stob. 
I.213,15-21 (LS 46 D)), that ‘warmth’ was identified with the agent of motion and breath was the mediator. 
99 E.g. Arist. De Gen. An. 2.3.736b33-737a1. See Hahm (1977) p.158 and I.3.9, n.115 below. 
100 For Herophilus, see Gal. UP. X.12 (= III.812 K.); Caus. Symp I.2 (= VII.88-89 K) and De tremore 5 (= VII.605 
K). For Erasistratus, see Gal. Atr. Bil. 5 (= V.125 K.); Loc. Aff. VI.5 (= VIII.429 K). In Gal. Nat. Fac. II.8 (= II.110-
11 K) Galen further attacks Erasistratus for ignoring those who argue that biology consists of the four 
qualities, of which heat is of primary importance.  
101 Hahm (1977) p.160; Sedley (1999) p.388, Cambiano (1999) p.600-601. For a recent introduction to 
Praxagoras of Cos, see Lewis (2017) p.1-11. 
102 Fr. 12 Lewis. 
103 Frs. 20, 22 Lewis. 
104 Fr. 28 Lewis; Lewis (2017) p.275-284. 
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perception.105 Certain diseases that entail cognitive impairment were also 
attributed to disruptions of πνεῦμα,106 suggesting a mediatory role for πνεῦμα in 
cognition.107 Moreover, according to Galen, Praxagoras identified respiration as 
the process by which psychic πνεῦμα is nourished,108 prompting Fritz Steckerl to 
argue that Praxagoras identified πνεῦμα with ψυχή.109 Though Orly Lewis has 
recently revealed Steckerl’s conclusion to have been somewhat overzealous,110 
the overlap between Praxagorean and Chrysippean πνεῦμα on the question of 
the mediating substance of perception and cognition indicates Praxagoras – and 
the movement he initiated111 – as an influence on Chrysippus’ amendment to 
Zenonian physics.112 
     It is worth taking a moment to consider this transposition of medical orthodoxy 
into natural philosophy. Orly Lewis’ principle and most convincing objection to 
Steckerl’s reading of Gal. De ut. resp. 1.2-3.10 (= fr.16 Lewis) as evidence for 
Praxagoras’ theory of πνεῦμα-qua-soul is that expounding the soul’s nature lay 
beyond the intellectual purview of the physician in the third century BC.113 This 
introduces us to a theme that will accumulate significance as we progress, 
namely, that a discipline’s epistemological ambit determines the kinds of claims 
which a practitioner will be inclined to make; knowledge is gathered in pursuit of 
a τέλος and one’s τέλος determines the questions one undertakes to answer. This 
does not prevent ideas from traversing disciplinary boundaries once they have 
taken shape, but the nature of the τέλος naturally leads practitioners to 
conclusions that are unlikely to have originated elsewhere. The medical roots of 
Chrysippean πνεῦμα merit foregrounding for two reasons. 1) The Stoics’ 
 
105 Frs. 25, 27 Lewis; Lewis (2017) p.284-287. 
106 Fr. 25 Lewis. 
107 Lewis (2017) p.287-292. We are forced to be more circumspect in attributing to Praxagoras a theory 
that identified πνεῦμα with cognition. 
108 Fr. 16 Lewis = Gal. De ut. resp. 1.2-3.10. 
109 Steckerl (1958) p.21. 
110 Lewis (2017) p.292-298. 
111 It is not my intention to downplay the influence of Herophilus and Erasistratus on Chrysippus’ 
innovation, merely to emphasise Praxagoras’ role in initiating this tradition. Chrysippus was certainly 
aware of Herophilus and Erasistratus’ physiology, and took their theories seriously. See e.g. Gal. PHP I.6. 
for Chrysippus’ refutation of Erasistratus’ theory that the left ventricle of the heart was replete with vital 
πνεῦμα; ibid. III.1.12-15 for Chrysippus on different variations of (quasi-)encephalocentrism, which likely 
correspond to the divergent theories of both Herophilus and Erasistratus.  
112 For more on Chrysippean πνεῦμα, see I.4.4 and I.5 below. Note that Chrysippus (Gal. PHP III.1.21-25) 
appeals to the authority of Praxagoras in his defence of the Stoic psychophysiological model that 
identified the heart as the seat of the soul. 




identification of πνεῦμα with the active principle – and, indeed, the broader 
psychophysiological significance of πνεῦμα from the third century BC114 – was 
derived, in no small part, from medical innovation;115 the monopolization of the 
faculties of soul by πνεῦμα arose from medical science, uncovered on the path 
towards a discipline-specific τέλος. (Thus, the appellation ‘Pneumatist’ evokes a 
branching continuity, reaching both for Chrysippean Stoicism and an older, 
technical pedigree). Chrysippus adopted an idea with relatively narrow 
explanatory utility and expanded its potential to cosmobiology (see esp. I.4.4).116 
2) Chrysippus adapted the Stoic doctrine of the active principle to conform to a 
contemporary physiological orthodoxy; the ‘new reality’ of human physiology had 
implications for the macrocosm. For the Stoics, the physiology of the cosmos is 
understood through the inspection of the human body. 
I.3.10 ἐκπύρωσις 
Though the principles are indestructible, the world-order is not; its lifecycle is 
regenerative. Diogenes Laertius gives us an account of Stoic cosmogony: God, 
fate, present in new waters like a seed in seminal fluid, makes ‘matter serviceable 
to himself for the successive stages of creation.’117 The model is one of self-birth 
and self-orchestrated maturity. Aristocles, reporting Stoic doctrine, writes of the 
world’s end that ‘at certain fated times the entire world is subject to conflagration, 
 
114 e.g. Epic. Ep. Hdt. 63. πνεῦμα is yet more integral to Asclepiadean psychology. See IV.4. 
115 As noted above (I.3.8), the role played by πνεῦμα in early Stoic psychology was likely far more limited, 
preceding as it did the preeminence of πνεῦμα in third century medical science. The existence of some 
precedent within the school likely facilitated Chrysippus’ innovation – and gave him grounds to 
retroactively assert its Stoic pedigree – but I am confident that the preeminent status of πνεῦμα in the 
medical sphere was vital to Stoicism’s identification of πνεῦμα with soul (ψυχή). The movement instigated 
by Praxagoras of Cos and upheld by Herophilus and Erasistratus constitutes the most significant shift in 
psychophysiological orthodoxy between the premierships of Zeno and Chrysippus. 
     The Aristotelian precedent was also, clearly, a facilitating factor. As noted at I.3.8, Aristotle analogizes 
πνεῦμα to αἰθήρ in De Gen. An. 2.3.736b33-737a1; innate πνεῦμα is identified with the ‘instrument’ of 
movement in De An. III.10 – it is not the first cause of movement, as it is in Chrysippean physics, but the 
corporeal instrument of an incorporeal ψυχή. We should also note the role of air as a mediator of 
sensation in e.g. Ibid. II.7-8. However, given the correspondence between Chrysippus’ innovation and the 
transformation in medical orthodoxy, it seems likely that the Aristotelian influence was more faciliatory 
than it was the decisive. Praxagoras is the authority cited by Chrysippus at Gal. PHP III.1.21-25 in defence 
of his cardiocentricism. Aristotelian psychophysiology is not easily pieced together from his extant 
writings, but we can be confident that innate πνεῦμα was a single piece of a more complicated puzzle, 
with specific (if unclear) rolls for πνεῦμα, blood (e.g. Insomn. 459b7ff) and heat (e.g. Part. An. 653b5). For 
a discussion of Aristotle’s psychophysiology see the articles reprinted in van der Eijk (2005) p.119-135, 
206-237. For Aristotle’s relationship to medical literature see III.3.2. 
116 For the identification of the active principle with soul, see I.4 and I.5.2 below. 
117 D. L. VII.135-136 trans. Hicks (1925). 
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and then is reconstituted afresh.’118 Stars portray the signs of nascent 
conflagration.119 The cosmos is by degrees dissolved into the active principle, 
which then sets about recreating its components in same manner as before, 
reproducing the same cycle.120  
     A reading of this process – shared, at least, by Cleanthes121 – makes of the 
cosmos a mortal animal, as much the subject of life and death of any as its 
organic constituents. Chrysippus moved to dissociate ἐκπύρωσις with 
destruction, arguing that ‘since death is the separation of soul from the body, and 
the soul of the world is not separated but grows continuously until it has 
completely used up its matter on itself, the world must not be said to die.’122 But 
note that Chrysippus’ defence of the world’s immortality is built on the assumption 
of cosmic physiology; his argument resolves the cosmos into the principles ‘body’ 
and ‘soul’; the inseparability of these principles protects the world from death. 
Where generation and destruction are linguistic devices giving shape to certain 
kinds of qualitative change,123 one wonders how far depriving the cosmos of 
death disaligns its macro-microcosm parity with the human part; the human soul 
is not permanently destroyed at his/her death; its tenor (see I.5) is lost for a time, 
but consider how the doctrine of everlasting recurrence would revive the human 
as it does the whole, orchestrating, cyclically, his/her maturity through successive 
stages of creation ad infinitum.124 In the periodic obliteration of its body, the 
 
118 Aristocles in Eus. Pr. ev. 15.14.2 (LS 46 G). 
119 Alex. Lyc. 19, 2-4 (LS 46 I), quoting Zeno: ‘everything which burns and has something to burn will burn 
it completely; now the sun is a fire and will it not burn what it has?’ The destructive capacity of sublunary 
fire seems to have qualified its creative cousin for agency in the pseudo-destruction (see below) of the 
cosmos. The assumption that the world was destined for destruction via the agency of a particular 
element can be mapped onto an ancient mythological tradition, long in place by the Stoic school’s 
inception. But note how Stoic eschatology expands what was typically the purging of humankind to the 
obliteration of all internal qualities. The cosmos, like its human microcosm, perishes in fire. 
120 The doctrine of everlasting recurrence is offered by Chrysippus as a potential consequence of cosmic 
lifecycle in Lact. Div. inst. 7.23 (LS 52 B). Its likelihood is supported by the Stoic identification of God with 
cosmos (see supra I.3.8), whose perfection must be such that it is difficult to see how successive self-
amendments would be theologically justified. cf. Eus. Pr. ev. 15.19.1-2 (LS 52 D); Simp. In Ar. Phys. 886, 
12-16 (LS 52 E).   
121 Salles (2009) p.118-131, esp. 124-126 on Cic. ND II.118. 
122 Plut. St. Rep. 1052C-D (LS 46 E) quoting Chrysippus’ On Providence book I. Note also the distinction 
made in Phil. Aet. Mundi 90 (LS 46 M) between Cleanthes’ model of the conflagration, in which the world 
is changed into fire, and that of Chrysippus who supposed the world became the less intuitively 
destructive ‘light.’ 
123 Calc. In Tim. 293 (LS 44 E) see supra I.3.6. 
124 Cf. D. L. VII.135-136. 
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lifecycle of the cosmos reflects that of the human, its structural and behavioral 
template.125 
     I implied at I.3.6 that the human lifecycle was reflective of the journey to/from 
ἐκπύρωσις in more than one dimension. Perhaps we can also identify a parallel 
between ἐκπύρωσις and the (theoretical) perfection of Stoicism’s ethical τέλος. 
Conflagration amounts to the annihilation of the world’s internal boundaries – 
variants of ἕξις (I.5) in the Chrysippean model –; it is the world’s underlying 
monism, its all-rationality, brought to the surface. At the point of conflagration, the 
cosmos is conceived as most divine.126 Striving for ἀρετή is the process of 
dissolving oneself, through the elimination of one’s psychological affections,127 
into cosmic harmony. It is the instant where the human is his/her most divine. It 
is also, of course, practically unachievable; Chrysippus was willing to 
acknowledge the idealistic nature of this moral standard.128 But the journey 
towards rational perfection through the progressive alleviation of one’s affections 
is, it seems, receptive to analogy with progressive conflagration. The ethical 
journey of the idealised sage is mirrored in the behaviour of the whole.  
I.4 The World-Soul 
With the pieces in place, the cosmobiology of this chapter’s title can be explored 
in depth. Our questions, going forward, are as follows. What does it mean to posit 
a cosmic psychology? What does this tell us about the relationship between Stoic 
philosophy and the human psychophysiology? 
I.4.1 ψυχή 
In the prevailing wisdom of antiquity, a living being is necessarily ensouled. A 
Stoic definition of what it is to be ensouled is found in Origen’s On Principles: 
‘Ensouled things are moved by themselves when an impression occurs within 
 
125 Stoic philosophy would itself present this relationship the other way around. I mean to stress here that 
the Stoics (and many before them) impose human characteristics on their conception of the 
divine/cosmos. See below I.4.2. 
126 e.g. Plut. St. rep. 1052C-D (LS 46 E); Origen Cels. 4.14 (LS 46 H). 
127 See III.5 for a Stoic explanation of psychological pathology. Sen. Ep.92.3 (LS 63 F) ‘…the wise man’s 
mind should be such as befits god.’ Note the proclamation at Epict. Diss. 2.14.7-8 (LS 63 E) that it is for 
the Stoic to alter his wishes to fit the pattern of what occurs to him, to lose himself. For Posidonius (see 
Clem. Mis. 2.21.129.4-5 (LS 63 J), this amounts to being ‘completely uninfluenced by the irrational part of 
the soul.’  
128 Plut. St. rep. 1041F (LS 66 A). See also Panaetius’ frank admission that he was ‘a great distance from a 
wise man’ quoted in Sen. Ep. 116.5 (LS 66 C). 
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them that calls forth an impulse.’129 Sextus Empiricus gives us two definitions of 
the Stoic soul: ‘that which sustains the whole compound’ and ‘the commanding-
faculty.’130 ψυχή is thus shorthand for both centremost part and the whole, the 
source and its continuous consequences. The commanding-faculty (ἡγεμονικόν) 
is the soul’s ‘highest part’, the source of reason, sense-perception and sense-
interpretation.131 Says Chrysippus, quoted in Calcidius: ‘The soul as a whole 
despatches the senses (which are its proper functions) like branches from the 
trunk-like commanding-faculty to be reporters of what they sense, while itself like 
a monarch passes judgement on their reports.’132 Aëtius records a similar Stoic 
analogy, where seven parts of the eight-part soul extend from the ἡγεμονικόν, the 
eighth part, like the tentacles of an octopus.133 Five of these parts are the senses. 
The remaining two are the vocal and generative parts.134 All are expressions of 
the ἡγεμονικόν – the vocal, generative and sensory components – are 
dispositions of the same substance.135 The Stoic soul is the corporeal progenitor 
of animation, sentience and intelligence. To postulate a world-soul is to distribute 
these qualities throughout the cosmos, to identify the cosmos as an animate, 
sentient and intelligent organism, generative of its constituents and one whose 
manipulation of λόγος – its self-orchestration – is reflected in the structure of 
human speech.136 
I.4.2 Zeno 
That nature is endowed with soul was central to Stoic cosmology from its 
inception. We find three arguments attributed to Zeno that grant the world the 
faculties of soul. The argument from superiority: ‘That which has the faculty of 
 
129 Origen Princ. 3.1.2-3 (LS 53 A). 
130 S. E. M VII.234. 
131 Aët. 4.21.1-4 (LS 53 H). 
132 Calc. In Tim. 220 (LS 53 G). 
133 Aët. 4.21.1-4 (LS 53 H), albeit an octopus with seven tentacles. 
134 Ibid.; Gal. PHP III.1.10. 
135 See I.4.4 and I.5 below. 
136 Long (1982) p.49-53 for the role of λεκτά in distinguishing the human from the animal soul in Stoicism. 
I touch on this again at I.5.4. Note Plut. St. Rep. 1047A (LS 31 H): ‘Chrysippus defines rhetoric as an 
expertise concerned with the order of continuous speech and its arrangement. Furthermore, in book 1 he 
has even written the following: ‘I think one should cultivate not just a frank and unaffected order but also, 
apart from speech, the appropriate kinds of delivery in relation to the fitting tones of voice, facial 
expressions and gestures.’’ The τέλος of rhetoric is an aesthetic ideal exemplified by cosmic reason (λόγος) 
i.e. the harmony of its self-arrangement. Parallels might also be drawn between the role of λόγος in 
‘shaping impulse scientifically’ (D. L VII.86) during human development and ‘dialectic’ (D. L. VII.41-44) as 
conceived in Stoicism, the science of uncovering truth through rational discourse –  i.e. shaping the world 
in speech such that what is spoken is consistent with reality. 
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reason is superior to that which does not; nothing is superior to the world; 
therefore, the world has the faculty of reason.’137 The argument from part to 
whole: ‘Nothing devoid of sensation can have a part of itself which is sentient; the 
world has parts that are sentient; therefore the world is not devoid of sensation,’138 
and the argument from generation: ‘Nothing that is inanimate and irrational can 
give birth to an animate and rational being; but the world gives birth to animate 
and rational beings; therefore the world is animate and rational.’139 The Platonic 
provenance of Zeno’s vitalistic cosmology should be acknowledged,140 so too the 
Platonic/Socratic heritage of the arguments in its favour.141 Zeno parts ways from 
Plato is his insistence that the substance of soul is corporeal; animation, 
sentience and rationality are dispositions of the active principle.142 
     Each argument is a mechanism for delocalizing human psychic faculties. Zeno 
follows Plato in locating soul – and by extension virtue – in the behaviour of the 
world.143 Plato, having established the role of god (or gods) in ordering the 
cosmos,144 maintains in Laws 10 that god and mortals, being both moral agents 
– i.e. in possession of reason – participate in a shared conception of the good.145 
The world provides the template for correct human behaviour, consonant as it is 
with the human part through their shared morality through their shared rationality 
through their corresponding souls. When Zeno identified the goal of life with ‘living 
in agreement with nature, which is living in accordance with virtue’,146 his ethical 
teleology is predicated on this moral parity which, in Stoic cosmology, is a 
 
137 Cic. ND II.21 trans. Rackham (1911) modified for brevity. cf. S. E. M IX.104. 
138 Cic. ND II.22 trans. Rackham (1911), cf. S. E. M IX.85. 
139 Cic. ND II.22 trans. Rackham (1911), cf. S. E. M IX.101. Cicero’s speaker, the Stoic philosopher Balbus, 
goes on to relate in ND II.22 what he introduces as one of Zeno’s favourite comparisons: ‘If flutes playing 
musical tunes grew on an olive-tree, surely you would not question that the olive-tree possessed some 
knowledge of the art of flute-playing; or if plane-trees bore well-tuned lutes, doubtless you would likewise 
infer that the plane-trees possessed the art of music; why then should we not judge the world to be 
animate and endowed with wisdom, when it produces animate and wise offspring?’ 
140 Plat. Tim. 30a-c. 
141 Ibid. For the Platonic version of the argument from superiority see S. E. M IX.107. See Plat. Phil. 29a-
30a (cf. Xen. Mem. 1.4.8) for the Socratic version of the argument from generation. The argument from 
part to whole, though not found in Plato, would seem to rest on Platonic premises e.g. Plat. Tim. 30c. See 
Hahm (1977) p.136-140 for a more thorough account of the provenance of Zeno’s cosmobiology.  
142 Cic. Acad. 1.39 (LS 45 A) for Zeno’s conception of body (and supra I.3.2); Aët. 1.7.33 (LS 46 A) for the 
nature of the active principle in the early Stoic tradition (and supra I.3.5, I.3.8). We infer the materiality 
of the Zenonian world-soul by comparing what we know of Zeno’s physics with the arguments he adopted 
from Plato.  
143 Cf. Plat. Laws 10.899-901. 
144 Plat. Laws 10.899. 
145 Ibid. 10.903d. 
146 D. L. VII.87. 
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physical connection. It is worth noting how the arguments advanced in support of 
the world-soul start from the assumption that the human part is rational; 
conclusions are drawn about the nature of the cosmos from observations of 
complex human behaviour. The early history of western philosophy is the story 
of a posteriori abstractions from part to whole; philosophy uses human 
intelligence as the model for God’s psychological topography. λόγος, in Stoicism, 
is contingent upon and/or identified with ψυχή,147 the principle of creativity which 
cannot be extracted from the material it works. For Zeno, as for Plato, the human 
aggregate is the gateway to understanding the cosmos which, on account of this 
parity, is subsequently upheld as the moral paradigm. If the Stoic studies physics 
to an ethical end,148 then this process is mediated by his conception of human 
psychology.  
I.4.3 Cleanthes 
Cleanthes replicates the doctrine of his master with minimal elaboration. His 
independent treatment in this section is justified only by the organic peculiarity of 
his arguments for cosmic vitality.149 The premise that ‘it is a law of Nature that all 
things capable of nurture and growth contain within them a supply of heat’ is 
attributed to Cleanthes in Cicero’s De natura deorum (ND).150 By Cicero’s 
account, Cleanthes argued for the presence of heat in each of the four elements 
and concluded ‘from the fact that all the parts of the world are sustained by heat 
that the world itself also owes its continuous preservation for so long a time to the 
same or similar substance.’151 As Hahm observed,152 this is the argument from 
part to whole but with a material peculiarity; the part is the organism, the whole is 
the cosmos, and we make the journey from premise to conclusion via the 
constituents of the cosmic body, sustained and enlivened by all-penetrating fire. 
 
147 In Zeno’s case, ψυχή and λόγος were likely considered functionally synonymous. The situation will 
become more complex following Chrysippus’ premiership. See I.5.2 below for the graded dispositions of 
πνεῦμα in Chrysippus’ physics/psychology. 
148 Plut. St. Rep. 1035 C-D (LS 60 A).  
149 Hahm (1977) p.140. 
150 Cic. ND II.23 trans. Rackham (1911). He continues (II.23-24):…for everything of a hot and fiery nature 
supplies its own source of motion and activity; but that which is nourished and grows possesses a definite 
and uniform motion; and as long as this motion remains within us, so long sensation and life remain, 
whereas so soon as our heat is cooled and quenches we ourselves perish and are extinguished.’ The 
arguments Cleanthes advanced in support of this premise are recorded in ND II.24. 
151 Cic. ND II.28, see ibid 25-27 for Cleanthes’ argument for the presence of heat in each of the four 
elements. Note that Cicero’s speaker established at II.25 that heat is the property of the ‘all-penetrating 
fiery element.' 
152 Hahm (1977) p.141. 
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The preservative property of the active principle is fundamental to Stoicism’s 
analysis of causes, whose medical implications and (putative) elaborations are 
examined in chapter III.4.153 But note for the moment the organic character of 
heat’s sustaining/life-giving quality. According to Cleanthes, the ‘fiery principle is 
interfused with the whole in such a way as to constitute the male and female 
generative principles, and so to be the necessary cause of both the birth and 
growth of all living creatures, whether animals or those whose roots are planted 
in the earth.’154 Fire is responsible for generation, sustenance and growth in both 
the part and the whole. The cosmos lives as an organism lives. While it retains 
its Platonic identify as rational exemplar,155 it is analogised further with its organic 
components through the mechanisms of its existence. 
     Cleanthes proceeds to identify heat with soul and reason in ND II.29. At ND 
II.31 we find that Cleanthes repeated Plato’s argument that self-animation is a 
property of soul and added that the uncaused animation of heat made it the only 
candidate for its substance. Heat’s all-penetrating nature, proven to Cleanthes’ 
satisfaction in ND II.25-27, makes of the world an animate organism, compelled 
by its soul. Plato’s doctrine is transposed into the flesh-plenum of Stoic 
cosmobiology; corporeality and mutual coextension necessitate the soul’s bodily 
signature; observation of universal traits in organisms – the parts through which 
philosophy demystifies the whole – might have suggested its nature. It is through 
Cleanthes’ interpretation of the world-soul that the enigma of the organic cosmos 
presents itself: how does one delineate the organic part within the organic 
 
153 See esp. III.4.2. 
154 Cic. ND II.28. 
155 I specify Platonic and not Zenonian. For while the materiality of the world-soul is absent from our 
sources for Zeno’s vitalist cosmology, it remains possible that the doctrines Cicero attributes to Cleanthes 
are of an older provenance.  
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whole?156 Stoicism – particularly in its earliest formulations157 – is resistant to 
clear internal boundaries, the continuum of part and whole is in service to the 
philosophy’s τέλος. 
I.4.4 Chrysippus 
Under Chrysippus’ guidance, Stoic cosmology found its most enduring form. The 
structure of the soul hereon becomes integral to how the Stoics rationalise nature 
as a whole. The anatomy of the Stoic soul begins with the ἡγεμονικόν, which the 
Stoics, when attending to the microcosm, located in the human heart.158 
According to Galen, the doctrine has an embryological provenance; the Stoics 
maintained that the heart was generated first in the womb, which then becomes 
the agent of the rest of the body’s assembly,159 making of its ‘shell’ an extension 
of its rationality. Congruently, the ‘exterior’ components of the Stoic soul are 
manifestations of the instrumentality of the ἡγεμονικόν.160 Sight, for example, is 
‘breath which extends from the commanding-faculty to the eyes’, hearing is the 
same substance, reaching from the ἡγεμονικόν to the ears.161 The division in the 
 
156 An answer suggested in ND relates to the idea that not every locus in the cosmic animal is equally 
possessed of the faculties of soul. We note in ND II.29 a distinction between human intelligence and that 
of ‘lower animals’ in Cleanthes’ cosmology, who are moved only by ‘something resembling intelligence.’ 
That human intelligence might be congruently inferior to that of the cosmos can be inferred from this 
passage; their inferior capacity for sensation is said explicitly in ND II.30-31. The text, in the order in which 
it is preserved, would have the heat that sustains the world be more intense than that which sustains the 
individual. The argument seems to be that if the inferior heat of the human is sufficient to produce 
sensation, then not only must the cosmos be sentient but its capacity for sensation must outstrip our own. 
But how can the whole exceed in sentience constituents of its constitution? How can an animal feel more 
perfectly than parts of its own body? This formulation has no precedent in Zeno and seems reliant on 
assumptions that have not been established in the text. If we accept that ND II.30-31 are insufficiently 
developed, the possibility that the text has been incorrectly ordered presents itself. Hahm (1997) p.268 
argued convincingly that ND be rearranged so that II.40-44 be inserted between II.29 and II.30, such that 
the comparison becomes that between the warmth with which ‘men and animals’ are imbued and the 
‘stainless, free and pure’ heat of self-governed celestial bodies. The comparison is therefore between part 
and part and not between part and whole. Cleanthes identified the sun with the cosmic ἡγεμονικόν (Plut. 
Comm. not. 1075D (LS 46 L), see supra I.4.2, I.4.4 below). It is quite possible that ND records a comparison 
he made between the purest concentration of the world-soul and a disposition of soul that had been 
tempered by its peculiar qualification (see I.5 below). Though the cosmos may include in its psychology 
flushes of ‘free and pure’ artistic fire, the cosmic soul is plenary. That the world-soul has structure (for the 
mechanics of which in Chrysippean cosmology, the model we are best able to discern, see I.5.1-2) does 
not compromise macro-microcosm parity if said structure is reflected in the architecture of the human 
soul. 
157 See supra I.3.3. As noted at n.53 and elaborated below (I.4.4 and I.5), the situation in Chrysippean 
Stoicism is more complex. 
158 D. L. VII.159, Gal. Foet. 4.698, 2-9 (LS 53 D). 
159 Gal. Foet. 4.698, 2-9 (LS 53 D). 
160 Long (1982) p.47-48. For the nature of those components see Aët. 4.21-4 (LS 53 H); Gal. PHP III.10-11 
and supra I.4.1. 
161 Aët. 4.21-4 (LS 53 H). The identification of breath (πνεῦμα) with the substance and instrumentality of 
the ἡγεμονικόν alerts us to Aëtius’ Chrysippean source. 
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soul between root and branches, ἡγεμονικόν and emanations, was likely present 
in Stoic psychology from its inception.162 The expansion of this terminology to the 
cosmos was possibly a later development; Cleanthes is the earliest Stoic for 
whom a conception of a cosmic ἡγεμονικόν can be attested.163 Evidently, a 
division introduced to explain the relationship between an intuitively singular 
rational faculty and the variegated facets of psychic experience was discovered 
to have broader explanatory utility which Chrysippus, armed with a more versatile 
and a yet more physiological conception of nature’s qualifying principle (I.5), 
would modify and elaborate. 
     Where Cleanthes softened the boundaries between the organic part and the 
organic whole, Chrysippus posited a unity between the human soul and that of 
the greater organism, contingent on the symmetry of their faculties and structure. 
As we have seen, Chrysippus identified the active principle with πνεῦμα, ‘breath’ 
(I.3.8). πνεῦμα in the human body is identified, at least in part,164 with the 
substance of the soul; in On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP), Galen 
quotes from Chrysippus’ On the Soul: ‘The soul is πνεῦμα connate within us, 
extending as a continuum through the whole body as long as the free-flowing 
breath of life is present in the body.’165 It is on this premise that Stoic 
psychophysiology would go on to have a presence in the medical sphere, where 
subtle variations in all-penetrative πνεῦμα suggest implications for the body as a 
whole.166 Yet note that in its original context, πνεῦμα is the binding agent of Stoic 
anthropocentricism, shaping nature into philosophy’s τέλος. Moreover, the 
substance of the human soul could not be analyzed independently from that 
which permeates the whole. 
     Identifying πνεῦμα with ψυχή facilitates the flow of soul in and out of the 
body.167 Though the substance of one’s soul is in perennial flux the structure is 
 
162 D. L. VII.110. 
163 Plut. Comm. not. 1075 D (LS 46 L). See supra n.156. Though doubtless the Zenonian model suggested 
this development. 
164 See I.5 below. 
165 Gal. PHP III.1.10. 
166 See chapter III. 
167 Calc. In. Tim. 220 (LS 53 G) preserves the following argument from Chrysippus: ‘it is certain that we live 
and breathe with one and the same thing. But we breathe with natural breath. Therefore, we live as well 
with natural breath. But we live with soul. Therefore, the soul is natural breath.’ Breathing is the process 
by which the internal and external worlds intuitively meld. The substance of ψυχή is taken into the body, 
directly and automatically. Its status as the substance of the human soul is obviously dependent on its 
presence in the body – ‘the soul is pneuma connate within us’ (Gal. PHP II.1.10, above) – but its status as 
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preserved. This structure, as we have seen, is concentrated at the ἡγεμονικόν 
located in the heart, whence it flows ‘as if from the source of a spring’, spreads 
through the body and distributes its faculties.168 This pattern of concentration is 
reflected in the world-soul; πνεῦμα pervades the cosmos from the ἡγεμονικόν, 
identified with αἰθήρ in Chrysippus’ cosmology and located at the periphery of the 
continuum: the heavens.169 The structure of the world-soul resembles an 
inversion of that of its human components; the cosmos is governed from its 
periphery, the human from his/her centre. But we should note a precedent set by 
Aristotle regarding the ‘true’ centre (the μέσος) of any given animal; in De Caelo, 
Aristotle distinguishes between the geometric centre of the body of an animal and 
the true centre of that animal.170 An animal’s true centre is the locus from which 
it is governed and Chrysippus (and Cleanthes before him) upholds his precedent 
in transposing the seat of control to the stars.171 Presenting the cosmos in the 
vocabulary of human psychology contributes to its demystification, but it also 
solidifies the parity between the human part and the whole. Zeno’s proclamation 
that the philosopher’s τέλος is the emulation of nature becomes less abstract in 
Chrysippean cosmology if one recognises the mechanisms of nature’s 
transformations as one’s own – and breathes them in. 
     πνεῦμα performs a comparable function in Chrysippus’ cosmology to that of 
divine fire or cohesive heat in the physics of his predecessors; it is the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν (the sustaining/synectic cause) of animation, sentience and 
intelligence throughout the cosmos, identified with ψυχή.172 According to 
Diogenes Laertius, the doctrine that ‘the world is a living being, rational, animate 
and intelligent, is laid down by Chrysippus in the first book of his treatise On 
Providence,’173 a title that reminds us that the function of nature’s soul is the 
 
a portion of the world-soul – as the agent of intelligent qualification in the Stoic cosmos – is retained 
within and without the human form. 
168 Calc. In. Tim. 220 (LS 53 G). cf. Gal. PHP III.1.10-11. 
169 D. L. VII.139.  
170 Arist. De Cael. 2.13.193b6-15. Our discussion of Aristotle’s influence on the structure of the 
Chrysippean world-soul should not be limited to this passage from De Caelo. As we saw above (I.3.8 and 
I.3.9, n.115) πνεῦμα is first analogised to αἰθήρ in Arist. De. gen. an. 2.737b.33-737a1. It is unclear, 
however, how far Chrysippus drew directly from Aristotle in the development of his theory of πνεῦμα/the 
world-soul; theoretical conceptions of πνεῦμα underwent diverse and considerable changes within the 
Peripatetic school during the interim between the two philosophers (c.f. for example Diocles of Carystus 
fr.78, 80 van der Eijk and Strato of Lampsacus fr.108-112 Wehrli). 
171 Hahm (1977) p.151.  
172 For the constituents of Stoic aetiology, see III.4.1. For the difficulties inherent in uncovering the original 
Stoic doctrine of αἴτια συνεκτικά, see III.4.2. 
173 D. L. VII.142 trans. Hicks (1925). 
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providential crafting of its parts. That the activity of the cosmos is directed at itself 
where the human soul is moved to emulate the template of the macrocosm – the 
world beyond the skin – amounts to the principal distinction between the two 
agents. Recall, however, that the ‘micro-soul’ is itself a constituent of nature’s 
providential expression. ‘The world alone is perfect,’ says Cicero’s Stoic speaker 
in ND, and therefore the world alone ‘is virtuous, rational and divine.’174 Self-
sufficiency separates the human aggregate from the cosmos; the human requires 
a paradigm upon which to map his/her behaviour. This relationship is summarised 
in ND. The explanation is attributed to Chrysippus: 
…just as a shield-case is made for the sake of a shield and a sheath for the 
sake of a sword, so everything else except the world was created for the 
sake of some other thing; thus the corn and fruits produced by the earth 
were created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man: for 
example the horse for riding, the ox for ploughing, the dog for hunting and 
keeping guard; man himself however came into existence for the purpose 
of contemplating and imitating the world; he is by no means perfect, but he 
is a small fragment of what is perfect.175 
The teleological character of this passage is explicit.176 The human, like the sword 
sheath, was designed to receive the object for which it was created: in this case, 
the moral value of ‘accordance with the whole’.177 Identifying ψυχή with πνεῦμα 
literalizes the reception of this purpose; through its share of nature’s psychic 
faculties – on which I elaborate below (I.5.3) – the human is afforded the 
necessary apparatus for enabling nature’s self-contemplation. The hierarchy of 
nature’s constituents (I.5.2), where the human is instrumental only to the cosmos 
considered as a whole, has a psychological justification in Chrysippus’ 
cosmology. In the next section, we explore with more acuity the topography of 
nature’s thought processes. 
I.5 Dispositions of πνεῦμα 
It is appropriate, given the centrality of πνεῦμα to Stoicism in its most abiding 
formulation and to the theory of Stoicism’s medical descendants, that a section 
 
174 Cic. ND II.37 trans. Rackham (1911) cf. D. L. VII.143. 
175 Cic. ND II.37-38 trans. Rackham (1911). 
176 For the relationship between psychology, cosmology and teleology see below I.5.3. 
177 Cf. Cic. Fin. III.17.20-22. 
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of this chapter be devoted to the substance itself.  In this section, we explore both 
the ethical and cosmobiological implications of nature’s psychological topography 
and answer the question of how the ontological character of the human body/soul 
duality is expressed in Chrysippean Stoicism. 
I.5.1 ἕξις  
Discrete bodies within the whole are sustained by the tenor of their πνεῦμα, their 
ἕξις.178 Tenors are αἴτια συνεκτικά:179 units of reality’s ongoing assembly 
conceived as ‘currents of air’.180 By their agency ‘bodies are sustained. The 
sustaining air is responsible for the quality of each of the bodies which are 
sustained by tenor; in iron this quality is called hardness, in stone density, in silver 
whiteness.’181 πνεῦμα is the sustaining cause of both a body’s structural integrity 
and its abiding characteristics. These functions are interrelated; the preservation 
of a discrete body is predicated on that of its defining characteristics. ἕξις is a 
product of pneumatic motion: ‘there exists in bodies a kind of tensile movement 
which moves simultaneously inwards and outwards, the outward movement 
producing quantities and qualities and the inward one unity and substance.’182 
The simultaneity of inward and outward motion makes of discrete entities the 
consequence of a tension; they are acted on internally by opposite forces through 
whose interplay their features manifest.183 Qualities spring from the nature of this 
ἕξις, they are ‘breaths and aeriform tensions which give form and shape to the 
parts of matter in which they come to be.’184 Boundaries are thus delineated by 
 
178 Derived from the verb ἔχειν, ‘to have’ or ‘to hold.’ 
179 For species of cause in Stoic aetiology, see III.4. 
180 Plut. St. Rep. (LS 47 M). 
181 Ibid. quoting from Chrysippus’ On Tenors.  
182 Nemes. 70,6-71,4. (LS 47 J). Philo calls this ‘breath which turns back on itself’ in Quod deus sit 
immutabilis 35-6 (LS 47 Q). 
183 Gal. Musc. Mot. 4.402,12-403,10. (LS 47 K) explains this internal activity with an analogy of a bird in 
flight. Though the bird appears motionless when viewed from below, it is in fact ‘counterbalancing its 
innate downward inclination due to the weight of its body by the upward motion resulting from its soul’s 
tension.’ Processes unseen account for the appearance of stasis. The analogy to flight indicates the 
exactness of the process. The harmony of the cosmos is fine-tuned; it can be detected in the tension with 
which the simplest features are actively sustained. 
184 Plut. St. Rep. (LS 47 M). An enigmatic passage from Simplicius (In Ar. Cat 237,25-238,20 (LS 47 S)) 
introduces a Stoic distinction between innate identifiers resulting from ἕξις and characteristics which 
define the particular – those dispositions which, while they can be removed, cannot be intensified or 
relaxed. He offers virtue and the straightness of a stick as two examples of this type. According to 
Simplicius, tenors, for the Stoics, ‘are not specified by their duration or strength but by a certain peculiarity 
of mark.’ We examine the distinction between common and peculiar qualification at I.5.5 below, but it is 
unclear if this is what Simplicius is referring to. My best guess is that ‘virtue’ and ‘straightness’ are 
consequent on ἕξις but are not peculiar dispositions of πνεῦμα in the manner of say, bitterness or 
sourness which, be they relaxed or intense in a particular embodiment, correspond to an internal 
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subtleties of ἕξις;185 an omnipresent rational cause diversifies its effect by varying 
the tautness of its movement across the spectrum of resultant phenomena.  
I.5.2 Hierarchy of psychic faculties  
πνεῦμα is all-penetrating. λόγος too, since the cosmos is intelligently designed, 
is omnipresent.186 But the faculties of πνεῦμα, the complete spectrum of the 
soul’s potential expressions, are not evenly distributed. A passage from the 
pseudo-Galenic Introductio sive medicus attributes three different ‘kinds’ of innate 
πνεῦμα to Stoic physics: ‘The breath which sustains stone is the tenor kind, the 
one which nurtures plants is physical and the psychic breath is that which, in 
animate beings, makes animals capable of sensation and of moving in every 
way.’187 ἕξις is the most basic kind, the process by which bodies are sustained. 
φύσις is responsible for nutriment and growth and ψυχή is the cause of animation. 
A passage from Philo’s Allegories of the Laws presents this gradation as 
cumulative: ‘Physique (φύσις) is tenor in actual motion. Soul (ψυχή) is physique 
which has acquired impression and impulse.’188 The tensile motion of πνεῦμα 
accounts for both the coherence of the stone and the growth of the plant.189 The 
capacity to receive and act upon impressions is an elaboration of φύσις. Philo 
also introduces a fourth, yet higher faculty of λόγος, that is the rational, 
deliberative component.190 Reason distinguishes humans from animals, and 
develops in the child from the psychic faculties that he/she shares with irrational 
(though sentient) lifeforms.191 This highest grade is the deliberative mind (νοῦς) 
which, in its complexity – i.e. in the depth and variety of the options it bestows 
upon on the human – is most closely reflective of the underlying intelligence 




phenomenon. Virtue and straightness are contingent upon standards imposed by the architecture of the 
external world. 
185 Scade (2013) p.82-87. 
186 NB Philo Leg. alleg. 2.22-3 (LS 47 P) where the ‘powers’ expounded below are functions of intelligence. 
187 Ps.-Gal. Intr. 14.726,7-11 (LS 47 N). 
188 Philo Leg. alleg. 2.22-3 (LS 47 P); cf. Philo Quaestiones et solution in Genesim 2.4 (LS 47 R), where soul 
is identified with a higher faculty of ἕξις. 
189 Long (1982) p.46, Long examines psychic functions in Stoicism from p.45-53. 
190 Philo Leg. alleg. 2.22-3 (LS 47 P) cf. Philo Quod dies sit immutabulis 35-6 (LS 47 Q); D. L. VII.138-139. 
191 D. L. VII.86; Long (1982) p.47. 
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I.5.3 Ethical interlude 
In VII.86-87, Diogenes Laertius sets out the hierarchy of psychic faculties in 
Stoicism – albeit without Chrysippus’ physical explanation – then proceeds: ‘this 
is why Zeno was the first (in his treatise On the Nature of Man) to designate as 
the end ‘life in agreement with nature’…which is the same as a virtuous life, virtue 
being the goal towards which nature guides us.192 Stoicism maintained from its 
nascency that the life lived in agreement with nature was the preserve and τέλος 
of the rational being.193 Thus, the Roman Stoic Seneca argued that ‘goodness’ 
was attainable only by man and God.194 The latter possesses it by nature, the 
former by practice.195 Rationality is evidenced by harmony (I.3.1). The harmony 
of nature is the template for correct human behaviour, accessible via the 
contemplative faculty.196 What this behaviour amounts to is self-mastery; reason 
recognises the value of curbing one’s desires, nurturing friendships, upholding 
public duty, acting in service to a prevailing sense of order such that virtuous acts 
are correctly motivated etc.197 In ascribing each level of psychic complexity to the 
tensile movement of πνεῦμα, Chrysippus, though he delineates the boundary 
between man and nature more clearly than his predecessors, perfects this 
concrescence of physics and ethics by improving the resolution on the 
mechanism that assigns mankind its τέλος. 
     Rationality emerges as the child matures. Nature guides the child to a 
harmonious disposition of the soul.198 Objectively, this involves a subtle 
transformation in the tenor of his/her πνεῦμα. But the subjective experience of 
one’s development of the higher faculties of soul – which is, simultaneously, the 
recognition of those same faculties behind the ordered nature of the cosmos199 – 
is worth considering. According to both Seneca and Cicero, for the Stoics, 
apprehension of nature’s subtleties – the details of the moral paradigm – 
proceeds by process of analogy.200 Analogy, in Stoicism, depends on physical, 
 
192 D. L. VII.87 trans. Hicks (1925). 
193 Striker (1996) p.228. cf. Cic. ND II.37-38. 
194 Sen. Ep. 124.13-14 (LS 60 H). 
195 Ibid. 
196 Cic. Tusc. IV.XV, 34-35. See supra 1.2.1. 
197 Sen. Ep. 120.3-5 (LS 60 E); Stob. 2.58, 5-15 (LS 60 K) for examples of innately virtuous characteristics. 
198 D. L. VII.90 – ‘For the starting-points of nature are never perverse.’ Trans. Hicks (1925). cf. Plut. St. Rep. 
1041E (LS 60 B). 
199 Striker (1996) p.229. 
200 Cic. Fin. III.33; Sen. Ep.120.3-5 (LS 60 E). 
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structural parallelisms (see further III.5). The mind ascends by logical inference 
from the readily observable to the formerly concealed – to the nature of ἀρετή, 
the τέλος of logical human action.201 In Seneca’s account, psychological 
processes are discerned through analogy with the physiological: ‘we were familiar 
with bodily health. From this we have worked out that there also exists a health 
of mind. We were familiar with bodily strength. From this we have worked out that 
there also exists strength of mind.’202 Seneca proceeds to set out the sequence 
of observations that leads from one’s basic familiarity with bodily health and 
strength to one’s thorough comprehension of the nature of the sage.203 On this 
account, recognising health as a desirable physiological state is the seed from 
which Stoic ethical doctrine develops according to nature; the notion of a 
preferable psychological disposition, evidenced through action, is an 
extrapolation from rudimentary physiological observations. Correspondence of 
bodily and psychological models is taken as self-evident; inquiry into mind begins 
with its example in the localised human aggregate.204 Bodily health is not typically 
considered an inherent good in Stoic ethics (see further III.3.3),205 but our 
preference for health over disease is an innate preconception,206 the 
acknowledgement of which provides the basis for our inquiry into what does 
constitute an inherent good. For the Stoic philosopher, therefore, the attraction of 
bodily health is the starting point. The τέλος of the Stoic philosopher is to abstract 
from the particular a universal model of appropriate human behaviour, consistent 
with the physical/theological realities uncovered in the process. 
I.5.4 Cosmobiology 
Macro-microcosm parity enforces one’s behavioral obligations to the natural 
order. We would be remis not to acknowledge the biological analogies offered in 
our sources concerning nature’s psychological topography. Diogenes Laertius, 
 
201 Striker (1996) p.229-230; Cic. Fin. III.33. 
202 Sen. Ep.120.3-5 (LS 60 E). 
203 For examples of physiological-psychological parity in Chrysippus, see the quotation from On Affections 
in Gal. PHP V.2.22-4 for the role of Stoic philosophy in ameliorating diseases of the soul and Gal. PHP 
IV.6.1-6 for a biological model of psychological strength. This passage relies on the identification of τόνοι 
(stretched ropes, cords. See I.5.4 below and n.209-210) with both physiological and psychological sinews. 
204 cf. supra I.4.2. 
205 D. L. VII.101-3 lists both health and strength among the ‘indifferents’, a category in Stoic ethics that is 
removed from moral value. Stob. 2.79, 18-80,20-1 (LS 58 C) lists health and strength among indifferents 
that are ‘in accordance with nature’, accounting for their value in the logical discernment of the ethical 
ideal. 
206 See Plut. St. Rep. 1041E (LS 60 B); D. L. VII.53. 
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expounding the distribution of intelligence in the Stoic cosmos – which he calls 
animal, animate and rational – writes that providence passes as ἕξις through 
some of its parts ‘as through the bones and sinews’.207 The parts which are 
sustained by ἕξις are compared to the rigid, physiological scaffolding that 
supports a complex being. There is a parallel here with Chrysippus’ 
psychophysiological application of the word τόνος – stretched ropes or cords, 
employed to denote tension, a faculty of ἕξις – preserved in Galen’s PHP, 
whereby the substance of the soul takes on a sinewy character.208 Chrysippus 
refers to human psychology, but the cosmobiological implications are apparent. 
The grasp of the world-soul on its material elaborations is an exercise of physical 
strength, reflected in the capacity of the sinews.209 As the cosmos as a whole is 
sustained by way of ἕξις, the topography of the world-soul attains a kind of 
musculature.210 
     The passage from Philo’s Allegories of the Laws that deals with the hierarchy 
of psychic faculties in Stoicism takes this macro-microcosm parity further. Philo 
writes of ἕξις that it is ‘shared by lifeless things, stones and logs, and our bones, 
which resemble stones also participate in it.’211 Stones and logs are inanimate in 
the manner of bones, restricted in their localised psychic faculties yet necessary 
constituents of an organic whole. ‘Physique’, Philo continues, ‘also extends to 
plants and in us there are things like plants – nails and hair.’212 Nails and hair 
grow on the body like plants upon the earth, according to nature, but without 
impulse. Impressions and impulses are the preserve of rational and irrational 
 
207 D. L. VII.138-139. 
208 Gal. PHP IV.6.1-6. 
209 Hahm (1977) p.155 makes much of the possible synonymy of τόνοι and νευρά (cord-like physiological 
structures) in texts predating On Affections. But the only reliable example of the two terms being used 
interchangeably is the Hippocratic text On Joints (De art. 11). How far Chrysippus’ conception of τόνος 
was influenced by anatomical texts is unclear, but the possibility remains open. Certainly, the elision of 
τόνος (a Stoic concept that predates Chrysippus, see n.210 below) with ἕξις (a Chrysippean invention) 
combines the sustaining capacity of πνεῦμα with a notion of strength, which makes it amenable to the 
obvious physiological analogy. 
210 The perennial tension this evokes is carried further by the musical connotation of τόνοι, from which 
we derive the English ‘tone’. Plut. St. Rep. 1084d reports the Cleanthean conception of τόνος as the 
physical ‘striking of fire’ identified with the virtues of ‘force and strength.’ Cleanthes’ model affords ‘force 
and strength’ a creative agency. The ‘striking’ of a body implies a subsequent reaction, a sounding and 
vibration from the object struck. cf. Clem. Strom. V.8, 48 where Cleanthes reportedly likened the sun, the 
cosmic ἡγεμονικόν, to a plectron, an implement that induces music from the lyre by skillfully plucking its 
strings. The active principle is the musician, the passive principle, the instrument. See Hahm (1977) p.155-
156. The musical analogy is salient in a cosmology of localised micro-harmonies, all participating in a 
greater, moral-aesthetic perfection. 




animals alike;213 the faculties of the zoetic soul are included under the umbrella 
of the eight-part human soul. Although the human aggregate is a unified body, 
subtleties in ἕξις permit the analysis of the whole into psychically distinct regions, 
reflecting the cosmos back upon itself.  
     The rationality of the human soul – that which elevates it above the zoetic – is 
not analogised to any part of the external world in Philo’s account or elsewhere.214 
Rather, as we have seen, it is the behaviour of the human which is intended to 
reflect the rationality of the macrocosm. Realising one’s τέλος requires 
deliberation; deliberation is a function of language.215 Language, distinguished 
from utterances,216 is composed of λεκτά, ‘sayables’ or more primitively, 
‘thinkables’.217  λεκτά are incorporeals by whose instrumentality the rational being 
navigates the corporeal world with a greater awareness than its irrational 
counterparts, and therefore with a greater moral obligation.218 The unity of 
language and reason, encapsulated in λόγος, is as old as Greek philosophy itself. 
A parallel may be drawn between the organisation of the cosmos via λόγος and 
its description in language. Developing a coherent model of the world – the seeds 
of which are posited first in thought and then refined through dialectic219 – is to 
perform in language and in microcosm what the Stoic God performs upon itself.220 
The connexion between human psychophysiology and cosmology in Stoicism is 
profound. Each of the world’s psychic expressions finds an analogue in the 
human aggregate, and vice versa. 
I.5.5 Peculiar qualification 
How, then, is the human individuated? Stoic ontology recognises four ‘genera’ of 
body: substrate, qualified, disposed and relatively disposed.221 These are 
 
213 Ibid. 
214 Except insofar as it resides pre-eminently in the ἡγεμονικόν, which Chrysippus localised at the 
periphery of the cosmos (see D. L. VII.139 and I.4.4 above). Its function in Stoic cosmology, however, by 
which its presences is evidenced, is omnipresent.  
215 This argument is made in Long (1982) p.50-53. 
216 D. L VII.57. 
217 Long (1982) p.50-51; Schenkeveld and Barnes (1999) p.197-213. 
218 Long (1982) p.52-53. 
219 The dialectical element of Stoic sense-making enforces the inter-reliance of human beings in 
uncovering truth. In this respect – though I wander beyond what is explicit in the source material – 
humanity itself might better fulfil the role of microcosm than the individual human form; it is through 
their cooperative effort that the cosmos is created in language. 
220 Note in particular our sources pertaining to the Chrysippean interpretation of ‘dialectic’ as a 
mechanism for truth-finding. e.g. D. L. VII.41-44, 46-48; Alex. Aph. In. Ar. Top. 1,8-14 (LS 31 D). 
221 Simp. In Ar. cat. 66,32-67,2 (LS 27 F). 
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metaphysical lenses through which bodies can be interrogated. The answer to 
our question will most likely be found in the subdivision of the second category: 
the distinction between ‘common’ and ‘peculiar’ qualification. The distinction is 
intended to reconcile physical with epistemological reality. According to Plutarch, 
the Stoic answer to the ‘growing argument’ – that to grow is not to develop but to 
be replaced by a different entity – was to divide the metaphysical analysis of the 
human being into two: on the one hand, he/she is substance, a dynamic 
aggregate of common qualifications amounting to ‘the human’; on the other, 
he/she is a body of peculiar qualification.222 On the former analysis he/she is 
‘always in flux…neither growing nor diminishing nor remaining as it is at all’; on 
the latter he/she ‘remains and grows and diminishes and undergoes all the 
opposite affections to the first one – although it is its natural partner, combined 
and fused with it, and nowhere providing sense perception with a grasp of the 
difference.’223 Plutarch bemoans the absence of sensory evidence for the 
human’s dual nature as reported by the Stoics but what he sought (or purported 
to have sought) would be found in the dimension of time; the doctrine of peculiar 
qualification is best summarized by Simplicius:  
…if in the case of compound entities there exists individual form – with 
reference to which the Stoics speak of something peculiarly qualified, which 
is both gained, and lost again, all together, and remains the same 
throughout a compound entity’s life even though its constituent parts come 
to be and are destroyed at different times.224 
The peculiar qualification arrives and departs as a unity and transcends localised 
physical transformations undertaken over time. It is the inalienable property by 
which the individual is recognised as him/herself, the progenitor of particularity.225 
 
222 Plut. 1083A-1084A (LS 28 A). The growing argument is traced back to Epicharmus, supposed pupil of 
Pythagoras. Plutarch attributes the metaphysical division of the human into substance and peculiar quality 
to Chrysippus. See Sedley (1999) p.403-404. 
223 Plut. 1083A-1084A (LS 28 A); cf. Oxyrhynchus papyrus 3008 (LS 28 C) – ‘…since the duality which they 
say belongs to each body is differentiated in a way unrecognisable by sense-perception. For if a peculiarly 
qualified thing like Plato is a body, and Plato’s substance is a body, and there is no apparent difference 
between these in shape, colour, size and appearance, but both have equal weight and the same outline, 
by what definition and mark shall we distinguish them and say that now we are apprehending Plato 
himself, not the substance of Plato?’  
224 Simp. In Ar. De. an. 217,36-201,2 (LS 28 I). 
225 Sedley (1999) p.404. 
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     It is, however, a somewhat ill-fitting constituent of an otherwise intelligible 
cosmic psychophysiology. How the Stoics expressed the peculiar quality in 
physical terms is uncertain. We intuit that peculiar qualities are posterior to 
common qualities,226 but to identify peculiarity with a complex of common 
qualities – as the fourth century philosophy Dexippus does in his commentary On 
Aristotle’s Categories227 – is unconvincing, for minor adjustments to one’s 
character and appearance, inevitable over time, would necessarily alter the 
character of the peculiar quality.228 Alternatively –  and I think more likely – there 
is an additional psychic imprint that pervades the aggregate, a pattern of 
pneumatic tension that radiates peculiarity, despite the sum of the human’s 
common qualifications being repeated across species and reflected in the nature 
and behaviour of the cosmos as a whole. The human is thus an aggregate of 
innate cosmic processes, sustained by ἕξις, nurtured by φύσις, imbued with all 
the faculties of ψυχή and bonded by shared reason to the moral perfection of the 
natural order. His/her limits are defined by subtleties of ἕξις and his/her peculiarity 
is consequent on an inalienable imprint, a feature common to a sequence of 
dynamic patterns – the body-soul interconnexion – over time, which is itself a 
transient manifestation within a greater cosmic organism, whose presence is a 
feature common to the sum of dynamic patterns which comprise its body and its 
soul. 
I.6 Conclusion: The moral value of organic cosmology  
My intentions for this chapter have been as follows. 1) To set out Stoic physics in 
its original, non-medical context; 2) to emphasize Stoicism’s τέλος by 
foregrounding the ethical consequences of its physical doctrine and 3) to draw 
attention to the physiological peculiarity of Stoic cosmology. This final pursuit has 
two purposes. The first, as I set out in the introduction, is to lay the groundwork 
for the question of why Athenaeus’ transposition of Stoic physics into medicine 
appears to have been stringently selective, given the centrality of health and 
physiology to the original doctrine. The second is to demonstrate how 
physiological models are employed in Stoic philosophy, and to what end. The 
tension, as should now be clear and as shall unfold further throughout III, is 
 
226 And find support for thus at Syrianus In Ar. Met. 28,18-19 (LS 28 G). 
227 Dex. In Ar. Cat. 30,20-6 (LS 28 J). 
228 Sedley (1999) p.405. 
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between Stoicism’s psychophysiological analysis of the cosmos and the 
Pneumatist’s anti-cosmological analysis of the body and the soul. 
     Stoic ethics identifies in nature the formula for correct human behaviour, 
consistent with an innate rationality that orchestrates the world’s perfection and 
guides the human by his/her deliberative mechanism – evidenced in the 
metaphysical dexterity of language – towards ἀρετή, participation in natural 
perfection, the integration of oneself into a complete all-thinking whole. The Stoic 
cosmos is hylozoic; every constituent is living tissue, moved/sustained by 
reason/soul. But it is only when considered as a unity that the world assumes the 
role of moral paradigm; harmony is evident at every layer of analysis – from the 
interaction of the principles, the elements, the parts of the body, fruits and 
animals, animals and humankind –  but it is to the sum of these congruities which 
the ethicist aspires.  
     Stoic ethics is a dialogue between part and whole. It is only the human 
component who is capable, by virtue of his/her psychophysiology, to recognize 
the ethical implications of the totality, to see oneself reflected back. Macro-
microcosm parity enforces one’s behavioral obligations to the natural order, such 
that cosmobiology is the base ingredient for Stoicism’s psychological salve. The 
part mirrors the whole by means of a shared psychophysiological topography, 
differentiated only by the variable of relative perfection. What the cosmos creates 
of itself the human creates in language, wielded as an epistemological tool for 
dividing truth from falsity and reflective, in its rationality, of designing λόγος. 
Moreover, for the Stoics, human psychophysiology is the gateway to a posteriori 
comprehension of the All. It should not, therefore, come as any surprise that 
human health, as demonstrated in both Zeno and Seneca, is conceived as a 
gateway to understanding ἀρετή. The questions we must answer going forward 
and which we will pick up in chapter III, are as follows. 1) How far can Stoic 
physics accommodate the physician’s τέλος? 2) How far is Stoic philosophy – 
Stoic physics appropriately oriented, with its holistic fixation – compatible with 
that same τέλος? 3) To what extent can Stoicising medicine ever be considered 
‘Stoic’ when τέχναι are defined by constraints to epistemology, by the aversion of 





Atoms, εἴδωλα, ἀταραξία 
On the therapeutic τέλος of Epicurean philosophy 
* 
II.0 On to Epicureanism. As in chapter I, my intentions for this chapter are 
multiple, but all are foundational to my analysis of the Epicureanism’s medical 
adaptation, the subject of IV. My goal is to delineate the body-soul duality in 
Epicurean physics with the intention to 1) present the physical and 
epistemological ideas whose transposition into medicine I explore in IV in their 
original philosophical context and 2) contextualise Epicurean psychophysiology 
as a component of an ethics-oriented, ‘medicalised’ philosophy in which 
knowledge of physics was instrumental to the pursuit of ἀταραξία (psychological 
equanimity).  
     As set out in my introduction (0.3),1 I will argue over the course of this thesis 
that the changes we see Graeco-Roman doctors make to Hellenistic doctrine 
become more intelligible if understood as a reaction to an entrenched hierarchy 
of disciplines, formalised by Aristotle, that dominated Hellenistic ethics and 
subordinated all intellectual pursuits to that of the intrinsic Good. In the case of 
Epicureanism, I will argue at II.5 (and pick up the thread in IV) that the doctrine, 
which styles itself a psychological panacea, developed its physics only so far as 
to accommodate the role of psychological medicament. Moreover, I will suggest 
that practical realities of the medical profession may have proven incompatible 
with the Epicurean τέλος. In order to do this, an overview of the content and 
function of Epicurean physics is necessitated and will occupy us at II.3. As with I, 
the distribution of emphasis in this chapter is dictated by the nature of 
Epicureanism’s medical adaptation. Thus, where we had little to say of Stoic 
epistemology in the last chapter, this branch of Epicurean philosophy will receive 
significant attention below, both in tandem with the outline of Epicurean physics 
at II.3, and independently at II.4. I will argue in IV that the medical appeal of 
Epicurean philosophy lay principally in the domain of epistemology. Epicurean 
 
1 See further III.3, esp. III.3.1. 
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epistemology rests on the assumptions of its physics; it cannot be abstracted 
from the particulate model of reality on which it depends. 
II.1 Asclepiades of Bithynia 
As in the previous chapter, the following discussion of Epicureanism is shaped 
by the nature of its medical appropriation. The following summary is simply that; 
controversies surrounding the nature of Asclepiades’ influences/adaptations are 
addressed in IV.1.2. 
     A native of Cius (later Prusias ad mare) in Bithynia (modern northwest Turkey) 
Asclepiades established himself in Rome during the latter part of the second 
century BC. As Greek medicine’s first celebrated exponent in Rome,2 controversy 
abides as to whether Asclepiades be considered a late-second century physician 
or one whose influence was greater felt in the early part of the first century BC.3 
Whatever the correct chronology, Asclepiades’ status in Rome amounts to a 
critical development in the history of Greek medicine; Asclepiades of Bithynia is 
an axial figure, a steppingstone between the third century Hellenistic anatomists 
and the tradition of Graeco-Roman medicine exemplified by Galen of Pergamon 
in the second century AD. 
     Asclepiades’ theory of health and disease drew extensively from Epicurean 
atomism.4 He proposed that matter could be analysed into ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι, 
subsensible particles that behave like Epicurean atoms in their perpetual motion 
 
2 The earliest, though apparently unsuccessful, attempt to establish Greek medicine in Rome was, 
according to Pliny (NH XXIX.6), made by one Archagathus (‘The Executioner’) in the late 3rd century BC, 
whose purported brutality stymied his attempts to develop a substantial following. Greek doctors would 
continue to drip into Rome in the coming century, but it would not be until the late second century BC 
that Rome would boast its own major medical authority. 
3 Asclepiades’ arrival at Rome in the closing decades of the second century BC is uncontested; how much 
of the first century he saw remains unclear. Rawson (1982) placed the date of his death before 91 BC. 
Vallance (1990) accepts Rawson’s chronology without additional analysis. The orthodox view was 
questioned in a recent article by Rebecca Flemming (2012) p.67-69, who argues that the conventional 
date relies too heavily upon a single sentence in Cicero’s De. or. The sentence in question (I.62: …neque 
vero Asclepiades, is quo nos medico amicoque usi sumus tum eloquentia vincebat ceteros medicos, in eo 
ipso, quod ornate dice bat, medicinae facultate utebatur, non eloquentiae.), in which Cicero has the orator 
L. Crassus speak of having enjoyed Asclepiades’ services as a doctor and a friend in a dialogue set in 91 
BC, is ambiguously worded, and Crassus’ application of the perfect tense in referring to Asclepiades should 
not automatically be taken to suggest that he was dead before the dialogue took place. Flemming 
suggests, in accordance with evidence from Sextus Empiricus (M VII.80), that Asclepiades lived into the 
second decade of the first century BC, which would have afforded him the necessary time to establish his 
reputation in Rome and produce the most plausible chronology for his various pupils and followers. 
4 For the debate surrounding this claim, see IV.1.2. Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-7 (see further IV.2.2) is 
our principal source for the theory summarised in this paragraph. 
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through a limitless void. They, like atoms, are perceptible only to reason. They 
have primary qualities – size, shape and tangibility – but are without secondary, 
phenomenal qualities – colour, smell, taste etc. Health is maintained by the free 
and balanced motion of ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι through void-gaps (πόροι, pores) in the 
body while, in most cases, disease results from the impaction of ὄγκοι in any 
particular locality. Asclepiades’ epistemology also indicates a profound Epicurean 
influence.5 I will argue in IV.5 that the appeal of Epicurean physics to the Bithynian 
lay chiefly in its inextricability from Epicurean epistemology. I dedicate II.3-4 to 
illuminating this bond. 
     Where the boundary between Stoicism and Pneumatism is characterised by 
selective permeability (see esp. III.2), the place where Epicureanism and the 
medical art touch is defined by explosive transformation. Asclepiades makes the 
following modifications to Epicurean doctrine, which inform the content of this 
chapter: 1) he denied the body a localised ἡγεμονικόν. This is the doctrine that 
brought him most attention from commentators outside the medical field (IV.4); 
2) he claimed that everything occurs through necessity, eschewing 
Epicureanism’s intrinsic anti-fatalism (IV.3);6 3) most controversially (for modern 
commentators), he proposed that the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι were frangible; they can be 
broken into fragments of infinite parts.7 Questions of anti-fatalism, psychology 
and the properties of the atom will occupy our attention throughout this chapter. 
We examine the relationship between each of these physical doctrines and 
Epicureanism’s ethical τέλος so as to establish their negotiability if the system 
were to jettison its ethical obligations and re-orient itself towards facilitating a 
physician’s goals. In Asclepiades’ interaction with Epicureanism, negotiability is 
the decisive variable. I will argue at IV (esp. IV.5.3) that this quality is determined 
by the dependency of Epicurean epistemology on the physical doctrine under 
scrutiny. Asclepiades modifies Epicurean philosophy around the peripheries of 
an immutable core, the unyielding knot of physical and epistemological premises. 
 
 
5 I address the controversies surrounding this subject at IV.5. 
6 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass 1.14.115.  
7 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-107. IV.2 for the broader consequences of this doctrine. At IV.2.5 we 
examine the possible motivations for Asclepiades’ introduction of corpuscular fragility into a physics 
derived from Epicureanism. 
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II.2 Background and Evidence 
The Epicurean school was founded in Athens in the last decade of the fourth 
century BC by the eponymous philosopher, an Athenian citizen raised on the 
island colony of Samos.8 Near the midpoint of his life, having crafted elsewhere 
the foundational principles of the philosophy he would continue to nurture,9 
Epicurus returned to his metropolis and founded The Garden, a secluded 
community of friends and followers (including, most scandalously, women and 
slaves) throughout which his doctrines were disseminated and discussed.10 
Where Stoicism was a steppingstone in a tradition whose influence on western 
philosophical and religious thought has gone unbroken,11 the broader history of 
the Epicureanism, encompassing all of its manifold receptions, is marked by 
lengthy periods of silence and disinterest. For all its early popularity, the school 
fades from history after the third century AD. Its influence goes undetected until 
the early seventeenth century, when the principles of Epicurean physics would 
be rediscovered and incorporated into the foundations of modern science.12 
     Concerning testimonia, we are better posed to reproduce in a more 
consolidated form Epicurean cosmology than we are with the Stoic equivalent. 
This is consequent, in part, on the fidelity of later Epicureans to the doctrines of 
the founder; though evidence of inter-Epicurean disagreement over the school’s 
development has been uncovered – particularly concerning the location of the 
ἡγεμονικόν in light of anatomical discoveries (II.3.9)13 – the template goes 
 
8 D. L. X.1. Among the early teachers under whom the young Epicurus studied, Nausiphanes, the follower 
of Democritus, is attested in multiple accounts. D. L. X.13-14 cites the Chronology of Apollodorus and 
Ariston’s Life of Epicurus. 
9 Sedley (1998) p.128-132 makes a compelling case for books I-XIII of Epicurus’ magnum opus, On Nature, 
having been completed before he established himself in Athens in 306/306 BC. Epicurus taught for four 
years in Lampsacus (D. L. X.15), on the Asian mainland, where much of the first thirteen books of On 
Nature were likely written. 
10 D. L. X.2, 10-11. 
11 The founding of this tradition is most commonly – though somewhat arbitrarily – attributed to Plato, 
most famously by Alfred North Whitehead in his book Process and Reality (1929, p.39 in the 1979 
corrected edition), in which he argued that the European philosophical tradition consisted of ‘a series of 
footnotes to Plato’. It is worth noting, given Plato’s peculiar reticence regarding Democritean philosophy, 
that the materialist tradition Epicurus inherited from Democritus and Leucippus is among the few 
exceptions from Plato’s direct influence. What Epicureanism shares with Stoicism, as I will argue over the 
course of this thesis, is more directly inherited from Aristotle and pertains to the teleology of the 
Epicurean ethical project. 
12 O’Keefe (2010) p.5. 
13 Sedley (1998) p.68-70. An exegetical treatise by Demetrius of Laconia, recovered from the library of 
Philodemus at Herculaneum (P. Herc. 1012), acknowledges a discussion within the Epicurean school 
concerning whether Epicurus might have been mistaken in his cardiocentricism. I treat the anatomical 
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unchallenged throughout the history of the school.14 Epicureanism undergoes no 
transformation comparable to that of Stoicism under Chrysippus’ premiership; the 
picture we construct of Epicurean cosmology is the product of layered reiterations 
of foundational doctrines, rather than an ongoing reconciliation of conflicting 
testimonia towards a broad consensus which accounts for alterations over time. 
     Of more tangible significance, we have a greater wealth of Epicurean 
testimonia than we do for any other Hellenistic school. Among the surviving works 
of Epicurus are three didactic letters, preserved intact: the Letter to Herodotus, 
the Letter to Pythocles, and the Letter to Menoeceus, concerning physics, 
cosmology and meteorology, and ethics respectively, and a collection of 
aphoristic Principal Doctrines (RS), all which are preserved in the tenth book of 
Diogenes Laertius’ Lives.15 From Epicurus we also possess (occasionally 
substantial) fragments from his magnus opus, On Nature,16 recovered from 
Philodemus’ library in Herculaneum, a further collection of aphorisms entitled the 
Vatican Sayings for the location where the manuscript was discovered, and an 
assortment of fragments quoted in Greek writings and the Latin works of Cicero 
and Seneca. Though what survives of Epicurus’ corpus amounts to a sliver of his 
literary output,17 we are fortunate to possess summaries of Epicurean physics 
and ethics in the founder’s own words. There are some limitations; Epicurus tells 
us that the Letter to Herodotus – the longest of his extant epistles and most 
important for our purposes – was intended as an epitome of his physical system,18 
designed to abbreviate for the student his principal doctrines at the expense of 
the ‘exact details’ which he presumes his reader can access should they wish.19 
 
discoveries that prompted this dispute in some depth at IV.4, where I examine their influence on 
Asclepiades’ psychological model. 
14 To acknowledge this is not to echo Eduard Zeller’s (1870 p.394-396) hostile pronouncement that no 
system other than Epicureanism ‘troubled itself so little about the foundation on which it rested’ nor 
‘confined itself so exclusively to the utterances of its founder’ on account of their ‘servile dependence’ on 
his doctrine, for all that Zeller’s view found antecedents in antiquity (e.g. Numenius in Euseb. Praeb. 
Evang. 14.5.3, see Fish & Sanders (2011) p.1). Zeller’s conclusions were insufficiently founded. As Sedley 
(1989) p.97-99 argues, the Epicureans were not unique in their adherence to the canonical texts of their 
school’s founder; what distinguishes the Epicureans from, for example, the Stoics in this area is that 
Epicurus laid out his doctrine systematically, and in great detail (with a possible significant exception (see 
II.5)), where Zeno seems to have left vast areas of his philosophy unclarified. 
15 The Principal Doctrines are generally considered to have been arranged by Epicurus himself, as opposed 
to having been subsequently gleaned from his texts. Gaskin (1995) p.5. 
16 Specifically, fragments from Books II (two copies), XI (two copies), XIV, XV, XXV, XXVIII and four further 
unidentified books. See Sedley (1998) p.98-99. 
17 D.L. X.26-27 – Epicurus ‘eclipsed all before him in the number of his writings.’ Trans. Hicks (1925). 
18 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 35. Chapter citations in Epicurus’ epistles are taken from D. L. X. 
19 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 83. 
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Moreover, the body of work the Letter to Herodotus purports to summarise is 
naturally limited to that which predates its composition. Sedley identifies this body 
of work as books I-XIII of On Nature which,20 in its completed form, was thirty-
seven books in length.21 This may account for the more significant omissions we 
identify in the text, cross-referenced with later Epicurean sources.22 
     The Letter to Herodotus is typically used to supplement and contextualize our 
most complete source for Epicurean physics, the didactic Latin epic De rerum 
natura (hereafter DRN) by the Roman poet Lucretius, written in the first century 
BC. Addressed to one Memmius,23 and crafted for a Roman elite, DRN 
reconstructs Epicurean physics in Latin verse, ‘sweetening’24 with poetry the 
breadth of Epicurean cosmology from the nature of the atom to the roots of 
meteorological phenomena by way of human sense-mechanics and the 
impressions that guide reason towards nature’s subsensory mechanisms, then 
further still to the character of εὐδαιμονία/ἀταραξία. DRN is Epicurus’ cure-all, 
rendered palatable. Much of what Lucretius writes of Epicurean physics can be 
checked against the Letter to Herodotus. Where Lucretius does include details of 
physical doctrine that are absent from Epicurus’ epitome, we have little cause to 
suspect him of deviating from the founding doctrine; David Sedley has done much 
to establish Lucretius’ ‘fundamentalist’ devotion to Epicurean doctrine, evidenced 
by his lack of engagement with contemporary inter-Epicurean debates or with the 
philosophy’s first century opponents,25 and has argued convincingly that the first 
fifteen books of Epicurus’ On Nature was Lucretius’ singular Epicurean source.26 
Lucretius tells us that he is walking in the footprints of Epicurus.27 When he is not 
 
20 Sedley (1998) p.100, 131-132 
21 D.L X.27. 
22 See for example II.3.8 below. 
23 Almost certainly (or, at least, almost certainly based upon) the historical C. Memmius, whom Cicero 
implores (Ep. Fam. 13.1.3-4) on behalf of Athenian Epicureans not to demolish what remained of Epicurus’ 
house. See Clay (1983) p.212-225 for the relationship between Lucretius and his reader, of which the 
historical Memmius is but a single facet. 
24 Twice in DRN – first at I.936-950 and then again at IV.11-25 – Lucretius likens his poetry to the ‘sweet 
yellow honey’ smeared upon the rim of a goblet of bitter medicine. I examine this imagery and what it 
says of Epicureanism curative self-image at II.5.1. 
25 Sedley (1998) p.62-93. Also, Clay (1983) p.24-25. 
26 Sedley p.134-165. The only section of DRN which cannot be sourced from On Nature is the plague 
episode at VI.1138-1286, which is derived from Thucydides. Considering Lucretius’ devotion to the tenets 
of On Nature I-XV in the rest of the text, deviations from Thucydides’ account should be read as reflective 
of Epicurus’ position as articulated in those books. See II.5.3 below. 
27 Lucr. III.1-30. 
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transposing the first books of On Nature into verse, he is celebrating the wisdom 
of their author or justifying their translation into poetry.28 
     Beyond Epicurus and Lucretius, we possess fragments of the inscription of 
Diogenes of Oenoanda, an Epicurean of the second century AD who had his 
works inscribed on a portico wall in the eponymous polis. Non-Epicurean – and 
frequently hostile – testimonia include Seneca, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero, 
Plutarch and Diogenes Laertius. 
II.3 Physics and the scientific method 
The following exposition will follow the order of information set out in the Letter to 
Herodotus (hereafter Ep. Hdt.) as far as is useful. I withhold the discussion of the 
mechanics of sensation until II.4.1. The discussion of the swerve 
(clinamen/παρέγκλισις), absent from Ep. Hdt., is inserted at II.3.8. Throughout 
this section I focus on the emphasis Epicurus imposes on the capacity of the 
human mind to apprehend nature’s hidden apparatus so as to demonstrate how 
Asclepiades’ adopted scientific method was originally perceived to lead 
inexorably to the following materialist conclusions. In contrast with I.3, 
epistemology, rather than ethics, is our focus in this section and the next. As we 
shall see, my thesis is that the physics-ethics interconnexion is not so closely 
entwined in Epicureanism as it is in Stoicism; with respect to ethics, Stoic physics 
is a template (III.5); Epicurean physics is a justification (II.5.6). As we shall see, 
the abatement of pain is seldom aligned with the activity of atoms – indeed, when 
atomism is moulded to accommodate an ethical stipulation, as with the clinamen 
(II.3.8), the backwards engineering of anti-fatalism into corpuscular materialism 
is manifest in the resultant (at least, apparent) incoherence. The consequences 
of this partial disjunction for Epicureanism’s medical adaptation will unfold 






28 cf. Lucr. III.1-3 and IV.1-25. Lucretius’ claims to originality, such as that made at I.921-929, pertain to 
the form of DRN, not the content. 
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II.3.1 Permanence and biological regularity 
The first law is conservation.29 Nothing can be generated ex nihilo or destroyed; 
the elements are permanent. Therefore, nothing can be added to or subtracted 
from the All.30 From Ep. Hdt.:  
…nothing comes into being out of what is not. For in that case everything 
would come into being out of everything, with no need for seeds. Also, if that 
which disappears were destroyed into what is not, all things would have 
perished for lack of that into which they are dissolved.31 
Refutation of ex nihilo generation and destruction is, as we have already seen 
(I.3.5) a common gambit in ancient philosophy.32 The empirical character of 
Epicurus’ exposition is, however, a distinctive attribute of his method of 
speculation.33 Immediately prior to the passage above, Epicurus impresses on 
Herodotus the importance of sensation in grounding inferences to the non-
evident.34 In the context of Ep. Hdt., the appeal to sensation at Ep. Hdt. 38-39 
confirms his empiricist criteria. We observe biological regularity and understand 
that generation necessitates a pre-existent seed. Furthermore, the constancy of 
sense-reality suggests a minimum into which matter can be destroyed, a 
magnitude to be reincorporated into a newer structure.35 Asclepiadean physics 
preserves the quantity of matter in the universe, but the interpolation of 
corpuscular fragility would appear to have consequences for the permanence of 
reality’s substructure (see IV.2.4.3).36 
     The cyclicality of phenomena – dissolution and reconstitution in place of 
destruction ex nihilo and spontaneous generation – is not addressed directly in 
Ep. Hdt. but Lucretius communicates its essence. He appeals to the self-
 
29 This is the first physical principle Epicurus addresses in Ep. Hdt., and very likely the subject of Nat. I. 
Sedley (1998) p.110-114. 
30 A distinction is once again enforced between the cosmos and All. Like the Stoics (cf. S. E. M IX.332), the 
Epicureans conceive the All as an infinite totality; unlike the Stoics, the Epicureans theorized that the 
totality included an infinite number of additional worlds both similar and dissimilar to the one which we 
inhabit. See Epic. Ep. Hdt. 45; Ep. Pyth. 88. 
31 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 38-39 (LS 4 A). 
32 c.f. Calc. In Tim. 293 (LS 44 E); I.3.6. 
33 Sedley (1999) p.364. 
34 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 37-38 (LS 17 B); Asmis (2009) p.85-86. See II.4.3 below. 
35 Cf. Lucr. I.225-237, 241-249, 670-676. 




replenishing character of nature in his proof of matter’s eternal conservation.37 
The themes of birth and death within a world-order of permanent constituents 
persist through DRN. The organic model of death and birth as respectively 
nourishing and nourished is applied to an ecology of compound bodies, organic 
and non-organic alike, perishing into one another,38 permanent in their 
constituents but impermanent in their permutations. Biological regularity is held 
to be indicative of deeper truths concerning physical reality. This is notable both 
as an example of Epicurean scientific reasoning and of how philosophy 
incorporates biological phenomena into a broader cosmological schema. There 
are parallels with Stoic cosmobiology, but they can only be taken so far. Where 
Epicureanism locates in biology the template for complex but constrained 
patterns of development, a sign from which subsensible mechanics can be 
inferred; Stoicism identifies the starting point for cosmological, theological and 
ethical extrapolation. Vitality is not emergent in Stoic physics, it is fundamental. 
II.3.2 Body and Void 
Where questions can and have been raised about the Stoics’ commitment to 
materialism,39 Epicurean cosmology permits no such ambiguity. Epicurus tells us 
in Ep. Hdt. that ‘the totality of things is bodies and void’ and that ‘beyond these 
nothing can even be thought of, either by imagination or by analogy with what is 
imagined.’40 Phenomena spring from the as-yet-unspecified interactions of 
primary bodies. Only absence is incorporeal, be it empty of all matter or 
functioning as a substratum for material interaction.41 As was the case with the 
 
37 Ibid. I.250-264. 
38 E.g. Ibid. I.665-674. 
39 See Gourinat (2009) p.46-70 and I.3.2, n.41. 
40 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 39-40. (LS 5 A). 
41 Body and void are per se existents but void is not an element in its own right. Epic. Ep. Pyth. 86, for 
example, implies an ontological distinction between the indivisible elements and the plane of their 
activity. Body and void do not replace one another as bodies traverse the domain of their activity; the 
replacement of a portion of void by body would contradict the law on conservation; void must not perish 
as a body passes into it, nor be generated ex nihilo in its wake. They must, therefore, be coextensive. 
Epicurus recognises no qualitative distinction between ‘void’ and ‘room’ and ‘intangible substance’ 
(ἀναφῆ φύσιν, a technical expression of his own invention) in Ep. Hdt.39-40, or elsewhere (cf. S. E. M X.2). 
Aët. I.20.2 (LS 5 D) corroborates that for Epicurus ‘the difference between void, place and room is one of 
name’. S. E. M X.2 suggests that Epicurus’ intangible substance remains qualitatively identical irrespective 
of whether it is occupied. It is, after all, defined simply as the absence of resistant touch. Terms such as 
‘void’ and ‘place’ have utility insomuch as they denote whether a portion of the ‘intangible substance’ is 
occupied at point of analysis: void is unoccupied place; place is occupied void. The intangible substance is 
therefore all-present. Sedley (1999) p.369 likens Epicurean void to a computer screen; transformations in 
the display do not affect the nature of the screen. 
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law of conservation, the exposition of the basic division in Ep. Hdt. appeals 
immediately to the empiricist criteria for their existence.42 Epicurus’ inquiry into 
nature proceeds from the assumption43 that non-evident truths can be determined 
a posteriori from images (εἴδωλα) corresponding to phenomena. The mechanical 
underpinnings of this assumption await us in II.4.1. It is sufficient, for now, to note 
only that observation precedes rational judgement in Epicurean analysis. That 
bodies exist is stated in Ep. Hdt. to be ‘universally witnessed by sensation’.44 An 
equivalent passage in DRN sets our more precisely Epicurus’ claim.45 Body is 
defined by spatial extension and tangibility.46 What is intangible is void by 
definition.47 Extra-geometrical properties of sense-data vary across phenomena, 
where shape and tangibility apparently do not.48 These additional properties must 
therefore be parasitical upon bodies for their existence.49 Geometry, in concert 
with tangibility, is the most self-evidently independent attribute of the observable 
world. 
     What is more, these bodies are ‘observed to move’.50 Epicurus conceives 
motion as reliant on an intangible substratum.51 Where the Stoics posited void as 
a non-physical boundary, by whose presence they may designate the cosmos 
bodily, finite and whole, the Epicureans, in the atomist vein, introduced void into 
the structure of the cosmos. Lucretius asks that we attend to our senses in 
confirming the atomists’ conclusion.52 The function of a body is to block. It is rigid, 
without flexibility or give.53 Universal corporeality begets a static world, at odds 
with the mutating reality of our senses.54 The example: ‘if there is motion, there 
 
42 Sedley (1999) p.366. 
43 An ‘assumption’ that is, of course, based on Epicurean physical doctrine. Epicurean physics and 
epistemology are, as we shall see throughout II.3-4 mutually justifying. The consequence of this are 
further explored throughout IV. 
44 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 39. 
45 Lucr. I.419-444. 
46 Ibid. I.433-436. 
47 Ibid. I.437-439. 
48 Ibid. I.433-436. 
49 See II.2.3 below. 
50 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 40. 
51 Ibid. This was originally an Eleatic proposition advanced as part of an effort to invalidate motion as 
apprehended by the senses. The Eleatics held that void, which could not be thought of, could not exist, 
and therefore neither could motion. There is only ‘what is’, the monad, undifferentiated and static. Early 
atomism is a response to the Eleatic position which accepts their premise but seeks to refute their 
conclusion. See e.g. Arist. Phys. VI.187a1-3. 
52 Lucr. I.334-345. 
53 Ibid. I.336. 
54 Lucr. I.336-339. 
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is void; there is motion, therefore there is void’ is employed by several ancient 
authors to exemplify sign-inference in the Epicurean mode.55 Epicurus’ scientific 
methodology is adapted from a materialist precedent. He accepts, as Leucippus 
and Democritus did,56 the epistemic value of phenomena but differs from his 
atomist predecessors in his account of their ontology.57 
     Further empirical proofs for Epicurean void in DRN concern porosity. In the 
Epicurean view, the permeation of solid bodies by more diffuse substances 
necessitates void-gaps: moisture seeps through solid rock; food, once 
consumed, permeates an entire animal; voices permeate walls; cold permeates 
bones.58 Diffusive substances penetrate solid objects via their imperceptible 
interstices which offer no resistance to mobile bodies. Everything in the Epicurean 
sense-cosmos is porous to an extent, and that extent depends on how densely a 
structure’s constituent bodies are arranged. The size of the void gaps present in 
a solid object determines its relative weight, and weight differentials between 
objects of identical proportions are offered as a further empirical proof for the 
presence of void in solid objects.59 The basic division is non-evident, but is 
identified via reason in accordance with that which is ‘universally witnessed by 
sensation.’60  
II.3.3 Phenomena  
In Ep. Hdt., Epicurus distinguishes per se existents – bodies and void – from 
‘properties or accidents’ of these.61 Per se existents exist independently; 
‘accidents’ are non-essential attributes – i.e. perceptible consequences of the 
interactions of bodies within void, parasitical on prior entities and transient in their 
 
55 Philod. Sign. 11.32-12.31 (LS 18 F); S. E. M VII.211-216. 
56 e.g. Arist. GC 324b35-325b5 (DK 67A7). 
57 See II.4.2 below. 
58 Lucr.  I.346-355. 
59 Lucr. I.362-367. Lucretius’ argument here relies on a property of atomic motion that has not yet been 
established in the text, the innate ‘downward’ motion. 
     At I.370-384, Lucretius concludes his argument for the existence of void within the structure of the 
cosmos by anticipating and contradicting a familiar counterproposition: motion within an infinitely 
divisible plenum via mutual displacement, which was the model for qualitative change favoured by the 
Stoics, and by Aristotle before them. The example he gives is that of a fish swimming through water by 
displacing the sea around it – here offered as a symbolic representation of all independent motion within 
an essentially fluid continuum – and argues that even in this specific instance the water must be 
interspersed with void gaps in order for motion though its mass to be facilitated. The appearance of 
fluidity and other intermediary physical states are consequences of solid bodies colliding and combining 
in particular ways within an intangible substratum. 
60 cf. Epic. Ep. Hdt. 39-40. 
61 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 40. 
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manifestation.62 The ‘properties’ of bodies and void refer to their permanent, 
defining attributes, those characteristics which cannot be removed from an entity 
without destroying it.63 They are concomitant with per se existents but do not 
share their ontological status.64 For bodies, these are tangibility, weight and 
three-dimensional extension – i.e. size and shape.65 For void, these are three-
dimensional extension and intangibility.66 
     Every other characteristic of the sensible world, however intuitively basic or 
abstract, is a consequence of body and void. Sense-reality, being the sum of such 
characteristics, is an abundance of transitory entities whose only permanent 
characteristics are those which are predicated on basic binary. Crucially, 
however, sense-reality is not illusory. Though its epistemic appearances have no 
per se existence, they are, nonetheless, objects in corporeal reality. Democritus, 
having come this far, confined the accidents of bodies to the realm of popular 
illusion.67 Epicurus adopted the contrary approach. Accidents of bodies, though 
not independently existent, are real in Epicurean epistemology at the level at 
which they are perceived.68 That observer-dependence does not preclude 
‘existence’ in Epicurean ontology is elucidated in a fragment from the third century 
Epicurean scholarch Polystratus’ On Irrational Contempt, an anti-sceptical work. 
Polystratus argues that observer-dependent or ‘relative’ phenomena are non-
illusory because their consequences ‘are plain for everyone to see’, making a 
familiar appeal to self-evidence as a sufficient indicator of a sense-object’s 
 
62 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 70-71. Time, the dimension by which the impermanence of accidents is decided, is itself 
an accident. It is described by Demetrius of Laconia, an Epicurean of the second century BC, as an ‘accident 
of accidents’ (S. E. M X.219-227), posterior, in the abstract, to the transformations of posterior 
phenomena. cf. Lucr. I.458-463. 
63 Lucr. I.450-451. See Ibid. I.445-482 for the poet’s systematic elimination of other pretenders to the 
status of per se existent. Having distinguished accidents and properties from per se existents Lucretius 
turns his attention to abstract pretenders such as time and facts concerning past events – the components 
of history. The former (n.62 above) is a consequence of perception which cannot be understood 
separately from the sequence of events it relates to. The latter are considered either ‘accidents of the 
world’ or of specific geographical locations. They too are thus ‘accidents of accidents’, which continue to 
resonate in the sensible world because the bodies with which the participating phenomena were 
composed and the space in which they acted must continue to exist. See Clay (1982) p.125 for this 
argument and the problems it poses. See also Sedley (1999) p.371. 
64 S. E. M X.219-227. 
65 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 54. 
66 Lucr. I.453. 
67 D. L. IX.44; S. E. M VII.135. 
68 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 72. Cic. Fin. I.21 interprets this decidedly anthropic component of Epicurean epistemology 
as the wilful disregarding of the distortive capacity of perspective. For Epicurean sensory mechanics and 
criteria for truth, see II.4.1 and II.4.2 respectively. 
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essential truth.69 Polystratus concedes that relative predicates such as ‘bigger’ or 
‘heavier’ do not have the same status as a sense-object’s innate characteristics 
– for example, the qualities of being ‘gold’ or ‘stone’ – but acknowledging an 
ontological hierarchy of accidental properties does not invalidate the truth-value 
of any species of appearance.70 ‘Gold’ and ‘stone’, through consistent in their 
epistemic appearances across the full variety of observers, are no more 
independently existent than observer-dependent phenomena. Both are 
consequent on the primitive activity of bodies in void. Every phenomenon, both 
the relative and the intrinsic, gestures towards its hidden source. 
II.3.4 Atoms 
Asclepiadean ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι, as I shall argue in IV.2, were elaborated from the 
principles of Epicurean atomism.71 To be ἄτομον is to be uncuttable. To analyse 
reality into atoms and void is to impose a limit on the divisibility of material. While 
atomism is the bedrock of Epicurus’ physics, he dedicates only three sentences 
of Ep. Hdt. to elucidating his atomic thesis:72 
…of bodies some are compounds, others the constituents of those 
compounds. The latter must be atomic and unalterable – if all things are not 
going to be destroyed into the non-existent but be strong enough to survive 
the dissolution of the compounds – full in nature, and incapable of 
dissolution at any point in any way. The primary entities, then, must be 
atomic kinds of bodies.73 
On Gabor Betegh’s reading of Ep. Hdt. 40-41, Epicurus was primarily concerned 
with establishing that atoms are incapable of qualitative change, such as to their 
shape, of which division is but one potential cause.74 The existence of the 
phenomenal world may presuppose an ineradicable element, but the constancy 
of the phenomenal world – the recurrence of myriad patterns that restrains its 
 
69 Poly. De cont. 23.26-26.23 (LS 7 D). 
70 Ibid. 
71 At IV.2.2 I make the case for Asclepiades first having posited particles which were more or less 
analogous to Epicurean atoms. The introduction of frangible ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι into an essentially Epicurean 
physical system (minus, we have every reason to believe, the atomic swerve (see II.3.8, IV.3 and IV.5.3.3) 
represents a development in Asclepiades’ thinking. 
72 Betegh (2006) p.261-284 remains the most revealing study of Epicurus’ defence of his atomism focusing 
on the following three sentences from Ep. Hdt. 40-41. See further IV.2.4.3. 
73 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 40-41 (LS 8 A). 
74 Betegh (2006) p.278, 282. 
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transformations75 – depends on the immutable nature of the prima materia.76 This 
conclusion is reached a posteriori from observed regularities in nature. To do 
away with this root doctrine is to invite consequences that a doctor who 
elaborated his theory of health from the initial conditions of Epicurean physics – 
as I shall argue Asclepiades did in IV.2.3 – would be required to address. We will 
examine how phenomenal constancy might have been preserved in Asclepiades’ 
system at IV.2.4.3. My thesis, following Asmis and Leith,77 is that a balancing 
mechanism had to be incorporated into Asclepiades’ physics in order to preserve 
truth-value of sense-data in Epicurean terms.  
     The property of the Epicurean atom that precedes its immutable nature is the 
absence of void within its boundary. Compound bodies, being assemblages of 
atoms, are divisible along the interstices between their atomic parts.78 The 
compound is reticulated by void-gaps and is thus impermanent, physically 
divisible; atoms are ἄτομον because they contain no unoccupied space; the body-
space binary depends on their monadic structure.79 Body is unalterable. 
Phenomenal transformations are permutations of permanent corpuscles. The 
unitary nature of the atom is shared by the ὄγκος, but Asclepiades found cause 
to develop a wholly distinct theory of material’s intrinsic properties. 
II.3.5 (In)finitude 
To be finite is to be bounded by a distinct substance, as the atom is bounded by 
void. The universe is unbounded; there is no third per se substance capable of 
describing its limit.80 Atoms are infinite in number; void is infinite in extent. A finite 
number of atoms in an infinite expanse would never collide; a finite plane could 
not contain infinite matter.81 Though atoms are infinite in number, the variety of 
sizes and shapes they might can take is restricted.82 Lucretius explains that an 
infinite variety of sizes and shapes would engender the existence of atoms of an 
infinitely large magnitude, which is inconceivable.83 Moreover, the manifestation 
 
75 See Lucr. I.584-598 for this argument from observed regularities in nature. 
76 Betegh (2006) p.261-284. 
77 Asmis (1983); Leith (forthcoming) II.1.2. 
78 Lucr. I.531-539. Fragility is measured in internal, unoccupied space. 
79 Sedley (1999) p 372. 
80 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 41-42; Lucr. I.958-1020; Furley (1999) p.419. 
81 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 42; Lucr. I.1008-1051. 
82 Although finite, the number of possible shapes and sizes must nevertheless be larger than is conceivable 
to account for the diversity of phenomena contained within the sensible world. Sedley (1999) p.373. 
83 Lucr. II.481-2. 
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of the phenomenal world relies on the components of its substructure functioning 
beneath the level of perception, lest the εἴδωλα (see II.4.1) produced by their 
activities be intermittently obscured by their own dimensions.84 Epicurus denies 
the possibility of atoms being large enough to perceive in Ep. Hdt. but does not 
elaborate his reasoning.85 The empirical absence of atoms large enough to be 
perceived per se might have been sufficient to propose an upward limit on their 
magnitude. A downward limit might result from the same arguments against 
infinite divisibility, but it is not obvious that a finite size range would result in a 
finite number of atomic shapes.86 A more complete explanation depends on the 
Epicurean theory of minima, a further – I believe, illuminative (IV.2.4.2) – point of 
departure with the Asclepiadean elaboration.  
II.3.6 Minima  
Epicurean atoms can neither be cut nor traversed to infinity.87 This distinction is 
most helpfully understood as the difference between physical and theoretical 
divisibility.88 Minima, which are units of magnitudes constituting the ‘minimum in 
the atom’, are physical (not epistemological) constituents, but the dichotomy 
retains its explanatory utility.89 Heterogeneity of atomic shapes implies the 
existence of a yet more fundamental species of component that is subject to 
variform arrangements across type; the ‘partlessness’ of the atom is difficult to 
defend when one considers the variety of atomic shapes and therefore the 
number of possible configurations of a yet more fundamental magnitude.90 
According to Lucretius, the theory of minima, in concert with the upward limit on 
the size of the atom necessitated by experience, results in the restriction of the 
number of shapes in which an atom can exist, as only a limited – if inconceivably 
immense – number of configurations are possible within fixed boundaries of 
size.91 
 
84 Sedley (1999) p.373. On account of the mechanics of sensation laid out at II.3.1, a macroscopic atom 
could not be perceived in the manner of a compound. It would register solely as an impediment to εἴδωλα. 
85 Epicurus Ep. Hdt. 55-6. The corresponding segment in DRN, to which Lucretius alludes at II.498-499. is 
unfortunately absent. 
86 Sedley (1999) p.373-374. 
87 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 56. 
88 Long (1974) p.33-34. 
89 Sedley (1999) p.376. 
90 Long & Sedley (1987) p.41. 
91 Lucr. II.482-496. 
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     The arguments for minima in Ep. Hdt. 56-57 are derived from Eleatic 
arguments about motion and infinity.92 When Epicurus writes that it is impossible 
to conceive how an infinitely divisible magnitude could be traversed,93 his 
argument recalls Zeno’s dichotomy paradox, wherein motion across a structural 
continuum is supposedly refuted on the grounds that every arbitrary distance can 
be resolved into infinite fragments of infinite divisibility.94 The echo of Zeno in 
Epicurus is unsurprising given atomism’s history. Aristotle, from whom our 
knowledge of early atomism is primarily derived, maintains that the tradition 
began as a reaction to Eleatic arguments against motion and plurality; every atom 
functions, in effect, as a discrete Parmenidean unity.95 It remains unclear as to 
whether the early atomists addressed divisibility beyond the question of 
frangibility;96 Aristotle’s silence on this matter strongly suggests that Epicurus was 
the first to apply Zenonian arguments to the composition of the atom. On 
Simplicius’ account, where the early atomist appealed frequently to the smallness 
and the partlessness of the atom, Epicurus stressed only its immutability,97 a 
detail whose foregrounding makes the Asclepiadean elaboration much more 
significant (see IV.2.4.2). Precedent for Epicurus’ theory of minima can be 
identified outside the atomist tradition in the work of the third century Dialectician 
Diodorus Cronus, whose theory of partless bodies and space will be revisited in 
the next section.98 
     A concluding note on minima pertaining to Epicurus’ scientific method. Having 
epitomised his argument for minima in Ep. Hdt. 56-57, Epicurus analogises 
physical minima to the minimum in sensation in order to explain how they 
 
92 These arguments are 1) traversal necessitates partless minima (cf. Zeno’s dichotomy paradox); 2) an 
atom containing infinite parts is an atom of infinite size (cf. Lucr. I.619-622.); 3) since the finite body has 
a distinguishable extremity and since one can conceive of the whole in sequence from one extremity to 
the next, the act of doing so and holding such an object in thought would be equivalent to ‘reaching 
infinity in thought’ should that object’s boundary circumscribe an infinite number of parts, which should 
be impossible. See Furley (1967) p.8-27 and White (1992) p.203-208 for the interpretation of (3) as a direct 
challenge to Aristotle’s argument in GC 1.2. for the impossibility of the dissolution of a finite magnitude 
into limit entities. 
93 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 56-57.  
94 Arist. Phys. 233a21-28, 239b9-14 (DK 29A25). 
95 e.g. Arist. Phys. 187a1-3; GC 324b35-325a6, a23-b5. 
96 Long (1974) p.34. 
97 Simp. In Ar. Phys. I fr.216 (= Usener 268); cf. the argument of Betegh (2006) p.261-284, supra II.3.4, 
IV.2.4.3. 
98 The influence of Diodorus on the Epicurean theory of minima is detectable in the consequences of the 




function, mathematically, as constituents of the atom.99 An experiential 
phenomenon is used to illuminate the nature of the subsensible; Epicurus argues 
that the smallest magnitude of which the human can conceive is by its nature 
partless (thus shapeless) yet extended, inviting the reader to infer that the ‘real’ 
minima possess the same counterintuitive mode of extension.100 Moreover, 
sensible minima are neither coextensive nor contiguous with their neighbouring 
magnitudes but are nonetheless conceived as parts in a sequence ‘in their own 
peculiar way’.101 This has been interpreted as a response to Aristotle, who argued 
that partless constituents of a conglomerate magnitude could never be in contact 
with one another without being fully coextensive – i.e. matching whole to whole – 
because they would otherwise have to be connected part to part or part to whole 
and both of these alternative options necessitate parts.102 Epicurus does not 
detail the ‘peculiar manner’ in which minima are in sequence in his extant works; 
we may infer from this absence in Ep. Hdt. that Epicurus considered – at least, in 
the writing of Ep. Hdt. (and likely its source) – that the analogy with sensible 
minima was sufficient to communicate how a sequence of minimum magnitudes 
is possible without contiguity. The analogy is therefore not an explanatory aid, but 
the explanation itself. That we can comprehend – if not adequately articulate – 
the mathematics of non-contiguous, sequential arrangements is supposed to 
indicate an analogous process beneath perception. This is typical of Epicurus’ 
scientific method, but in this instance the inference is strained. Sensible minima 
can exist independently, where real minima are the limits of atomic 
magnitudes.103 If sensible minima can exist independently then they must have 
fixed dimensions around which one could cut. The revelation of such dimensions 
would problematise their ‘partlessness’ and non-contiguous sequential 
arrangement. Epicurus acknowledges the analogy’s imperfection when he denies 
real minima the possibility of independent motion – i.e. that which is not incidental 
to the motion of the atom – and thus their capacity to recombine in the manner of 
 
99 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 58-59. Lucr. I.746-52 uses this analogy as further proof for the existence of minima, but 
this does not appear to be Epicurus’ intention in Ep. Hdt.  
100 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 58. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Aristotle Phys. VI.1. See Long & Sedley (1987) p.42. Aristotle himself (Phys. V.3.226b34-227a6) seems 
to have been aware of the loophole which Epicurus exploits; he writes that succession requires only that 
one thing to be after another with nothing of the same kind between them. See White (1992) p.203. 
103 Lucr. I.602-604. 
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the atom.104 I submit that this distinction, if it does not outright undermine the 
utility of the analogy with the sensible, leaves it vulnerable to criticism within an 
epistemological framework that shared many Epicurean presuppositions. Given 
that Asclepiades dispenses with Epicurean minima when he posits frangible 
elements but – as I will argue in IV.5 – retains an essentially Epicurean scientific 
methodology, this vulnerability is worth acknowledging. I will argue at IV.2.4.2 
that Asclepiades was comprehensively aware of the consequences of replacing 
atoms with frangible ὄγκοι in a system whose basic Epicurean foundations he 
otherwise sought to retain. We should remain open to the possibility that 
instances where Epicurean methodology may not be fully successful on its own 
terms were exploited for the physician’s ends. 
II.3.7 Atomic motion 
The mechanism of motion in a cosmos that is resolvable into partless magnitudes 
is worth considering, as it is a further component of Epicurean physical doctrine 
that Asclepiades – I will argue knowingly (IV.2.4.2) – discards. The doctrine starts 
with Diodorus Cronus,105 to whom a thesis of ‘staccato’ or ‘granular’ motion is 
attributed based on his analysis of space and time into minimal and partless 
entities.106 Motion cannot occur between partless units of extension as there is 
no intervening magnitude through which to pass. Moreover, an object cannot be 
partly present in a partless space. A partless body must therefore ‘jump’ from 
partless place to partless place in sequence, never moving, but acknowledged to 
have moved from unit A to unit B.107 The Epicurean doctrine of partless minima 
entails this mode of locomotion. Simplicius confirms that the Epicureans accepted 
Diodorus’ thesis, for all that it goes unmentioned in Ep. Hdt.108 Asclepiades’ 
rejection of minima entails his rejection of this species of movement. His 
awareness of this would indicate his intimate familiarity with Epicurean physics, 
the broader – i.e. non-medical – consequences of his modifications to Epicurus’ 
system, and (at least, potentially) the efforts he took to justify his element theory 
against that which he inherited (see IV.2.4.2). 
 
104 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 59. 
105 Following a line of reasoning first made and dismissed in Arist. Phys. VI.1. 
106 S. E. M X.85. The argument at M X.119-20 is likely derived from Diodorus. See Sedley (1999) p.359. 
107 S. E. M X.86. 
108 Simp. In Ar. Phys. 934.23-30. Whether the adoption of Diodorus’ thesis came from Epicurus or a later 
Epicurean is ultimately not relevant for our purposes. 
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     In the Epicurean tradition, atoms have an innate tendency to move 
downwards, ‘borne by their own weight’.109 The reasons are empirical: objects of 
perception tend towards the surface of the earth unless diverted or obstructed 
from without.110 Epicurus infers a posteriori that this uniform quality of motion 
must be intrinsic to the behaviour of the atom. Lucretius lists the falling of 
meteors, solar heat and bolts of lightning to earth as illustrations of the natural 
inclination of phenomena towards the surface of the earth.111 Structures in nature 
which tend upwards such as trees, crops and flames are dismissed as being 
subject to external pressures from beneath; disentangled from those pressures 
they would fall to earth as would a tree branch severed from its trunk.112 
Epicurean atoms fall with equal velocity irrespective of discrepancies of size and 
weight.113 Epicurus grasped, correctly, that size/weight discrepancies only affect 
the speed of an object if the medium it traverses has some innate resistance, 
such as air and water.114 Void is, by definition, the absence of resistance. 
Consequently, every atom will move as ‘fast as thought’ until a moment of 
impaction, after which it will rebound at the same speed.115 Motion is perpetual, 
an adaptation of Democritean atomism proposed in light of Aristotle’s critique of 
 
109 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 43-44; Lucr. II.83-85, 217. 
110 As to the value of ‘up’ and ‘down’ as descriptors of direction in an infinite totality, Epicurus argues in 
Ep. Hdt. 60 that we must comprehend ‘up’ and down’ relative to our own (most commonly oriented) 
perspective. Konstan (1972) p.269-278 remains the most convincing analysis of this confusing passage. 
Standing upright, ‘up’ extends infinitely above us, ‘down’ extends infinitely beneath us. Note that the 
human being is thus the measure of direction not only in the cosmos of which he/she is a transient 
component but also of the limitless totality, of which his/her cosmos is, correspondingly, a transient 
component. For Epicurus’ account to hold true across all locations then the earth must necessarily be flat 
and orthogonal to the trajectory of unimpeded atomic motion – a detail which brings Epicureanism into 
conflict with most rival cosmologies in this period. Aristotle had argued for the sphericity of the earth both 
on valid astronomical grounds (De cael. II.14.297b23-298b20) and on grounds relating to his theory of the 
centrifocal motions of elements which depended upon the earth having a central point that was 
consistent across the area of its surface (De cael.II.14.297a8-b23). Lucretius I.1058-1067, in an attempt to 
defend what one suspects might have been an increasingly untenable position hundreds of years after it 
was proposed, seeks to ridicule proponents of a geocentric cosmos with a spherical earth at its axis and, 
in doing so, accidentally anticipates a number of the consequences of his heliocentric reality. See Furley 
(1999) p.421. It is intriguing, given our interest in how tightly Epicurean epistemology ties perception to 
reason to objective truth, that there appears to be nothing in the nature of atomic motion (elaborated 
further in this section and the next) that necessitates the construction, over time, of a flat earth as 
opposed to a spherical one, or one of any other shape. The flat plane is necessary only as a baseline from 
which the uniform direction of innate atomic motion can be deduced – i.e. it is necessary for the proof 
that atoms, unimpeded, fall in parallel lines towards the earth but it is not a necessary consequence of 
monodirectionality itself. 
111 Lucr. II.184-215. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 61; Lucr. II.225-243. 
114 Lucr. II.223-242. 
115 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 61. 
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the atomist tradition in Physics IV.116 In the case of compounds, while the speed 
of the compound itself is variable, being vulnerable to the influence of any number 
of contingent factors which come into play at the level at which compounds 
interact, the greater portion of the atoms with which it is comprised are 
understood to be colliding and rebounding at their natural speed but doing so 
within the compound’s boundaries for the duration of its existence.117 As we shall 
see in IV.2.3, the properties of corpuscular motion set out in this paragraph are 
shared by the atom and the ὄγκος. 
     The final component of atomic motion in Epicureanism – and the most 
conspicuous discrepancy between the motion of the atom and the ὄγκος – is the 
swerve (clinamen/παρέγκλισις). It is also Epicurus’ most dramatic divergence 
from the atomist tradition he inherited. It fulfils two purposes, one cosmogonical 
and one ethical, pertaining to its role in enabling human volition. The latter 
purpose is examined in the next section. As to the former, particles traveling in 
parallel lines at identical speeds require an additional event to precipitate 
collision. The swerve is a necessity of Epicurean cosmogony; Lucretius cites the 
formulation of reality itself as the proof of its existence, once the empirical basis 
for the other properties of atomic motion have been established.118 Swerves, on 
Lucretius’ account, occur intermittently and have done so forever.119 This and the 
inherent unpredictability of the swerve – there are no conceptual apparatus 
whereby one can ascertain which atom(s) will be next to swerve and when a 
swerve might occur – are the only aspects of its nature we can confidently assert. 
It seems safe to assume that all atoms will inevitably swerve and will do so an 
infinite number of times, owing to their permanence. But beyond this, scholars 
have been left to speculate as to whether the swerve constitutes a permanent 
adjustment in direction – that is, until the atom is impacted – along an oblique 
angle, or a momentary orthogonal ‘side-step’ motion from one vertical trajectory 
into another.120 It remains the most mysterious component of Epicurean 
 
116 Arist. Physic. IV.8, 215a 19-22. Epicurus confirms the perpetual motion of atoms at Ep. Hdt. 43-47. See 
Inwood (1981). 
117 Furley (1999) p.422. The exception being those atoms shorn from its surface to produce εἴδωλα. See 
II.3.1 below. 
118 Lucr. II.216-224. 
119 Ibid.  
120  Purinton (1994) p.115-146, (1999) p.260-261 champions the oblique swerve. Sedley (1983a) p.41-42; 
Asmis (1984) p.279-280 and Englert (1987) champion the sidestep view, to name a handful of examples. 
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physics;121 its capacity to frustrate arises, in part, from its backwards engineering 
into an inherited tradition of mechanistic materialism from the predecided (non-
Democritean) ethical axiom that human behaviour is (at least partially) volitional. 
It is in the swerve’s second, non-cosmogonical purpose where the psychological 
τέλος of Epicurean physics is most conspicuous.122 Attempts to assemble a 
remedy for the problems created by the clinamen from Epicurean testimonia have 
proven inconclusive.123 The incursion of anti-fatalism into atomism is where we 
must now turn. 
II.3.8 Ethical Interlude: The physics of libera voluntas  
In De finibus (Fat.), Cicero dismisses the swerve as a ‘piece of childish fancy’ and 
‘an arbitrary fiction’, expressing his belief that it ‘is the capital offence in a natural 
philosopher, to speak of something taking place uncaused.’124 Epicurus’ 
insistence that human experience – under which we should include the subjective 
experience of human activity – be validated, and the concessions he makes in 
pursuit of this end, exposes his philosophy to attacks that the early atomists were 
invulnerable to. The attempt to reconcile his atomism with the peculiarities of his 
τέλος – instrumental to which, we will see below, was his anti-fatalism – begets 
Epicurus’ most eccentric doctrine. Democritus before him did not perceive the 
 
For our purposes, the unclear mechanics of the swerve are secondary to the ethical perspective on the 
swerve’s necessity. 
121 Much of the controversy surrounding the swerve, with respect to both its unclear mechanics and the 
nature of its relationship with volition (see II.3.8 bellow) is an inevitability of limited source material. 
Epicurus does not mention the swerve in Ep. Hdt., nor does he refer to it in any of the extant fragments 
of On Nature, an absence most surprising in those fragments which deal with the question of free will 
(Nat. 34 (LS 20 B, C)) and in which an appeal to its physical basis would seem appropriate. Despite these 
curious omissions, we lack sufficient cause to attribute the doctrine to anybody other than Epicurus 
himself. I refer again to Sedley (1998) p.62-91 on Lucretius’ fundamentalism; Nat. is very likely Lucretius’ 
sole Epicurean source. The swerve is not an elaboration that can be excised from Epicureanism without 
harming the school’s basic ethical assumptions (II.3.8). Certainly, the swerve was attributed to Epicurus 
in antiquity. The only Epicurean text that mentions the swerve besides DRN is the inscription of Diogenes 
of Oenoanda 32.1.14-3914 (LS 20 G), which celebrates Epicurus as the atomist who discovered the swerve 
– and therefore non-necessitated movement –  where Democritus before him had failed to do so. Cicero, 
moreover, blames Epicurus for the doctrine (Fin. I.19, Fat. 21-25). 
122 Beyond the simple fact that the cosmos exists (and thus that atoms interact), one’s experience of one’s 
own choice-making capacity would appear to be the primary data-point from which it is inferred. See 
II.3.8 below. 
123 Purinton (1999) p.255-257 provides a summary of the variety of positions attributed to Epicurus 
concerning the precise relationship between his doctrine of atomic swerves and his libertarianism. I 
reference some of them further below. Diversity of opinion is, in this instance, an outgrowth of the 
swerve’s inherent mystery. The fullest recent analysis of the Epicurean swerve is O’Keefe (2005), who 
summarises conflicting interpretations of Epicurus’ libertarianism/incompatibilism, along with the 
Epicurean sources that support each interpretation, at p.10-25. 
124 Cic. Fin. I.19. trans. Rackham (1914). 
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‘undisturbedness’ (ἀθαμβίαν) he promoted to be dependent on non-necessitated 
action,125 a detail in the background of Cicero’s declaration at Fin. I.21 that ‘where 
Epicurus alters the doctrines of Democritus, he alters them for the worse.’126 
     The occurrence of the swerve – by which I specify the initial deviation of 
trajectory prior to impaction – is alone independent of the otherwise prevalent 
mechanics of causality and logical necessity. Each swerve, as Cicero identifies, 
is an aberrant event which takes place without an obvious external cause. In its 
absence, mechanistic processes would underpin all activity within the Epicurean 
totality, as they do in Democritus’ system.127 In its presence, mechanistic 
processes persist but share the ontological territory with an anomalous species 
of movement. The result is chaotic. If we make the assumption that not every 
collision in the Epicurean model results directly from a swerve – i.e. there are, 
within what Cicero refers, in Rackham’s translation, as the ‘riotous hurly-burly of 
atoms’ underpinning ordered perception,128 impactions resulting directly from 
impactions, the effects of caused effects – such processes must retain their 
functionality where swerves are not occurring, and an atom must be subject to 
those same processes immediately after the occurrence of a swerve. Epicurean 
physics is therefore a hybrid of predictable and unpredictable activity, adhering 
 
125 See e.g. Cic. Fin. V.87 for Democritus’ ethical pursuit. For necessity in early atomism, see e.g. Aët I.25.4 
(DK 68A43). Reconciling what we know of Democritean physics with our Democritean ethical fragments 
and testimonia – many of which evoke a proto-Epicureanism (e.g. John of Stobi, Anthology 3.1.46 (DK 
68B219), 3.5.17 (DK 68B188); Clem. Paid. I.6.2.1-3 (DK 68B214); Cic. Fin. V.87 above) – is far from 
straightforward. Vlastos (1945-1946) is the classic article on this subject. Part II.VI (1946) deals with the 
reconciliation of necessity with Democritean ethics. At p.56, Vlastos attributes to Democritus a form of 
proto-compatibilism (though he does not use this term) where ‘chance’, like ‘colour’, is a species of 
subjective illusion in Democritean cosmology, ‘existent’ only at the level at which we, who are similar 
illusions, interact with the world. One wonders, elaborating from Vlastos’ take on Democritean necessity, 
if Epicurus’ insistence that phenomena are non-illusory might have denied him access to this method of 
conceptually detaching the self from primitive determinism. The ‘anti-reductionist’ interpretation of the 
swerve (e.g. Sedley (1983a); Annas (1993). See O’Keefe (2005) p.17, and 65-109 for O’Keefe’s ‘anti-
eliminativist’ interpretation) holds that, in introducing the non-mechanical aspect of atomic motion, 
Epicurus was motivated by the preservation of emergent psychological properties in a cosmology that 
would otherwise consign them to illusion. This is significant for our purposes as it casts the swerve not 
only as a doctrine unveiled by Epicurus’ scientific method but as a necessary component of Epicurean 
epistemology – i.e. the basis for the method – the structure of which I will argue in IV.5 Asclepiades 
incorporates more or less unadjusted into his medical cosmology. See IV.3 for Asclepiades on 
determinism, and what this implies of his conception of the medical purview. At IV.5.3.3 I address the 
potential tension between Asclepiades’ epistemology and his determinism. 
126 Trans. Rackham (1914). 
127 Cic. Fat. 21-25; Diog. Oen. 32.1.14-3.14 (LS 20 G). 
128 Cic. Fin. 1.20 trans. Rackham (1914). 
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to seemingly incompatible rule-systems simultaneously. Causality is integral to 
the system, but it is not universally prevalent. 
     The effort to forestall universal causality results from Epicurus’ belief that 
human activity is not (or, at least, not entirely) the product of necessity, dictated 
from the bottom up by the mechanical activity of one’s constituent atoms, but the 
product of volitions. Epicurus’ argument for free will in our fragments of On Nature 
(Nat.) rests on the assumption that rationality emerges from choice;129 
deliberation loses its efficacy in a world where the future is determined.130 
Fatalism – that the possibility of self-betterment is out of human hands – runs 
contrary to Epicureanism’s ethical τέλος.131 Cic. Fat. 21-25 reports Epicurus’ 
rejection of logical determinism, the principle that every statement, including 
those about future contingents, must either be true or false. To accept this is to 
concede that truth ‘for all eternity…is certain, and if certain then necessary too, 
which he [Epicurus] considers enough to prove both necessity and fate.’132 In the 
Letter to Menoeceus (Ep. Men.) Epicurus compares a cosmology ruled by causal 
necessity with one presided over by interventionalist gods and concludes that the 
latter case may indeed be preferable because the gods can be influenced 
(however minutely) through supplication.133 Evidently, ἀταραξία was conceived 
as the pursuit of the human agent, she who is free to pursue her own goals. 
Ethics, the child of reason, depends upon an undetermined future, so much so in 
the Epicurean view that Epicurus cites the very existence of common behavioural 
standards as proofs of human volition: ‘the fact that we rebuke, oppose and 
reform each other as if the responsibility lay also in ourselves, and not just in our 
congenital make-up and in the accidental necessity of that which surrounds and 
penetrates us.’134 To those who venture that all human behaviour, irrespective of 
how rational it may appear outwardly and/or subjectively, results from 
mechanistic processes, Epicurus responds that the conduct of his opponents will 
always contradict their fatalistic claims – they apportion praise and blame as if 
the recipients were responsible for their actions.135 Moreover, the fact that they 
 
129 Epic. Nat. 34.21-2, 26-30 (LS 20 B, C). 
130 By suggesting that this was Epicurus’ principle concern, I am agreeing with O’Keefe (2005) p.123-152. 
Cic. Fat. 21-25 is the strongest piece of evidence in support of this interpretation. 
131 Cic. Fat. 21-25; Epic. Ep. Men. 133-134. 
132 Cic. Fat. 21-25 (LS 20 E). 
133 Epic. Ep. Men. 133-134. 
134 Epic. Nat. 34.26-30 (LS 20 C). 
135 Epic. Nat. 34.26-30 (LS 20 C). 
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engage Epicurus on this point implies that they hold him personally responsible 
for his faulty suppositions and that they, by appealing to his reason, have the 
capacity to influence him.136 To argue against our conception of ourselves as 
rational agents is self-refuting.137 We are in want of an account from Epicurus 
himself of how this argument can be translated, a posteriori, into physical 
doctrine. We have only a short rebuke of his materialist predecessors for turning 
‘a blind eye to themselves’ in the formation of their causal doctrine, and thus 
failing to observe the contradiction between their actions and their physics.138 
That the swerve was backwards engineered into materialism physics from an 
ethical observation is suggested by this passage. It is our subjective experience 
of choice making that Epicurus foregrounds. This, like all phenomena,139 
presupposes a primitive physical signature. 
     The swerve and voluntas are explicitly connected in DRN II.251-293,140 our 
fullest source for this controversial doctrine. Lucretius makes a distinction 
between compelled motion – reeling from a blow, for example – and self-
instigated motion against the tide of external forces – recovering one’s balance 
after having been struck –, then relates this binary system of movement to the 
activity of atoms.141 The form of Lucretius’ argument is typically Epicurean: 
fundamental laws are ascertained via analysis of the manifest; reason journeys 
from εἴδωλα to the interplay of per se entities.142 An external observation is cited, 
that of the behaviour of racehorses in the instant before they break out of the 
gates,143 yet the appeal is also to our subjective experience of voluntas: ‘yet in 
our breasts there is something that has the power to fight against this [external] 
force and resist it’.144 Though the example is of a man regaining balance after 
having been struck, an event we might observe befalling another, the use of the 
 
136 Ibid.; Epic. SV 40. See O’Keefe (2005) p.87-89. O’Keefe adopts this type of argument in his defence of 
Epicurus’ anti-eliminative materialism (p.88).  
137 O’Keefe (2005) p.89. 
138 Epic. Nat. 34.26-30 (LS 20 C). 
139 Except, apparently, ἀταραξία itself. See II.5 (esp. II.5.6). It is on the question of how the Epicurean 
realises his philosophy’s τέλος that Epicurean reductionism is least in evidence. It is therefore the point 
where Epicurean physics and ethics seem most loosely entwined. 
140 Also, Diog. Oen. 32.1.14-3.14 (LS 20 G). 
141 Lucr. II.271-283, 284-293 respectively. O’Keefe (2005) p.26-37 for a recent analysis of this passage. 
142 O’Keefe (2005) p.28-29. 
143 Lucr. II.264-270. 
144 Lucr. II.279-280 trans. Melville (1997), my italics. In Latin: ‘…tamen esse in pectore nostro quiddam 
quod contra pugnare obstareque possit.’ Note that the chest is the location of the mind in Epicurean 
psychology (I.3.9). The inference seems clear, the mind has the capacity to resist the infinite chain of 
causes and effects.  
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first-person plural binds our experience to that which we are invited to consider. 
This detail is worth noting. It reminds us that the ethics-oriented τέλος of 
Epicurean philosophy permits that Epicurus’ scientific method be applied to 
internal experiential (i.e. phenomenological) data – one’s experience of one’s 
own psychological activity – as well as that which is perceived externally. When 
we consider (as we shall in IV.3 and IV.5 (esp. IV.5.1.2 & IV.5.3.3)) that the 
clinamen is absent from Asclepiadean physics, where the Epicurean scientific 
method survives almost entirely intact,145 we will note how the physician’s τέλος 
orients his attention away from this species of experiential data (IV.5.1.2) even if 
the method of sign-inference he applies to external phenomena is adapted 
without adjustment.146 
     The mechanics of the relationship between swerve and voluntas are 
unspecified in DRN.147 This absence has made for considerable controversy over 
the history of scholarly interest in this subject. Early twentieth century orthodoxy 
held that voluntary actions were posterior to uncaused atomic activity; volitions 
were caused by swerves; the swerves were not the products of volitions.148 In his 
seminal work Two Studies in the Greek Atomists (1967), David Furley advanced 
the most enduring challenge to this position. He argued that the strict ‘bottom up’ 
formulation fails to do justice to Epicurus’ libertarianism, making the case that a 
random event at the atomic scale must bring about a correspondingly random 
event in human behaviour and that it was beneath the acumen of one such as 
Epicurus to overlook so conspicuous a point of contention.149 He suggested 
instead that most instances of choice in Epicurean causal analysis were, in fact, 
mechanistic in origin, and that the swerve – in his view, a very rare event – was 
introduced into the mix to guard against the possibility that every human act was 
preordained.150 Various alternative models have been suggested since Furley’s 
 
145 IV.5.1. 
146 O’Keefe (2005) p.26-32 makes a credible case for the claim that the principle purpose of DRN II.251-
293 is to distinguish self-originated ‘mind-steered’ motion from motion with an external cause. The 
former mode of activity is of limited relevance to medical inquiry, where the latter, predictable aetiology, 
analysed into primitive activity (as far as is medically relevant), falls within the epistemic purview of the 
physician. See further IV.5.3.3. 
147 Indeed, when Lucretius explains voluntas at DRN IV.877-896, he not only neglects to mention the 
swerve but presents human volitions as the consequences of impinging atomic constellations on the spirit 
(see I.3.9). Human activity reads as mechanistic in this passage, but our susceptibility to the influence of 
impinging εἴδωλα/ideas is clearly only part of Epicurus’ analysis of motivated human behaviour. 
148 Bailey (1928) p.435-436, (1947) p.840-843, 1287. 
149 Furley (1967) Study II, p.163-164. 
150 Furley (1967) Study II.  
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objection. Walter Englert argued that volitions precede swerves; swerves are 
necessary for a decision, once made, to be physically enacted but are not the 
causes of volitions themselves.151 David Sedley proposed a more explicit ‘top 
down’ model, in which swerves are caused by volitions; he speculates that 
volitions, rather than overriding physical laws, direct atoms down alternative 
pathways which are already accounted for in the Epicurean system.152 Jeffery 
Purinton, at the century’s culmination, reinstated the case for the old orthodoxy 
by arguing that a satisfying reconciliation of Epicurus’ atomism with his 
libertarianism is, in the final analysis, unattainable.153 Tim O’Keefe argues that 
the swerve has ‘no impact on Epicurus’ general metaphysics, philosophy of mind, 
or action-theory’, but simply allows for deliberation and efficacious action – it 
preserves the openness of the future.154 This controversy concerning the swerve 
arises from what reads as a disfigurement in Epicureanism considered as a 
unified philosophy; it speaks to the resultant incoherence of forcing the base-
mechanics of a pre-existing physical system, founded by Leucippus and 
Democritus, into alignment with an externally derived – and ostensibly conflicting 
– ethical stipulation. 
     Whether or not Epicurus found a way to reconcile his materialism with his 
libertarianism/anti-fatalism, the τέλος of Epicureanism is conspicuous in the 
doctrine of the swerve. O’Keefe argues persuasively that it is the fatalism of the 
Democritean system to which Epicurus primarily objects.155 Fatalism, more so 
than theism,156 deprives us of self-mastery and the opportunity to attain ἀταραξία 
through the exercise of reason. The inclusion of the swerve emancipates the 
human from the tyranny of fate and enables the Epicurean project,157 but this 
comes at the expense of the robustness of Epicurean causal theory. I will return 
to the swerve and its absence in Asclepiades’ medical theory at IV.3 and IV.5.3.3. 
Two simple points can be made here, on which I will elaborate in IV. 1) The 
question of fatalism will very likely have been considered external to the 
physician’s τέλος. 2) The practice of medicine necessitates predictable systems 
 
151 Englert (1987). 
152 Sedley (1983a). See also Long & Sedley (1987) p.110-112. 
153 Purinton (1999). 
154 O’Keefe (2005) p.149-152 (quotation from p.149). He refers to his interpretation as ‘ultra-minimal’ 
(p.150). 
155 Ibid.  p.65-109. 
156 Epic. Ep Men. 133-134. 
157 Ibid.; Cic. Fat. 21-25. 
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of cause and effect at the level of the human being’s prima materia (or at least, 
the ‘elements of medicine’ (see III.2)). There is a question, however, as to 
whether the scientific method Asclepiades adopts from Epicurus and wields in 
defence of Rationalist medicine is reliant, in some way, on the swerve. I will 
address this at IV.5.3.3. 
II.3.9 Psychology 
We end the section with a note on Epicurean psychology, a branch of Epicurean 
philosophy that does not survive its transposition into medicine intact but the 
manner of its modification, I propose at IV.4, is particularly illuminating. 
     The Epicurean ψυχή fulfils a comparable function to that of the Stoics 
(I.4.1).158 It is the progenitor of thought, sensation, motion, and emotion and is 
equally corporeal to the flesh and bones with which it is (in the case of 
Epicureanism) juxtaposed.159 The soul is a composite of elemental substances, 
three of which are analogous to external phenomena: fire, air and wind; only the 
fourth, a fine material which ‘lacks a name’, is unique to sentient entities in the 
Epicurean cosmos.160 The nature of the juxtaposition of soul-atoms is mutually 
interpenetrative;161 the four substances combine into a fifth: a unique substance 
which nonetheless retains the powers of each of its constituents so completely 
that particular psychic functions can be attributed to particular constituents.162 
There is an association in DRN III.266-322 between the function of particular 
 
158 That is, if we limit our analysis of the Stoic ψυχή to its functions with respect to human behaviour, as 
far as is possible. The Epicurean ψυχή has no function outside the body save for its dissolution back into 
its prima materia. It is worth noting, however, that the Epicurean ψυχή operates in dialogue with εἴδωλα, 
impressions impinging on the senses and the mind which prefigure human responses. In this respect, 
there is a component of the Epicurean ψυχή that exists behind the body, sense/thought-provoking if not 
sensate and thinking.  
159 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 63-67. When Epicurus writes that the soul is ‘a body’, he is specifying that the soul is an 
individuated substance, rather than simply reiterating that the constituents of the soul are bodily at the 
most primitive level of analysis. See Everson (1999) p.542-544.  
160 Aët. 4.3.11 (LS 14 C); Lucr. III.262-322. The constituents of the Epicurean ψυχή are only documented 
in secondary sources. Epic. Ep. Hdt. 63 speaks only of the soul resembling wind with an admixture of heat. 
161 Lucr. III.262-265. 
162 Aët. 4.3.11 (LS 14 C); Lucr. III.262-322. Fire produces bodily heat and is responsible for anger; air, 
distinguished from πνεῦμα by its stillness, is responsible for rest; πνεῦμα is the source of self-governed 
motion in humans and animals, accounting for fear and the flight response when predominant in the 
limbs. The unnamed substance is the origin of sensation; its minute particles are interspersed throughout 
the soul in a manner that is analogous (though imperfectly) to how those of the soul are distributed in the 
body. An addition ingredient was necessary for which there was no simple external analogue. Lucr. III.281 
refers to the unnamed substance as the ‘spirit of spirit’. The problem with this analogy is that the unnamed 
substance is a constituent of the soul where the soul is not a constituent of the body; it is a separate 
substance that exists within the boundary of the animal.  
91 
 
constituents of ψυχή and emotional displays upon which personalities are 
modelled.163 It is an idea that Lucretius introduces then downplays, perhaps 
anxious of the implications that a rigorized materialist explanation of personality 
might have for Epicurean anti-fatalism. 
     Psychic functions are differentiated into those of mind (animus) and those of 
spirit (anima).164 The mind functions as the base of intellectual and emotional 
activity in Epicurean psychology, located in the chest.165 Its functional synonymy 
with the Stoic ἡγεμονικόν caused later writers to interpret this as a claim about 
the function and location of the ruling-part-of-the-soul.166 The mind is an 
individuated part of the body in the manner of any other organ or limb.167 It rouses 
itself to action quicker than anything else in human awareness, producing its 
effects at a faster rate than any other compound entity.168 The spirit, to which all 
other functions of the soul are attributed, is distributed throughout the rest of the 
body and is so thoroughly interpenetrated with the mind as to constitute, in effect, 
a seamless emanation from a deliberative nexus, confined within the limits of the 
flesh.169 The mind is conceived as distinct from the spirit though precisely where 
it ends and where the spirit begins is ambiguous.170 There is evidence to suggest 
that Epicurean psychophysiology came under scrutiny from within the school 
itself in the wake of third century anatomical advancements; the discovery, 
through dissection, of the nervous system, went some way to confirming the 
brain’s function as the source of animation.171 An exegetical treatise on 
foundational Epicurean texts by Demetrius of Laconia, an eminent Epicurean and 
rough contemporary of Asclepiades of Bithynia, informs us of an internal debate 
 
163 See n.162 above. We consider the implications of this for Asclepiades’ rejection of the quadripartite 
model of the soul at IV.4.1. 
164 Lucr. III.136-176. 
165 Ibid. III.139-140. 
166 Aët. 4.5.5 states explicitly that Epicurus located the ἡγεμονικόν in the thorax. 
167 Lucr. III.94-97. 
168 Ibid. III.182-185. At Ibid. III.185-190 he goes on to argue that the speed of the mind must be on account 
of the exceedingly rounded and exceedingly minute nature of its atoms. Everson (1999) p.551. 
169 Lucr. III.139-176. This relationship is structurally analogous to that of the Stoic ἡγεμονικόν and the 
other seven parts of the soul. 
170 Ibid. III.420-424:  
‘Please now apply both these names to one thing;  
When for example I speak of spirit and show  
That it is mortal, understand me also  
To speak of mind since it is one with the other  
And the whole is combined.’ – trans. Melville (1997). 
171 Sedley (1998) p.68-70. 
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in Epicureanism concerning the location of the mind that was stimulated by 
anatomical developments.172 I will argue in IV.4.3 that Asclepiades’ rejection of a 
localised ἡγεμονικόν was influenced, in part, by the same developments that 
vexed contemporary Epicureans. 
     As mind and spirit are functionally interdependent, so too are soul and body. 
Epicurus writes at Ep. Hdt. 63-64 that though the soul ‘has the greatest share in 
causing sensation’ it would not possess this faculty were it not confined within the 
aggregate.173 The soul’s functions are realised through its presence in the flesh. 
This emphasis on body-soul coaffection is ethically motivated; the obliteration of 
the soul’s faculties along with the body is a necessity of the Epicurean project,  
one that asks us to believe that ‘death is nothing to us’; emancipation from 
sensation is emancipation from the moral universe, whose restrictions have no 
meaning beyond εἴδωλα.174 To this end, Lucretius, in DRN III, seeks to persuade 
his reader that the body and soul develop in tandem from the same initial seed, 
that they mature and wither in concert.175 The mechanism of sensation, which we 
explore shortly below (II.4.1), is upheld as the exemplar of psychophysiological 
synthesis.176 The union of bodily and psychological pain is also cited in DRN III 
as evidence of their mutual interdependence,177 a detail which I argue in II.5.2 is 
crucial to understanding how Epicureanism seeks to ameliorate bodily pain by 
applying its medicine directly (and exclusively) to the mind. 
II.4 Epistemology178  
Psychology forms a natural bridge from physics to epistemology. I will 
demonstrate in IV.5 that Asclepiades’ epistemology is, in essence, Epicurean, 
and that Epicureanism’s epistemological component is the source of the system’s 
 
172 P. Herc. 1012. cols. XLII-XLVII. See Sedley (1998). p.70. 
173 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 63-64. 
174 Epic. Ep. Men. 124-127. 
175 Lucr. III.445-459. 
176 See II.4.1. Note Lucr. III.624-633. Making a memorable case for the soul’s dependence on the body, 
Lucretius cites the reliance of painters and poets to represent disembodied spirits as if they were ‘still 
endowed with their senses’ – i.e. bodily in appearance if not in tangibility – as evidence of the 
inseparability of body and soul in art as in thought as in reality. 
177 Ibid. III.152-176. 
178 What I refer to as Epicurus’ epistemology in this section, Epicurus himself would call the κανονική 
(canonic), a word derived from the Greek κανών, a ‘measuring stick’: appropriately, a tool for discerning 
what the senses, unaided, cannot. The κανονική, according to Sextus Empiricus (M VII.22), is the science 




medical appeal in a period where the popularity of medical Empiricism compelled 
Rationalists to develop more sophisticated epistemologies in defence of their 
theory-driven craft.179 Throughout II.3, I sought to emphasise the dependency of 
Epicurus’ physics on his epistemology. In this next section, I stress the 
dependency of Epicurus’ epistemology on his physics. My intention is to 
demonstrate that Epicurus’ scientific method could not be adapted independently 
of the philosopher’s materialism. 
II.4.1 Mechanics of sensation 
We have seen throughout II.3 that Epicurean epistemology has two premises. 1) 
Experiential data in non-illusory. 2) Subsensible reality is accessible to a 
posteriori reasoning via experiential data.180 In this section and the next, we 
examine the former premise on which the latter is based, beginning with the 
mechanics of sensation. 
     Epicurus’ explanation of the mechanics of sensation at Ep. Hdt.46-53 focuses 
almost exclusively on those preceding vision; vision is the paradigm for all modes 
of sensory activity in the text. Auditory and olfactory processes are touched on 
very briefly; they function by means of the same underlying mechanics 
distinguished only by the sense organ affected and, consequentially, the quality 
of the data.181Perception for Epicurus, as it was for Democritus,182 is mediated by 
εἴδωλα – ‘images’.183 εἴδωλα, as set out in Ep. Hdt., are streams of atoms emitted 
from the surface of an object, bounced from its dimensions by internal 
vibrations,184 that penetrate the sense organ(s) and transmit to the observer the 
object’s epistemic appearances in a manner that is commensurate with the 
condition and capabilities of the sense organs by which they are received.185 In 
the case of vision, εἴδωλα preserve in transit the arrangement they held when 
constituents of the source-object;186 they are projected surface-layers, one atom 
thick, which extend the properties of shape and colour beyond their source in an 
 
179 See IV.2. For an introduction to Empiricist epistemology, see V.2.2. 
180 S. E. M VII.211-216 encapsulates Epicurus’ scientific methodology succinctly. 
181 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 53. 
182 Theoph.  Sens. 55-7, 60-7, 73-6. (DK 68A135). 
183 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 46. 
184 An effect of the ongoing atomic collisions within its boundary. This process is essential for maintaining 
the object’s structure. See Ibid. 50. 
185 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 46-53. 
186 Ibid. 48. 
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unbroken effluence unless they are distorted by external causes.187 The ongoing 
emission of εἴδωλα by objects of perception is not revealed by diminishment in 
the object’s size due to a process of ‘reciprocal replenishment’; compound 
bodies, for as long as their structural integrity is preserved, ‘catch’ atoms from the 
spaces between compounds as quickly as they shed them.188 εἴδωλα travel at 
maximum speed – ‘as quick as thought’189 – because the atoms suffer no (or 
vanishingly few) collisions on their journey from object to receptor; they penetrate 
the senses with no appreciable break in continuity.190 The continuous 
impingement of the observer by atoms ‘traveling at the highest speed’ ensures 
that any alteration to the nature of the object will immediately register 
perceptively.191 
     Perception is the bombardment of the sensate with atoms shorn from 
structures in a shared external world. εἴδωλα are not themselves perceived, being 
too minute to register directly.192 Instead, they establish contiguity between 
subject and object and allow sense objects, however far removed, to be 
perceived as if by touch.193 Although vision is the paradigm in Ep. Hdt.46-53, the 
senses are best expressed as variants of tactile experience distinguished by the 
properties of the receptor. The touch-to-sight analogies Lucretius offers in DRN 
IV.256-268 are intended to confirm the similarity of object and εἴδωλον, such that 
mediating εἴδωλα are not taken to be corruptive of the ‘true external world’ – i.e. 
the world of objects, not transmissions.194 Touch, considered as an independent 
sense, is not reliant upon εἴδωλα, therefore the corroboration of touch and sight 
 
187 S. E. M VII.206-210. 
188 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 48.  
189 Ibid.  
190 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 48.  
191 Ibid. 
192 Lucr. IV.256-268. 
193 Cf. the Asclepiadean claim that ‘the common sense is touch’ in Cal. In Tim. 214. See IV.4-5. 
194 Lucr. IV.256-264 compares ‘the images that strike our eyes’ with wind that ‘blows slowly on us’ and 
points out that ‘we do not feel each particle of wind or cold’ as a separately delineated entity, but rather 
we experience the wind as a whole, as the sum of its cumulative impressions. Note also ibid. IV.230-236, 
where Lucretius exploits the fact that ‘a given shape handled in the dark’ corresponds to its visual 
impressions ‘in clear daylight’, as evidence for sight and touch being derived ‘from a like cause’. This 
passage does, however, raise the question of the role that light must play in the visual process. A 
counterintuitive explanation involving the ‘black air of darkness’ (caliginis aer ater) is hinted at IV.337-
343, which generates more problems than it solves. This is arguably the area of the Epicurus’ explanation 
of sensation that is most unsatisfactory. The insufficiency seems to be born of the desire to construct a 




confirms the reliability of the mediator.195 The example at DRN IV.265-268 is an 
enlightening metaphor for the epistemic value of εἴδωλα. Lucretius relates the 
mechanics of vision to how the properties of a stone can be discerned by touch. 
He points out that although contact is only ever made with the stone’s outermost 
layer, it is not the surface of the stone that the observer is experiencing, but the 
hardness deep within.196 
     A final point – experience is not passive. Sense receptors translate by means 
of ‘application’ (ἐπιβολή) impinging εἴδωλα into intelligible data.197 This 
mechanism is clarified by analogy with the Epicurean imagination,198 the principle 
source for which is DRN IV.722-822. The spaces between objects pullulate with 
εἴδωλα that are yet more delicately textured than those which strike the senses.199 
They penetrate the mind directly and provoke thought, yet our minds are not the 
cauldron of chimerical imagery that such a model might foment;200 because of 
their gossamery nature, ‘the mind cannot clearly see any except those which it 
strains to perceive’.201 Through application we curate the content of our thoughts, 
assembling imaginary objects from the εἴδωλα that move unseen, but do so within 
reach of our awareness.202 Sense organs play a congruent role in the 
interpretation of εἴδωλα; 203 the eye strains to focus on an object at the expense 
of the clarity of its environs. Consequently, the condition of the organ informs the 
character of the sense-impression attained through application. If the tongue, 
confused by disease, cannot detect the sweetness of the honey, the ‘smooth 
atoms’ which prefigure its defining taste will pass over its surface undetected.204 
Jaundiced eyes mingle the εἴδωλα with yellow seeds.205 
 
195 Asmis (1999) p.270. 
196 Lucr. IV.265-268. His argument is that if the layers beneath the surface were somehow to disappear 
then the surface-layer, still extant, would be imperceptible. Therefore, our engagement with the surface 
permits inferences to be drawn about the object considered as a whole. 
197 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 50. Asmis (1999) p.271. 
198 An explanatory technique employed by Asmis (1999) p.271-282, following Lucr. IV.808-817.  
199 Lucr. IV.724-729. 
200 Lucr. IV.732-744 explains Centaurs and denizens of the imaginations as chimerical assemblages of 
errant images. But, as we shall see, an element of artifice is required of the thinker in order to assemble 
such an entity in mind. 
201 Ibid. IV.802-803. Trans. Melville (1997). 
202 Ibid. IV.779-803. 
203 Ibid. IV.808-813. 
204 Ibid. IV.644-670. We revisit this passage at II.5.5 when we examine how pain and diseased might be 
identified with movements of atoms in Epicurean physics. 
205 Ibid. IV.332-336. 
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II.4.2 Criteria for truth 
The active participation of the organ in sensation would seem to potentiate 
distortion, but Epicurean epistemology asserts the truth-value of all sense 
impressions.206 Epicurus’ Κανών – a lost work on Epicurean scientific 
methodology, known to us via references in later texts –  holds that perceptions, 
preconceptions and feelings – at root, the experience of pleasure and pain – are 
the criteria of truth.207 
     The role of perception (αἴσθησις) in the κανονική is to furnish the observer with 
an accurate impression of the object of inquiry as it has reached his/her sense 
receptors at a given angle, distance and time. A loud sound heard from a great 
distance registers as faint. But the witness is not misled; he/she experiences the 
sound as it exists at his/her vantage.208 Similarly, one’s experience of colour, 
shape and size are affected by perspective, but this does not alter the fact that 
the εἴδωλα received exist in objective, external reality; alterations undertaken in 
the intervening space correspond to the object’s epistemic appearances at 
precisely the distance from which they are received.209 We receive the object as 
it can be interpreted, according to our senses, from our locus of subjectivity. Even 
if our senses are impaired, the impressions we receive correspond to external 
objects, but the inferences we draw from those impressions are vulnerable to 
error. The truth-value of perception is foundational to that of the latter criteria.210 
     Feelings (πάθη) are distinct from perceptions, but they are closely intertwined. 
Twice in Ep. Hdt, Epicurus identifies them as a distinct species of criterion, but 
one whose function in his scientific methodology is similarly foundational.211 
Feelings (curiously, given their centrality to Epicurean ethics) are not expounded 
separately in Ep Hdt. but the inference that they constitute internal responses to 
external stimuli – i.e. perceptions – is unlikely to be controversial. The τέλος of 
Epicureanism orients the philosopher towards the attainment of pleasure/the 
abatement of pain, a πάθη and the measure (κανών) of all good.212 Aversion to 
 
206 Ibid. IV.469-521; S. E. M VII.7206-2010, VIII.63. 
207 D. L. X.31. 
208 S. E. M 206-210. 
209 Ibid.; Lucr. IV.455-463; Plut. Col. 1109C-E (LS 16 I). 
210 Asmis (1984) p.63-80. 
211 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 38, 82. In both instances, it is clear that feelings and perceptions fulfil a similar role in the 
aetiology of sign-inference. Together, they are the first effect in the mechanism of deliberation. 
212 Epic. Ep. Men. 129. Asmis (1999) p.275. 
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pain and attraction to pleasure are the guiding principles of Epicurean ethics. 
Merging feelings with the aetiology of sensation enforces their truth-value; if 
perceptions are prospects on an objective world, feelings are instinctive value 
judgements on objective data – an awareness of the condition of one’s soul in 
response to some external event.213 They are the arbiters of moral truth;214 their 
ethical value rests on their epistemological value, which is in turn contingent on 
the physical mechanism of sensation. Moreover, feelings have self-reflexive 
value as evidence of non-evident physical realities. Epicurus attributes his 
knowledge of the soul to self-analysis, directed at perceptions and feelings.215 
Epicureanism’s thorax-centric psychophysiology, discussed at II.3.9 above, has 
a phenomenological basis: if we attend to our perception of internal processes, it 
is evident that our most potent emotional responses originate in the chest.216 
     Preconceptions (προλήψεις) are the third species of criterion. They are 
constituents of ‘general understanding’ (καθολικὴν νόησιν) – i.e. axioms 
synthesized out of repeated experiences;217 the word ‘man’ evokes the concept 
of ‘man’, an abstraction, parasitical on cumulative experience, which does not 
require elaboration.218 Epicurean preconceptions are distinct among equivalent 
doctrines because the impressions from which they are synthesized are imposed 
on human sense/psychological apparatus from without, rooted in perceptions 
(εἴδωλα) from the objective world.219 Not all preconceptions are common – 
preconceptions of places/acquaintances etc. must depend on one’s peculiar 
experiences – but common preconceptions are upheld as evidence for universal 
moral truths, such as the attraction of pleasure,220 and form the epistemological 
basis for Epicurean theism, unverified by the senses yet imprinted on the mind.221 
 
213 They are not, however, identified with particular atomic configurations in any of our extant sources. 
We might expect the equanimity one experiences in the absence of negative stimuli to have some sort of 
fundamental physical signature. But πάθη in Ep. Hdt. are conceptualized only as a kind of introspective 
perception. The physical nature of the data uncovered is not detailed. I return to this below at II.5.5. 
214 Hinted at in Plut. Col. 1109C-E (LS 16 I). 
215 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 63, 68. 
216 Lucr. III.140-142. 
217 D. L. X.33 is our principle text for the nature of preconceptions. They are also generally agreed to be 
the subject of Epic. Ep. Hdt. 37-38, alongside perceptions and feelings. For their dependence on 
perception, see Long & Sedley (1987) p.89; Asmis (1984) p.63-80, (1999) p.276-283. 
218 D. L. X.33. 
219 Asmis (1999) p.279. 
220 Cic. Fin. I.29-30; Epic. Ep. Men. 128. 
221 Epic. Ep. Men. 123-124; Cic. ND I.43-9. The Epicurean spokesperson in ND points to the imprint of divine 
existence in all men’s minds, common across all races and cultures. He uses the term προλήψις to refer 
to a shared outline – the basic, unaugmented notion that there are gods, independent of cultural 
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Common preconceptions emerge from accumulated memories and the thorough 
cross-referencing of experiences. They coalesce into a body of empirical 
knowledge that forms the basis for rational enquiry.222 Epicurus avoids the word 
πρόληψις in Ep. Hdt. 37-38,223 but he clearly has this criterion in mind when he 
appeals to his recipient’s intuitive understanding of the meaning behind his 
words.224 Accepting common preconceptions as axioms is a necessary 
preliminary step to philosophical enquiry, permitting progress from premise to 
conclusion instead of suffering an infinite regress through endless premises.225 
II.4.3 Sign-inference  
The non-evident yields its secrets via inference from the evident. Examples of 
this method in application have been encountered on several occasions over the 
course II.3; knowledge of the Epicurean cosmos is built from a foundation of 
perceptions, feelings and preconceptions.226 Suppositions offered via reason 
alone are valueless before they are confirmed or contested by sense-evidence.227 
‘The study of nature’, Epicurus writes in Ep. Pyth. 87, ‘must not conform to empty 
assumptions and arbitrary laws but follow the promotions of the facts.’228  
     Claims made about the non-evident must therefore be consistent with 
experience;229 they must be ‘uncontested’ by the facts apprehended by the 
senses.230 A sign does not independently (and by necessity) induce the mind to 
infer some component of non-evident reality but must be read in concert with a 
wealth of established preconceptions. For example, Epicurus reminds his reader 
in Ep. Hdt. that there is nothing in his account of εἴδωλα that is contested by the 
 
adornments – and says that it is on the basis of the κανών that we are permitted to proceed from 
acknowledging this outline to positing their existence by unanimous consent. 
222 Philod. Sign. 11.32-12.31 (LS 18 F); Ibid. 34.29-39.17 (LS 18 G) for sign-inference by similarity, a method 
of inference that is contingent upon the continuity of perceptions.  
223 Perhaps because frontloading his epitome of his physics with technical epistemological terminology 
would not be conducive to clarity. Long and Sedley (1987) p.89. 
224 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 37. 
225 Asmis (2009) p.86. 
226 With the former being the most primitive component of the deliberative mechanism. 
227 D. L. X.34; S. E. M VII.211-216. This detail must be accounted for if one is to read the quotation of 
Antiochus of Ascalon in S. E. M VII.201 – in which the  assertion that we ‘apprehend nothing at all with 
reason’ is attributed to Asclepiades – as evidence of Asclepiades’ deviation from the Epicurean precedent, 
as Polito (2006) p.324 does. I return to this discussion at IV.5.1.1. below. 
228 Trans. Hicks (1925). 
229 S. E. M VII.211-216 is the fullest account of Epicurean methodology, which uses ‘if motion, therefore 
void’ as the illustrative example. See supra II.3.2. 
230 Long and Sedley (1987) p.95. 
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senses;231 the peculiarities of his doctrine of sense-perception follow from 
conclusions reached earlier on in his epitome, which subsequently form the basis 
of more focused inquiry. Reason may formulate its own conclusions within the 
limits of that which is consistent with perceptions.232 When a variety of possible 
inferences can be drawn, closer inspection, such as that of a person recognised 
as a potential-acquaintance from distance, can yield more precise conclusions.233 
But in cases where our opinions cannot be rendered more precisely through more 
thorough sensory inspection – such as that of the nature of the atom/ὄγκος,234 for 
example – we should acknowledge that Epicurus’ scientific methodology does 
not appear to guarantee a correct conclusion, merely one that is consistent with 
perceptions; we might more accurately categorise these nature-guided 
inferences to the non-evident as productive of ‘that which cannot, through 
attendance to experience, be revealed to be false’. With this in mind, consider 
the following questions. How far can Asclepiades, unbound by Epicurus’ ethical 
obligations but adapting Epicurean epistemology for his own ends, exploit this 
acknowledged room for error? How far can he tinker with the roots of Epicurean 
physics without jeopardizing the integrity of Epicurean epistemology, if his own 
goals gave him cause? How much of Epicurean physics is, as it were, negotiable? 
II.5 The Epicurean panacea  
In this final section, we examine the τέλος of Epicurean philosophy and the 
philosopher’s self-conception as a physician of the soul. I will argue that, despite 
the rhetorical value of therapeutic imagery to the philosopher’s cause, the 
relationship between Epicureanism and the medical τέχνη may, in fact, have been 
oppositional. I will make two related claims about the depiction of medicine in 
Epicurean sources: 1) Epicureanism privileges the abatement of psychological 
pain over the physiological (II.5.1-2) and develops its physics only as far as is 
necessary to accommodate its role as psychological medicament, a base-
 
231 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 48. 
232 In Lucr. VI.703-11, for example, the poet tells us that it is acceptable to posit a variety of contradicting 
non-evident causes to evident data – a dead body, considered from a distance, could have arrived at that 
condition by several means – as long as our speculation does not stray from what is self-evident. 
233 S. E. VII.211-216; D. L. X.34. 
234 The example given of that which cannot be verified, conclusively, via closer inspection in Lucr. V.509-
503 is the cause of the appearance of celestial motion. Lucretius limits himself to expounding only what 
is possible in accord with the physical-epistemological premises established in the proceeding books of 
DRN. Evidently, atomism was considered to have been established beyond doubt by Epicurus, but it is not 
necessarily the case that others making use of his methodology, such as Asclepiades, would be obligated 
to agree with him. See IV.5.3. 
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ingredient in the philosopher’s salve (II.5.5-6); 2) when Epicurean philosophy 
presents itself as an effective panacea for the distresses of the mind it does so in 
acknowledgement that the medical art had failed to produce an analogous salve 
for the distresses of the body (II.5.3). 
     The depiction of medicine in Epicurean sources is an area that has received 
little attention by scholars of Asclepiades of Bithynia. In exploring the motivations 
behind Asclepiades’ modifications to Epicureanism, it is worth asking a) what 
questions does Epicurean physics leave unanswered that a physician, beginning 
from quasi-Epicurean physical and epistemological suppositions, can, pursuant 
to the peculiar demands of his discipline, apply his attention to? b) Could the 
hostility of the mother-doctrine to Asclepiades’ τέχνη have been a motivating 
factor in Asclepiades’ movement away from Epicurean atomism? Could we, for 
example, read the institution of corpuscular fragility in Asclepiadean physics – a 
radical departure from the adopted system whose significance Asclepiades 
cannot have been unaware of – as – at least, in part – an act of defiance against 
the impositions of a hostile philosophy?235 This final point, which we will revisit in 
more depth in (esp.) IV.2.5.2,236 is impossible to prove definitively. I hope, 
however, that by drawing attention to the depiction of medicine in Epicurean 
sources, I will permit us to consider Asclepiades’ deviations from the mother-
doctrine in their appropriate context. 
II.5.1 Philosophy as salve  
The τέλος of Epicureanism is curative. Torquatus, the Epicurean spokesperson 
in Cicero’s De Finibus, summarises the pursuit of Epicurean ethics as follows: 
…the greatest pleasure according to us is that which is experienced as a 
result of the complete removal of pain. When we are released from pain, the 
mere sensation of complete emancipation and relief from uneasiness is in 
itself a source of gratification.237 
In Ep. Men. 128, Epicurus holds emancipation from pain and anxiety to be the 
aim of all the Epicurean’s activities and in the third of his Key Doctrines (RS) 
 
235 I stress ‘in part’. For the (possible) practical advantages of the doctrine of frangible ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι, see 
IV.5.1. 
236 Though the question guides the entirety of IV.2. 
237 Cic. Fin. I.37 trans. Rackham (1914). 
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he states plainly that ‘the removal of all pain is the limit of the magnitude of 
pleasures. Wherever pleasure is present, as long as it is there, pain or distress 
or their combination is absent.’238 There is nothing in principle, then, to suggest 
that Epicurean ethics is antithetical to medicine; if pain and anxiety are the 
enemies of pleasure, and the highest form of good is to be attained by (and 
identified with) the eradication of these πάθαι, then anybody boasting a reliable 
method of alleviating bodily pain will have accomplished at least half of the 
objectives of the Epicurean teacher (presuming that a certain amount of 
psychological perturbation will be removed with pain’s abatement).239 
However, the word ‘reliable’ is doing most of the work in the previous sentence. 
If medicine were understood to represent an unreliable method of relieving 
pain – curing some, failing to cure others, contributing to the pain of a few, 
without a sufficiently robust theory of when professional intervention is and is 
not productive240 – we might ask if the accumulated efforts of physicians move 
humanity closer or farther from the attainment of psychological equanimity; 
mightn’t their inconstancy qualify as an irritant (at the very least), and therefore 
as a stimulant of pain? Might it not be preferable, in light of this confusion, to 
accept the inevitability of certain forms of pain and cultivate a mindset that 
permits one to endure it? 
     The value Epicurus identifies in medicine resides to its rhetorical utility. A 
fragment from Epicurus makes an explicit analogy between the appropriate 
function of the doctor and that of the philosopher: 
Vain is the word of a philosopher which does not heal any suffering of man. 
For just as there is no profit in medicine if it does not expel diseases of the 
body, so there is no profit in philosophy either if it does not expel the 
suffering of the mind.241 
 
238 Epic. RS.3 (LS 21 C). 
239 A presumption we are entitled to make on the grounds of the closeness with which body and soul are 
bonded in Epicurean psychology. See supra II.3.9 and II.5.3 below. 
240 There is an acknowledgement in Arist. Met. I.981a that the medical τέχνη cannot invariably bring about 
its end. The practice of medicine, on Aristotle’s account, entails encounters with the particular. 
Particularity draws one outside the domain of theoretical knowledge. See Chiaradonna (2013) p.381-391. 
That no single patient is perfectly similar to any other, and therefore that the medical τέχνη cannot, 
without scrupulous attendance to particularity, devise a system that would guarantee results is a recurring 
theme throughout the Hippocratic Corpus, e.g. Epid. I.23 and VM 20 (briefly addressed in 0.2). We will 
return to Arist. Met. I.981a at V.2.2 in my discussion of the origin of medical Empiricism in the debate 
convening τέχνη and ἐμπειρία. 
241 Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 31 = Epic. fr. D54 in Bailey (1926) p.133 trans. Bailey (= Usener 221). 
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As presented in 0.1, and we shall see further in (esp.) III.5.2, the tradition of using 
clinical terminology to describe psychological pathology is beloved of the Stoics 
and the Epicureans alike, but where the Stoic use of medical analogy serves to 
emphasise a physics-rooted teleological affinity between Stoic philosophy and 
the medical art (III.5), I submit that Epicurus’ apparent disinterest in exploring the 
physical signature of pain in his cosmology (set out at II.5.4 below) 
recontextualises the above passage as, above all, an affirmation of disciplinary 
boundaries. When Epicurus likens his practice to that of a physician he marks 
out, very clearly, the subject of his administrations; medicine is expected to expel 
diseases from the body; philosophy is expected to expel suffering from the mind. 
     Over the course of this section, I will argue that in the absence of a consistent 
and appropriately rigorous atomist account of suffering in Epicurean physics 
there is, inevitably, a relaxing of the ties that bind the behaviour of the human to 
that of his/her constituent atoms;242 the philosopher does not engage with his 
‘patient’ (to continue the analogy) at the level of his/her constituents; the 
receptivity of the patient to the philosopher’s medicine, his words, can only be 
discerned through their attitude, their subsequent patterns of behaviour. Where 
the physician applies himself to the health of the body, seeking to bring about a 
desirable physical state, the philosopher is looking elsewhere, towards a territory 
which, when mastered, will protect one’s equanimity from the assaults of bodily 
pain. When Epicurus writes in SV 54 that ‘one should not pretend to philosophise, 
but actually philosophise. For what is needed is not a semblance of health, but 
real health’, it is not difficult to establish the epistemological domain in which ‘real 
health’ is understood to reside.243  
II.5.2 Precedence of mind over body  
Across our sources for Epicurean ethics, psychological equanimity always takes 
precedent over bodily pleasures. While Epicurus writes in Ep. Men. that ‘the end 
belonging to the blessed life’ is freedom from pain in the body and disturbance in 
the soul, he continues by impressing on his reader that the process of ‘sober 
reasoning’ lies at the root of the pleasant life, that ‘which tracks down the causes 
of every choice and avoidance, and which banishes the opinions that beset the 
 
242 I will address the limitations of our sources on this subject at II.5.4 below. 
243 Epic. SV 54 (LS 25 D). 
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soul with the greatest confusion.’244 Uncertainty, the father of fear, is the 
Epicurean bête noire. His attitude concerning the abatement of physical pain is 
that one must undertake to recognise its causes then avoid them.245 The 
temptation to make a comparison with the ‘Rationalist’ approach to medicine is 
forestalled by the fact that the prudence Epicurus advises at Ep. Men. 132 is not 
dictated by a theory of the root causes of pain – of pain as expressed by the 
activity of atoms – but by the empirical observation that certain behaviours, 
undertaken to excess, have negative consequences; ‘sober reasoning’ guides 
the Epicurean through the phenomenal world by attending to evident facts. 
     In such instances where pain is unavoidable one must cultivate the 
appropriate outlook to permit one to endure it and, in doing so, alleviate the 
psychological distresses that bodily pain might engender; Epicurus reminds us in 
RS 4 that pain is not unending, and that the worst pains afflict us for the shortest 
time.246 It is here that knowledge of the physical account of Epicurean 
psychophysiology seems pertinent. Recall from II.3.9 the arguments for the 
interconnectivity of body and soul in DRN III.152-176 pertaining to the twin-
experiences of pain in body and mind; as fear has physiological symptoms, bodily 
wounds have psychological effects. Epicurean ethics seems to presuppose that 
the psychological collateral of bodily pain can be tempered via the cultivation of 
the correct psychological disposition. The goal is to deprive bodily pain, as far as 
it possible, of its capacity to adversely affect the mind. A remarkable letter, 
addressed to one Idomeneus, written towards the end of Epicurus’ life, 
encapsulates this attitude: 
On this blissful day, which is also the last of my life, I write this to you. My 
continual suffering from strangury and dysentery are so great that nothing 
could augment them; but against them all I set gladness of mind at the 
remembrance of our past conversations.247 
 
244 Epic. Ep. Men. 127-132. (LS 21 B). 
245 Ibid. 
246 This sentiment is echoed in a quote preserved in Seneca’s Epistulae Morales (Sen. Ep. Mor. XXX.14.), 
where Epicurus argues that pain at death is to be recognised for its brevity. Sedley (1998) p.163-165 
argues that the Epicurean attitude towards the toleration of pain was intended to be included in the final 
version of DRN, which Lucretius never lived to finish. See II.5.3 below. 
247 D. L. X.22 trans. Hicks (1925). 
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For Epicurus, sufferings such that ‘nothing could augment them’ were 
rendered tolerable through recourse to pleasant memories. On his account, 
his psychological equanimity was such that his agonies were inert, his mind 
unaffected by their raging. What this amounts to, in physical terms, is the 
detachment of the mind from the spirit-body interconnexion (therefore, to a 
degree, from the sensation of pain) as far as the physics of the mind-spirit-
body interconnexion will allow. This we have mostly been left to infer, for the 
aetiology of pain in the body-soul duality is not expressed in reductionist terms 
in Epicurus’ extant writings. We have better luck with Lucretius, as we shall 
see at II.5.5 below. However, as I will argue, Lucretius’ allusions to the atomic 
roots of pain in the body and mind are insufficiently rigorous to indicate a 
substantive Epicurean physical basis for the aetiology or hierarchy of pain. 
Lucretius does, however, confirm the mind’s partial independence from the 
spirit at DRN III.144-151; the mind may have experiences that are unregistered 
by the spirit and may ‘wander’ independently of other psychophysiological 
activity. It is surely this capacity for independent activity that allows for claims 
such as that in D. L. X.22 to be made, but how this is accounted for in physical 
terms remains unspecified.248 
     Epicurean justification for the primacy of psychological pleasure over that 
of the body can be found in our first century testimonia, closer to the period of 
Asclepiades’ popularity. Cicero reports of Epicureanism in the Tusculan 
Disputations that ‘the body rejoices just so long as it perceives a present 
pleasure; but the mind perceives both the present pleasure, along with the 
body, and foresees the one that is coming without allowing the past one to fly 
away.’249 As made clear in RS 4, bodily pains (so too pleasures) are creatures 
of the present moment. The mind’s capacity to project into the future and 
contextualise present sensations – a function, we should note, of its partial 
independence from sensory constraints250 – makes it the superior component 
of the mind-body aggregate. Epicurus’ letter to Idomeneus, quoted above, 
 
248 The temptation is to posit that the higher concentration of soul-atoms in the mind/chest is the cause 
of this additional freedom of activity. To those who might question, on this basis, if Asclepiades’ rejection 
of a localised ἡγεμονικόν, coupled with his determinism, can be read as further evidence of the physician’s 
disinterest in the independence of thought, I will argue at IV.4.3 why I think this is unlikely to be the case. 
249 Cic. Tusc. 5.95. (LS 21 T) I favour the Long & Sedley translation on this occasion. This is partly for reasons 
of brevity, but also because King’s (1945) translation of animum as ‘soul’ is insufficiently specific for my 
purposes. 
250 Lucr. III.144-151. 
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informs us that the mind’s capacity to project into the past and soothe itself 
with pleasant memories was a further factor in assigning its supremacy. The 
Epicurean spokesman in Cicero’s De finibus argues that mental pleasures, 
though rooted in the pleasures of body, are the greater of the two.251 The 
inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda, moreover, laments that the immediacy 
of present concerns can blind people to the superior value of psychological 
equanimity.252 
     What I want to establish, going forward, is that although freedom from bodily 
and psychological pain jointly constitute the Epicurean τέλος, the elevation of  
psychological equanimity over physiological concerns casts the afflictions of 
the body not as diseases to be cured, but as physical states to be avoided, via 
prudence, or withstood, through cultivation of mind; ἀταραξία functions as a 
ballast against pain which is conceived as a temporary perturbation that the 
mind, unbound – to a certain extent – by sensory constraints, is able to endure. 
I will propose at II.5.5 that the Epicureans were disinterested in pursuing the 
medical potential of their physics on account of their preoccupation with 
ἀταραξία as a state of psychological equanimity. In the next section, we 
explore the possibility that the medicine art per se may have been conceived 
as an impediment to ἀταραξία. 
II.5.3 Medicine in DRN VI.1138-1286 
The depiction of the medical art in DRN VI.1138-1286 cannot be ignored in our 
pursuit of a prevailing Epicurean attitude towards medicine as an independent 
discipline. Here, the Athenian plague of 430 BC is rendered in excruciating detail. 
VI.1138-1286 stands out in DRN as very likely the only section of the poem for 
which Epicurus’ magnum opus, his work On Nature, was not Lucretius’ source.253 
Instead, lines 1138-1286 are modelled on the description of the plague in 
Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War II.47-54 and retain the order of 
material first presented in Thucydides’ text. The ready availability of Lucretius’ 
source for DRV VI.1138-1286 has long permitted scholars to identify in each 
deviation from the source material an expression of Lucretius’ Epicureanism. One 
 
251 Cic. Fin. 1.55.  
252 Diog. Oen. 38.1.8-3.14 (LS 21 V). 
253 Sedley (1998) p.160. 
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such alteration concerns the failure of doctors to cope with the disease. 
Thucydides writes:  
At the beginning the doctors were quite incapable of treating the disease 
because of their ignorance of the right methods. In fact, mortality among the 
doctors was highest of all since they came more frequently in contact with 
the sick. Nor was any other human art or science any help at all. Equally 
useless were prayers made at temples, consultation of oracles, and so 
forth...254  
By contrast, Lucretius writes succinctly of the medical art that it ‘muttered’, or 
perhaps ‘refrained from speaking’ in ‘silent fear’ (…mussabat tacito medicina 
timore), providing no respite to the victims of the plague.255 On first analysis, the 
purpose of each passage is the same; the point is that medicine was unequal to 
the task of preventing the plague from spreading. However, as J. H. Phillips notes 
in his 1982 article ‘Lucretius on the Inefficacy of the Medical Art’, the difference 
in tone is stark.256 Only Lucretius references the fear exhibited by the doctors at 
the bedsides of the afflicted. Thucydides, by contrast, spares the Athenian 
doctors the accusation of quivering in their ineptitude; when he writes that 
mortality among the doctors was the highest of all – a detail omitted by Lucretius 
– he affords their deaths a certain nobility;257 they suffered as they sought to give 
assistance to the dying, a hopeless task, but one undertaken nonetheless. 
     H. S. Commager, in his influential 1957 article ‘Lucretius’ interpretation of the 
plague’, wrote of the pattern of Lucretius’ supposed ‘lapses’ from Thucydides in 
DRN VI.1138-1286 that they betray the Roman poet’s tendency to view ‘physical 
phenomena in moral or psychological terms – especially in terms of fear and 
desire, held by Epicurean doctrine to be the two principle obstacles to 
happiness’.258 Subsequent scholarly efforts found a broad consensus on this 
issue. For all that questions remain as to how explicit Lucretius intended the moral 
 
254 Thuc. II.47 trans. Warner (1953). I include the lines concerning the inefficacy of all human sciences and 
divine exhortations to emphasise that Thucydides is not singling doctors out for their failure, he is singling 
them out for their exceptionally mortality rate. Lucretius omits adapting these lines at VI.1197ff. He 
references the inefficacy of divine reverence at VI.1276-1277, falling in line once again with Thucydides’ 
structure (cf. II.52), but the accusation of inefficacy at VI.1197ff is curiously reserved for the medical art. 
255 Lucr. VI.1179. 
256 Phillips (1982) p.234. 
257 Ibid. 
258 Commager (1957) p.106. 
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lesson of DRN VI.1138-1286 to be, there is little doubt that the plague serves a 
symbolic function in the poem. Lucretius writes at III.459-461 that ‘just as the 
body is prone to foul diseases and harsh pain, so we can see the mind to suffer 
anxiety and grief and fear’;259 psychological perturbation is a disease for which 
Epicureanism is offered as the cure. The Athenians who fell victim to the plague 
of 430BC were denied Epicurus’ medicine; his teachings, we are led to suppose, 
would have afforded them some comfort. Lucretius casts himself as a marketer 
of Epicurus’ salve. In the metaphorical architecture of DRN, where Epicureanism 
is medicine and Lucretius’ poetry is the ‘sweet yellow honey’ smeared on the 
goblet’s rim,260 what metaphorical function does the medical τέχνη per se serve, 
when it appears starkly on the page? 
     Taking Lucretius’ deviation from Thucydides at VI.1179 as our evidence, 
medicine per se is an inferior (and ultimately ineffectual) body of knowledge to 
that which Epicureanism preserves. The doctor’s fear – the great Epicurean bane 
– stems from an encounter that exceeds his understanding, a confrontation with 
the limitations of his τέχνη. Had he placed his faith in Epicureanism, we are invited 
to presume, he would, confronted by the horrors of the plague, be free from the 
fear that consigns him to silence. But if Epicureanism can be likened to medicine, 
it is intended as a psychological balm.261 Though Lucretius would disparage 
practitioners of the medical art for their failure to understand the causes of the 
plague, he reveals nothing in the text that might suggest how the physicians 
would be better served, in practical terms, had they understood the plague’s 
atomic roots.262 He offers no alternative medical theory, but hints instead at an 
alternative moral outlook. In making the case for DRN VI being incomplete, David 
Sedley points out that the Epicurean position on how physical pain can be 
tolerated if one cultivates the appropriate mindset (II.5.2 above) is absent from 
DRN, though the plague episode hints at its intended inclusion.263 Following the 
logic of Lucretius’ poem, the missing piece of the lesson at DRN VI.1138-1286 is 
not a superior medical theory, but a superior alternative to medicine. When 
Lucretius writes at VI.1226 of medicine’s inability to find a cure common to all 
 
259 Trans. Melville (1997). 
260 Lucr. I.936-950. 
261 A point I develop further at II.5.5 below. 
262 Despite his discussion of disease in these terms at DRN VI.660-664. 
263 Sedley (1998) p.161-165. 
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who were afflicted, the image evoked is that of a discipline grasping at solutions, 
perhaps occasionally chancing on a remedy for some, but never developing an 
reliable methodology for the effective treatment of all.264 We must ask if the 
uncertainty indulged by practitioners of medicine, a necessary concession to the 
practical realities of their art, is antithetical to the cultivation of the ‘correct 
mindset’; uncertainly begets fear, the abolition of which is the path to ἀταραξία.  
     The question of how much we are entitled to infer about the general Epicurean 
attitude to medicine from DRN will be addressed shortly below (II.5.4), but the 
argument that Lucretius was negatively disposed towards medicine is supported 
by evidence from elsewhere in the text. As Phillips notes, the discovery of 
medicine is absent from Lucretius’ account of the progress of civilisation in DRN 
V.772-1457.265 The closest Lucretius comes to making note of medical 
advancement is a reference to primitive humankind’s ignorance of the proper 
method for the treatment of wounds at V.994-998. This thread is not picked up in 
his account of civilisation’s later stages, but the implication is certainly that a 
proper method of treating physical injuries existed to be found.266 This would not, 
of course, come close to representing the full scope of the medical τέχνη as it 
existed in the Hellenistic world, and certainly not with regard to Rationalist 
medicine, which claims non-evident causes as its domain of study.267 Lucretius 
will likely have conceded that a few practical measures could be taken to alleviate 
physical pain in contexts where the causes are self-evident – i.e. techniques 
which were arrived at empirically, with predictive effects. But beyond that, the 
medical art is not included among the inventions that moved the humanity closer 
to equanimity, such as the discovery of fire, the advancement of language and 
the eventual concession to the necessity of law. When physicians do appear 
towards the poem’s conclusion, they are vessels for the demonstration of the 
paralysing effects of fear.      
     While the argument can be made that the deviation at DRN VI.1179 is a 
consequence of mere poetic styling – a device incidentally, of which 
 
264 Or at least, a method for determining when it was appropriate for physician to intervene – i.e. when 
success was attainable. DRN VI.1226-1234 represents a further alteration from Thucydides, where the 
psychological consequences of the plague seem to take precedence over the danger of physical contagion. 
See Commager (1957) p.112-113 for further analysis of DRN VI.1226. 
265 Phillips (1982) p.234. 




Epicureanism was largely disdainful268 – we should note that Lucretius’ depiction 
of the inefficacy of the medical art is consistent with the privileging of 
psychological equanimity over the bodily across our Epicurean testimonia.269 So 
too is the heightened psychological emphasis at VI.1226-1234 and elsewhere, 
when contrasted with Lucretius’ source.270 The interpretation of DRN VI.1179 as 
a knowing disparagement of the medical art is also consistent with the absence 
of a fully-developed Epicurean theory of health and disease in any of our extant 
testimonia. We might ask if the pursuit of ἀταραξία is inconsistent with the realities 
of medical inquiry, such that the medical potential of Epicurean physics was never 
sufficiently explored. 
II.5.4 Cautionary interlude 
Before we continue, we must address the limitations of our source material in 
making the case that the physics of bodily disease was underexplored in 
Epicureanism. Hypotheses such as that which I advance at II.5.5-6 below are 
assembled from extant material and may date poorly on discovery of new 
additions to the Epicurean cannon. Is it possible that an Epicurean theory of 
health and disease has been lost to us? 
     Of the list of works attributed to Epicurus in D. L. X.27-28, the two most likely 
homes for such a theory are On Diseases and Death –  to Mithras (Περὶ νόσων 
και θανάτου)271 and the one of the lost books of On Nature. Nothing of the 
contents of the former work is known. But I would suggest that combining the 
subject of disease with death points towards the letter’s ethical, and likely non-
medical purpose. We know that the Epicurean position on death was that its 
capacity to incite fear was, on the final analysis, unfounded.272 There is also, as 
we have seen (II.5.1-2) ample evidence to suggest that Epicurus’ most frequent 
(if not only) response to the question of bodily pain was that one must cultivate a 
mindset that deprives pain of the same capacity to induce fear – which is to say, 
 
268 See, most obviously, our fragments from Philodemus’ work On Poems. The fact that Philodemus 
himself wrote poetry (Cic. Pis. 68-72 and the various epigrams in the fifth book of the Anthologia Graeca) 
suggests that we exercise caution when upholding Lucretius’ chosen medium as evidence of a deeper 
dissent from Epicurus’ doctrines. While he may not, at DRN VI.1179, be reproducing a direct attack on the 
medical τέχνη located somewhere in Epicurus' On Nature, it is unlikely that there is anything in his source 
text that prohibits him from emphasising the art’s inefficacy. 
269 Supra II.5.2. 
270 Commager (1957). 
271 The full title of which, including ‘…and death’ (και θανάτου) was persevered in P. Herc. 1012, col.38. 
272 E.g. Epic. Ep. Men. 124-127. 
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to respond to pain as one responds to one’s mortality: it is inevitable, but it need 
not disturb the mind. The title thus inclines me to believe that the methodology of 
coping with these inevitabilities was the subject of the text, rather than something 
approaching a physical exposition of disease. Death cannot be cured; the pairing 
of death with disease suggests that the topic of the letter was not medical, but 
ethical/psychological. 
 
     A more likely location of the Epicurean theory of health is one of the missing 
books of On Nature. We can be confident in assuming that Lucretius’ hints 
towards an atomistic model of disease (see II.5.5) are sourced from somewhere 
in Epicurus’ magnum opus.273 But we cannot, as we shall see (II.5.5-6), 
reconstruct from references in DRN alone a unifying atomistic theory of disease 
or pain, let alone a bone fide Epicurean theory of medicine. If such a theory 
existed, I would question why Lucretius would decline to mention it in DRN, eager 
as he is to celebrate the discoveries of his school’s founder. If the subtext of DRN 
VI.1138-1286 is that knowledge of Epicureanism would have prepared the 
Athenians for the horrors which befell them, then surely partaking in Epicurus’ 
medical knowledge would have further spared the victims of the plague from the 
fear and uncertainty which Lucretius brings to the forefront of the episode.  
Against this, one might raise the strong possibility that DRN VI was unfinished,274 
or that Epicurus’ theory of health was confined to a book of On Nature with which 
Lucretius was less familiar.275 But it seems to me that in either case, Epicurus’ 
medical pronouncements, if they existed at all, were far from the forefront of his 
philosophy. As we saw in II.5.3 above, the logic of DRN VI.1138-1286 as it existed 
at the time of Lucretius’ death indicates that Epicurus’ explanation of how bodily 
pain could be tolerated is the missing components of the poet’s unfinished lesson, 
not a hypothetical medical theory;276 the depiction of Epicureanism as a 
psychological salve is manifestly the driving impetus for the inclusion of this 
episode. It remains plausible that Epicurus’ theory of health was written in one of 
the more ‘obscure’ books of On Nature. But given Epicurus’ own apparent role in 
assigning each book their relative importance,277 we can at least be confident in 
 
273 Sedley (1998) esp. p.62-93 on Lucretius’ ‘fundamentalism’, p.133-165 on Lucretius’ plan and its 
execution. 
274 Sedley (1998) p.157-165.  
275 Ibid. p.99-102 for discourse on the ‘popular books’ of On Nature, p. 135-144 (esp.) for Lucretius’ source. 
276 Ibid. p.163. 
277 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 35. 
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asserting that if a perfunctory theory of health and disease was recorded 
somewhere in On Nature, its significance to the Epicurean project was minimal.   
II.5.5 An atomistic theory of disease? 
Our departure into ethics in II.5.1-3 has returned us to the physics at the root of 
medical theory, and to the question of the Epicurean explanation of disease. If 
the medical art was guilty of indulging in the kinds of uncertainty that were 
antithetical to Epicureanism’s τέλος, then a theory of medicine designed from 
Epicurean principles is the obvious desideratum.278 However, no unifying theory 
of health and disease is presented from within the school itself.279 Asclepiades’ 
initial attempt to develop a theory of health and disease within Epicurean physical 
constraints – which I will argue for at IV.2.2 –  implies that he saw something of 
value in Epicurean physics,280 but we are under no obligation to project on him 
an interest in Epicurean ethical concerns. Keeping in mind the textual limitations 
addressed at II.5.4 above, I posit that the reluctance displayed by Epicurean 
sources to pronounce, authoritatively, on issues of bodily health – that is, 
independently of appeals to psychological equanimity – is suggestive of a certain 
moral wariness on the part of the Epicurean philosopher, such that the medical 
utility of Epicurean physics had not been properly explored. If there was work yet 
to be done then such work demanded a physician’s estrangement from the 
question of psychological equanimity – more broadly, someone who could exploit 
the utility of the Epicurean physics-epistemology interconnexion independently of 
ethics. Crucially, a non-Epicurean. In this section, I will argue that Epicureanism 
develops its physics only so far as to account for its ethical τέλος, leaving the 
question of the physics of disease largely unexplored. At II.5.6 below, I make the 
case for the disjunction of physics and ethics in Epicurean sources. 
     Our best source for an atomistic theory of disease is Lucretius who, in DRN 
VI, conceives of disease in the same terms as he does thunder, earthquakes and 
 
278 It is, of course, not at all obvious that a philosopher of the third century BC would consider it the task 
of philosophy to develop a detailed medical theory. Aristotle’s comments on the place of medicine within 
philosophy are significant here, but I delay my examination of the Aristotelian framework until III.3 and 
will revisit it in the context of Asclepiades’ relationship with Epicureanism at IV.2.5.2. My motivations are 
structural. I provide detailed examples of the kinds of deviation we see physicians make from their 
adopted philosophical models before I shine light on the (at least, partially) clarifying framework. 
279 The hints in DRN towards an atomic theory of pain indicate only a perfunctory acknowledgement in 
Epicurus’ doctrine. See II.5.6 below. 
280 And I propose that the value Asclepiades identified in Epicurean physics – as has, by now, been 
appropriately foreshadowed – was rooted in Epicurean epistemology. See IV.5. 
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volcanic eruptions;281 they are inevitabilities of natural mechanics (at least, within 
the context of the cosmos we inhabit), explicable in materialist terms. His 
conception of disease is here encapsulated: 
For is there anyone that feels surprise  
If fever rising with its burning fire 
Attacks the limbs or if some other pain 
Afflicts the body, caused by some disease? 
The foot swells suddenly; sometimes a stab of pain  
Shoots into the teeth or even into the eyes. 
The fiery rash breaks out, creeping over the body, 
And burns whatever part it seizes on,  
Crawling relentlessly across the limbs. 
All this is caused by the multitude of atoms; 
For sure the earth and sky of ours contain  
Sufficient store of noxious disease  
To spawn a growth of ills immeasurable.282 
Lucretius uses the variety of ailments which assault the human body as an 
analogy for the meteorological events which take place in the cosmos;283 the 
lesson is that the mechanics underpinning the phenomenal world are sufficiently 
complex to account for everything in perception, however seemingly 
uncaused.284 But how much do we learn about the nature of disease from this 
passage? Only that diseases are accidents prefigured in atomic configurations, 
 
281 Lucr. VI.655-673. 
282 Lucr. VI.655-664 trans. Melville (1997). 
283 Ibid. VI.655-673. 
284 Lucretius also compares the size of man relative to the cosmos to the size of the cosmos relative to the 
all at VI.650-654. A macrocosm-microcosm relationship is being promoted to several different ends. The 
human and the cosmos adhere to the same laws. The human and the cosmos are, in the final analysis, 
vanishingly small constituents of a whole. I mention this to draw attention to the fact that elucidating the 
nature of disease is not the focus in VI.655-673. Lucretius’ chosen examples seem intended to enforce the 
analogy. Note particularly the parity between the ‘fiery rash…creeping over the body’ (VI.660), the realms 




multiple and variform. Lucretius goes no further in explaining the nature of such 
configurations. Instances of specific ailments are further elaborated in the text, 
but never in the spirit of divulging a unifying (or, even, an isolated) atomic 
explanation for the aetiology of disease. In the case of epilepsy, to use a 
memorable example from DRN III, symptoms arise because the atoms which 
comprise the mind are tossed around within the body like an ocean in a storm 
and endure for the duration of the tumult.285 No first cause is offered, but nor 
should we expect one; Lucretius’s objective is not to demystify epilepsy; he is 
using it, in context, to illustrate the mind’s mortality.286 The description is intended 
to illuminate a property of the soul for the purpose of guiding that of the reader 
towards quiescence. The elemental basis of an epilepsy is a premise at III.487-
509, not the conclusion. 
     In the overture to the description of the plague, less than three hundred lines 
from the end of DRN, when Lucretius finally announces his intention to explain 
the nature of disease per se, he fails to deliver on this promise.287 He confines 
his explanation to epidemic diseases and identifies pestilences with baleful 
arrangements of atoms in the air which are inhaled, imbibed or ingested via 
infected waters and foodstuffs.288 What makes such patterns harmful is not 
elaborated, though there is an interesting ethnographic diversion into how 
unfamiliar environments more readily produce disease in travellers.289 
Unfortunately, rather than exposit the mechanics of this, Lucretius merely offers 
some examples of how different climates produce different people and how 
diseases are often geographically specific.290 But with the possible exception of 
this short account – which, in the context of the poem, is principally a prelude to 
the description of the plague whose credentials as a didactic device have been 
 
285 Lucr. III.487-509. 
286 Ibid. III.459-525 for fuller context. The capacity of medicine to heal the mind as it does the body is also 
used as evidence for the mortality of the mind. There is at least the implication in the analogy at III.510-
512 that the body can be healed by medicine, but its mention is incidental. It is not clear what kind of 
psychological healing Lucretius is referring to in these lines – epilepsy, in his description, passes when ‘the 
disease is spent’ (III.502) – but in the context of the poem, reading the line as a generic an analogy for the 
curative property of Epicureanism does not seem like too great a reach. cf. Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 
31 = Epic. fr. D54 in Bailey (1926) p.133 (= Usener 221). 
287 At least, in the detail we are accustomed to expect at this stage in DRN VI. His limited explanation does 
succeed in providing the basis of an alternative to divine agency as the cause or epidemic diseases. 
288 Lucr. VI.1090-137. 
289 Ibid. VI.1103-1130. A ‘diversion’, because the plague that befell Athens to which this section is a 
preamble was hardly the result of an unfamiliar environment. 
290 Lucr. VI.1103-1130. 
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thoroughly established291 – physical disease is never the focus in DRN; its 
function is typically to illustrate a component of broader 
physical/psychophysiological doctrine, such as the examples of VI.655-673 and 
III.459-535 respectively, or as part of an analogy for psychological disquiet, the 
disease for which Epicureanism is the cure. I suggest that this apparent reticence 
indicates Lucretius’ reluctance to engage fully with an atomistic explanation of 
disease. We may contrast Lucretius’ treatment of disease at DRN VI.655-664 and 
1090-1137 with that of meteorological and other natural phenomena from 
VI.96.292 Despite the analogy Lucretius wants to draw between diseases of the 
body and events within the cosmos, phenomena whose roots are perfectly 
external to the boundaries of the body permit Lucretius to explicate their nature 
with more confidence.293 The depiction of disease as an arrangement of atoms 
raises more questions. Disease is not an external, delineable phenomenon. It is 
an event that occurs within the body and the ultimate condition of a process which 
has implications for the physical relationship between the human body and the 
external world. There is, I suggest, a certain untapped potential in Epicurean 
physics when it comes to the question of disease, one whose lack of actualisation 
manifests as a vulnerability in DRN. The question demands a mechanical 
explanation which is never supplied by our sources for Epicurean philosophy but 
is – at least partially – supplied by Asclepiades in terms consistent with Epicurean 
conditions (see IV.2.2). 
     To return, then, to DRN VI.655-664, there are two noteworthy explanatory 
limitations of the atomic model of disease which a physician – working from 
Epicurean physical principles but directing his efforts towards a distinct τέλος – is 
at liberty to resolve. The first relates to the mechanics of how atoms in the body 
interact with those whose nature precipitates disease. Disease is nominally a 
phenomenon of the body, but we may define it more precisely as the ultimate 
condition of a sequence of events which take place on either side of the human 
boundary. It is unclear from Lucretius’ account where it is that the atomic roots of 
disease manifest. When he writes of pain afflicting the body that is caused by 
 
291 Given how Lucretius fails to explain the nature of disease in this section, his claim to be about to do so 
at VI.1090 reads like a pretext to steer the poem towards his intended moral conclusion. 
292 Of which the passage at DRN VI.655-664 is, in fact, a component. 
293 Moreover, theorising as to the elemental causes of meteorological phenomena has no explicit bearing 
on any practical discipline in which the merits of a theory can be conclusively tested. 
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some disease,294 are we to infer that the pattern of atoms he attributes to disease 
is an event occurring inside the body, or something the body is affected by, or 
both? We might presume that nocuous patterns of atoms interact with those of 
the body to produce a new arrangement from which the symptoms spring, but we 
are left to question whether these outside patterns are innately nocuous or if 
disease is co-dependent on conditions in the body. As we have seen, in the case 
of epidemic diseases – standardly distinguished as a class of their own – the 
agent of contagion is located in the air, but the ethnographic element of the 
exposition at VI.1090-1137 invites us to speculate that the precomposition of the 
body has a role to play either in one’s susceptibility to disease or in the creation 
of disease through the juxtaposition of something in the body with potentially 
destructive compounds in the atmosphere.295 But speculate is all we may do. 
There is no explanation as to how, at the atomic level, disease interacts with the 
body.296 DRN VI.1090-1137 is the closest we get to an Epicurean account of how 
the body interacts with the atmosphere in the aetiology of disease. Not only does 
this account limit itself to epidemic disease, ignoring the other possible causes of 
disease besides exposure to pestilence,297 it also raises more questions about 
the nature of the internal-external relationship in the origin of disease than it 
answers. 
     Asclepiades’ core thesis goes some way towards filling in this absence. 
Disease in the body is explained by the impaction of ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι in the body’s 
elemental constitution.298 That impaction might be caused by nocuous 
combinations of the same base material originating externally is consistent with 
 
294 Lucr. VI.657-658. 
295 This is the case, of course, with Epicurus’ account of perception (Ep. Hdt. 46-53, supra II.4.1-2). The 
same atomic patterns can have different effects on different individuals’ sense receptors. See the example 
of honey on the taste receptors of the healthy vs. the unhealthy at Lucr. IV.644-670. Atoms in the body 
interact with atoms in the honey to create the experience of taste; the ‘sweetness’ detected by the 
healthy tongue is undetected by the unhealthy subject despite their partaking of an identical substance. 
Of course, in this example the body is already diseased – the inability to detect sweetness is perceived as 
a malfunction resulting from disturbed atoms in the body (IV.668-670) – but the possibility remains that 
potentially destructive configurations in the atmosphere could only adversely affect the body in concert 
with some feature of its atomic precondition. 
296 We get so far as the non-specifically deleterious patterns of atoms being inhaled, imbibed, or ingested 
and then passing into the chest (VI.1150-1152). The aetiology of the manifestation of disease following 
this is left to our imaginations. 
297 Thus, we should be wary of inferring that infected air, food and water were the only ways in which 
disease could be precipitated in the Epicurean conception of disease. Though Lucretius certainly presents 
VI. 1090-1137 as if it contained a universal explanation for disease. 
298 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-7; S. E. M. III.3-5. 
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both Epicurean doctrine and our sources for Asclepiades’ elemental conception 
of human physiology. Anonymus Londinensis writes of the role of the pores in 
regulating the material flowing into and out of the body in Asclepiades’ theory.299 
The body is engaged in an ongoing reciprocal exchange of elements with the 
outside world – this, too, is Epicurean doctrine.300 But it is only in our sources for 
Asclepiades that we see it incorporated into a general theory of disease.301 There 
is something in the elemental composition of a contiguous pattern that 
precipitates impaction. Sextus Empiricus includes the body’s permeability in his 
list of the hypotheses which underpin Asclepiades’ explanation for fever.302 The 
mechanics of internal-external interaction in the onset of disease is part-way 
addressed. The role of pre-existing conditions within the body’s material 
composition at the point of interaction with a pattern which precipitates disease 
remains unclear.303 But in a theory that makes so much of the variable of porosity, 
we are probably safe to assume that pre-existing conditions in the body had a 
role to play in the manifestation of disease. We should note that Asclepiades’ 
theory addresses this limitation without recourse to corpuscular fragility;304 
exchange ‘ὄγκοι’ for ‘atoms’ in Cel. Pass. 1.14-105-7 and we have an Epicurean 
addendum to an area neglected in Epicurean testimonia. 
     The second deficiency in Lucretius’ account is related to precisely what it is 
about a compound that makes it harmful to the human form. All diseases are 
united by their capacity to bring about and sustain pain. How is this quality 
prefigured in the atomic arrangement of each disease? What have all diseases – 
or, yet more generally, what have all pain-giving phenomena – in common, at the 
atomic level?305 A partial Asclepiadean answer may be inferred: in most cases, 
pain describes a state of impaction in the body’s constituent ὄγκοι precipitated by 
patterns of ὄγκοι which, according to nature, bring about such an effect under 
particular conditions. The question remains as to how this property might manifest 
 
299 Anon. Lond. xxxix.1-32. 
300 See supra II.4.1. 
301 The account of pestilence at Lucr. VI.1090-1137 also incorporates this phenomenon into the aetiology 
of disease. But limitations of this passage are addressed above. 
302 S. E. M. III.3-5. 
303 S. E. M. III.3-5 does allude to the role of ‘present circumstances’ in regulating the volume of the 
continuous effluences that occur ‘from us to the outside’ but this seems to be a consequence of impaction, 
and therefore a feature of disease as opposed to a contributing factor.  
304 For the argument that the institution of corpuscular fragility was a later development to a theory that 
stuck more closely to Epicurean physical doctrine, see IV.2.2. 
305 Cf. Lucr. VI.809-825.  
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itself. Here, unfortunately, our sources are unclear. If there is a role for the 
frangibility of the ὄγκοι in this context, it is not obvious. More likely, given the 
significant possibility that the fundamentals of Asclepiades’ theory were in place 
before he instituted this particular modification (IV.2.2), a solution, if presented, 
would broadly conform to Epicurean presuppositions.  
II.5.6 The physics of pain in De rerum natura 
The problem of pain is of greater significance for our purposes, with implications 
for the disparity between Stoicism and Epicureanism’s medical adaptation. In this 
final section, I will suggest deficiencies in the Epicurean physical account of pain 
creates a weakness in the bond between the physical and ethical branches of 
Epicurean philosophy, such that the former might be considered independently 
of the latter – selectivity of the sort that Stoic physics and ethics will not permit. 
     If we analyse the aetiology of pain into 1) ‘pain inciting atomic configurations’ 
and 2) their ‘pain sustaining’ equivalent,306 we find that neither are expounded in 
the depth we might expect given the centrality of the pain-pleasure continuum to 
Epicurean philosophy.307 Lucretius comes close to offering a physical account of 
both causal constituents of pain, but neither example is sufficiently rigorous to 
indicate their source in a comprehensive theory of the underlying physics of pain. 
The first example, a candidate for (1), is a reference in DRN IV to the atomic basis 
of pleasant and unpleasant tastes: 
…when bodies of the diffusing flavour 
Are smooth, they sweetly touch and sweetly stroke  
All the wet trickling regions of the tongue. 
But contrawise they prick the sense and tear it 
In their encounter, the more they are filled with roughness.308 
The association between coarseness and unpleasantness of taste does not 
permit us infer that all bodily pain is caused by the introduction of abrasive atoms 
into the body. Lucretius is quite careful to point out, in the context of a broader 
 
306 (2) is accounted for Asclepiades’ theory. Of (1) we have no mechanical explanation. 
307 A deficiency that is further illuminated via cross-analysis with the comparative unity of physics and 
ethics in Stoicism. See my discussion of fourth book of Chrysippus’ On Affections at III.5. 
308 Lucr. IV.622-626 trans. Melville (1997) slightly modified. 
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exposition on the nature of the human sensation, that it is a function of the tongue 
to be susceptible to such variations of shape, hence the pleasure/pain that one 
experiences through eating ends at the palette.309 If we recall the explanation of 
epidemic diseases at DRN VI.1090-1137, in which the atoms which precipitate 
disease enter the body through the mouth, it seems significant that no connection 
is drawn between foul tasting food or drink and the ingestion of tainted 
foodstuffs.310 We learn from the discussion at IV.664-674 that the pain-giving 
properties of sharp atoms are dependent on their interaction with the appropriate 
receptors – hence variations in taste between different animals/people – but we 
stretch the appropriate domain of speculation when we posit that different 
degrees of susceptibility to disease – such as those implied at VI.1090-1337 – 
are contingent on analogous receptors elsewhere in the body.  
     The second example, and candidate for (2), appears at DRN II.963-967 as 
part of an answer to the question of why Epicurean atoms are unable to 
experience pain: 
Pain occurs when particles of matter 
Attacked by some force in the limbs and flesh 
Quiver and tremble in their deep abodes; 
And when they settle back into their places 
That is soothing joy.311 
While we may infer from the above that pleasure, in physical terms, is an 
equilibrial state and pain represents a localised divergence,312 I submit that this 
account is remarkably sparse given the centrality of the pleasure-pain dichotomy 
to the Epicurean project. The model, as presented, fails to account for the 
distinction between psychological and bodily pleasure,313 how disturbances to the 
 
309 Lucr. IV.627-632. 
310 We do see the relationship between disease and taste referenced at IV.664-670. But here the capacity 
of disease to alter one’s perception of taste is the focus, and it is once again used as an analogy for the 
explanation of something evidently more important. Lucretius uses this phenomenon as evidence for how 
different internal configurations of atoms (for the disease body has had its atoms ‘thrown into 
confusion’(see below)) react differently to stimuli hence the role of subjectivity in assigning pleasant and 
unpleasant tastes. 
311 Trans. Melville (1997). 
312 Consistent with Epicurus’ negative definition of pain at e.g. RS 4. 
313 Supra II.5.2. 
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atomic structure of the body might impact that of the mind and how the mind can 
be remodelled as immune to this apparent domino effect.314 That joy is associated 
with the process of restoration at DRN II.966 implies that Lucretius’ subject is 
kinetic pleasure and bodily pain,315 not the psychological disposition that 
constitutes the greater share of the Epicurean τέλος. The physical signature of 
ἀταραξία (and its distortions) is not expounded. Moreover, given what we know 
of atomic motion,316 the image of atoms ‘quivering and trembling in their deep 
abodes’ (sollicitata suis trepidant in sedibus intus) hardly evokes an intelligible 
alteration from an initial, salutary state. It is perfunctory, going no further than 
explaining that movements in one’s constituent atoms are, in fact, the root-cause 
of pain. Lucretius’ objective in this passage is to explain that pain can only  be 
caused within a compound entity – one in which there can be an ideal and a 
deleterious combination of constituents; his description lacks a mechanical 
explanation as to what it is for atoms to be ‘out of place’; we infer only: ‘where is 
not conducive to pleasure’. No further elaboration is offered elsewhere in the text.  
     The model hinted at DRN II.963-967 is consistent with depictions of disease 
elsewhere in DRN, which are most frequently identified with one’s atomic 
structure having somehow been upset by hidden stimuli.317 But while this might 
explain distorted cognitive or sensory functions – the end to which such internal 
conditions are invoked elsewhere in DRN – mere disequilibrium is not presented 
as an explanation for pain in these alternative examples; this we are left to infer 
from the context established at DRN II.963-967 above. I submit that Asclepiades’ 
conception of disease as resulting from the impaction of elemental bodies is 
consistent with the model hinted at in this passage and should be read as an 
attempt to elaborate an existent but ultimately cursory analysis of pain in 
materialist terms.318 Moreover, that the analysis is so perfunctory tells us much 
about Epicureanism’s priorities, and the cursory nature with which the ethical 
 
314 An effect that, as we saw at II.3.9 and II.5.2, is suggested at Lucr. III.152-176 but never explained in 
physical terms. Lucretius evokes this causal relationship as an argument for body-soul interconnectivity, 
for which he has an ethical objective.  
315 Cf. Cic. Fin. 2.9-10. 
316 Supra II.3.7. 
317e.g. Lucr. III.487-509; IV.664-670. Fever through an excess of bile is offered as one of unnumbered 
possible causes at IV.664. The association of bile with bitterness and therefore with rough constituents is 
valid. However, disturbing the body’s functional equilibrium through unspecified means and tearing at 
sense receptors in the tongue are far from synonymous. 
318 We return to thus argument at IV.2.2. 
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poles are rooted in physical theory has implications for how the doctrine might be 
adapted into medicine. 
     Neither the final goal of ἀταραξία nor the strains one must eradicate to reach 
it are explicitly identified with movements of atoms in our sources. Epicurean 
ethics finds its basis in the philosophy’s rejection of teleology and divine 
administration; understanding the cosmos in terms of the ungoverned interaction 
of thoughtless bodies is intrinsic to freeing oneself of fears born of theological 
anxiety. But beyond this, how might we translate the soothing of a troubled mind 
into the movements of atoms?319 What happens, at the atomic level, when 
Epicurus’ medicine is administered? We might assume that such a process must 
have a very particular atomic signature – comparable, to a degree, with the Stoic 
identification of preferred psychic states with a salubrious equilibrium of elements 
in the soul320 – yet none is offered.321 Epicurus’ arguments against teleology and 
providence, grounded in mechanistic – though crucially non-deterministic322 –  
physics and supported by a model of sense-receptivity that finds in the evidence 
of the senses the secrets to uncovering all truths, would seem to have been 
regarded as a sufficient physical foundation on which to base his ethical claims. 
I submit that this disjunction permitted Asclepiades to consider Epicurean physics 
independently of their ethical function, and thus to take Epicurean physics in a 
direction that was inaccessible to the natural philosopher, as in the case of his 
determinism, or simply outside the philosopher’s goal-dictated purview, as in his 
elaboration of the hitherto cursory Epicurean analysis of pain and disease. The 
consequences of any modifications made to the doctrine require justification only 
in physical and epistemological terms. Furthermore, any such alterations would 
only serve to distance himself from broader Epicurean concerns and affirm his 
independence as a physical theorist, which I will argue is a driving factor behind 
the physician’s tinkering with philosophical doctrine across the next two chapters. 
 
319 The best we could offer, generalising from II.963-967, is that atoms move from where they should not 
be to where they should be, with neither state being properly defined. In fact, as the Epicurean conception 
of ‘should’ and ‘should not’ is mediated by the magnetism of ἀταραξία, a more accurate answer, 
generalizing from II.963-967, is that atoms move from ‘where pain is produced’ to ‘where pain is not 
produce’, which hardly helps us. 
320 e.g. Gal. QAM 4 (= SVF 2.787). See III.5. 
321 Intuitively, one thinks of the atoms which comprise the mind in tumult then gradually settling into 
functional patterns. This is Lucretius’ explanation for the epileptic’s journey from seizure to recovery at 
III.487-509, but it is not analogised in the text to more subtle processes; it is used to illustrate the mind’s 
vulnerability. 
322 See supra II.4.3-4. 
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     As a coda to this section, in anticipation of my analysis of Stoicism’s 
adaptation into medicine in III, I wish to reemphasise the contrast between the 
Epicurean physics-ethics interconnexion and that of the Stoics, to which I have 
already hinted. As we saw throughout I, the Stoic pursuit of ἀρετή is identified 
with their quest to embody harmony as exemplified by the cosmos. The blueprint 
for εὐδαιμονία is the structure and behaviour of the physical world. Moreover, the 
process by which the Stoic, in his capacity as physician of the soul, seeks to 
relieve the mind of its affections can, in fact, be translated into physical activity. 
As we shall see at III.5, the medical analogies peppered throughout our fragments 
of Chrysippus’ On Affections depend on the philosopher’s restorative 
interventions being communicable in terms of balancing a patient’s elemental 
constitution. Thus, where Stoic physics provides a template for its ethics, 
Epicurean physics provides a justification. Both schools present themselves as 
curative, but only the former delves in any depth into the physical nature of the 
cure. When we ask in the next chapter why the transposition of Stoic philosophy 
into medicine was, relative to Epicureanism, a predominantly frictionless affair, 
our answer must acknowledge the relative seamlessness with which the 
branches of Stoic philosophy are bonded.323 Athenaeus was able to transpose 
the physics of Stoicism’s psychological therapies into a physiological context 
(III.5). Asclepiades, in his adoption of Epicurean physics, was afforded no such 
psychophysical template. The physics of pain are left to him to determine. In 
doing so, he is free to take from Epicurus what is useful, and discard what is not. 
II.6 Conclusion: The ethical τέλος of Epicurean physics 
My intentions for this chapter have once again been threefold: 1) to set out 
Epicurean physics and epistemology in their original, non-medical context; 2) to 
parse the nature of the physics-ethics interconnexion in Epicureanism in 
anticipation of a my analysis of the philosophy’s medical appeal in IV and 3) to 
make the case for the Epicureanism’s quasi-therapeutic τέλος having steered its 
practitioners away from physical questions of pain and disease, and to conduct 
their philosophy at the level of abstraction – within a model of consciousness with 
relatively loose ties to the world of atoms beneath, the ethical function of which is 
to justify, not to explain, Epicurean morality. 
 
323 At least in the incarnation to which Athenaeus of Attalia was exposed. 
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     I have proposed that when Epicureanism presents itself as an effective 
panacea for the distresses of the mind, it does so in acknowledgement that the 
medical τέχνη had failed to do the same for the body. The emphasis on the 
importance of psychological health above the physiological, coupled with the 
reticence I detect in Epicurean sources to pronounce authoritatively on the 
physics of pleasure and pain, speaks to the curative component of Epicurean 
philosophy, its τέλος, being an ultimately abstract cure for an ultimately abstract 
disease – fear. Epicureanism develops its physics only so far as is necessary to 
accommodate its psychological purpose, leaving matters external to the ambit 
defined by its τέλος unexamined or underdeveloped. I have proposed that, in the 
case of Epicureanism, the partial disjunction of physics and ethics accounts for 
some of the more radical transformations the doctrine undertakes as it is 
transposed from philosophy into medicine per se, affording the physician no 
ethical template upon which to base his medical theory. The branches of physics 
and epistemology are far more closely interwoven; adopting Epicurus’ theory of 
knowledge necessitates the partial adoption of his physics. We return to the 
physics-epistemology interconnexion in IV, where I will propose that this 
entanglement is key to understanding the logic undergirding Asclepiades’ 
modifications to Epicurean doctrine. 
     There is, moreover, a suggestion in Lucretius that Epicureanism might have 
perceived itself as incompatible with – if not opposed to – contemporary medical 
inquiry. This tension, I submit, between Epicureanism-as-medicine and medicine 
per se is a neglected frontier in Asclepiadean scholarship. As we shall explore 
over the next two chapters, enforcing disciplinary boundaries and demonstrating 
the capacity of the medical art to generate ideas independently was a driving 
force behind the modifications we observe. We must consider the possibility that 
not all modifications made by doctors to philosophy are practically motivated; 





Athenaeus of Attalia 
On the medical reception of doctrinaire Hellenistic philosophy, part I  
* 
III.0 In this chapter – the first of a two-part inquiry into the medical reception of 
doctrinaire Hellenistic philosophy in antiquity – we explore the intersection of 
Stoicism and the medical τέχνη via the theory of Athenaeus of Attalia. Athenaeus 
founded the Pneumatist school in the latter half of the first century BC,1 named, 
not for their founder, but for the substance at the centre of his theory of disease. 
He is identified as a student of Posidonius of Apamea by Galen in De causis 
continentibus.2 My aim is to diagnose the character of Athenaeus’ engagement 
with Stoicism and, in so doing, illuminate a crucial mechanism by which 
philosophical doctrine is transposed into medicine. There are two sets of 
questions for which we must find answers. Of the foundational set: what doctrines 
does he adopt? What does he discard? What does he modify? What principles 
underly his selective appropriation of Stoic doctrine? Of the emergent set: what 
do the answers to the above questions tell us about Athenaeus’ self-conception 
as a doctor as distinct from a philosopher, particularly in light of the adopted 
doctrine’s physiological peculiarity and therapeutic τέλος? I will also highlight, 
where appropriate, the elements of Athenaeus’ engagement with Stoicism that 
were enabled or facilitated by some intrinsic feature of the mother-doctrine. This 
will help us account for the differences between the mode of Athenaeus’ 
philosophical interaction and that of Asclepiades of Bithynia (IV), that we might 
better understand the similarities. 
     The structure of this chapter is as follows. We begin at III.1 with an evaluation 
of the evidence for Athenaeus and his school and establish from the outset the 
various interpretive obstacles that determine our course through the material. I 
will also summarise the current (though hardly abundant) state of Athenaean 
scholarship. At III.2 our subject is Athenaeus’ element theory. We examine each 
of our sources in turn and determine the extent to which Athenaeus’ conception 
of the ‘elements of man’ is compatible with Stoic element theory. I argue that what 
 
1 See I.1 n.2 for the controversy surrounding the date of the school’s origin. 
2 Gal. CC 2. For the associated controversy, see I.1, n.4. 
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certain witnesses diagnose (or else, ‘portray’) as deviations from the mother-
doctrine are better explained by Athenaeus’ scrupulous enforcement of 
disciplinary boundaries, his delineation of a technical epistemology. In III.3 I 
contextualize this interpretation by bringing the Aristotelian framework into the 
light. I argue that the Pneumatist’s bid for disciplinary autonomy is intelligible 
when understood within – or, perhaps, as in dialogue with – Aristotle’s hierarchy 
of sciences. At III.4 we investigate Athenaeus’ taxonomy of causes and cross 
reference it with our sources for the Stoic analysis of causation. I will argue that 
it is in the domain of causal theory that we see genuine innovation from 
Athenaeus of Attalia, but the scope of his creativity is nonetheless constrained by 
the intransigent doctrines of Stoic cosmology. At III.5 we examine the role of 
medical analogy in the extant fragments of the fourth book of Chrysippus’ On 
Affections. I will emphasise the ‘correlative affinity’3 between Chrysippus’ 
therapeutic project, oriented towards the realisation of psychological equilibrium, 
and Athenaeus’ conception of physiological health and disease. I emphasize that 
the discontinuity between Stoic philosophy and Stoicising medicine (established 
in III.2-3) is yet more striking when considered in light of this affinity, but I will 
argue that Athenaeus nonetheless finds justification for distancing himself from 
his intellectual heritage in his predecessor’s therapeutic work. 
III.1 Evidence and contemporary scholarship 
Here I introduce the sources and summarise the treatment of Athenaeus and the 
Pneumatists in contemporary scholarship. A more general introduction to 
Athenaeus and this theory has been given at I.1. 
III.1.1 Evidence 
The surviving medical literature of the early Roman Principate preserves no 
record of the teachings of Athenaeus and his school.4 His writings, the 
centrepiece of which was a comprehensive treatise titled On Remedies (Περὶ 
βοηθημάτων), setting out his medical theory systematically across a span of thirty 
books, have not survived save for a few scant fragments preserved in Oribasius’ 
Medical Collections. We are left to reconstruct his medical theory from testimonia 
 
3 A phrase employed in the fourth book of Chrysippus’ On Affections quoted in Gal. PHP V.2.22-24 trans. 
De Lacy (1978). 
4 It was on this basis that Athenaeus was originally dated to the first century AD. See I.1, n.2. 
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which postdates his life by centuries, but whose existence is itself a telling 
indication of the extent to which his teachings would endure after his death. Our 
most fertile source for Pneumatism is Galen, in particular the sixth section of his 
treatise On the Elements according to Hippocrates (Hipp. Elem.) which, in the 
course of its endeavour to reconcile the Hippocratic treatise On the Nature of Man 
with what was, in its essence, the Aristotelian elemental theory which Galen 
espoused, contains a lengthy critique of Athenaeus’ insistence that ‘the elements 
of man and medicine’ be restricted to the elemental qualities: the hot, the cold, 
the wet, the dry.5 De causis continentibus (CC) is a further indispensable text; it 
deals with Athenaeus’ causal theory and attributes its quiddity to Stoic influence. 
However, references to Athenaeus and Pneumatism in Galen are infrequent 
when considered against the ink Galen devotes to critiquing the doctrines of 
Athenaeus’ Hellenistic predecessors, particularly those of the third century 
anatomists and Asclepiades of Bithynia.6 This paucity might be attributed to the 
fact that Galen found comparatively little to contest in Athenaeus’ work;7 he 
celebrates On Remedies as the best general medical treatise compiled in recent 
centuries and references to Athenaeus elsewhere in the corpus portray him as 
an authority to whom Galen was occasionally willing to defer.8 Where Galen is 
hostile to Athenaeus, as he is throughout much of Hipp. Elem. 6, his antipathy 
stems from a broader philosophical disagreement upon which little rests that can 
be applied in practice.9 
     The second group of texts which shine some light on Athenaeus’ practices are 
the pseudo-Galenic documents the Introductio sive medicus (Int.) and the 
Definitiones Medicae (Def. Med.). The compiling of each text is separated by 
approximately a century; Int. is probably a rough contemporary of the Galenic 
corpus,10 where Def. Med. is an earlier text, understood to predate Galen by 
approximately one hundred years.11 Besides Galen and the pseudo-Galenic 
 
5 For Galen’s motivations in Hipp. Elem. see Hankinson (2017). 
6 For Asclepiades in Galen see IV.1.1. 
7 Nutton (2013) p.207 refers to Galen’s ‘suffocating friendship’ as an impediment to the historian’s task 
of reproducing with precision the medical theories of Galen’s Rationalist predecessors and 
contemporaries. Galen’s tendency to subsume his precursors – who, in reality, were only united by their 
shared opposition to the Empiricist and Methodist sects – under the label ‘Hippocratics’ has distorted our 
conception of Rationalist medicine and the variety therein.  
8 e.g. Gal. Caus. Symp. (= VII.165 K.). Athenaeus is commended at Gal. Hipp. Elem. 6.2-4 (= I.457 K.). 
9 See III.2.1.2. below. 
10 Petit (2014) p.275. 
11 Kollesch (1973) p.33. 
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testimonia, our sources for Athenaeus and the Pneumatists are limited to brief 
fragments and references scattered sparsely through the surviving medical 
literature. 
III.1.2 Scholarship 
The paucity of testimonia has had a correspondingly limiting effect on the 
treatment of Athenaeus and the Pneumatists in modern scholarship. The most 
thorough study to date remains Wellman, Die Pneumatische Schule bis auf 
Archigenes (1895),12 which was published more than a century ago and suffers 
from outdated perspectives. An updated, systematic analysis of Athenaeus and 
his school has for some time been overdue.13 On the subject of Athenaeus’ 
relationship to Stoicism, the complexities and implications of the physician’s 
engagement with the philosophy have, at the time of the completion of this thesis, 
gone largely unaddressed. 
     With the notable exceptions of Sean Coughlin’s (2018) article ‘Athenaeus of 
Attalia on the Psychological Causes of Bodily Health’ (see III.5.3.2) and David 
Leith’s as-yet-unpublished NAAP paper on Athenaeus’ element theory (see 
II.2),14 much of the recent scholarship addressing Athenaeus and the Stoics has 
been centred on Athenaeus’ causal analysis, specifically, on the question of how 
far Athenaeus’ tripartite taxonomy of causes (see III.4), presented in the context 
of the aetiology of disease, can be mapped onto Stoicism’s existing analysis of 
causation, of which our knowledge is far from complete; in reconstructing Stoic 
causal theory, the model ascribed to Athenaeus in CC 2 – the source in which 
the physician’s Stoic heritage is attested – is often consulted in the absence of 
authentic Stoic data.15 Moreover, Athenaeus’ taxonomy of causes constitutes his 
most lasting contribution to medical theory; we should not be surprised that this 
aspect of his theory has attracted most scholarly attention. Jim Hankinson has 
long been the authority on this subject;16 his work is invaluable to any serious 
inquiry into the causal analysis of both the Stoics and the Pneumatists. Their 
 
12 I pass over cursory though nonetheless helpful introductions to Athenaeus and the Pneumatists such 
as that of Nutton (2013) p.207-208. 
13 Fortunately, such an update is pending. Sean Coughlin has been completing a full study on Stoic physics 
and medicine in the writings of Athenaeus of Attalia, unpublished at the time this thesis was completed. 
14 Inna Kupreeva’s 2014 article ‘Galen’s Theory of Elements’ also contains a lengthy discussion (p.172-195) 
of the disparity between Galenic/Aristotelian and Pneumatist element theory. See I.2.1.2 below. 
15 e.g. Hankinson (1999) p.490-491. 
16 A further notable contribution to this subject is Frede (1980).  
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symmetries and asymmetries await us in III.4 where I hope to build on 
Hankinson’s work,17 and clarify the genuinely innovative components of 
Athenaean causal analysis. 
     Despite the interest in Athenaeus’ causal theory, the questions of what 
motivated Athenaeus to distance his medical theory from its predecessor in 
philosophy – be this tendency expressed through genuine innovation or through 
enforcement, via selective appropriation, of a technical epistemology – and what 
these instances of innovation/boundary enforcement tell us about the relationship 
between medicine and philosophy in our period have gone untreated. As 
expressed at 0.4, the contemporary study of ancient medicine has a tendency to 
emphasise the permeability of the boundary between medicine and philosophy in 
antiquity; specialisation in the medical art is a neglected area of study. 
III.2 The elements of man   
The analysis of disease as a nocuous state resulting from impairments to the 
body’s πνεῦμα consequent on an imbalance of elements can, I would suggest, 
be incorporated into Stoic psychophysiology without friction. Everything in Stoic 
cosmology arises from the activity of the active principle – standardly identified 
with πνεῦμα (fire and air, the hot and the cold) by the first century BC – upon its 
passive counterpart.18 The all-penetrating nature of Stoic πνεῦμα, alongside its 
functions as the qualifying principle and mediator of psychic faculties,19 allow for 
subtle variations in its quality to have simultaneous appreciable effects on both 
physiological and cognitive process. Identifying πνεῦμα as the sustaining cause 
(αἴτιον συνεκτικόν) of disease appears broadly consistent with Stoic 
psychophysiology,20 though we are left to speculate as to what the causal chain 
that culminates in disease might look like.21 Athenaeus’ theory – intentionally or 
otherwise22 – provides potential answers to questions one might raise about the 
 
17 Particularly ‘Evidence, externality and antecedence: inquiries into later Greek causal concepts’, 1987. 
18 See I.3.5, 7-8. 
19 See I.5 for the psychic functions of πνεῦμα. 
20 I qualify ‘broadly’ because of Galen’s claim in CC 2 that for the early Stoics, αἴτια συνεκτικά properly so-
called refer only to the preservation of homogeneous substances. See III.4.2 for a detailed analysis of 
αἴτια συνεκτικά in CC 2. 
21 I will argue at III.5 that our fragments from the fourth book of Chrysippus’ On Affections hint at an 
elemental template for the causes of bodily disease in Stoicism based on Chrysippus’ analysis of 
psychological pathology, though the role of πνεῦμα in Chrysippus’ conception of affections/therapeutics 
is unclear.  
22 What we read as a lacuna in Stoic psychophysiology may be explained by limitations in our evidence. I 
am not suggesting that Athenaeus was motivated by the need to address problems he identified in 
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mechanics of external-to-internal elemental interaction in a hypothetical Stoic 
theory of disease and fits neatly into the greater topography of Stoic physics.23 
     However, although the centrality of πνεῦμα to Athenaeus’ theory of disease is 
evocative of Stoic physics, his element theory – insofar as it is appropriate to refer 
to it as such – appears, on first analysis, to discard the Stoic precedent. As I 
outlined at I.1, where the Stoics analysed the cosmos into elemental substances 
– fire, air, water and earth –, Athenaeus concerned himself only with their 
associated qualities – respectively, the hot, the cold, the wet and the dry.24 In the 
absence of sources/testimonia that attest to Athenaeus’ rationale, our first task is 
to illuminate the reasoning behind this apparent deviation. In the following 
subsection (III.2.1) I will evaluate each piece of evidence for Athenaeus’ element 
theory in turn and correct for instances of authorial bias where appropriate. I will 
argue here and in III.2.2 that Athenaeus’ self-restrictive template of the ‘elements 
of man’ (στοιχεῖα ἀνθρώπου)25 is consistent with Stoic element theory and 
speaks not of the physician’s desire to rewrite his theoretical foundation but to 
delineate the apposite domain of medical inquiry within a preexisting theoretical 
terrain. This expression of specialization – with a view, I will propose, towards 
securing creative independence – finds precedent in our testimonia for the quasi-
element theories of the third century anatomists (see III.2.2) and is, I will argue at 
III.3, prefigured in Aristotle’s taxonomy of sciences.  
III.2.1 Testimonia 






Stoicism, merely that his theory gives us some recourse in reconstructing how a Stoic theory of bodily 
disease might have worked. 
23 Moreover, as we cover at III.5 below, the mechanism of bodily health/disease proposed by Athenaeus 
is isomorphic with that of psychological health in Chrysippus’ psychology insofar as it can be recovered 
from our fragments of On Affections. The identification of health with ‘good proportionality’ is consistent 
with Stoicism’s ethical thesis, for all that Athenaeus’ theorising is not ethically motivated.  
24 See e.g. ps.-Gal. Int. 9.5 (= XIV.698 K.). Our sources for this question are the subject of III.2.1. 




The pseudo-Galenic Introductio sive medicus contains the following summary of 
Athenaeus’ theory of ‘the elements of man’: 
According to Athenaeus the elements of man (στοιχεῖα ἀνθρώπου) are not 
the four primary bodies (fire, air, water and earth); but their qualities (the 
hot, the cold, the dry and the wet) of which he posits two productive causes, 
the hot and the cold, and two material, the dry and the wet. He interpolates 
a fifth (element of man) in accord with the Stoics, namely πνεῦμα which 
permeates everything and by which everything is sustained and regulated.26 
The phrasing of the first sentence would seem to indicate that Athenaeus denied 
that his στοιχεῖα ἀνθρώπου were compatible with those of the cosmos; the 
elemental qualities proposed instead are presented as straightforward 
alternatives: ‘the στοιχεῖα ἀνθρώπου are not the four primary bodies…but their 
qualities.’27 Athenaeus’ intellectual affiliation with Stoicism is affirmed 
immediately after his alternative element theory is introduced which, in the 
context of this passage, seems only to afford further emphasis to the extent to 
which Pneumatist element theory departed from an inherited intellectual 
orthodoxy.28 The designation of hot and cold qualities as ‘productive causes’ (τὰ 
ποιητικὰ αἴτια) contrasted with the ‘material’ (τὰ ὑλικά) qualities, dry and wet, 
reflects the mechanism of Stoic element theory but with the substances 
supplanted by their associated qualities. This association is upheld in Int.9.5 by 
the clause ‘ἀλλ' αἱ ποιότητες αὐτῶν’ (…but their qualities), with the possessive 
pronoun ‘αὐτῶν’ referring back to ‘τὰ τέσσαρα πρῶτα σώματα’. The qualities in 
Int. 9.5 maintain a relationship with the elemental substances but are nonetheless 
depicted as components in an alternative element theory which explicitly denies 
the elemental substances their status as στοιχεῖα ἀνθρώπου. What, therefore, is 
the relationship between the qualities and their associated substances in 
Athenaeus’ element theory? Beyond this confusion in the text, the reliability of Int. 
 
26 Ps.-Gal. Int. 9.5 (= XIV.698 K). In Greek: κατὰ δὲ τὸν Ἀθήναιον στοιχεῖα ἀνθρώπου οὐ τὰ τέσσαρα πρῶτα 
σώματα, πῦρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆ, ἀλλ’ αἱ ποιότητες αὐτῶν, τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν 
καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, ὧν δύο μὲν τὰ ποιητικὰ αἴτια ὑποτίθεται, τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, δύο δὲ τὰ ὑλικά, τὸ 
ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν, καὶ πέμπτον δὲ παρεισάγει κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τὸ διῆκον διὰ πάντων πνεῦμα, ὑφ’ 
οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ συνέχεσθαι καὶ διοικεῖσθαι. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Note also that the verb παρεισάγειν (to interpolate/introduce) affirms the externality(/ontological 
disparity) of Stoic πνεῦμα to the other four components of Athenaeus’ element theory. 
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9.5 as a source for Athenaeus’ theory – and, indeed, that of Stoics – is corroded 
by the author’s presentation of πνεῦμα as an element of ontological equivalence 
with the other four in Stoic physics; πνεῦμα is not a fifth element, but a mixture of 
the elements fire and air (I.3.8). The depth of the author’s engagement with the 
Pneumatist school must be called into question.29 
     Our second pseudo-Galenic text, the Definitiones Medicae, would seem to 
resolve some of the confusions enkindled by the later text: 
What is an element? An element is the first and simplest thing from which 
everything has come to be, and the simplest thing into which everything will 
be resolved. Athenaeus of Attalia says this in the third book. What are the 
elements of medicine (τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα)? The elements of medicine are, 
as some of the ancients maintained, the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry, 
which are the first, apparent (φαινομένων), simplest and least things from 
which the human has been put together, and the last, apparent, simplest 
and least (things) into which (the human) attains its resolution.30 
It is not obvious from the structure of this passage which of the two definitions is 
being attributed to Athenaeus of Attalia.31 Certainly, the second definition is 
consistent with Int. 9.5 (and the Galenic testimonia set out below). There is no 
confusion as to whether Athenaeus did consider the elements of medicine (τῆς 
ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα) to be the four qualities.32 The question is whether both 
definitions can be attributed to Athenaeus, or merely the latter. If both, then the 
notion that Athenaeus’ element theory was wholly distinct and oppositional to that 
 
29 Wellmann (1895) p.15 argued that the author of the Introductio sive medicus was, in fact, a Pneumatist. 
But the treatment of Pneumatism in the text does little to support this. An explicit reference to 
Pneumatism does not appear until Int. 9.6 = (XIV.699 K.). Pneumatism is not given independent treatment 
in the list of medical schools at Int. 4 (= XIV.638-684 K.); it is subsumed, instead, under ‘Rationalism’. The 
name of Athenaeus of Attalia is absent from the Kühn edition of Int. 4. See Petit (2014) p.276, 286-288. 
30 ps.-Gal. Def. Med. 31 (= XIX.356 K). In Greek: τί ἐστι στοιχεῖον; στοιχεῖόν ἐστιν ἐξ οὗ πρώτου καὶ 
ἁπλουστάτου τὰ πάντα γέγονε καὶ εἰς <ὃ> ἁπλούστατον τὰ πάντα ἀναλυθήσεται. Ἀθηναῖος δὲ ὁ Ἀτταλεὺς 
ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ βιβλίῳ φησὶν οὕτως. τίνα ἐστὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα; στοιχεῖά ἐστι τῆς ἰατρικῆς, ὡς τινὲς τῶν 
ἀρχαίων ὑπέλαβον, τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρόν, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων φαινομένων καὶ 
ἁπλουστάτων καὶ ἐλαχίστων ὁ ἄνθρωπος συνέστηκε καὶ εἰς <ἃ> ἔσχατα φαινόμενα καὶ ἁπλούστατα καὶ 
ἐλάχιστα τὴν ἀνάλυσιν λαμβάνει. 
31 Which definition the ‘οὕτως’ in ‘Ἀθηναῖος δὲ ὁ Ἀτταλεὺς…φησὶν οὕτως’ refers to is ambiguous, 
sandwiched as it is between the two. 
32 That the latter definition is associated with the ‘the ancients’ (τῶν ἀρχαίων) in Def. Med. 31 may have 
been part of Athenaeus’ (of one of his followers’) original written definition, the author’s source. David 
Leith, in an as-yet-unpublished paper on Athenaeus’ element theory (hereafter Leith, NAAP paper (2017)) 
has argued that the reference to ‘the ancients’ in Def. Med. 31 might have been an appeal to the authority 
of the Hippocratic treatise Nat. Hom. See I.2.1.2 below. 
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of his Stoic predecessors would seem less likely; instead, we would be presented 
with a two-part mechanism for how one arrives at the elements of things. An 
element is both 1) the simplest constituent of everything and 2) the simplest 
constituent with which the medical τέχνη contends.33 The latter definition reflects 
the philosophical pursuit of nature’s essence(s) but constrains its inquiry on two 
fronts: a) the boundary of the human and b) the limits of what is φαινόμενα 
(apparent). The doctor concerned with τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα is not antagonistic to 
inquiry into more primitive epistemological strata; he merely considers it 
independent to his τέλος. The two definitions must be mutually consistent; (2) 
must in reality be parasitical on (1) but (1) need not concern the doctor beyond, 
perhaps, a perfunctory acknowledgement of its de facto priority. The mechanics, 
even, of the relationship between (1) and (2) will likely fall beyond the doctor’s 
purview. But it is clear from the outset that the two definitions in Def. Med. 31 can 
be reconciled.34 
     What, then, is the argument for Athenaeus of Attalia being a proponent of both 
definitions in Def. Med. 31? The structural parity points to a common source; both 
convey a cyclical process of ‘generation from’ and ‘resolution into’, cycles of 
combination and simplification where beginning and end are identical states.35 
The cyclicality of the process has a Stoic complexion (see I.3.10). Compare both 
definitions in Def. Med. 31 with the Stoic definition of an element in D. L. VII.136: 
‘An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their 
birth and to which they are finally resolved.’36 The Stoic conception of the element 
is presented in the language of ἐκπύρωσις and cyclical recurrence. Definition (1) 
evokes this process, where definition (2) applies the same language (albeit with 
one additional criterion, addressed below) to a different epistemological territory. 
The Stoicising language of (2) would seem to contextualize it within the 
framework of Stoic cosmogony, suggesting that Athenaeus was the author of Def. 
Med.’s source. If Athenaeus accepted both (1) and (2), then he defined τῆς 
ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα against – that is, in contrast with, not in opposition to – the 
cosmological element theory of his intellectual predecessors. 
 
33 By extension, the simplest components proximate to a specific τέχνη. 
34 See e.g. D. L. VII.137. 
35 This parity is indicated in Leith, NAAP paper (2017). 
36 Trans. Hicks (1925). 
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     The most primitive constituents of the human being and those of the wider 
cosmos should, of course, be identical. Hence there is another significant point 
of departure between definitions (1) and (2).37 The adjectives ‘first’ (πρῶτα), ‘last’ 
(ἔσχατα) and ‘simplest’ (ἁπλούστατα) are common to both definitions; ‘apparent’ 
(φαινόμενα) is peculiar to (2). This criterion distinguishes τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα 
from mere στοιχεῖα. Naturally, cosmic elements can manifest perceptibly,38 but 
constraining one’s inquiry to the human form diverts one’s gaze from celestial fire 
or the rise and fall of the ocean. Accepting that (2) was written with a Stoic 
framework in mind,39 a boundary between philosophical and medical inquiry is 
established at the limit of the senses. In practical terms, this demarcation seems 
intuitive; the physician’s subject is the human body and the processes which 
affect its functionality; medicine concerns itself with the interactivity of mixtures. 
The human aggregate is manifestly complex, second in complexity only to the 
cosmos.40 But where the objective of natural philosophy – of theory (see III.3) – 
is to analyse the cosmos into the behaviour of its constituents, the physician’s 
τέλος is to effect change within the phenomenal strata. The physician, who is 
himself a complex agent, interacts with the body at the level of mixture. He seeks 
to apply his influence to the ‘least’ and ‘simplest’ substances in order to affect 
change at a posterior grade, but he is limited by how ‘deeply’ into the body’s 
constituents his influence can penetrate.41 
     The evidence from Def. Med. 31 addresses the question of the relationship 
between the elemental substances and qualities in Athenaeus’ theory of health. 
The apparent compatibility of Athenaeus’ element theory with Stoic cosmology is 
of interest here. That Athenaeus was a likely proponent of both definitions in Def. 
Med. 31 speaks to his engagement with the question of constrained, technical 
epistemologies and his support of their enforcement. That he, a physician, might 
 
37 Strictly speaking, there are two. The adjective ‘least’ (ἐλάχιστα) is only found in the second definition. 
Given that ‘simplest’ (ἁπλούστατα) is already attested, the inclusion of ‘least’ is puzzlingly tautological. 
We might infer that the simplicity of τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα is the dimension with which Athenaeus is most 
concerned. Cyclicality, though a marker of Stoic heritage, is ultimately of secondary importance to 
ontological priority – albeit constrained by perceptibility (see below) – to the physician. This extra stress 
is perhaps made explicable by the inclusion of the second peculiar criterion: that they are ‘apparent’. 
38 Stoic cosmology held that the sun was an entity of purest fire, for example. See e.g. Alex. Lyc. 19, 2-4 
(LS 46 I), Plut. St. Rep. 1052C-D (LS 46 L). 
39 Or, if they do not, that (2) was written with an essentially Stoic cosmological framework in mind. 
40 Provided we confine our definition of ‘entity’ to unified bodies. 
41 The counter argument to this is that knowledge of the elements beneath perception, of that which the 
doctor cannot influence, is nonetheless relevant to the question of what the doctor can influence. This 
was Galen’s position. See I.2.1.2 below. 
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have documented a cosmic definition of elements in order to contextualise his 
model of τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα suggests that he considered the demarcation of 
the medicine’s epistemological perimeter to fall within his purview; to define the 
elements of a discipline is (quite literally) a foundational act – it is a claim to be 
originating or formalizing something functionally self-sufficient; to do so within the 
context of Stoic element theory seems, at once, to be an acknowledgement of 
established Stoic wisdom, and also that of Stoicism’s limited capacity. Recall from 
chapter I the mother-doctrine’s holism, its ethical τέλος; Stoicism’s dictates to 
human behaviour are issued from perfection, from nature as a unified totality. It 
is for the physician to decide what doctrines can be applied usefully in fulfilment 
of his aims. It is for the physician to divert attention from ‘the whole’.  
III.2.1.2 Galen 
The Galenic testimonia are sourced from the sixth section of On the Elements 
According to Hippocrates (Hipp. Elem.), comprising a lengthy exposition of the 
deficiencies of Athenaeus’ element theory from Galen’s essentially Aristotelian 
perspective.42 Galen’s stated aim in Hipp. Elem. is to demonstrate that 
Hippocrates – specifically, the author of the seminal text On the Nature of man 
(Nat. Hom.) – ‘when inquiring into the elements of man’s nature, disdains those 
parts that are simplest and first relative to the senses and seeks those that are 
so in truth and by nature.’43 Over the course of Hipp. Elem., Galen seeks to 
reconcile the element theory expounded in Nat. Hom. with his own(/Aristotle’s), 
resolving (to his satisfaction) the disparities between the two systems and 
overruling rival ‘Hippocratics’ who read the opening declaration of Nat. Hom. (see 
0.2) as a rejection of philosophising element theories with respect to what is 
proximate to the physician’s art.44 David Leith has noted a parallel between the 
opening lines of Nat. Hom. and Athenaeus’ definition of τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα in 
Def. Med. 31; both set the boundary of medical inquiry at the limits of 
perceptibility.45 The appeal to ‘the ancients’ in Def. Med. 31 may be read as an 
 
42 For Galen’s ‘Aristotelian’ element theory, see Kupreeva (2014). 
43 Gal. Hipp. Elem. 1.4-5 trans. De Lacy (1996). 
44 Ibid. 3.49-50. See Kupreeva (2014) p.154-162; Hankinson (2017) par.2. 
45 Leith, NAAP paper (2017). The opening lines of Hipp. Nat. Hom. 1: ‘He who is accustomed to hear 
speakers discuss the nature of man beyond its relations to medicine will not find the present account of 
any interest. For I do not say at all that a man is air, or fire, or water, or earth, or anything else that is not 




appeal to the authority of this well-circulated text.46 Athenaeus would therefore 
have proposed a rival interpretation of Nat. Hom. which would go some way 
towards explaining the peculiar – and, in large part, uncharacteristic47 – hostility 
Galen exhibits towards Pneumatism at Hipp. Elem. 6, a factor that necessarily 
cautions our approach to this text. The following analysis must therefore account 
for Galen’s uncharitability (or, less charitably, his tendency towards wilful 
misinterpretation). 
     The opening lines of Hipp. Elem. 6 summarise Galen’s objection to Athenaeus’ 
element theory. He attributes to Athenaeus two noteworthy claims: the first is that 
the elements – hot, cold, dry and wet – ‘are clearly visible and do not require 
proof’; the second is that Athenaeus – though he sometimes called them ‘qualities 
and powers’ –  granted that his elements were ‘bodies’ (σώματα, i.e. ‘substances’) 
despite his reluctance to concede that the bodies were equivalent to fire, air, earth 
and water.48 Galen objects on both counts, bolstering his methodological critique 
with an appeal to the absurdity of Athenaeus’ conclusion. How should we interpret 
Athenaeus’ claim that the qualities ‘are clearly visible and do not require proof’?49 
Galen sees two options: 1) The existence of hot, cold, dry and wet qualities is 
self-evident; 2) the status of said qualities as elements is self-evident.50 He 
attributes to Athenaeus the latter, less coherent claim, but the evidence from Def. 
Med. 31 inclines us toward the former. We can be confident that the criterion of 
perceptibility was integral to Athenaeus’ element theory. Clearly, sense-
accessibility cannot be confirmation of a quality’s elemental status independently 
of the additional, Stoicising criteria listed in Def. Med. 31 and absent from Galen’s 
opening critique.51 With the evidence from Def. Med. 31 in mind – notably the 
earlier and more impartial text – the ambiguity Galen imposes on Athenaeus’ 
methodology reads as artificial, as a calculated effort to discredit. 
     If the methodology attributed to Athenaeus in Hipp. Elem. 6.1-9 is artificially 
imposed then we are right to suspect that the conclusion he is purported to have 
 
46 Leith, NAAP paper (2017). 
47 On the question of rival element theories, Galen’s hostility is typically reserved for the atomists. 
48 Gal. Hipp. Elem. 6.1 trans. De Lacy (1996). Kupreeva (2014) p.178. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid. 6.5. 
51 At Ibid. 6.9 Galen reminds us that ‘there is no one who does not clearly perceive with all his senses 
earth, air, water and fire’ and continues: ‘even some philosophers do not perceive whether they are 
elements.’ trans. De Lacy (1996). The confusion he exhibits would be remedied by attendance to the rest 
of the criteria for τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα in Def. Med. 31. 
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reached – that the qualities are σώματα independently of their traditional roots – 
is similarly misleading. At Hipp. Elem. 10-11 Galen acknowledges that the 
followers of Athenaeus might defend the eccentricity of their element theory by 
invoking disciplinary boundaries – that is, by claiming that the details of the wider 
world’s construction reside beyond the apposite epistemological domain of their 
τέχνη. But Galen’s interpretation of this defence of technical epistemologies is 
bizarre. He asks: ‘Why should I now dwell on the utter absurdity of making hot, 
cold, dry, and wet the elements of the medical art, as if it were an animal?’52 
suggesting that Athenaeus considered medicine itself –  an abstraction referring 
to a body of specific aims and practices – to be composed of the aforementioned 
qualities. Fascinating though speculation into the physical constitution of 
metaphysical abstractions might have been, we can be confident that ‘Athenaeus 
the ideasthete’ is a strawman of Galen’s construction. Galen is choosing to read 
a claim about epistemological constraints as a ludicrous physical doctrine. He 
misses – or rather chooses to ignore – the argument for medicine’s epistemic 
independence from broader physical inquiry. 
     A similar (and only marginally less absurd) claim is made of Athenaeus’ 
element theory at Hipp. Elem. 6.27. Galen quotes Athenaeus’ assertion that he 
is taking the ‘proximate (προσεχῆ) elements of animals, not the elements 
common to all bodies’ as the basis for his elemental theory and then suggests 
that by ‘proximate to’ Athenaeus in fact means ‘peculiar to’ and ‘of nothing else 
at all’.53 The suggestion, then, is that Athenaeus argued that animals were 
composed of fundamentally different ‘stuffs’ to the rest of the cosmos, that they 
were alien to the world into which they were born. While such a claim would 
certainly be anti-Stoic54 – and, indeed, a unique challenge to the assumption of 
 
52 Gal. Hipp. Elem. 6.11 trans. De Lacy (1996).  
53 Gal. Hipp. Elem. 6.27 trans. De Lacy. Galen proceeds from this quotation (6.28-30) to argue that 
Athenaeus should have named the body’s homoiomerous components (bone, cartilage, ligament etc.) the 
‘elements of man’ if he was truly only interested in what was perceptible irreducibles. The thrust of 
Galen’s argument in Hipp. Elem. 6.27-30 is that if one is going to permit that the body’s smallest, 
perceptible homoiomerous parts are composed of more fundamental materials, then one might as well 
concede that those materials are the same materials that form the basis of the cosmos. At 6.27, he takes 
Athenaeus’ argument that analysing bones, cartilage etc. into hot, cold, wet and dry qualities is useful to 
the practice of medicine, where analysing those qualities into their associated substances is not, to mean 
that the body could be analysed into an entirely different set of materials to the rest of the cosmos. He is 
being obtuse. Galen reserves his refutation of what might better approximate Athenaeus’ true position 
on the elements of man for later in the chapter, as we shall see shortly below. 
54 I argued in I that the physiological peculiarity of the Stoic cosmos is fundamental to the philosophy as a 
whole. To deny the human his/her psychophysiological parity with the whole/God would be to deny 
him/her access to ἀρετή. 
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generality in Greek philosophy – we need not take it at face value. It is Galen 
himself who, in a less polemical mode, locates Athenaeus within the Stoic 
intellectual lineage.55 The Stoicising taxonomy of causes ascribed to Athenaeus 
in CC 2 depends upon the unity of internal and external processes; interaction is 
enabled by shared principles, within and without. Moreover (and most decisively), 
the Greek προσεχῆ (translated by De Lacy as ‘proximate’) is not a synonym for 
‘peculiar to’. It translates more precisely as ‘closest in relationship to’56 which 
neither precludes such qualities existing outside the animal (for they obviously 
do) nor that yet more fundamental constituents can exist within; primitive σώματα 
may be present in the animal but not ‘προσεχῆ’ to the exposition of medicine.  
     For all his rhetorical posturing in Hipp. Elem., Galen does provide some 
valuable insights into how Athenaeus understood the relationship between the 
elements of man/medicine and those of the wider cosmos. With his appetite for 
wilful misconstrual sufficiently indulged, Galen begins to tackle Athenaeus’ 
element theory on something closer to its own terms. We note that for Galen 
qualities are incorporeals that produce the four elements through their interaction 
with prime matter (ὕλη).57 When he accuses Athenaeus at Hipp. Elem. 6.38 of 
being ignorant of the distinction between a first principle (ἀρχή, referring to matter 
and the invading incorporeal quality) and an element, there is an underlying 
philosophical disparity at play pertaining to the incompatible physical frameworks 
which Galen and Athenaeus adopt.58 Qualities are indeed σώματα in Stoic 
physics (I.3.9). There is nothing implicit in Athenaeus’ treatment of the qualities 
as bodies (as in Hipp. Elem. 6.1) that suggests he sought to sever their 
relationship with the traditional cosmic elements. Athenaeus’ withdrawal from 
Stoicism – as far as we are able to discern so far – is expressed only through the 
erection of epistemic barriers against the practice of philosophical – i.e. non-
medical – inquiry. 
 
55 Gal. CC.2. 
56 Cf. Galen’s less distortive use of προσεχεῖς in a similar context in Gal. MM. 2.5 (= X.107 K.). See III.2.2 
below. 
57 Gal. Hipp. Elem. 6.37-38. 
58 Noted in Leith, NAAP paper (2017). See Kupreeva (2014) p.172-195. This disjunction is perhaps most 
evident in the argument Galen recounts between his nineteen-year-old self and his Pneumatist instructor 
at Hipp. Elem. 6.16-25 (see Kupreeva (2014) esp. p.181-192). The dispute rests on their conflicting  
premises; the Pneumatist’s corporealism allows him to regard quality and predicate as equally somatic 
(e.g. 6.18); Galen conceives qualities as manifesting as isolatable corporeal entities only (and only 




     The following passage from near the end of Hipp. Elem. suggests that Galen 
did, in fact, understand the nature of Athenaeus’ withdrawal from the primal 
epistemological strata of cosmological speculation:  
To be afraid to grant that [fire, air, water and earth] are elements for the 
reason that we neither take of them out of the body nor put any of them into 
it is utterly stupid; for when we eat and drink the things that have been 
generated from the elements we most certainly put the elements too into 
our bodies. But not in a pure form, [the Pneumatists] say, and not alone. 
Then it was incorrect to say that we neither take out nor put in an element; 
this statement should not have been made without qualification in that way, 
but with the qualification ‘not alone or unmixed or itself by itself’. And yet 
even with this qualification what does it aim to achieve for them? It is not 
reasonable that speculation about the elements be considered useless 
because we do not take into our bodies any one of them unmixed with 
another; and it was wrong to deny that fire and air and water and earth are 
elements for the reason that we use things that have been generated from 
them, but each of them alone, separate by itself, is completely useless.’59 
This passage preserves an argument for Athenaeus’ element theory that 
presupposes the existence of more primitive physical constituents. It is not an 
argument designed to refute the presence of fire, air, water and earth inside the 
body, but to delimit the appropriate epistemological dominion of the medical art 
with the boundary set at the ontological perimeter of ‘unmixed with another’ – i.e. 
the limit of independently identifiable σώματα. That speculation about cosmic 
elements was considered ‘useless’ by Athenaeus tells us that he narrowed the 
breadth of his inquiry to the substances his τέχνη rendered pliable, a process 
which we learn from Def. Med. 31 involved the analysis of the body into apparent 
entities. Mixtures interact with mixtures. Galen’s counterargument from Hipp. 
Elem. 6.43 that the human body does, for example, inhale unmixed air, might be 
neutralized by the response that an increased or stifled intake of breath would 
manifest through changes in body temperature: a detectable (and rectifiable) 
increase/reduction in the quality of ‘cold’. Moreover, attendance to the Stoic 
theory of mixture (I.3.7) makes further sense of Athenaeus’ distinction.60 The 
 
59 Gal. Hipp. Elem. 6.41-42 trans. De Lacy (1996). 
60 Noted in Leith NAAP paper (2017). 
138 
 
elements are mutually coextensive; though elemental proportions are necessarily 
unequal, no portion of a mixture does not contain, in some quantity, fire, air, water 
and earth. Sensible water is not wholly water, sensible air not wholly air etc. We 
might suggest that it is Athenaeus’ Stoic heritage that defines the boundaries of 
his element theory and thus the epistemological ambit of Pneumatism; the doctor 
cannot, within a Stoic cosmos, interact directly with reality’s most basic 
constituents, so naturally he confines his agency to the epistemological strata in 
which he can cause change. 
III.2.2 The proximate domain of medical inquiry 
Was there a problem, then, with my reading of Def. Med. 31 as an exercise in 
disciplinary autonomy, as the annexation of an epistemological territory for 
medicine to nurture independently? Is Athenaeus’ definition of τῆς ἰατρικῆς 
στοιχεῖα already implicit within Stoicism? There is a trace of precedent for this 
self-restriction within Stoicism itself. At PHP V.2.31-34, Galen quotes from 
Chrysippus’ On Affections a Zenonian conception of bodily health and disease: 
…Zeno’s argument proceeds as it should. And disease of the soul is most 
similar to an unsettled state of the body. Disease of the body is said to be a 
lack of proportion in its components, hot, cold, dry and wet…Health in the 
body is a kind of blend and proportion of the (things) expressly stated.61 
Zeno’s analysis of disease into an imbalance of qualities would appear to 
anticipate Athenaeus’ element theory, but we glean nothing substantial from this 
passage. We are not in a position to explain why Zeno evoked the qualities over 
the substances in whatever text Chrysippus is drawing from; my suggestion, 
based on the lack of corroborating evidence for a bone fide Stoic theory of 
medicine, is that Zeno was influenced by the language of Aristotle’s analysis of 
physiological elements when he made the above claim.62 That Zeno accepted 
that it was appropriate to discuss bodily disease in terms of qualities does not 
imply that he believed this to be the only framework in which disease could be 
explained – indeed, the analogy that Zeno wants to draw between physiological 
and psychic disequilibrium speaks to the absence of well-fortified technical 
 
61 Gal. PHP V.2.31-32 trans. De Lacy (1978) with omissions. We first encountered this passage at I.3.1 in 
the context of harmony in Stoic physics. 
62 See e.g. Arist. PA 2.1, 646a12-24. 
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epistemologies in his exposition. Conspicuously, Zeno’s reference to the 
elements of  bodily health/disease and those of Athenaeus are divided by 
purpose; the analogy between the mechanism underpinning good health and 
Good disposition is where the emphasis is placed in PHP V.2.31-34.63 We would 
be unwise to read the quote at PHP V.2.31-34 as a claim made by a Stoic about 
the apposite territory of medical inquiry – neither Zeno, Chrysippus nor Galen are 
interested in that question in PHP V (see further III.5); the emphasis, for Zeno 
and Chrysippus, is on the correlative affinity of attractive physical states – i.e. it 
is an assertion of cosmic generalities, a philosophical claim. But it certainly does 
not dispel the argument that the epistemological restrictions Athenaeus imposes 
on himself were in some sense implied by Stoic physics.  
     My thesis is that although Athenaeus seems to be following the logic of Stoic 
physics in his claim that there are restrictions to what is ‘proximate’ to medicine, 
it is his freedom from Stoicism’s τέλος – and therefore his freedom from Stoicism 
per se, if not from Stoic physics – that permits him to focus on and claim as his 
own an underexplored territory within Stoic cosmology, namely the body as 
exclusively a mixture of mixtures, neither a microcosm of the Stoic God/cosmos 
with an ethical imperative nor a mixture of fire, air, water and earth on all fours 
with every other discrete compound but something in-between, compatible (by 
implication) with both alternative conceptions but bounded by a constrained 
epistemology. Within these constraints, and oriented towards a distinct τέλος, 
new ideas may materialise that a physician could claim as his own – for himself 
and for his profession.64 Moreover, though Athenaeus’ Stoic heritage – 
specifically his corporealism and Stoicising theory of mixture – will have informed 
the perimeter of his field of inquiry, the impetus to consistently enforce this 
perimeter was, it seems, derived from elsewhere. While there is a suggestion (in 
the most gossamery sense of the term) that his elemental theory of disease was 
anticipated in Stoicism, we see clearer anticipation for his approach to the 
elements of man in the work of his medical precursors in the Hellenistic world.65  
     Galen reports in the Method of Healing (MM) that Erasistratus of Ceos made 
a comparable case for the necessity of a medicine-specific (quasi-)element 
 
63 It is unclear whether the quote beginning from Gal. PHP V.2.25-34 is Chrysippus reporting Zenonian 
doctrine or Chrysippus building on Zenonian doctrine. In either case, the analogy is the point. 
64 For an example, see III.4.4. We discuss this professional territorialism in more depth at III.3. 
65 An argument first made in Leith, NAAP paper (2017). 
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theory,66 and moreover that supporters of this argument cited a yet earlier, 
Herophilean precedent: 
You [Galen’s Erasistratean opponent] tell us to abandon the highest peak 
of natural science and not to seek to understand the nature of man as 
philosophers understand it – advancing by reason as far as the first 
elements – and [that it is sufficient] for you to say this alone, that one should 
designate artery, vein and nerve as the proximate (προσεχεῖς) principles 
and elements of the natural science which pertains to man, and someone 
praised Herophilus in this regard for saying these words: ‘Let these be 
primary, even if they are not primary.67 
Here, as in Hipp. Elem. 6.27, Galen takes issue with the idea of ‘proximate 
elements’, the suggestion – here attributed to an Erasistratean opponent – that a 
physician, in service to his purpose, must terminate his inquiry before it reaches 
the human body’s most primitive constituents. In MM 2.5 (= X.107 K.) Galen lists 
the Erasistratean elements as ‘artery, vein and nerve’ but we understand this to 
be non-exhaustive; Leith makes the case in his 2015 article that, based on 
Galen’s practices elsewhere in the corpus, ‘artery, vein and nerve’ are intended 
as examples of the uniform/homoiomerous parts of the body (τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ), and 
therefore as perceptible irreducibles in Galen’s formulation of what this pertains 
to.68 Erasistratus’ restricted element theory may derive from the same 
methodological considerations as his similarly restrictive causal doctrine which 
holds proximate causes – i.e. the most immediate species of cause – as the only 
stage in the causal chain to which the doctor should attend;69 to attempt to cause 
 
66 See Leith (2015a) for an in-depth analysis of the following passage from Gal. MM. 
67 Gal. MM. 2.5 (= X.107 K.). Trans. adapted from Leith (2015a) p.465. In Greek: ἀποχωρεῖν τῆς ἄκρας 
φυσιολογίας κελεύοντες καὶ μὴ ζητεῖν οὕτω φύσιν ἀνθρώπου καταμαθεῖν ὡς οἱ φιλόσοφοι 
καταμανθάνουσιν, ἄχρι τῶν πρώτων στοιχείων ἀνιόντες τῷ λόγῳ, καὶ τοῦτο ὑμῖν ἀπόχρη μόνον εἰπεῖν, 
ὡς ἀρτηρίαν καὶ φλέβα καὶ νεῦρον ἀρχὰς προσεχεῖς καὶ οἷον στοιχεῖα χρὴ τίθεσθαι τῆς περὶ τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον φυσιολογίας. καί τις ἐπῄνεσεν ἐν τούτῳ τὸν Ἡρόφιλον εἰπόντα κατὰ λέξιν οὕτως· “ἔστω ταῦτα 
εἶναι πρῶτα, εἰ καὶ μή ἐστι πρῶτα”. 
68 Leith (2015a) p.464-468. At Gal. Nat. Fac. I.6 (= II.12 K.), Galen is explicit in identifying all uniform parts 
of the body as perceptible elements. We learn from Gal. Hipp. Elem. 6.29 that Galen is more sympathetic 
to restricting the ambit of medical inquiry to the body’s uniform components than he is to Athenaeus’ 
eccentric model. He maintains that ‘a person might agree that these perceptible (least) parts (i.e. the 
uniform parts) appear to be elements but not agree that they are elements. For it is not what appears to 
be the simplest and first part, but what is so in nature, that is truly an element.’ (Hipp. Elem. I.4-7 trans. 
De Lacy (1996)). Galen’s peculiar grievance with Athenaeus in Hipp. Elem. 6 seems to arise from the fact 
that Athenaeus’ element theory gestures towards a conception of ‘true elements’ in a way that restricting 
one’s inquiry to the uniform parts of the body does not. 
69 Leith (2015a) p.473-478 after Allen (2001a). 
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change at an earlier stage is to ignore the most obvious problem in favour of 
conditions that are not themselves necessarily productive of disease.70 
Analogously, to delve beneath the activity of perceptible elements is to 
circumvent the nocuous epistemological stratum and arrive in a territory where 
disease does not exist. The quote attributed to Herophilus in MM 2.5 above is 
also found in the Anonymus Londinensis papyrus where it is appended to an 
argument that the categories of ‘simple’ and ‘composite’ be understood only in 
relation to sense perception.71 Thus he says: ‘Let apparent things (τὰ φαινόμενα) 
be called primary, even if they are not primary.’72 That the boundary of the 
proximate domain of medical inquiry is set by Athenaeus at the limit of the senses 
in Def. Med. 31 (and by implication in Hipp. Elem. 6.41-42) suggests that 
Pneumatist drew principally from his medical predecessors. He shares their 
methodological framework and accepts that his therapeutic τέλος imposes 
limitations on the scope of his inquiry.  
     Athenaeus therefore locates himself in a distinctly medical lineage when he 
designates as τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα the hot, the cold, the wet and the dry. Though 
the corporealism of the mother-doctrine permits him to look deeper into the body 
than its uniform components, the impetus for demarcating a technical 
epistemology originates outside Stoicism. We should note, of course, that neither 
Herophilus nor Erasistratus developed their theory from within a pre-existing 
cosmology. Athenaeus is placing their (as we shall see, broadly Aristotelian) 
methodological template over an independently developed physical model which, 
as I set out in chapter I, was ethically oriented in its design. Athenaeus’ 
commitment to these epistemological constraints is therefore more pointed; he 
disregards the broader physical framework on which his theory is dependent and, 
in doing so, discards the philosophical mantle. Athenaeus interacts with Stoic 
physics as a physician – a technician without an ethical τέλος – and, it would 
seem, a novel interaction with an existent theoretical landscape demanded a 
novel appellation: Pneumatist. To better understand the necessity for distancing 
Pneumatism from Stoicism, we must introduce Aristotle’s hierarchy of sciences. 
This demands a section of its own.  
 
70 Leith (2015a). 
71 Anon. Lond. xxi 18-23, 32-35. 
72 Ibid. For more on this quote, including the problem of its translation in von Staden (1989) and the 
difference between its preservation in Galen and Anonymus Londinensis, see Frede (2011) p.122-132. 
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III.3 An Aristotelian frame  
This section is divided into three subsections. III.3.1 is an overview of the ethical 
framework in which I propose we locate Athenaeus’ medical theory. At III.3.2 we 
explore how the taxonomy of sciences set out in III.3.1 may have constrained 
Aristotle’s own medical writings and at III.3.3 we ask how obediently Athenaeus 
conforms to the role of ‘productive scientist’ as stipulated in Aristotle’s hierarchy 
of intellectual pursuits. 
III.3.1 Aristotle’s taxonomy/hierarchy of sciences  
In the opening lines of the Nicomachean Ethics (NE), Aristotle identifies the good 
of every art (τέχνη) with the end (τέλος) to which all efforts are directed, thus ‘the 
end of the science of medicine is health, that of the art of shipbuilding a vessel, 
that of strategy victory, that of domestic economy wealth.’73 Just as the ends of 
subdisciplines are instrumental to that of their ‘master art’, τέλη (insofar as they 
are plural) are uniformly instrumental to a singular intrinsic τέλος, that which is 
pursued as an end in itself.74 The supreme τέλος must be the object of the most 
authoritative art, namely Politics, the science of organising subordinate 
sciences,75 and that τέλος is identified with εὐδαιμονία.76 As we saw in I and II, 
both the Stoics and the Epicureans adopted this teleological framework as the 
basis of their ethics,77 thus orienting their philosophies towards the realisation of 
a singular pattern of behaviour.78 In the case of the Stoics, εὐδαιμονία is identified 
with virtue (ἀρετή) which is a state of psychological (and thus behavioural) 
agreement with nature/God; Stobaeus elucidates Stoicism’s teleological method 
of defining happiness: it is the end ‘for the sake of which everything is done, but 
 
73 Arist. NE I.1 trans. Rackham (1926). 
74 Ibid. I.2. 
75 Ibid. See Irwin (2012) p.509-511 for Aristotle’s conception of politics as the most ‘architectonic’ science. 
76 Arist. NE I..4. The rest of book I is dedicated to Aristotle’s analysis of εὐδαιμονία. We find the most 
succinct definition in I.7: ‘the Good of man proves to be the active exercise of his soul’s faculties in 
conformity with excellence or virtue.’ Trans. Rackham (1926). Lear (1988) p.160-174 for an introduction 
to εὐδαιμονία in NE and its relationship to Aristotle’s conception of virtue (ἀρετή). Irwin (2012) for a more 
comprehensive introduction to the concept and surrounding controversies. 
77 Though naturally in the case of the Epicureans ‘purpose’ is not innate within the cosmos; the value of 
ἀταραξία is discerned a posteriori and understood as parasitic upon purposeless atomic interactions. 
78 This is not, we should note, Aristotle’s own purpose in writing NE. Providing self-insight to those who 
already manifest εὐδαιμονία was Aristotle’s primary aim. Though he recognises the practical value of NE 
(e.g. NE I.2), his argument rests on the assumption that he is merely throwing light upon intrinsic 
processes. See Lear (1988) p.157. As I set out in 0.1, the idea of philosophy as curative develops in the 
Hellenistic era. See again II.5 and III.5 below. 
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which is not itself done for the sake of anything.’79 The parallels with NE I are 
clear. Philosophy is purpose driven; all ends are instrumental to the realisation of 
εὐδαιμονία; physics and logic are less branches of philosophy, more tributaries 
of a self-justifying ethical project. 
     In NE this asymmetry is expressed through the division of science into its 
theoretical and practical components.80 Theoretical science concerns itself with 
invariable truths such as the nature of God, the laws of mathematics and change 
insofar as it is governed by natural law.81 It is (to reuse my language at 0.2) 
knowledge cultivated for its own sake, the incorporation of reality into mind.82 
Practical science concerns itself with what an individual can change.83 It is 
oriented towards εὐδαιμονία and must naturally conform to the rule-systems 
unveiled by theoretical science.84 The two subdivisions of practical science are 
φρόνησις, the true practical science, which is concerned with behaviour, and 
τέχνη, the productive science, which is concerned with bringing about particular 
products or states.85 Stoic ethics, seen through this frame, is a φρόνησις 
emerging from the soil of physical and logical theory; it orients itself towards the 
realisation of εὐδαιμονία/ἀρετή as prefigured in nature.86 Medicine, by contrast, 
is a τέχνη. As Aristotle puts it in NE, ‘medical science does not seek to control 
health, but studies how to procure it; hence it issues orders in the interests of 
health, but not to health.’87 As physical theory elucidates the nature of εὐδαιμονία 
in Stoicism, a theoretical conception of health is foundational to the development 
of medicine as a productive science. There is an affinity, then, between φρόνησις 
and τέχνη; both sciences pursue an end and chart their course through the 
territory illuminated by theory.88 But there is, for our purposes, a significant 
 
79 Stob. 2.77, 16-27 (LS 63 A). Note also that ‘happiness’ and ‘the happy life’ are synonymised in this 
passage, further reflecting Aristotelian εὐδαιμονία. 
80 NE VI is the source of Aristotle’s classification of different forms of knowledge. Taylor (1990) remains 
the most thorough treatment of the issues raised by NE VI. 
81 NE. VI.3. 
82 It is further divided into scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and intuitive reason (νοῦς, the quality that 
enables one to grasp first principles), which together constitute wisdom (σοφία). See NE. VI.3, 6-7. 
83 Ibid. VI.5. 
84 e.g. Ibid. VI.2. Aristotle indulges no moral scepticism or evaluative subjectivism; a correct decision is 
correct because it maps onto an eternal truth, grasped by theoretical science. Taylor (1990) p.130. 
85 NE VI.4-6. Taylor (1990) p.129. 
86 See e.g. Plut. St. Rep. 1041E (LS 60 A); Stob. 2.77, 16-27 (LS 63 A). 
87 NE VI.13 trans. Rackham (1926). cf. Athenaeus’ conception of the starting point of medical exposition 
in ps.-Gal. Int. 2.5 (= XIV 676-677 K.). 
88 At NE I.13 Aristotle himself analogises the requirement of the statesman to possess theoretical 
knowledge with the physician who must comprehend the anatomy of the part of the body he is treating. 
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differentiating factor to consider: medicine is explicitly conceived as the lesser 
science in NE.89 Health, in Aristotle’s hierarchy of sciences, is instrumental to 
εὐδαιμονία, where political science/ethics orients itself directly towards the 
intrinsic good. I submit this as a possible incentivizing factor in Athenaeus’ 
enforcement of rigid disciplinary boundaries; if medicine were to prove itself a 
generative science by contributing to theory, not merely building on immutable 
foundations established by philosophy, then its position in the hierarchy of 
sciences might warrant reconsideration. We will return to this at III.3.3 and III.4 
below. For now, note that securing medicine’s status as a generative science 
requires that innovation begin with the first principles of medicine – that is, from 
within the epistemological territory pertinent to medical inquiry.90 We have already 
seen from the testimonia examined at III.2.1 how Athenaeus enforced such an 
epistemic boundary, but it is important to further contextualise his activity within 
Aristotle’s taxonomy of sciences, particularly with respect to the demands each 
discipline makes of its practitioner. 
III.3.2 Theoretical vs. practical science in Aristotle  
In arguing that ethics, being a practical discipline, is necessarily an inexact 
science in NE, Aristotle contrasts a carpenter with a geometrician, an artisan with 
a theoretician: ‘a carpenter and a geometrician both try to find a right angle but in 
different ways; the former is content with that approximation to it which satisfies 
the purpose of his work; the latter, being a student of truth, seeks to find its 
essence or essential attributes.’91 The τέλος of one’s discipline determines one’s 
obligation to exactitude. The theoretician, dealing with essential processes, 
explores the world as it is; the artisan delves into theory only in as far as his 
purpose demands. Aristotle counsels that, in matters of practical science, one 
should ‘not allow side issues to outbalance the main task in hand’;92 intellectual 
exploration beyond the epistemic boundaries determined by one’s τέλος is 
potentially deleterious to one’s acknowledged aim. The carpenter who behaves 
as a geometer is of limited productive value; he cannot resolve his materials into 
 
Taylor (1990) p.129. Note also Ibid. I.7 in which ethics, the practical science, is analogised to the productive 
science of carpentry (see III.3.2). Aristotle is himself aware of this structural parallelism. 
89 Arist. NE I.13. The status of medicine’s hierarchical relationship to natural philosophy in Aristotle is most 
recently explored in Lefebvre (2019). 
90 cf. Arist. Resp. 480b22-31. See III.3.2 below. 
91 Arist. NE I.7 trans. Rackham (1926). 
92 Ibid. trans. Rackham (1926). 
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mathematical abstractions – entities in thought – and still build a functioning 
table.93 
     The comparison between Aristotle’s geometrician-carpenter analogy at NE I.7 
and the relationship between Stoic physics (specifically) and Pneumatism is a 
natural one. Physics concerns itself with essences and essential attributes; 
Athenaeus’ interpretation of Rationalist medicine, as we saw in III.2, concerns 
itself with theory only insofar as the entities considered are proximate to 
medicine’s τέλος. I suggest that Athenaeus’ conception of the τῆς ἰατρικῆς 
στοιχεῖα becomes more intelligible when understood within the framework of 
theoretical vs. practical science in NE. It does not answer the question of why 
Athenaeus’ element theory could not have been expressed from within Stoicism 
(for which see III.3.3). But it does contextualise Athenaeus’ contributions to 
theoretical science – more precisely, Athenaeus’ contributions to medical science 
that may have a broader theoretical implication (III.4) – within this pre-existing 
framework; it clarifies the criteria for distinguishing medical from physical inquiry. 
     There are several passages in the Parva Naturalia in which Aristotle 
differentiates medicine from philosophy in terms of both subject matter and 
methodology. At Sens. 436a17-b2 Aristotle writes that it is a ‘duty of the physical 
philosopher to reflect on the first principles of disease and health’ because health 
and disease are characteristics of living beings.94 For this reason ‘most inquirers 
into nature’ and doctors are alike but there is a methodological disparity; ‘the 
former at the end of their inquiries reach a discussion of medicine, while the latter 
begin their investigation into medicine with an inquiry into nature.’95 Theoreticians 
reach a discussion of the first principles of disease ‘at the end of their inquiries’, 
where the intellectual territory explored is most abundant. Doctors, by contrast, 
reach backwards into questions of first principles from their τέλος. That this is a 
distinction between general and specialised inquiry is implied by a passage from 
Div. somn. where Aristotle differentiates ‘the distinguished among doctors’ (τῶν 
ἰατρῶν οἱ χαρίεντες) from those who inquire more broadly into the subject of sign-
 
93 Note how this analogy preserves the structural affinity between φρόνησις and τέχνη in NE. For the 
purpose of this section, our interests are in the contrary demands of practical vs. theoretical science. 
94 Trans. Hett (1935).  
95 Arist. Sens. 436a17-b2 trans. Hett (1935). 
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inference from dreams.96 The former are specialists who inquire into dreams to a 
practical end; the latter are interested in the prophetic quality of dreams from a 
purely theoretic vantage – i.e. as an end in itself. It is once more in the territory of 
‘medically proximate’ that general inquiry approaches its pinnacle, where the 
specialist has further moves to make. Aristotle summarises this relationship at 
Resp. 480b22-31: 
As for health and disease it is not merely the business of the physician but 
also the physical philosopher to discuss their causes up to a point. But the 
way in which these two classes of inquirers differ and consider different 
problems must not escape us, since the facts prove that up to a point the 
methods go hand in hand; for those physicians who have subtle and 
inquiring minds have something to say about natural science, and claim to 
derive their principles therefrom, and the most polished of those who deal 
with natural sciences really conclude with medical principles.97 
The conclusions of natural science form the beginning of the medical τέχνη. With 
the pieces in place, the physician selects what is appropriate and builds from 
there. But what is most remarkable about Resp. 480b22-31 is the suggestion that 
‘physicians who have subtle and inquiring minds’ might have something to 
contribute to natural science. The implication is that specialised inquiry can, from 
a self-constrained starting position, discover something hitherto unknown with 
implications that stretch beyond the confines of its τέχνη.98 
     When considering this remarkable tip of the hat to medical inquiry, it is 
important to note that Aristotle conceived the differentiated sciences as being 
intrinsically harmonious.99 Medicine, insofar as it is practised appropriately, is a 
practical outgrowth of Aristotle’s own theoretical system. This claim is not so 
eccentric if we accept that Aristotle himself engaged in a form of medical inquiry 
under the criteria he himself sought to establish. It is for the most distinguished 
of natural scientists, after all, to have an impact beyond the boundaries of their 
 
96 Arist. Div. Somn. 463a-7. The verb φιλοσοφεῖν denotes an expression of interest rather than ‘to practice 
philosophy’ in its full, technical sense. See van der Eijk (2005) p.192-193. 
97 Arist. Resp. 480b22-31 trans. Hett (1935), my italics.  
98 van der Eijk (2005) p.195. 
99 In this respect, his taxonomy of sciences has its own cosmological peculiarity. NE VI is the clearest single 
example of this. 
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discipline.100 As indicated in my introduction (0.2), the evidence that Aristotle 
wrote medical works is compelling.101 Diogenes Laertius lists among Aristotle’s 
bibliography two books concerning medicine (the Ἰατρικά);102 Caelius Aurelianus 
quotes from an Aristotelian medical work entitled De adiutoriis (‘On Remedies’, 
probably Περὶ Βοηθημάτων in Greek, the title of Athenaeus’ own magnum 
opus)103 and there is evidence that the Anonymus Londinensis is based on a 
doxographical work on the causes of diseases written by Aristotle who was – for 
it seems necessary to mention it – the son of Nicomachus, physician to king 
Amyntas of Macedon.104 A recent article by Robert Mayhew argues convincingly 
that the last three chapters of pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata (Pr. I.55-57) were 
excerpted from Aristotle’s lost medical writings.105  
     That different subdisciplines of inquiry make different demands of their 
participants, that one’s τέλος determines the proximate domain of one’s inquiry, 
that specialised disciplines begin their theoretical exposition where general 
inquiry typically concludes and that descending by reason into the ‘essences of 
things’ is counterproductive to the realisation of practical goals are all stipulations 
of Aristotle’s taxonomy of sciences. The behaviour he advocates in NE and 
elsewhere is echoed in the methodologies of Athenaeus and his Hellenistic 
predecessors alike, as exhibited in the epistemological constraints they apply to 
their respective element (or quasi-element) theories (III.2). Moreover, that doctors 
– if sufficiently accomplished – can contribute to theory from the rigidly delineated 
confines of medically-proximate epistemology is anticipated at Resp. 480b22-31. 
 
100 Arist. Resp. 480b22-31 
101 See Mayhew (2015) p.2-6. 
102 D. L. V.25. 
103 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 2.13.18. See Van der Eijk (2005) p.264. 
104 See Manetti (1994) p.47-58 for the relationship between Aristotle and the Anonymus Londinensis. The 
Aristotelian connection is a matter of consensus; the debate revolves around the number of degrees of 
separation between Aristotle and the Anonymus Londinensis papyri. For Aristotle’s father, see D.L. V.1. 
105 Mayhew (2015). Philip van der Eijk argued in an article entitled ‘On Sterility (Hist. An. 10), a medical 
work by Aristotle?’, reprinted in van der Eijk (2005) p.259-275, that many of the controversies surrounding 
the little-studied Aristotelian text On Sterility (HA 10) – specifically those pertaining to its authorship, the 
validity of its status as a part of the History of Animals (HA) and its divergences from the other treatise 
that deals with the question of reproduction, the Generation of Animals (Gen. An.) – resolve themselves 
if we understand HA. 10 as a diagnostic work by Aristotle, distinct from Aristotle’s project in HA and, 
crucially, not intended to give a systematic, theoretically satisfactory account of reproduction, but a 
diagnostic guide with instructive intent and practical value. Extraneous details are shorn by the ambit of 
a framework that is self-consciously unsystematic. The aims of HA 10, on Van der Eijk’s interpretation, are 
practical; its theoretical exposition is constrained by its purpose 
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With the contextual scaffolding now in place, let us return to Athenaeus and his 
relationship to Stoicism. 
III.3.3 Stoicism vs. Pneumatism  
Stoicism’s theoretical component is necessarily all-encompassing; a philosophy 
that elevates nature to the status of moral paradigm, that analyses physics ‘for 
no other purpose than for the differentiation of good and bad things’106 and 
identifies the distinctly non-localised phenomenon of ‘harmony’ with that which is 
intrinsically Good must consider nature as a whole;107 harmony – the morally 
illustrative proportion – is evident in every ontological stratum; its omnipresence 
is essential to its value.108 The breadth of Stoicism’s physical component is 
dictated by an ethical τέλος which demands an extensive theoretical foundation; 
if anything is obscured, it is those areas explored by specialists for non-ethical 
ends (see III.4.4). By contrast, Pneumatism’s theoretical component is 
necessarily tightly constrained; the Pneumatist, though working from within the 
same cosmology, limits his inquiry to that which is proximate to medicine – i.e. 
that which pertains directly to bodily health within the epistemological territory in 
which the medical art can bring about change. Stoicism furnishes the Pneumatist 
with the theoretical basis for a medical τέχνη but the Pneumatist ‘picks up’ Stoic 
physics at a point where philosophical exposition concludes.109 The restrictions 
Athenaeus places on his element theory (III.2) are intelligible within the 
Aristotelian framework of theoretical vs. practical science where Stoic physics 
(specifically) is a theoretical pursuit and Pneumatism practically oriented, but this 
is only a partial explanation. 
     As we established at III.3.2 above, Aristotle clearly envisages the taxonomy 
of sciences he sets out in NE as being mutually compatible. In Aristotle’s model, 
disciplines which orient themselves towards the realisation of instrumental goods 
– principal among which are the productive sciences, the category to which the 
medical τέχνη belongs – do so in service to the attainment of εὐδαιμονία. 
Aristotle’s own medical interests, discussed at III.3.2 above, are indicative of this 
compatibility; he can assume the methodology of the medical writer and write 
 
106 Plut. St. rep. 1025C-D (LS 60 A). 
107 See I.3.1 and esp. Cic. Fin. 3.21. 
108 Recall e.g. Gal. PHP V.2.31-34, supra III.2.2 and below III.5.3.1. 
109 cf. Arist. Sens. 436a17-b2. 
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within the appropriate epistemological constraints while remaining comfortably 
within the topography of a greater philosophical system. Athenaeus’ element 
theory can be expressed in the same terms. But Athenaeus was not a Stoic 
philosopher directing his attention to a partially neglected area of inquiry with a 
view to further illuminating the path to εὐδαιμονία; he was a physician, the founder 
of a distinct school under a distinct name with a distinct τέλος whose insistence 
on enforcing the perimeter of a distinctly medical epistemology (III.2) suggests 
that he took this distinction seriously.110 Where Aristotle might adopt differently 
delineated intellectual personae depending on the task at hand, Athenaeus, as 
far as we can discern, equips himself with a singular methodological toolkit, 
gesturing towards the wider theoretical landscape only to justify the restrictions 
he imposes on the ambit of his inquiry. His early exposure to Stoicism informed 
his understanding of the world, but at no point does he permit this influence to 
erode the boundaries which define his craft. 
     Two details of the framework we have noted in this section seem particularly 
pertinent to the question of the discontinuity between Stoicism and Pneumatism. 
The first, alluded to at III.3.1 above, is that Aristotle’s hierarchy of sciences 
explicitly denigrates medicine as inferior to the kind of ethical inquiry which 
corresponds to Stoicism’s practical realisation.111 A ‘Stoic physician’, which is to 
say, a hypothetical Stoic philosopher who practised medicine and produced 
predominantly medical(/technical) works, must be less valuable than a Stoic 
ethicist (or Stoic philosopher proper) on account of the latter’s more intrinsically 
valuable τέλος according to Aristotle’s framework in NE.112 Specialisation, from 
this vantage, looks like an abdication of responsibility; health, for Aristotle, may 
be instrumental to εὐδαιμονία, but its pursuers walk a lesser path to those who 
devote the greater portion of their energy to promoting virtue in their peers.113 For 
the Stoics, the relationship between bodily health and εὐδαιμονία is contentious. 
Diogenes Laertius, expounding Stoic ethics, lists ‘health’ among the states which 
produce neither benefit nor harm;114 εὐδαιμονία is not dependent on one’s optimal 
 
110 See in particular the two definitions we ascribed to Athenaeus in Def. Med. 31 (III.2.1.1). 
111 Arist. NE. I.13. 
112 See III.3.1 and Stob. 2.77, 16-27 (LS 63 A) for Stoicism’s essentially Aristotelian ethical framework. 
113 Arist. NE I.13. 
114 D. L. VII.101-103 alongside pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, reputation and noble birth (LS 58 A). 
Though those states listed are counted among ‘preferred indifferents’ they are not necessarily beneficial. 
Therefore, they are not necessarily instrumental to attaining what is good.  
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physical condition.115 Stobaeus includes health among ‘indifferent things’ that are 
nonetheless ‘in accordance with nature’ – i.e. preferred – in early (orthodox) 
Stoicism;116 health is preferable to disease but it is not a necessary steppingstone 
on one’s journey to ἀρετή. The picture becomes more complicated (and 
moderately more supportive of health’s instrumental value) when we consider 
sources – downstream from Chrysippus’ influence – that expound the Stoic 
ethical project in terms of selecting and deselecting goals based on their 
agreement with nature.117 Posidonius, interestingly, argued that this was to 
conflate ‘‘living in agreement with nature’ with ‘doing everything possible for the 
sake of primary things in accordance with nature’, making it similar to actually 
positing pleasure or freedom from pain…as the target.’118 Evidently, the 
relationship between ‘preferred indifferents’ such as health and the pursuit of 
ἀρετή created problems for the Stoics.119 Aristo of Chios, an early Stoic and 
associate of Zeno, objected to the very concept of ‘preferred indifferents’.120 
Health, on his interpretation, is not unconditionally preferable; he argues that one 
would deselect health if it were conditional on one’s service to a tyrant.121 
Preferred – i.e. harmonious122 – indifferents threaten to distract from the Good as 
exemplified by the whole; Posidonius, though he concedes that the pursuit of 
micro-harmonies – i.e. localised, delineable examples of something occurring ‘in 
agreement with nature’ – such as freedom from pain ‘denotes an activity which is 
a necessary accompaniment of the end’, counsels against confusing this for an 
end in itself.123 Would our Stoic doctor not be guilty of precisely this error or 
orientation? The doctor’s τέλος is unlikely to put him in conflict with Stoicism’ final 
aim, but the best our Stoic physician can hope for is the realisation of a preferred 
but non-essential physical state – a peculiar misdirection of his efforts, in Stoic 
terms. By distancing himself from the mother-doctrine Athenaeus discards the 
 
115 Ibid. VII.104. 
116 Stob. 2.79,18-80, 13; 82,20-1 (LS 58 C). 
117 Cic. Fin. III.31; Stob. 2.76.9-15 (LS 58 K) expounding the views of Diogenes of Babylon and Antipater; 
Ibid. 2.75-11-76 (LS 63 B) for a similar view expressed by Chrysippus.  
118 Gal. PHP V.6.10-14 (LS 64 I). Diogenes Laertius writes at VII.128 that Posidonius denied that virtue was 
self-sufficing, and that health, wealth and strength were necessary for its attainment. According to 
Diogenes (VII.103), Posidonius included wealth and health among the ‘goods’. But neither claim is 
corroborated by evidence elsewhere. We should be hesitant to attribute too much significance to 
Diogenes’ assertions here, particularly in light of PHP V.6.10-14. 
119 See LS 64 (p.401-410). 
120 S. E. M. XI.64-67 
121 Ibid. 
122 Stob. 2.79,18-80, 13; 82,20-1 (LS 58 C). 
123 Gal. PHP V.6.10-14 (LS 64 I). 
151 
 
ethical obligation built into Stoicism’s holistic architecture and focusses on 
medicine independently of its relationship to the philosophy’s aims. In doing so, 
Athenaeus accepts the constraints of practical inquiry prefigured in Aristotle’s 
work and applies them not only to Stoic physics, but back to the context in which 
they originate, borrowing from Aristotle’s taxonomy of sciences only what is useful 
to the inquiry into medicine itself – specifically, the template for specialisation – 
and discarding the hierarchy of disciplines in which the practical vs. theoretical 
distinction is embedded. 
     The second detail is the suggestion at Resp. 480b22-31 that physicians who 
have sufficiently ‘subtle and inquiring minds’ can contribute to theory from the 
vantage point of their specialist epistemological domains. I will argue in the next 
section that some of Athenaeus’ aetiological stipulations embody precisely this 
conception of theory being nourished from within the domain of medical inquiry, 
thus functioning not merely as an immutable foundation upon which to construct 
a technical methodology but as a shared body of physical knowledge whose 
evolution could be variously engineered. When Athenaeus contributes to theory 
as a Pneumatist, the effect is to deny the mother-doctrine a claim to the 
discoveries of medicine and to expand medicine’s value beyond the production 
of health, though crucially, without ever averting his focus from the physician’s 
τέλος; it is through the physician’s unwavering pursuit of health and its underlying 
causes that he discovers new facts about the world which may have a broader 
application. Enforcing a discontinuity between Stoicism and Stoicism’s medical 
application is not to extoll the value of Pneumatism at the expense of Stoicism, 
but to defend the value of medicine against its implicit denigration in the ethical 
structure of Hellenistic philosophy. 
III.4 Aetiology  
Over the course of III.2 we saw how ideas can be trimmed by disciplinary 
boundaries without undergoing changes to their content. This is not, however, the 
only mechanism by which ideas evolve in transit from one discipline to another, 
nor is it the only mechanism evident in Athenaeus’ medicalised Stoicism. Our 
focus in this section is Athenaeus’ taxonomy of causes as reported in Galen’s CC 
2. Taking each category of cause in turn, I will assess how neatly Athenaeus’ 
analysis of causation can be mapped onto its Stoic precedent (insofar as it can 
be reconstructed) and ask the question of whether the process of applying 
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(putatively) universal causal theories to medicine required that the content of 
those ideas be adjusted. My thesis is that it is through this process that Athenaeus 
contributes to physical theory. However, his contributions were such that they 
posed no threat to the integrity of the mother-doctrine. 
III.4.1 De causis continentibus 2 
Athenaeus’ tripartite taxonomy of causes is recorded in Galen’s De causis 
continentibus 2.1-4 (CC), his treatise on sustaining/synectic causes. It is in this 
context that Athenaeus’ intellectual debt to Stoicism and association with 
Posidonius is preserved. Note that Galen references Athenaeus’ Stoic 
connections with a view to explaining Athenaeus’ aetiology of disease; it should 
be understood, as far as Galen is concerned, as an elaboration of Stoic principles. 
CC 2 must form the starting point of any inquiry into Athenaeus’ Stoicising causal 
theory and is worth quoting at length: 
As for Athenaeus…he founded the medical school known as the 
Pneumatists. It suits his doctrine to speak of a containing cause 
[sustaining/synectic/cohesive cause = αἴτιον συνεκτικόν] in illness since he 
bases himself upon the Stoics and was a pupil of Posidonius…Athenaeus’ 
three types [of cause]  are as follows: the first consists of containing causes 
[αἴτια συνεκτικά], the second of preceding causes [αἴτια προηγούμενα], and 
the third of the matter of antecedent causes [αἴτια προκαταρκτικά]: for they 
call everything external to the body which produces disease in it thus. If 
what is produced in the body belongs to the class of what causes disease, 
then while it has not actually brought the disease about, it is called the 
preceding cause. Alterations are produced in the natural πνεῦμα by these 
causes [i.e. the αἴτια προηγούμενα]  together with those which are external 
[i.e. the αἴτια προκαταρκτικά], and with the body moistened or desiccated, 
chilled or heated, these are said to be the containing causes [αἴτια 
συνεκτικά] of diseases.124 
There are three species of cause in Athenaeus’ aetiology of disease, 
differentiated by their temporal relationship to disease and their origin relative to 
 
124 Gal. CC 2.1-4 (with omissions) trans. taken from Hankinson (1999) p.490 with minor changes for clarity 
of terminology. Lyons (1969), whom I use for more detailed analysis of CC 2.4-5 below (III.4.4.2), 
unhelpfully translates Athenaeus’ school as the ‘Animists’ and preceding causes as ‘immediate causes’, 
neither of which seem adequate to what is expressed. 
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the body.125 The αἴτιον συνεκτικόν (see III.4.2) is variously translated as the 
‘containing’, ‘sustaining’ or ‘cohesive’ cause and is the focus of CC. This category 
is cotemporal and coextensive with its effect. The αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν (III.4.3), 
the ‘antecedent’ cause, is prior and external to its effect. The αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον (III.4.4), the ‘preceding’ cause, is prior and internal. All three 
causes have a role to play in the realisation of disease;126 it is in their interactions 
that the pattern of deleterious alterations constituting disease resides. In the 
following analysis, insofar as it is possible, I will begin by contextualising each 
species of cause within the framework of Stoic causal theory, then examine how 
each cause is transposed into Athenaeus’ aetiology of disease and what changes 
they undergo in the process. 
III.4.2 αἴτιον συνεκτικόν (or, causes of being vs. causes of becoming in 
Stoic/Pneumatist causal analysis) 
The αἴτιον συνεκτικόν is cotemporal with its consequence; its cessation would be 
that of the event it brings about. The distinction between cotemporal and 
antecedent causes is typically attributed to the Stoics; Galen names them in the 
opening lines of CC as the first philosophers ‘of his acquaintance’ to speak to 
cohesive causes.127 For the Stoics, formalising the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν was a 
necessity born of their conception of the cosmos as something that was actively 
held together (i.e. sustained) from within.128 The activity of the active principle in 
matters of both qualitative transformation and cohesion necessitates a distinction 
between causes of ‘becoming’ and causes of ‘being’.129 The original – i.e. non-
medical – Stoic doctrine is set out in CC 1 (immediately prior to Athenaeus’ 
introduction into the discussion) and this too merits lengthy quotation:  
[The Stoics’] view is that from the four elements are produced those bodies 
that Aristotle calls homogeneous and are described by Plato as ‘the first to 
 
125 In the following summary I deviate from the order in which they are presented in CC 2.1-4 for ease of 
explanation. The αἴτιον προηγούμενον must understood in relation to the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν. 
126 Though the occurrence of disease is not necessarily dependent on all three causes (III.4.4.2). 
127 Gal. CC 2.1. It is surprising that variance in the temporal relationship between cause and effect was not 
discussed prior to the Stoics. Note the striking absence of an Aristotelian treatment of the temporal 
features of causal relations in his aetiological analysis (Arist. Phys. 2.3, 1924b16-195b30, see Hankinson 
(1987b) p.80-81). What seems like a peculiar delay in the commencement of an intuitively obvious mode 
of inquiry is illustrative on the dependency of causal analysis on physical precedents; the Stoic doctrines 
of through-and-through coextension and divine omnipresence realised through activity seemed to have 
been uniquely apt for the development of complex causal systems. Questions of causing arise a priori. 
128 See I.5.1. Note in particular the conception of ἕξις as a product of pneumatic motion. 
129 Hankinson (1999) p.482. 
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be generated’, while all other bodies are simply compounds of these. Of the 
elements themselves, some they call material and some active and 
dynamic. They maintain that the material elements are held together by 
those that are dynamic, fire and air being dynamic and active in their view, 
while earth and water are material. They say that in compounds the dynamic 
elements pervade the material through and through, that is to say, air and 
fire penetrate water and earth. Air is cold, and fire is hot. The natural effect 
of air is to consolidate and thicken a substance, whereas fire naturally 
causes expansion, loosening and widening. The two active elements have 
fine parts and the other two thick parts. All the substance with fine parts the 
Stoics call breath, and they think that the function of this breath is to sustain 
natural and animal bodies.130 
The activity of πνεῦμα is the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of all natural bodies; it is the cause 
of their ‘being’. As πνεῦμα is all-penetrative, so too is the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν 
coextensive with its effect. As Galen continues his exposition, he introduces a 
restriction to the Stoic definition of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν that would seem to 
threaten its consistency with Athenaeus’ interpretation set out in CC 2. 
By natural bodies I mean those that are produced by nature and not by 
human skill, like copper, stones, gold, wood and those parts of the animal 
that are called primary and homogeneous parts, that is, nerves, arteries, 
veins, cartilages, bones and everything else of the same sort. Men join bits 
of wood together with glue, nails, pegs, clay, gypsum and lime. Similarly, 
nature is found connecting all the parts of the body so as to form a united 
whole by means of cartilages, ligaments and tendons. If you like, you can 
call the parts of the body that produce this union in the simple members 
sustaining causes of compounds, and the same term can be applied to clay, 
gypsum, lime and the other things that serve the same purpose in externals 
which are connected by the skill of man and not by nature. It is not these, 
however, but rather the material substance with fine parts, that the Stoics 
call the containing cause of existing things.131 
 
130 Gal. CC 1 (LS 55 F). 
131 Ibid. cont. (LS 55 F). 
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On Galen’s account, for the early (though evidently post-Chrysippean) Stoics, 
αἴτια συνεκτικά are only properly so called when applied to homogeneous 
substances, the first bodies generated from the elements whose fusions and 
juxtapositions account for the rest of the observable world.132 This restriction, if 
correctly ascribed, seems to have two consequences for Stoic causal theory. 1) 
Post Chrysippus,133 the designation αἴτιον συνεκτικόν can be applied only to the 
activity of πνεῦμα; a contiguous body such as a ship or a house is sustained by 
a substructure whose posteriority to πνεῦμα disqualified it as an αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν, except by analogy.134 This restriction seems to emphasise the 
importance of mutual coextension to the original Stoic doctrine; evidence of a 
building’s support structure will not be located in each brick. 2) The αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν is exclusively a cause of ‘being’, not a cause of ‘becoming’.135   
     J. Hankinson, in his 1987 article ‘Evidence, Externality and Antecedence: 
Inquiries into later Greek causal concepts’, taking CC 1-2 as his primary source, 
argued that although the original Stoic doctrine of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν was 
restricted to causes of being, its ambit was expanded when it transitioned into a 
medical context.136 Hankinson attributes the introduction of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν 
into medicine to Athenaeus of Attalia and – though there are elements of 
Hankinson’s analysis which I will shortly call into question – we have no cause to 
doubt this particular claim.137 What remains controversial is the extent to which 
Athenaeus’ conception of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν was an elaboration of the Stoic 
precedent. This question is central to our purposes and requires more rigorous 
analysis than it receives in Hankinson’s article. My principal concern is that 
Hankinson privileges Galen’s analysis in CC 1 – the reliability of which I will 
 
132 Hankinson (1987b) p.82. 
133 The analysis of causation attributed to Zeno in Stob I.138,14-139,4 (LS 55 A) is evidently an analysis of 
αἴτια συνεκτικά. While the evidence from Stobaeus is consistent with point (2) above, Zeno’s synectic 
causes are unlikely to be dispositions of πνεῦμα. The identification of πνεῦμα as the active principle is not 
introduced into Stoicism until Chrysippus’ premiership (see I.3.8). The examples in Stob. I.138,14-139,4 
are, however, conditions of the human soul. 
134 ‘Contiguous’, that is, as opposed to ‘unified’. See Plut. Con. Praec. SVF 2.366. The ship/house is, of 
course, suffused through-and-through with πνεῦμα, but πνεῦμα, on Galen’s account, is only the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν (properly so-called) of its homogeneous components; πνεῦμα sustains the parts; the parts 
combine to form a whole. 
135 Hankinson (1987b) p.82-83. 
136 Ibid. p.83-85. 
137 Gal. CC 1-2 certainly implies that Athenaeus was responsible for shepherding the concept into the 
analysis of disease aetiology. Hankinson (1987b) p.84 further cites the centrality of πνεῦμα to Athenaeus’ 
medical theory and his affiliation with Posidonius as the basis for this claim. The connection between 
physician and philosopher is direct, with no intermediary medical authority. 
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challenge at III.4.2.3 below – over evidence that points towards a broader 
application of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν in early (i.e. pre-Athenaean) Stoicism. In his 
treatment of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν, Hankinson makes two claims – ‘Firstly, while 
there seems to be no good reason to doubt that the Stoics originated the 
terminology of containing causes, the meaning of that terminology underwent a 
crucial shift; and secondly, the impetus for that shift came from the medical 
schools’ with Athenaeus at the vanguard.138 How far can this be accepted? 
III.4.2.1 Gal. CC 1: Causes of being 
Galen writes in CC 1 that the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν, in its original conception, was 
only properly so-called when applied to the pneumatic disposition responsible 
preserving homogenous substances – ‘…copper, stones, gold, wood and those 
parts of the animal body that are called the primary and homogeneous parts’139  
– i.e. unified bodies whose structural integrity cannot be maintained by other 
means. We can, ‘if we like’, refer to the πνεῦμα which sustains each of the parts 
as the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of the whole but, in doing so, we deviate from the strict 
sense of the term. This is not the only place in which Galen distinguished between 
a ‘strict’ and a ‘loose’ application of the term ‘αἴτιον συνεκτικόν’. In his Synopsis 
of the books on pulses (Syn. Puls.) 9.458, 8-14 Galen writes that ‘it is above all 
necessary to remember how we said we were speaking of the ‘sustaining cause’ 
– not in the strict sense, but using the appellative loosely. For no one before the 
Stoics either spoke of or admitted the existence of the ‘sustaining cause’ in the 
strict sense. And what have even before our time been spoken of as ‘sustaining’ 
have been causes of something’s coming about, not existence.’140 The ‘strict 
sense’ in Syn. Puls. which Galen avoids is a Stoic peculiarity and refers 
exclusively to ‘causes of being’. Such causes, according to CC 1, were – at least, 
for the purists – only appropriately applied to basic stuffs. Stobaeus I.138.14-
139.4 appears to preserve the earliest Stoic analysis of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν, 
attributed to Zeno (though the term itself is not employed). According to Zeno ‘it 
is because of prudence that being prudent occurs, because of the soul that being 
alive occurs, because of temperance that being temperate occurs.’141 These 
examples refer to persistent states of being; their causes are stable conditions of 
 
138 Hankinson (1977) p.84-85. 
139 Gal. CC 1. 
140 Gal. Syn. Puls. 9.458, 8-15 (LS 55 H). 
141 Stob. I.13,14-139,4 (LS 55 A).  
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the (pre-Chrysippean/pneumatic) Stoic soul. The task of reconciling this passage 
from Stobaeus with CC 1 is not insurmountable; although the status of πνεῦμα 
as the active principle was not established under Zeno, ‘temperance’, in Stoicism, 
refers to a corporeal, unified body, ‘basic’ insofar as it refers to singular psychic 
condition, and stable for the duration of its existence.142 That there existed a strain 
within Stoicism that rigidly enforced the idea that the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν could only 
be applied to causes of being is not implausible, but we should, for reasons I lay 
out below (III.4.2.3) be hesitant to attribute it to all of Athenaeus’ Stoic 
predecessors. 
III.4.2.2 Gal. CC 2: Causes of becoming 
Were the Stoics dogmatic adherents to Galen’s strict interpretation of the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν, it is easy to see how this would be incompatible with the medical 
τέχνη. Medicine is concerned with the human body, a complex network of inter-
reliant substances and substructures – a juxtaposition of mixtures –, and the 
physical condition which the physician seeks to negate, disease in all its 
manifestations, is one which does not respect the boundaries between 
homogeneous substances. The physician, moreover, is seldom occupied with the 
analysis of fixed states of being; disease is dynamic, ever evolving, and rarely 
manifests as a single symptom. At CC 2 we note that the term ‘sustaining cause’ 
(coniunctam causam) is being applied to the internal condition that is cotemporal 
with the manifestation of disease – that is, neither a homogeneous body nor a 
persistent state but a specific pattern of deleterious transformations, observed by 
a doctor and endured by a patient.143 Disease is a process, a phenomenon 
defined by alteration.144 
     In CC 2.1-4, disease describes an event in the body which results from an 
internal disposition that differs from a salutary norm. It lasts as long as the body’s 
qualities remain in disarray, but the state of qualitative disequilibrium is all that is 
necessarily persistent. By the Stoic definition reported at CC 1, it is difficult to 
identify πνεῦμα in the body as the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of this state of disarray, yet 
in CC 2 Galen attributes to Athenaeus this precise claim. If we wanted – against 
 
142 Contrast with disease, a disequilibrial state. See Gal. PHP V.2.31-32 (quoted at III.2.2 above) for the 
Zenonian analysis of disease. 
143 esp. CC 2.4. 
144 Hankinson (1987b) p.84. 
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the grain of the text – to align Athenaeus’ definition more closely with the definition 
at CC 1, we would have to posit that πνεῦμα is the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of the human 
body as a whole and that its alteration, stimulated by αἴτια 
προκαταρκτικά/προηγούμενα,145 is identified as being cotemporal with disease – 
πνεῦμα is the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of the healthy body; altered πνεῦμα is the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν of the unhealthy (i.e. differently sustained) body. But Galen’s definition 
at CC 1 seems resistant to this interpretation. He writes that it is the function of 
πνεῦμα (spiritum) to sustain animal bodies but specifies ‘those parts of the animal 
body that are called the primary and homogeneous parts…nerves, arteries, veins’ 
etc. The body itself is held together by cartilages, ligaments and tendons 
(themselves caused by πνεῦμα, but by πνεῦμα causing them) which adopt the 
designation of αἴτια συνεκτικά only by analogy with the πνεῦμα which sustains 
the homogeneous parts – i.e. the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν proper.146 πνεῦμα penetrates 
the body through-and-through but it is not, according to the definition at CC 1, the 
αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of the compound. One could argue instead that πνεῦμα is the 
αἴτιον συνεκτικόν (by the Stoic definition in CC 1) of disease in each individual 
homogeneous part of the body in which it is present – i.e. πνεῦμα as the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν of homogeneous parts in particular states – but this would be to 
anatomise disease in the way that one anatomises an animal; when we speak of 
disease we speak of the whole, of a dynamic pattern of alteration traversing the 
body independently of the boundaries delineated by the homogeneous parts. For 
all the similarities between the Stoic and the Pneumatist conceptions of αἴτια 
συνεκτικά in CC 1-2 – both are conditions of πνεῦμα, both are coextensive and 
cotemporal with their effects – the distinction between the medical and 
philosophical uses of the term would seem, if taken at face value, to have 
significant implications. As Hankinson writes, broadening the role of the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν beyond the preservation of homogeneous substances transforms it 
from a cause of merely ‘being’ to one of ‘becoming’.147 
 
145 For the distinction, see III.3-4 below. 
146 What CC 1 lacks, however, is an account of the role of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν in sustaining certain ‘states 
of being’ – i.e. homogeneous conditions of πνεῦμα that transcend the boundaries of homogeneous body 
parts. What, for example, is the causal relationship between being ensouled and being alive? The Stoic 
designation of the soul as the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of life can be inferred from Stob. I.138,14-139,4 (LS 55 A) 
but this does not, as I suggested at III.4.2.1 above, seem to challenge Hankinson’s argument (1987, p.84-
85) that, for the early Stoics, αἴτια συνεκτικά denoted causes of being. 
147 Hankinson (1987b) p.84-85. 
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     That αἴτια συνεκτικά did refer to causes of becoming in medical literature is 
not controversial. The definition is favoured by Galen, who supplies the bulk of 
our testimonia for the medical application of synectic causes. He argues in De 
plentitudine that it is absurd to posit causes for irreducible substances,148 and 
makes it clear at CC 7-8 that he uses the term αἴτιον συνεκτικόν to refer to causes 
of generation.149 The phenomena for which αἴτια συνεκτικά have causal efficacy 
in Galen’s analysis include processes – sequences of events – as well as the 
generation of entities.150 Though Galen necessarily uproots the term from its 
foundation in Stoic cosmology, expanding the definition beyond dispositions of 
πνεῦμα/a corporeal active principle, the Galenic application of ‘αἴτιον συνεκτικόν’ 
is consistent with the Athenaean use of the term at CC 2 in its function as a ‘cause 
of becoming’.  
     Defining what a ‘cause of becoming’ entails in the context of a cause that is 
cotemporal with its effect requires us to broaden our inquiry. Unfortunately, the 
definition of αἴτια συνεκτικά given in Def. Med. – one of the earliest texts to 
reference the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν in a medical context – is unhelpful. Hankinson 
quotes Def. Med. 157 (= XIX 393 K) as defining the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν as a cause 
which ‘when present the effect is present, when absent the effect is absent and 
when increased the effect is increased’,151 citing this as evidence that the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν, in its medical application, is covariant with its effect – ‘they must be 
strongly functionally corelated with them, such that cause and effect exhibit 
concomitant variations in intensity.’152 But this is part of the definition of the αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον at Def. Med. 156; the definition of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν at Def. 
Med. 157 does not include the quality of covariance.153 However, given the 
questionable suitability of this definition in its application to the αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον (III.4.4) and its proximity to that of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν in the text, 
 
148 Gal. Plen. VII.524-8 K. Galen argues that the persistence of such substances is explained by their 
irreducibility; additional explanations are superfluous. He also argues that the apparent volatility of fire 
and air precludes their proposed function as instruments of cohesion and that the argument posed by the 
Stoics either results in an infinite regress of bodies whereby a cause must be caused by a cause which 
must be caused by a cause ad infinitum, or arrives at a position where a non-existent is responsible for 
the conservation of an existent. See Hankinson (1987b) p.82 
149 See also Adv Jul. XVIIIA.280 K. (= CMG V 10 3, 58.1-4); Syn. Puls. 9.458, 8-14 (LS 55 H) quoted at III.4.2.1 
above. 
150 CC 8. Hankinson (1980) p.83. 
151 Hankinson (1987b) p.85.  
152 Ibid. 
153 Hankinson (1999) cites this passage again at p.486, n.17 without qualification. 
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it is likely that it is misattributed;154 the definition is better suited as an alternative 
definition for the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν and thus the content of Hankinson’s argument 
– insofar as he is arguing that the medical application of ‘αἴτιον συνεκτικόν’ 
included the quality of covariance – remains unscathed. That we might have two 
distinct definitions for the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν in Def. Med., one including the quality 
of covariance and the other without, is itself intriguing. 155 It is tempting to identify 
a parallel between the two definitions of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν arising from the 
confusion in Def. Med. and the ‘strict’ and ‘loose’ interpretations of sustaining 
causes in Syn. Puls. 9.458, 8-14, with the quality of covariance applicable only to 
the latter. If a genuine bifurcation is reflected here, it might free us of the over-
reliance on Galen’s account that has frustrated this analysis thus far.156 But the 
information in Def. Med. XIX 392-393 K. is too confused to engender anything 
more than speculation. The problem with CC and Syn. Puls. as sources for early 
Stoic aetiology are addressed in the next section (III.4.2.3). 
     For all the confusion in Def. Med. XIX 392-393 K., examples of the medical 
application of the term that include the quality of covariance – the defining 
characteristic of a cotemporal cause of ‘becoming’ – are scattered throughout the 
Galenic corpus; heat is the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of appetite-loss in Caus. Symp. 
VII.132; αἴτια συνεκτικά are assigned to different types of pulse variation in Caus. 
Puls. I.IX.1-54. This, on Hankinson’s reading, is a quality that the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν acquires through its medical application. Certainly, the uncoupling of 
this term from its Stoic heritage permits its more liberal application; Galen’s αἴτια 
συνεκτικά are not conditions of πνεῦμα. But Hankinson’s argument is that the 
αἴτιον συνεκτικόν evolved, through Athenaeus, on contact with medicine’s 
purposes; Athenaeus’ Stoic education equipped him with the terminology, his 
 
154 cf. S. E. PH III.15. I examine this source at III.4.2.3. 
155 It is interesting to note that, despite Athenaeus’ theories lurking in the background in the taxonomy of 
causes at Def. Med. XIX 392-393 K. – his name appears at Def. Med. 155 (= XIX 392-3 K.) in the context of 
antecedent causes; the three-fold taxonomy of causes introduced at 154 mirrors that of Athenaeus at Gal. 
CC 2 – the examples of αἴτια συνεκτικά given at Def. Med. 157 would not qualify as such in Athenaeus’ 
taxonomy of causes in CC 2 in which the αἴτια συνεκτικά are specified as alterations in the body’s πνεῦμα. 
In fact, a case could be made for the examples given at Def. Med. 157 being more accurately aligned with 
the αἴτιον προηγούμενον in Athenaeus’ causal analysis; they are deleterious internal conditions that 
surely trigger the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν/pneumatic imbalance. Perhaps a contributing factor to the confusion 
at Def. Med. XIX 392-393 K. is the attempted inclusion of both a Pneumatist definition of the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν (misplaced in Def. Med. 156?) and an application of the term that had lost its Stoicising 
connotations, examples for which were preserved at Def. Med. 157. Galen’s examples, as we shall see, 
retain the quality of covariance without referring to conditions of πνεῦμα. 
156 Def. Med., recall, predates Galen by roughly a century. See Kollesch (1973) p.33. 
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Stoicising element theory (III.2) ensured that his application of αἴτιον συνεκτικόν 
retained most of its original associations. But, we may infer from CC 1-2, the 
peculiar requirements of his discipline necessitated the evolution of the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν from exclusively a cause of being to one of becoming. This 
modification permitted later doctors to depart more radically from the original 
Stoic usage. 
III.4.2.3 Athenaeus, Stoicism, and the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν 
If Hankinson’s reading of CC 1-2 is correct, then this would represent a different 
kind of interaction between medical and philosophical spheres to that to which 
we became accustomed in III.2. However, his interpretation relies entirely on a 
face-value reading of Galen’s testimonia. Among Galen’s disagreements with 
Stoic physics is his contention that it is ‘absurd’ to posit causes for irreducible 
substances – i.e. causes of being.157 The αἴτιον συνεκτικόν is the product of a 
physical system in which activity is all-present; irreducible substances owe their 
existence to a persistent, primitive agency.158 Galen, following Athenaeus, 
recognises the medical utility of positing a cotemporal cause. But is he not 
incentivised to uncouple the term from its original Stoic application? The Stoics 
originate the concept, Athenaeus transposes it into medicine – quite plausibly 
with a (perhaps even exclusionary) focus on its application as a cause of 
becoming, given the peculiar demands of his discipline –, Galen adopts the 
concept from Athenaeus and his successors but must find a means of rescuing 
the concept from a physical system to which he is opposed.159 Thus, he reminds 
his readers that his use of the concept differs from the original Stoic application 
by (over)emphasising the Stoic definition of αἴτιον συνεκτικόν as a cause of being. 
     As we have seen, Galen’s account of the Stoic application of the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν in CC 1 allows for the metaphorical application of the term to complex 
structures. The examples hinted at in this passage are not ‘processes’ in the 
traditional sense – they are organic bodies bound together by ‘cartilages, 
ligaments and tendons’ or man-made ‘externals’ held together by binding agents 
such as gypsum and lime – but this inclusion indicates an early Stoic awareness 
 
157 Gal. Plen. VII.524-8 K. 
158 See I.3.4, 7-8. From Seneca Ep. 65.2 (LS 55 E) ‘…a thing must be made from something, and by 
something. The latter is cause, the former is matter.’ 
159 As is abundantly evident in his treatment of Athenaeus’ element theory in Hipp. Elem. 6. See III.2.1.2. 
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that the concept had utility beyond explaining the cohesion of homogeneous 
bodies. It may also indicate some rhetorical manoeuvring on Galen’s part; is he 
obscuring the Stoic use of αἴτιον συνεκτικόν as a cause of becoming by 
consigning it to the realm of analogy? I think this is the case. If πνεῦμα is the 
αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of the human per se, then it follows that the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν is 
covariant with the various processes that occur within the aggregate, disease 
being only one of them. It occurs to me that, although individual psychic 
dispositions (such as those listed in Stob.1.138,14-139,4) are sustained by their 
synectic causes and that their aggregate, the individual human personality, is at 
any moment caused to be; the Stoic doctrine of peculiar qualification (I.5.5) poses 
a particular problem to Hankinson’s reading of CC 1-2. Whatever individuates the 
human is both suffused throughout the aggregate and covariant with 
transformations to his/her body (I.5.5).160 How does Stoic causal theory account 
for peculiar qualification if not through reference to the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν as a 
cause of becoming? And what of Stoic cosmogony? How does Stoic causal 
theory account for the transformation of fire into water at the birth of a new cosmic 
cycle without proposing that divine agency, the active principal, is the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν of change?161 It is for Zeno’s designing fire to cause growth and 
preservation.162 It is difficult to accept that the early Stoics were blind to this 
application of the concept before its transposition into medicine, or to determine 
what they gain by excluding it. 
     We must also consider the testimonium of Sextus Empiricus as PH III.15. 
Sextus writes of containing causes that they qualify as such to ‘the majority’ of 
Stoics if ‘when they are present the effect is present, when they are removed the 
effect is removed, and when they are decreased the effect is decreased (thus 
[the Stoics] say that the application of the noose is the [containing] cause of the 
strangling).’163 On Hankinson’s reading, this time presented in his chapter 
‘Explanation and Causation’ in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic 
Philosophy,164 this is evidence for the Stoic application of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν 
 
160 See esp. Simp. In Ar. De. an. 217,36-201,2 (LS 28 I). 
161 D. L. VII.135-6, 142. 
162 Stob. I.213, 15-21 (LS 46 D). 
163 Translation taken from Hankinson (1999) p.484-485. Note that this definition is more or less identical 
to that of the αἴτιον προηγούμενον in Def. Med. XIX 392-393 K., further suggesting that the definition at 
Def. Med. 156 should correctly be applied to the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν. 
164 S. E. PH III.15 is also cited in Hankinson (1987b) p.85, n.19 as evidence for the original Stoic doctrine of 
synectic causes having undergone a ‘crucial shift’. 
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having assumed the quality of covariance by the time Sextus Empiricus wrote the 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism.165 The example given at PH III.15 is consistent with the 
application of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν in Galen, which is a de-Pneumatised variation 
of the term attributed to Athenaeus at CC 2.166 That Sextus refers to the ‘majority’ 
of Stoics leaves open the possibility that some Stoic purists (to take Gal. CC 1/ 
Syn. Puls. 9.458, 8-14 seriously) remained, but that most concurred, following the 
medicalisation of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν, that the concept was more fertile than 
originally proposed. If PH III.15 is evidence of an expansion of the term in later 
Stoicism – with Gal. CC 1 a reference to Athenaeus’ Stoic predecessors –, then 
this would be an example of Athenaeus contributing to theory from a vantage 
point of a specialised, practical science, thus behaving in the manner of the 
Aristotle’s boundary-challenging physicians, those ‘who have subtle and inquiring 
minds’ (III.3.2).167 But this interpretation requires us to take Gal. CC 1 at face 
value where, as I argued above, we have ample reason not to do so. S. E. PH 
III.15, though it allows for some disagreement within the Stoic school, gives no 
independent indication that the theory of αἴτια συνεκτικά had developed to include 
the quality of covariance. It is, moreover, easier to reconcile with Stoic 
cosmogony and the doctrine of peculiar qualification than Galen’s account in CC. 
    Athenaeus’ application of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν seems to have been consistent 
with the Stoic (i.e. Chrysippean) usage of the term, albeit narrowly applied within 
the aetiology of health and disease. If the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν referred principally 
(or even exclusively) to causes of becoming in Athenaeus’ taxonomy of causes 
(as it did for Galen) then this, like Athenaeus’ prima facie eccentric element 
theory, can be accounted for by the strictures of his τέλος. It is not in the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν, then, that we see evidence of Athenaeus developing Stoic aetiology 
further through his medical exposition. But this is merely the first component of 




165 Hankinson (1999) p.484-486. 
166 An analogy can easily be drawn between the noose as αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of strangling and πνεῦμα as 
the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of disease. That this example is attributed to the Stoics suggest that this is partly 
(though, not exclusively) the function is served – albeit applied more broadly to all pneumatic processes, 
not merely to those covariant with disease.  
167 Arist. Resp. 480b22-31.  
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III.4.3 αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν 
Curiously, the non-medical application of the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν is harder to 
pin down than the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν. The Stoic analysis of causation recorded in 
Stobaeus attributes to Zeno the position that ‘it is impossible that the cause be 
present yet that of which it is the cause not belong.’168 This would appear to 
overlook possibility of an independently existent, antecedent cause. But Stoic 
aetiology cannot have been limited to αἴτια συνεκτικά. That cause may precede 
effect is not only self-evident, but essential to the behaviour of the Stoic 
cosmos/God.169 Certainly by Chrysippus’ premiership a causal theory had been 
developed which centred on the interplay between (in the broadest terms) binary 
conceptions of causality: those which precede and those which are cotemporal 
with their effects.170  
     This is best illustrated by the comparison Chrysippus draws between the 
mechanism of human activity and that of a rolling drum. This analogy is recorded 
in Cicero’s De Fato (Fat.), where the Chrysippean model is invoked as an 
example of an aetiology that escapes the strictures of necessity yet retains the 
notion of fate.171 The external push which stimulates the motion is analogised to 
the sense impressions which stimulate a response in the human; the shape of 
the drum, and therefore its capacity to roll, is analogized to the innate human 
capacity to act upon those impressions. Chrysippus, quoted in Fat.: 
…as a person who has pushed a roller forward has given it a beginning of 
motion, but has not given it the capacity to roll, so a sense-presentation 
when it impinges will, it is true, impress and as it were seal its appearance 
on the mind, but the act of assent will be in our power, and as we said in the 
case of the roller, though given a push from without, as to the rest will move 
by its own force of nature.172 
The ‘push’ is an external event; the ‘capacity to roll’ is a persisting condition. 
Though the terminology is absent from Fat. 41-43, the push (if we extrapolate 
 
168 Stob. I.138, 14-139, 4 (LS 55 A).  
169 From Alex. Fat. 191,30-192,30 (LS 55 N): [The Stoics] say that since the world is a unity which includes 
all existing things in itself and is governed by a living, rational, intelligent nature, the government of 
existing things which it possesses is an everlasting one proceeding in a sequence and ordering. The things 
which happen first become causes to those which happen after them.’ My italics. 
170 Hankinson (1999) p.487. 
171 Cic. Fat. 41-43. 
172 Ibid. 43 trans. Rackham (1942). 
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from CC 2) qualifies as the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν on account of its antecedence 
and externality to its cause. The shape of the drum is the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν while 
the drum is rolling and is therefore an effect of the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν.173 This 
relationship is most succinctly captured in Clement’s Stromata VIII.8.33:174 
When preliminary causes [αἴτια προκαταρκτικά] are removed, the effect 
remains, whereas a containing cause [αἴτιον συνεκτικόν] is one during 
whose presence the effect remain and on whose removal the effect is 
removed. The containing cause is called synonymously the complete cause 
since it is self-sufficiently productive of the effect.175 
Galen writes at CC 2 that the Pneumatists call ‘everything external to the body 
which harms it and produces disease in it’ the antecedent cause. It is the initial, 
external event that sets in motion a sequence of events that concludes in the 
αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of disease. Athenaeus’ analysis of causes upholds the basic 
Stoic model of cause-as-preceding and cause-as-sustaining interacting to 
produce an effect. But Athenaeus’ theory includes a further component which 
should, in turn, assist us in determining precisely what the αἴτιον 
προκαταρκτικόν entails.176 Onwards, then, to the αἴτιον προηγούμενον. 
III.4.4 αἴτιον προηγούμενον 
The αἴτιον προηγούμενον, I propose, introduces a new mode of ‘concept 
acquisition’ in the context of specialisation within a pre-existing cosmology, that 
of invention within an externally originating rule-system. This subsection is 
divided into two parts. The first deals with the possible philosophical application 
of the αἴτιον προηγούμενον derived, in large part, from scholarship concerning a 
 
173 Note that this model of the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν seems consistent with that attributed to the Stoics by 
Galen at CC 1, it being an analogy employed to illustrate a stable condition of πνεῦμα cotemporal with a 
mode of behaviour. Analogizing the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of disease to the rolling of a drum – though it may 
have some explanatory utility – is precluded by the fact that disease is, by definition, an unstable, 
heterogeneous condition. See III.4.2.1. 
174 Havrda (2011) for Galen as the probable source of Clem. Strom. VIII. Havrda lists the correspondences 
between Strom. VIII and the extant writings of Galen – particularly passages in Galen which refer to his 
lost treatise On Demonstrations – and proposes that Clem. Strom. VIII.3.1-15.1 (including the following 
passage) drew from a lost writing of Galen about the doctrine of demonstration, possibly On 
Demonstration itself. 
175 Clem. Strom. VIII.9.33 (LS 55 I). 
176 As we shall see at III.4.4.2, the suggestion that the αἴτιον προηγούμενον in Athenaeus’ taxonomy of 
causes is something caused by an event external to the body yet ostensibly manifesting independently of 
the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν (in some cases) should cause us to seek a narrower definition of the αἴτιον 
προκαταρκτικόν than merely a preceding, external cause.  
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particular passage from Cicero’s De Fato; the second with Athenaeus’ application 
of the term in CC 2. 
III.4.4.1 The speculative orbit of Cic. Fat. 41-44 
Where the distinction between the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν and the αἴτιον 
προκαταρκτικόν can be attributed to the Stoics, the Stoic application of the αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον has proven near-impossible to illuminate. Indeed, a non-medical 
provenance of term remains elusive. Questions arise as to how a prior and 
internal cause might be more generically conceived; is there a place for this 
concept outside the aetiology of disease? Before we proceed we should note that 
it is only in recent decades that preceding causes started to receive scholarly 
attention on a par with their less intractable cousins.177 Attempts to identify a Stoic 
origin for the αἴτιον προηγούμενον are motivated, in part, by the centrality of 
external-internal causal interplay to Stoic causal theory, but more decisively by 
the association Galen reports between Athenaeus and Stoics in CC 2 (III.4.4.2)). 
A third link to the mother-doctrine is assumed on account of Stoicism’s influence 
on the former categories of Athenaeus’ causal taxonomy. Much of what follows 
is speculative, but a necessary prerequisite to understanding Athenaeus’ 
aetiology of disease in its appropriate historical and contemporary scholarly 
context.  
     The distinction between αἴτια προκαταρκτικά and αἴτια προηγούμενα – that 
between an external and internal prior cause – is well attested elsewhere in 
ancient literature but none of our sources are authentically Stoic.178 The term 
αἴτιον προηγούμενον is not found in any Stoic sources nor does it appear in any 
contemporary or near-contemporary critique of Stoic causal theory (at least not 
as a technical term whose function is clearly defined).179 Is this distinction born of 
medical theorising? What is the evidence to the contrary? 
     The closest any Stoic source comes to illuminating a distinction between αἴτια 
προκαταρκτικά and αἴτια προηγούμενα is the following quotation from 
Chrysippus, preserved in Cicero’s De Fato: 
 
177 Frede (1980) and Hankinson (1987b) marking the shift. 
178 Hankinson (1999) p.489. The ‘ancient literature’ in question is primarily the corpus of Galen, as will 
soon become clear. 
179 Hankinson (1987b) p.88. 
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‘Some causes’ [Chrysippus] says, are perfect (perfectae) and principal 
(principalis), others are auxiliary (adiuvantes) and proximate (proximae). 
Hence when we say that everything takes place by fate from antecedent 
causes, we should not be taken to mean by perfect and principal causes, 
but by auxiliary and proximate causes.’ Accordingly, he counters the 
argument which I have just set out as follows: ‘if all things come about by 
fate it does follow that all things come about from prior (antepositae) causes, 
but not from principal and perfect but from auxiliary and proximate 
causes.180 
The purpose of Chrysippus’ argument as recorded in Cic. Fat. 41 is to distinguish 
what are here referred to as ‘prior’ (antepositae) causes from ‘perfect and 
principal’ causes – which we must assume at least include the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν 
– in a broader discussion about the nature of fate in Stoic causal theory.181 
Reconciling Cicero’s terms in Fat. 41 with the taxonomy of causes at CC 2 is 
troubled by the inconsistency Cicero demonstrates in applying these terms 
elsewhere in his reproduction of Chrysippus’ thought.182 But it is the pairing of 
‘perfect’ and ‘principal’ in Fat. 41 which is most intriguing for our purposes. Both 
are distinguished from antecedent causes – conceived in Fat. 43 (III.4.3) as the 
initial external ‘push’183 – and, as Frede suggests in his 1980 article, ‘The original 
notion of cause’, the importance of the internal-external distinction to Chrysippus’ 
causal scheme does incline one to regard the distinction between 
perfect/principal and auxiliary/proximate causes in Fat. 41 as that between 
internal and externa stimuli, for all that the distinction is never explicitly made.184 
If we proceed from the assumption that perfect and principal causes are not 
synonymous in Chrysippus’ causal analysis, then Chrysippus posited two types 
of cause that are internal to their effects: the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν must be one – the 
‘perfect’ cause as it is synonymized elsewhere185 – with the αἴτιον προηγούμενον 
being a plausible candidate for the other: the ‘principal’ cause.186  
 
180 Cic. Fat. 41 trans. Rackham (1942). 
181 Hankinson (1999) p.488. 
182 ‘Proximate’ (proximis, the final word in the quotation) demonstrably applies to a ‘prior’ (antepositae) 
cause in Cic. Fat. 41 but is identified with containing causes at ibid. 44. See Hankinson (1999) p.488. 
183 Which most plausibly corresponds to proximate causes in Cic. Fat. 41. See Frede (1980) p.241. 
184 Frede (1980) p.242. 
185 e.g. Clem. Strom. VIII.8.33 
186 Hankinson (1999) p.489. 
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     If we take perfecta and principalis to denote different species of cause in Cic. 
Fat. 41 and the latter as the αἴτιον προηγούμενον – as yet unfettered by medical 
connotations – the question remains as to what function the αἴτιον προηγούμενον 
is supposed to serve in Chrysippus’ causal theory. Frede refers to the ‘trichotomy’ 
of perception, disposition and human action in his assessment of Cic. Fat. 41-44, 
though he is careful to point out that the distinction between internal and external 
antecedents does not arise in the passages in question; for Frede, this is a matter 
of speculation born of the importance of the internal-external dichotomy to 
Chrysippus’ causal scheme, a model which emphasises how necessity is not, as 
it were, ‘the entire story’ in matters of human activity.187 Despite its lack of 
confirmation in the text, Frede’s analysis does direct attention to what seems to 
be a missing piece in Chrysippus’ rolling drum analogy in Fat. 43. Perception is 
the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν, likened to the initial push of the drum. Action is 
cotemporal with the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν, the human’s natural capacity to act as 
rolling is cotemporal with ‘rollability’. Yet the drum was endowed with the potential 
to roll before it received the initial push as the human is disposed to act in certain 
ways before he/she is induce to do so by the impinging sense-impression.188 
Thus, there is a distinction between disposition and actualisation. Acknowledging 
that disposition is both internal and a prior cause of action, Hankinson notes that 
‘it is tempting to conclude that…Chrysippus used αἴτιον προηγούμενον to refer to 
the persistent dispositional conditions of an agent in virtue of which a particular 
external occasion would have a particular result.’189 αἴτια προηγούμενα, on this 
interpretation, are dispositional properties in the Stoic analysis of causation. But 
how far can this interpretation be accepted? 
     Analysing Cic. Fat. 41-44 in conjunction with later evidence complicates the 
picture further and exposes the flaw in analogising the mechanism of human 
activity to the effects of external forces on inert objects. Returning to Clem. Strom. 
VIII,190 we find a demonstrably Stoic account of causality: 
Of causes some are antecedent, some containing, some auxiliary, some 
prerequisite. Antecedents are those causes which primarily provide the 
impulse towards the coming to be something, as beauty to for those 
 
187 Frede (1980) p.242. 
188 Hankinson (1999) p.491-492. 
189 Ibid. p.491. 
190 Trans. taken from Hankinson (1999) p.492.  
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intemperate in love; for when it is seen by them it conditions the erotic 
disposition, but not however in such a way as to necessitate it.191 
Impression plus predisposition does not necessitate action; the agent must 
assent to the impulse resulting from their combination. On this account, the αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον could be read as the pre-existing ‘erotic disposition’ in a state of 
actualisation following the sensory stimulation, the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν. It 
precedes its effect and is internal to that of which it is a cause. It does not trigger 
the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν until there is some additional input (‘assent’ in this case) but 
it is distinguished from a mere dispositional state by its having become active in 
the wake of the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν.192 This intermediary stage between αἴτιον 
προκαταρκτικόν and αἴτιον συνεκτικόν, in which something is caused which is 
(potentially) the cause of something else, is absent from Cic. Fat. 41-44. Rolling 
drums, it transpires, are less complex than people; the human’s receptivity to 
external causes is apparently not sufficient to stimulate predictable action. It is 
worth considering, given our governing interest in the effects of specialisation on 
existent ideas, how this (we should stress, merely hypothesised) conception of 
the αἴτιον προηγούμενον moves us away from a generically applicable 
classification of cause to one which is ostensibly only applicable in discussions 
of human psychology and will. It is difficult to conceive of an appropriate analogy 
for ‘assent’ outside the domain of rational behaviour. We should not be surprised 
that Chrysippus’ drum analogy is found wanting. It is perhaps a truism of causal 
analysis that the vocabulary of necessary concepts multiplies in conjunction with 
the behavioural complexity of the entities considered, and that specialisation 
exposes the deficiencies of universals. The question remains as to whether the 
asymmetry in Cic. Fat. 43 (exposed by comparison with Clem. Strom VIII.9.25) is 
the result of a poorly chosen analogy on Chrysippus’ part, whether recourse to 
analogy was itself an inadequate explanatory tactic or whether the report in 
Clement is of a later, more developed Stoic position.193  
     We must also recall that the basis for our speculation in this subchapter so far 
is an ambiguously worded passage in Cicero compounded by a small and 
 
191 Clem Strom. VIII.9.25 trans. taken from Hankinson (1999) p.292. 
192 Hankinson (1999) p.492. 




somewhat hesitant scholarly tradition.194 The Stoic αἴτιον προηγούμενον, if such 
a thing existed, is haltingly assembled and, as I established at the beginning of 
this subsection, our impulse to identify an analogue for this species of cause in 
Stoic theory is rooted entirely in CC 2 and the unambiguous Stoic heritage of the 
synectic and procatarctic causes illuminated therein. Pondering the potential 
Stoic provenance of the αἴτιον προηγούμενον without recourse to medical 
material is a frustrating by not entirely fruitless affair; it is worth establishing what 
this more obscure category of cause might constitute in a philosophical context 
in order to determine if there is any way in which the category as it appears in CC 
2 can be read as a development or an appropriation of an existent article of causal 
analysis. 
III.4.4.2 The αἴτιον προηγούμενον in Gal. CC 2 
Beyond Cic. Fat. 41-44, our best piece of evidence for a pre-existing Stoic 
application of the αἴτιον προηγούμενον is CC 2 itself,195 but the explicitly medical 
nature of the term as applied in CC 2 should surely caution us against the 
assumption of a Stoic provenance. Note that it is only Athenaeus’ application of 
the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν that Galen explicitly associates with the physician’s Stoic 
education.196 
     Where the philosophical application of the αἴτιον προηγούμενον remains 
indeterminate, the role it played in Athenaeus’ taxonomy of causes is (at least, 
broadly) easier to define. Galen writes in CC 2 that the Pneumatists call 
‘everything external to the body which harms it and produces disease in it’ the 
αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν, and that ‘if what is produced in the body belongs to the 
class of what causes disease, then, while it has not actually brought the disease 
about, it is called the αἴτιον προηγούμενον.’197 Simply put, the αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον is an event that takes place inside the body which stimulates the 
αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of disease. It precedes and is proximate to the deleterious 
internal condition of πνεῦμα. But its relationship with the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν 
is more difficult to define. Frede proposes that ‘the αἴτιον προηγούμενον is the 
internal disposition brought about by the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν which in turn 
 
194 I.e. Frede (1980) p.242 and Hankinson (1999) p.488-492. 
195 Hankinson (1999) p.490 quotes CC 2.1-4 in a chapter on explanation and causation in Stoic philosophy 
and begins his exposition of the αἴτιον προηγούμενον from this medical foundation. 
196 Gal. CC 2.1. 
197 Trans. Hankinson (1999) p.490. 
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activates the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν’.198 Galen’s description of the αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον as something that is ‘produced in the body’ immediately after the 
function of the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν is explained lends some credence to this 
interpretation. Hankinson, in support of Frede’s thesis, cites Galen’s Caus. Puls. 
IX.2-3 as a clear example of the αἴτιον προηγούμενον functioning as an effect of 
the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν in medical literature; Galen sets out the causal 
sequence linking an initial chill to the onset of fever and describes as ‘preceding 
causes’ each transformation taking place within the body that was caused by the 
external chill, terminating in the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of the resultant fever.199 But we 
run the risk of reproducing a ‘Galenised’ account of Athenaeus’ aetiology in our 
recourse to Galenic texts that do not discuss Athenaeus directly. The examples 
given in CC 2 itself – the αἴτιον προηγούμενον as the activity of drugs or poisons 
within the body – can be reconciled with Frede’s interpretation if we allow for the 
administration of drugs/poisons to be categorized as αἴτια προκαταρκτικά. To 
take the snakebite example, the initial bite is antecedent to its effect – i.e. 
envenomation, the αἴτιον προηγούμενον – external to the body, and causes 
harm.200 However, the examples of antecedent causes at CC 2.4 suggests that 
Athenaeus had a more restrictive definition of what constituted an αἴτιον 
προκαταρκτικόν, properly so called: ‘For example, when a man is affected by the 
heat of the sun, this produces a change in his natural spirit (πνεῦμα) which 
becomes hotter than it was before, and when he is affected by cold this spirit 
turns to cold.’201 Galen writes at CC 2.5 that what the Pneumatists ‘call prior (i.e. 
antecedent) causes are the humours produced in our bodies when these are too 
hot, cold, moist or dry’, suggesting that αἴτια προκαταρκτικά are initial 
environmental conditions, defined by an excess/deficiency in a particular 
elemental quality, that stimulate the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν. Envenomation, on this 
reading, is not an effect of an αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν per se, but an αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον that is distinguished from the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν by its origin 
within the human body; αἴτια προηγούμενα are internal conditions ‘whose nature 
is opposed to that of the body.’ The Frede/Hankinson reading would seem to 
neglect the latter part of CC 2, but it is not clear that the Galenic use of αἴτια 
 
198 Frede (1980) p.242. 
199 Gal. Caus. Puls. IX.2-3 K. cf. Praes. Puls. IX.386 K. See Hankinson (1999) p.490-491. 
200 cf. Gal. CC 2.2-3. 
201 Gal. CC 2.4. trans. Lyons (1969). 
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προηγούμενα as bridges between the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν and the αἴτιον 
συνεκτικόν was absent from Athenaeus’ causal analysis. Galen’s claim at CC 2.3 
that ‘if what is produced in the body [by the αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν] belongs to the 
class of what causes diseases’ without directly giving rise to the disease itself 
(i.e. the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν) then it belongs to the category of preceding cause 
suggests that the term was occasionally employed in the manner that Frede 
suggests, but not that the αἴτιον προηγούμενον is necessarily an effect of the 
αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν. Moreover, this conditional at CC 2.3 (along with the 
examples at CC 2.4) indicates that the αἴτια προκαταρκτικά do not require a 
‘bridging cause’ to trigger the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν. 
     What should be uncontroversial, however, is that the αἴτιον προηγούμενον in 
CC 2 is designed to account for physiological realities.202 It is a species of cause 
which might conceivably be overlooked in one’s construction of a causal 
taxonomy intended for general application but which would, of necessity, be 
accounted for in an analysis which began from the events taking place within the 
human form. Recalling the argument that αἴτια προηγούμενα in a philosophical 
context are αἴτια συνεκτικά in potentiality, note that the account of αἴτια 
προηγούμενα in CC 2 consigns the cause to something ‘produced in the body.’ 
This precludes the designation of αἴτια προηγούμενα to causes which ‘lie in wait’ 
for an appropriate trigger; a body disposed to responding predictably to 
antecedent causes is not synonymous with that response in a state of 
actualisation.203 Examples of αἴτια προηγούμενα in the medical literature all refer 
to actualized events. In the example of Gal. MM X.65-67 K., the preceding cause 
of inflammation is given as an excess of blood in the veins following the excessive 
intake of food; it is not the capacity of one’s veins to contain more blood than is 
optimal that is identified with the αἴτιον προηγούμενον. The precedent hinted at 
in Clem. Strom. VIII.9.5 comes closer to anticipating Athenaeus’ use of the term 
 
202 Of course, as we shall see at III.5 below, Stoic psychology is amenable to analogy with physiology in 
the context of pathology. This analogy, as amply hinted, is based on the ‘correlative affinity’ of the physical 
processes underpinning both psychological and psychology pathology at the level of the body’s elements 
(see e.g. Gal. PHP V.2.31-33). It seems to me that Athenaeus’ taxonomy of causes could be employed in a 
psychological context; hypothetically, the αἴτιον προηγούμενον of a diseased soul could be the initial 
imbalance of elements that throws the soul (πνεῦμα) into disarray in exactly the same way as Athenaeus 
conceives of physiological disease. However, it is clear that Athenaeus only had bodily disease in mind 
(see esp. III.5.3.2). Moreover, none of our fragments from Chrysippus’ On Affections (the subject of III.5) 
refer to αἴτια προηγούμενα. It is only in the context of CC 2 that one is moved to identify this parallel.  
203 Hankinson (1999) p.492. 
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inasmuch as it presents us with a causal scheme that includes an internal 
disposition in a state of actualisation (in this case functioning as an intermediary 
between αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν and αἴτιον συνεκτικόν), but this similarity is 
insufficient to postulate a Stoic origin for the term as applied in CC 2. Clement 
never refers directly to the αἴτιον προηγούμενον in his wide-ranging account of 
causal theory in Strom. VIII, and the passage in which the intermediary category 
of ‘disposition-in-state-of-actualisation’ is referred to is specifically included to 
illuminate the role of assent in human action; the context, as noted above, is 
exclusively psychological. No further input is required to transform the αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον into the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν in Athenaeus’ causal analysis. The 
αἴτιον προηγούμενον is itself the trigger of pneumatic disarray.  
     The αἴτιον προηγούμενον, therefore, as a distinct article of causal analysis 
with an independent technical application, appears to have originated in the 
medical sphere, a specialised context which, in the case of the Pneumatists, was 
in turn rooted in a pre-existing Stoic cosmology. That the distinction between 
αἴτιον προκαταρκτικόν and αἴτιον προηγούμενον was formalized by Athenaeus 
of Attalia is not a claim that can be substantively contested. We find no earlier 
medical authority to whom the αἴτιον προηγούμενον is attributed.204 I have 
already noted that an internal prior cause, stimulated by some manner of external 
event, is a species of cause with a distinctly biological application, but note also 
how its utility as an article of causal analysis depends on its relationship with the 
other two categories in Athenaeus’ taxonomy. The αἴτιον προηγούμενον is born 
of the conjunction of the pre-established interplay between αἴτια προκαταρκτικά 
and αἴτια συνεκτικά in Stoic causal analysis – a relationship that reconciled the 
conception of manifest entities being actively caused from within with the 
observable realities of prior cause and subsequent effect – and the manifest 
complexity of physiological processes. The invention of the αἴτιον προηγούμενον 
should not be read as a challenge to Stoic orthodoxy; it should be read as an 
attempt to reconcile a causal scheme which was designed with universal 
application in mind with the nuances of specialised analysis. It is significant that, 
despite the life that the αἴτιον προηγούμενον would continue to have within the 
 
204 I maintain that our earliest source for its application, ps.-Gal. Def. Med. 156 (= XIX 392-393 K), for all 
the problems with text (see supra III.4.2 esp. n.155), gestures, through the confusion, towards an 
Athenaean origin. His trichotomy of causes introduces the causal taxonomy in Def. Med. XIX 392-393 K. 
and he is mentioned by name at Def. Med. 155. 
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medical sphere,205 there is no evidence to suggest that the doctrine found its way 
out of the medical τέχνη and into the wider field of causal analysis. It seems 
plausible that the αἴτιον προηγούμενον was too esoteric to have explanatory 
value beyond the discipline for which it was designed. Nevertheless, the αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον fits so unobtrusively into Stoic causal analysis that the effect of its 
presence on the wider causal framework was apparently negligible, presenting 
no challenge to be accommodated or negated by the existing Stoic analysis of 
causality. It is a concept peculiar to medical analysis, albeit embedded in (and 
thus dependent upon) a more generically applicable causal framework. 
III.5 Patterns of pathology: medicine in Chrysippus’ On Affections 
We have mapped Pneumatist element (III.2) and causal (III.4) theory onto their 
equivalents in Stoicism and identified two mechanisms by which ideas are 
trimmed and adapted as they transcend disciplinary boundaries: 1) the 
enforcement of discipline-specific epistemological restrictions; 2) invention within 
a pre-existing cosmology, necessitated by discipline-specific demands. We have 
also considered the Aristotelian framework in which, I propose, these 
constraints/adjustments are most intelligible (III.3). Through its consequent 
alterations the transposition of Stoicism into medicine illuminates several features 
of the philosopher-doctor relationship in the Hellenistic period. But we should be 
careful not to lose sight of how much Stoic doctrine remains intact, particularly in 
contrast with Epicureanism’s more radical mutations (IV). The reason, I want to 
argue, lies in the unified structure of Athenaeus’ mother-doctrine, the physicality 
of its ethics, the moral structure of its physics. In this section, my goal is to 
elucidate the Stoic precedent for Pneumatist medical theory per se. I evaluate the 
extent to which Pneumatism was intellectual indebted to Stoicism and return to 
the question of whether Stoic philosophy was particularly suited to medical 
adaptation. As I argued in I – and here we collect a thread introduced in our 
opening chapter – it is in light of Stoicism’s physiological peculiarity and curative 
τέλος that the Pneumatist inclination towards self-identification in contrast to the 
philosophical precedent is most clearly defined.  
     To recapitulate, Stoic psychology, with its physicalist model of the body-soul 
interconnexion and focus on the interplay of body-soul analogues at every scale 
 
205 See e.g. Gal. Caus. Puls. IX.2-3 K. etc. 
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within its unified continuum, presents itself for adaptation into the medical sphere; 
the act of remedying deviations from salubrious equilibria is seamlessly 
analogous to a medical act. If one’s ethical ideal has a clear physical signature, 
then a template for what it is to be physically healthy can be extracted, with little 
alteration, from the structure of the mother-doctrine. Recall the influence of 
Hellenistic medical writers on the promotion of πνεῦμα to the status of active 
principle in Chrysippean cosmology (I.3.9). It should come as no surprise that 
Chrysippus himself, the school’s most influential theorist, had an interest in 
matters pertinent to medical inquiry, developing an analogy between philosopher 
and physician which had already been exploited by Zeno.206 Here we examine 
how and why Chrysippus makes use of this analogy and compare his analysis of 
pathology in his ethical treatise On Affections to that of Athenaeus of Attalia, 
seeking to establish the extent to which their models can be reconciled (insofar 
as they can reconstructed). Exploring the question of medical analogy from a 
philosophical perspective illuminates the philosopher’s conception of the medical 
profession which, in turn, provides a further dimension to the physician’s 
relationship with the discipline he defines himself against. I will argue here (and 
in IV) that the Stoic position on the medical profession is without the critical 
connotations I diagnosed in Epicurean philosophy (see esp. II.5.3). 
III.5.1 Introduction to On Affections  
Our sources for the role of medicine and medical imagery in Stoicism come 
primarily in the form of selected fragments from the fourth book of Chrysippus’ 
lost work On Affections (Περὶ παθῶν), a treatise on the emotions, 
transformations, affections or pathologies of the soul. It documents Stoicism’s 
‘monistic’ psychology wherein emotions are conceptualised as pathological 
disturbances of a wholly rational intellect.207 The popularity of the text in antiquity 
is evidenced by the relatively abundant selection of fragments which remain 
accessible to source criticism.208 Much of what has been preserved of the text is 
 
206 Tieleman (2003) p.146. See Gal. PHP V.2.31-33. 
207 Contrasted with the Platonic and Aristotelian models in which the soul possesses both rational and 
non-rational faculties. The debate revolves around the question of whether the affections in question 
involve one or more non-rational occurrences along the causal chain, or whether they are distorted, 
pathological states of a rational mind. The Stoics, who locate rationality in every portion of the cosmos, 
champion the latter case. See Tieleman (2003) p.20. 
208 Tieleman (2003) p.1-3. In terms of preservation, the privileged position of On Affections in the 
Chrysippean Corpus prompted Hans Von Armin to devote an entire section to the text at SVF 3.456-490 
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embedded in the fourth and fifth books of Galen’s On the Doctrines of 
Hippocrates an Plato (PHP) – notably a medical text – with supplementations 
from books three and four of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations and Origen’s Against 
Celsus. The fragments in PHP appear in the context of Galen’s polemic against 
the aforementioned ‘monistic’ psychology attributed to the Stoics.209 
     The majority of our fragments from On Affections are derived from the fourth 
and final book of the treatise, which is referred to most frequently in our sources 
by the separate title: the Therapeutics.210 According  to Galen, the fourth book 
was written with a degree of separation from the preceding three which 
concerned themselves with laying the theoretical foundations upon which the 
Therapeutics was based.211 The alternative title, Therapeutics and Ethics, given 
at PHP V.7.52, establishes the field of therapeutic application.212 The 
Therapeutics is a treatise about human behaviour and the internal dispositions 
that precipitate human action. In this text, Chrysippus proposes a course of 
treatment for the physical disposition that corresponds to pathological modes of 
behaviour. In its title, an analogy is made between the affections that disturb the 
soul and diseases which torment the body; both are nocuous disruptions of a 
salutary norm.213 In proposing to cleanse the soul of its pathologies Chrysippus 
 
as an exception to his otherwise principally thematic arrangement of the fragments. However, the 
‘relative’ nature of this abundance must be born in mind. Galen tells us at PHP V.6.75 that the original 
text of On Affections consisted of four books, each of which was apparently twice the length of a book of 
Galen’s PHP. Nothing of the third book has survived. Moreover, the manner in which Galen presents the 
fragments from On Affections in PHP largely precludes any attempt to faithfully reconstruct substantial 
sections of Chrysippus’ text. 
209 I devote this footnote to clearing up the confusion related to this ‘monistic’ appellation. The Stoic soul, 
as discussed in I.4, is in fact conceptually divisible into eight distinct parts, differentiated by function (Gal. 
PHP III.10-11). In physical terms, each function is an expression of a singular ἡγεμονικόν located in the 
heart; they are distinguishable neither by substance nor source but by ἕξις, a measurement of rational 
activity. The Stoic soul is deemed monistic because it, like the rest of the Stoic cosmos, is rational through-
and-through. Plato (Rep. IV), by contrast, distinguished between the rational, spirited and desiderative 
components of that soul and it is his psychology that Galen seeks to adapt into correspondence with his 
own psychophysiology in PHP (Tieleman (2003) p.21). Despite Stoicism’s opposition to Platonic 
psychology, Sedley (1993) p.313-314 notes that Stoicism’s monistic – i.e. wholly rational – psychology is 
anticipated in the early Platonic dialogues (e.g. the Protagoras, Phaedo, and to some extent even in the 
later Theaetetus) and could perhaps be fruitfully regarded as a development of Socratic psychology, 
‘according to which the soul is in itself a purely intellectual faculty’ (p.313). Recall also the influence of 
Platonism on the Stoic conception of the world-soul (I.4.2). 
210 Tieleman (2003) p.140; Gal. PHP V.7.52. The Therapeutics does, however, repeat a number of 
theoretical points established in the first two books (nothing of book three survives; neither Galen nor 
Cicero comment on its contents). The title Therapeutics is given in e.g. Gal. PHP IV.5.10, 13; 5.2.21, 30; 
Gal. loc. aff. 3.1, VIII (= SVF 3.457). The alternative title, Therapeutics and Ethics is given in Gal. PHP V.7.52.  
211 Gal. PHP V.7.52. Tieleman (2003) p.92, 140. 
212 Tieleman (2003) p.140. 
213 Inwood (1999) p.712. 
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analogises himself to a physician, his students to his patients and Stoic doctrine 
to a psychological panacea.214 
III.5.2 Medical Analogy  
As I set out in the introduction to this thesis (and as we saw in II.5) the idea of the 
philosopher as doctor of the soul flourished in the interscholastic ἀγών that 
characterised Hellenistic philosophy – the contest to perfect the art of living.215 In 
the case of Stoicism, from the coextensivity of God and matter and a physicalist 
psychology is born a model of the soul that cannot be treated in isolation from the 
body. The soul is corporeal and resolvable into the same constituent materials as 
any other body in the Stoic cosmos. Medical analogy is more than merely 
explanatory;216 the philosopher, like the physician, is concerned with matters of 
the body. His purpose, like that of the physician, is to guide his subject to a 
salutary state through the studied manipulation of its constituents. The medical 
vocabulary of On Affections was first given appropriate consideration by Teun 
Tieleman in his 2003 analysis and reconstruction of Chrysippus’ text.217 Tieleman 
argues that, rather than serving a formalistic, metaphorical purpose, medical 
analogy in On Affections ‘is based on physical realities to which the corporeal 
soul is no less subject than the body.’218 Stoicism’s corporeal psychology 
confuses the distinction between therapies of the body and therapies of the soul 
(see esp. III.5.3.2); the soul’s affections – its pathologies, its emotions219 – are 
corporeal events, so too its return to equilibrium, to health. Chrysippus justifies 
the analogy in a passage preserved at PHP V.2.22-24, which is worth considering 
in full: 
It is not true that whereas there is an art, called medicine, concerned with 
the diseased body, there is no art concerned with the disease of the soul, 
or that the latter [art] should be inferior to the former in the theory and 
 
214 cf. II.5. 
215 Nussbaum (1994) p.14-15. 
216 A point that is overlooked in Cic. Tusc. IV.23. Cicero reads Chrysippus’ frequent recourse to medical 
analogy as an overused stylistic device  He does not object to the medical analogy per se – he employs it 
(as a stylistic device) himself at Ibid. III.6 – but denounces Chrysippus’ over-elaborate application as 
superfluous, thus neglecting to account for its physical basis and centrality to Stoicism’s ethical project. 
This is not a stylistic eccentricity.  
217 The broader question of medical analogy in Hellenistic philosophy was brought to light by Nussbaum 
(1994). 
218 Tieleman (2003) p.157. 
219 The Greek term πάθος means both ‘emotion’ and ‘disease’, a fact that Chrysippus apparently exploited 
throughout the Therapeutics. See below. 
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treatment of individual cases. Therefore, just as the physician of the body 
must be ‘inside’, as they say, the affections that befall the body and the 
proper cure for each, so it is incumbent on the physician of the soul to be 
‘inside’ both of these in the best possible way. And a person might 
understand that this is so, since analogy with them was set up at the start. 
For the correlative affinity with them will also make evident to us, as I think, 
the similarity of the cures and in addition, the analogy that the two kinds of 
healing have with each other.220  
The claim that physicians of body and soul must be ‘inside’ (ἐντός) their subjects 
is a claim that they must both possess extensive knowledge of precisely what it 
is upon which they administer their therapies.221  Of the body and the soul, though 
their shared constituents are not referenced in this passage, their pattern of 
potential transformations is isomorphic – i.e. structurally similar or ‘correlatively 
affinitive’ in De Lacy’s translation.222 Both are vulnerable to pathologies and 
responsive to correlative, restorative therapies. Moreover, the soul, its affections 
and restorative processes are equally accessible to human understanding as 
their physiological parallel. The patterns of deterioration and restoration are 
analogous. Both are vulnerable to pathology; both can be cured. 
     The analogy is defended at PHP V.2.22-24 on the grounds that it has existed 
‘from the start’ (ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς). In context, this reads as an appeal to how naturally 
the medical analogy emerges in speech and thus in thought.223 The promise of 
restoration to a preferable condition cannot be uncoupled from its healing 
connotation, particularly when the subject of the process is the human being, 
his/her interior tumult. The arts practised by physician and philosopher 
respectively are ‘two different kinds of healing’ but their ‘correlative affinity’ 
(ἀντιπαρατείνουσα οἰκειότης) elucidates their practical similarity. A further 
fragment, quoted in PHP, a mere two lines later and likely derived from the same 
 
220  Gal. PHP V.2.22-24 trans. De Lacy (1978). 
221 Tieleman (2003) p.144. 
222 Ibid. p.144 favours ‘parallel appropriateness’ as a translation for ἀντιπαρατείνουσα οἰκειότης. 
223 Tieleman (2003) p.145. An alternative reading is that ‘ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς’ refers to the beginning of Chrysippus’ 
text but note that Chrysippus elsewhere uses the phrase in the manner that Tieleman suggests. See Gal. 
PHP III.1.23 quoting from Chrysippus’ On the Soul: ‘And in these matters it is sufficiently clear that people 
have been brought from the outset (ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς) to the view that our governing part is in our heart’. trans. 
De Lacy (1978).  
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context,224 has Chrysippus address the human tendency to speak of 
physiological and psychological matters in the same terms: 
‘Just as strength and weakness, firmness and softness are observed in the 
body, and also health and disease, robustness and sickness’ and all the 
other affections, infirmities, and diseases that he goes on to list, ‘in the same 
way’, he says ‘there are certain things in the rational world that exist and are 
named analogously to all of these.’ He then continues: ‘I fancy that this sort 
of analogy and similarity has led to the sameness of their names. For we do 
in fact say that some persons are strong or weak also in the soul, and firm 
or soft, diseased or healthy; and we speak as if this was of affection, 
infirmity, and the like in the soul.’225 
The fusion of physiological and psychological vocabulary arises from a deeper 
similarity, prior to language; the terminology is interchangeable because it does, 
in fact, describe to the same basic process.226 The analogy emerges from an 
underlying, objective, physical parallelism between the affections of the soul and 
the diseases of the body.227 The ‘correlative affinity’ is legitimised on the basis of 
the body and the soul’s shared corporeality, their mutual coextension, and their 
shared constituents.228 
III.5.3 Medicine in On Affections  
The abundance of medical analogy in On Affections is clearly significant for our 
purposes. Athenaeus’ efforts to distinguish his profession from philosophy (III.2) 
are all the more striking when one considers how he adopts as the foundation of 
his theory the physical premises of a philosophy whose practitioners took 
measures to emphasise the indeterminacy of the boundary between medicine 
and philosophy on the basis of those same premises. The orientation of Stoic 
philosophy towards therapeutic aims further confuses the picture; the goal-
 
224 Tieleman (2003) p.145. 
225 Gal. PHP V.2.36-27 trans. De Lacy (1978). cf. Gal. PHP V.2.31-33 quoted most fully at III.5.3 below. 
226 D. L. VII.193 lists several Chrysippean treatises devoted to speech and linguistic ambiguity. It is an area 
to which Chrysippus devoted much time exploring. When Chrysippus writes of ‘correlative affinity’ 
(ἀντιπαρατείνουσα οἰκειότης), we can be sure that he selected his words with care. Tieleman (2003) 
p.146. 
227 See Sedley (1993) p.325-331 for an analysis of Chrysippean ‘psychophysics’. All psychological changes 
are pneumatic changes. It is through language, λεκτά, that psychophysical states translate into thoughts. 
λεκτά, being causally inert, map onto causal processes and make them intelligible. Isomorphic causal 
processes accommodate the same λεκτά. 
228 Tieleman (2003) p.146-147.  
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disparity of philosophy and medicine is challenged by the congruent nature of 
their goals at the level of physical processes, which in turn engenders a degree 
of terminological overlap. We will circle back to this problem at the end of this 
section. For now, note that the use of medical analogy in On Affections 
presupposes an (at least, a cursory) existent Stoic conception of the physical 
mechanics of health and disease. Three questions arise: 1) How exactly are 
physiological and psychological pathologies ‘correlatively affinitive’ in Chrysippus’ 
psychophysiology; 2) to what extent does Chrysippus’ conception of bodily 
disease anticipate that of Athenaeus and 3) how does the philosopher distinguish 
the practice of philosophy from that of medicine? I deal with each question in turn. 
III.5.3.1 The congruence of pathology at PHP V.2.31-33 
At III.2.2 we encountered a Stoic account of bodily health and disease that I 
reintroduce to the discussion here, quoted at greater length: 
‘…Zeno’s argument proceeds as it should. And disease of the soul is most 
similar to an unsettled state of the body. Disease of the body is said to be a 
lack of proportion in its components, hot and cold, dry and wet.’ A little later 
he says. ‘Health in the body is a kind of blend and proportion of the (things) 
expressly stated’; and then, ‘for in my opinion robustness of the body is the 
best blend of the (things) mentioned’; and after that, ‘It is not out of place to 
say this of the body, because proportion or lack of proportion in its 
components hot, cold, wet, dry, is health or disease; proportion or lack of it 
in the sinews is strength or weakness, firmness or softness; and the 
proportion or the lack of it in the limbs is beauty or ugliness.’229 
Health in the body is identified with the proper proportion of its constituents. In 
PHP V.2.31-33,230 health is at once one aspect of how harmonious proportionality 
manifests inside the cosmos and the exemplar by which psychophysical harmony 
is understood.231 The moral-aesthetic value of harmony is consistent throughout 
the cosmos, but it is through the spectrum of bodily health and disease that this 
concept is expounded. As Seneca would later frame it, our innate preference for 
 
229 Gal. PHP V.2.31-33 quoting Chrysippus trans. De Lacy (1978). 
230 See II.2.2 for the question of why Zeno apparently elected to analyse the body into its elemental 
qualities in this passage. 




health over disease is among ‘the seeds of knowledge’ from which Stoic ethical 
doctrine would develop.232 How, precisely, is this isomorphism reflected in 
Chrysippus’ model of psychophysical pathology? 
     In context, the quotation at PHP V.2.31-33 is introduced by Galen to 
demonstrate the weakness of Stoicism’s monistic psychology. Galen does not 
contest the analogy on the grounds of its explanatory utility. He argues instead 
that Chrysippus failed to pursue the analogy to its conclusion, pointing out that 
while an account is given of the aetiology of physiological pathology, an 
analogous account of psychological pathology is neglected.233 But this is an 
inaccurate reading. Galen’s anti-monistic purpose lead him to overlook (or 
plausibly, wilfully disregard) the deeper physical affinity between body and soul 
which Chrysippus (channelling Zeno) foregrounds in this passage. In PHP 
V.2.29-38, Galen’s argument is that Chrysippus cannot apply the template of 
bodily health/disease – of which he approves – to that of psychological 
harmony/pathology because his monistic psychology prohibits him from resolving 
the soul into parts.234 The parts that Galen is alluding to are the spirited, rational, 
and desiderative components of a three-fold Platonic soul.235 Psychological 
health, according to Galen, is attained ‘when the three parts (of the soul) are in 
harmony with each other and not in conflict at all…when in disharmony and 
conflict, (they produce) diseases.’236 Galen’s capacity for distorting the positions 
of his opponents to score dialectical points is familiar to us from II.2.1.2. At PHP 
V.2.35-38, he seizes on the Chrysippean/Zenonian analogy between 
physiological and psychological health as an opportunity to build and 
disassemble a straw man. His argument is that if the aetiology of disease requires 
pluralism, and disease in the body is the exemplar by which we understand 
disease in the soul, then the soul must be pluralistic. 
     But what Galen neglects to account for in PHP V.2.35-38 is that the Stoic soul, 
though indivisible into parts which are not to some degree imbued with rationality, 
consist of the same elements as the body.237 It too is a mixture. It too has an 
 
232 Sen. Ep. 120.3-5, 8-11 (LS 60 E). 
233 Gal. PHP V.2.29-38. 
234 Ibid. V.2.35-38. 
235 Gal. PHP V.2.37. 
236 Ibid. V.2.38 trans. De Lacy (1978). 
237 Of course, it is their proportion relative to each other that distinguishes the body from the soul; the 
soul consists primarily of fire and air, the body of water and earth. 
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optimal, equilibrial condition contingent on the harmony of its constituents and 
Galen is perfectly aware of this. In PHP V.3.18 he includes Chrysippus and the 
Stoics among those who correctly identified the correct proportion of elements as 
productive of health.238 Elsewhere, in a passage from The Capacities of the Soul 
Follow the Mixtures the of the Body (hereafter QAM), which Tieleman argues was 
based on the same section of the Therapeutics,239 Galen recounts with fidelity 
the Stoic conception of the soul as a mixture of fire and air.240 Moreover, he 
reveals his understanding that, for the Stoics, intelligence resides in a ‘well-
tempered blend’ of the elemental constituents of the soul, whereas foolishness 
derives from boundless heat.241 The Chrysippus of QAM identifies desirable – i.e. 
healthy – psychic conditions with ‘well-tempered’ (εὔκρατον) proportions of the 
soul’s constituents. Even in PHP V itself, Galen betrays his understanding that 
the Stoic soul has ‘two parts, elements, or states, that are intermingled 
throughout, the cold and the hot’ or ‘air and fire’ which he mentions as alternative 
appellations derived from their substances.242 
     For Chrysippus, the soul, as the body, is a blend of different elements. Health 
in the body is the proper proportion of its parts; it follows that ‘health’ in the soul 
– and note how naturally we reach for medical vocabulary – is isomorphically 
derived; body and soul are different blends of the same physical constituents, 
coextensive, mutually inextricable, and beholden to the same physical laws inside 
a cosmos whose natural tendency is towards concinnity, a perfect harmony of 
parts identified with the moral paradigm. The harmonious proportion is 
determined by the constitution of the whole; the body and the soul are distinct 
mixtures and so too must be their respective equilibrial proportions. But the 
mechanism of pathology is identical; it is disproportion caused by the 
deficit/surfeit of a particular constituent which throws the system into disarray. 
 
238 Alongside Hippocrates, Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus. 
239 Tieleman (2003) p.149, n.44. Tieleman bases this argument on the fact that there are almost no quotes 
from Chrysippus in Galen other than those which are taken from On the Soul or On Affections. QAM is 
believed to have been written some forty years after PHP. Galen, Tieleman speculates, having studied On 
Affections in the writing of PHP, continued to draw upon the text throughout his career without further 
relying on direct quotation. The subject-matter of QAM is such that recourse to the issues raised in PHP 
would have been appropriate and indeed, sections of QAM read like reworkings of PHP (cf. QAM 11 and 
PHP V.5, VII.1).  
240 Gal. QAM 4 (SVF 2.787). 
241 Ibid. 
242 Gal. PHP. V.3.8. It is unclear, from context, whether the inclusion of ‘air and fire’ as alternative names 
is derived from Chrysippus or if this is Galen’s insertion. 
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The psychophysiological analogy that Chrysippus draws in On Affections is more 
exact than Galen gives it credit for – at least, on his initial rendering of Chrysippus’ 
account. At PHP V.3.9-10, Galen moves to dismiss the possibility that Chrysippus 
(at PHP V.2.31-33) refers to elemental proportion as the basis for his analogy, 
and in doing so effectively summarises Chrysippus’ position: 
…I would be surprised if you [Chrysippus] wish to call the proportion of these 
[elements] the health or beauty of the governing part. For the health of its 
body is properly assigned to them, but as the governing part of the soul. Its 
health does not reside in them, even on your view. Thus, the whole pattern 
is destroyed and the claim to the same name is completely gone if we 
cannot show that disease, beauty and ugliness, are constituted in the soul’s 
governing part in the same way as in the whole body.243 
The ‘pattern’ is preserved, despite Galen’s surprise. That psychological and 
physical health are identified with the harmonious proportion of their respective 
constituents is the basis for their correlative affinity. A further fragment from PHP 
demonstrates, with some acuity, both the explanatory utility of medical analogy 
and its physical foundation. At PHP V.2.14 Chrysippus argues that ‘disease of 
the soul is most similar to a feverish physical state in which fevers and chills do 
not occur at regular intervals but irregularly and at random from the constitution 
(of the afflicted) and at the incidence of small causes.’244 Here, the apparently 
random occurrence of ‘chills’ is likened to the similarly immediate onset of 
emotion which does not signify a proximate cause. Galen presents this fragment 
as an argument against analogising disease in the soul to various forms of 
recurrent fevers,245 but, as Tieleman argues, disease (νόσος) at PHP V.2.14 
refers to the condition of the soul in disarray;246 each affection (πάθος) is 
analogised to a fever/chill.247 Galen (predictably) makes no reference to the 
 
243 Trans. De Lacy (1978). 
244 Trans. De Lacy (1978). 
245 Gal. PHP V.2.13. 
246 cf. III.4.1-2 and Gal. CC 2 on pneumatic disarray as the αἴτιον συνεκτικόν of disease in Athenaeus’ 
aetiology of disease. Disease is a broad descriptor for a state of disarray. 
247 Tieleman (2003) p.155. It is unclear from context whether Chrysippus intends the evocation of a 
‘physical state in which fevers and chills do not occur at regular intervals’ to refer to a peculiar type of 
(possibly hypothetical) fever. The supposed regularity of chills in a fever is well attested in ancient medical 
literature. Is the apparent irregularity of affections a distinguishing feature? If so, is the analogy to disease 
at PHP V.2.14 intended to suggest that the irregularity of affections is only apparent – i.e. if we understood 
the disharmonious soul as we understood the body then the ‘small causes’ he references would be 
apparent to us? 
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physical basis of this comparison. But we should note the ‘correlative affinity’ 
between a fever defined by ‘chills’ and Chrysippus’ physical model of soul in 
disarray. Pathologies occur within disharmonious bodies; within clashing tides of 
elements there are ‘spikes’ – i.e. moments when a single element is dominant. 
Intermittent shivering is a consequence of the alternative dominance of hot and 
cold qualities within a body that has lost its proper structure. Hot and cold are the 
dominant qualities present in the Stoic soul;248 the analogy preserved at PHP 
V.2.14 is intended to be exact. Just as the fevered body alternates between 
extremes of temperature, the unbalanced soul will alternate between extremes of 
mood, corresponding to physical fluctuations in the proportion of its mixture. 
Analogies such as that at PHP V.2.14 are exploitable because the preceding 
cause – which is a term I use advisedly249 – of physiological and psychological 
diseases are identical in character. 
     Stoicism physicalises psychological pathology with a rigor that is absent from 
Epicureanism. As I argued at II.5.6, neither the Epicurean goal of ἀταραξία – the 
‘health’ that the philosopher-doctor seeks to engender – nor the pathologies one 
must neutralise to attain it are explicitly identified with movement of atoms in our 
sources. Stoicism, through the unity of its physics and its ethics, can articulate its 
ethical/therapeutic aims in physical terms – indeed, it must; health and pathology 
attain their moral adjacency through Stoicism’s analysis of ‘universal nature 
and…the administration of the world.’250 Nature, for the Stoics, is the teacher.251 
What is Good cannot be delineated without recourse to Nature’s structure and 
behaviour; ἀρετή cannot be elucidated without recourse to physics. But once the 
nature of the Good has been revealed through analysis of the whole – the 
appropriate intellectual domain of the Stoic ethicist, the Stoic proper (III.3.3) – the 
harmony-disharmony dichotomy can be abstracted from cosmology and applied 
to different epistemological domains. My thesis is that the innate self-similarity of 
the Stoic cosmos, where ‘good’ and ‘bad’ – or, at least, ‘preferred’ and 
‘dispreferred’ (III.3.3) – are expressed in the same way at different scales and in 
different domains, facilitated Stoicism’s adaptation into medicine. To the 
 
248 e.g. Gal. PHP. V.3.8. 
249 Though as I argued at III.4.4.2, n.202, this is a retrojection of Athenaeus’ taxonomy of causes onto 
something for which it (probably) was not intended. I draw attention to it here only to indicate how easily 
one can conceive of Stoic psychophysics as a template for Athenaeus’ theory of disease.  
250 Plut. St. Rep. 1035 C-D (LS 60 A). 
251 e.g. Ibid.; D. L. VII.53; Cic. Fin. III.33-4. 
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physician starting from Epicurean principles, the physics of health, insofar as 
there are hints of such a doctrine in Epicureanism (see II.5.6), is for the medical 
τέχνη to bring to fruition. To the Stoicising physician, the mother-doctrine provides 
a template for the mechanics of health and disease. To what extent is 
Pneumatism prefigured in the template? 
III.5.3.2 Anticipating Athenaeus (and the problem of ‘non-somatic’ 
pathology) 
The paucity of evidence for both Athenaeus’ theory of disease and how far (and 
in what direction(s)) Chrysippus took the medical analogy in On Affections 
prohibits us from answering definitively the question of the extent to which 
Chrysippean therapeutics anticipates Pneumatism. Certainly, the Zenonian 
conception of disease as the disequilibrium of elemental qualities endorsed by 
Chrysippus at PHP V.2.31 is consistent with Athenaeus’ theory (III.2.2). I 
addressed Zeno’s choice to resolve the body into qualities rather than substances 
in PHP V.2.31 at III.2.2 above; though this detail clearly aligns his model of 
disease more closely with that of Athenaeus, we should be hesitant to accept that 
these were the only terms in which disease could be discussed in early Stoicism. 
Galen’s exposition of the Stoic soul at PHP V.3.7-8, derived from Chrysippus, 
implies that ‘hot and cold’ and ‘fire and air’ could be used interchangeably in the 
context of Stoic psychophysiology, but how much of this is coming from 
Chrysippus himself is unclear.  
     It is in the domain of psychophysiology that the boundary between doctor and 
philosopher is surely its most porous, and yet this seems to be the area where 
Athenaeus’ theory of disease is most difficult to reconcile with Chrysippus’ 
writings on the subject; it is difficult to identify an explicit precedent for the causal 
role of πνεῦμα in Athenaeus’ aetiology of disease in the extant fragments of On 
Affections with respect to Chrysippus’ model of psychological pathology,252 for all 
that its presence might be confidently assumed. It is possible that Chrysippus 
conceived πνεῦμα as only indirectly implicated in psychophysiological pathology; 
the affections, after all, are events that take place within πνεῦμα; perhaps the all-
penetrative quality of πνεῦμα is of less explanatory utility in the context of more 
 
252 This is a further reason for why I am reluctant to retroject Athenaeus’ αἴτιον προηγούμενον onto the 
aetiology of psychological pathology in Chrysippean Stoicism. 
186 
 
or less localised psychological pathologies.253 The spread of disease through the 
body is more readily explained by the unity of the active and passive principles 
and the holistic nature of the aggregate. Perhaps we should not be surprised, 
given the centrality of πνεῦμα to the theory, that it is the Athenaean conception 
of pathology where the distinction between physiological and psychological 
disequilibrium is most difficult to identify, despite the doctor’s focus on the former.  
     But the all-penetrative quality of πνεῦμα coupled with its function as the 
substance of the soul raises a further question vis-à-vis the Chrysippean model 
of pathology. How closely related are body and soul in On Affections? How do 
changes in the constitution of one impact the constitution of other? Though 
Chrysippus maintains that the physical basis of psychological and physiological 
pathologies is correlative, he nonetheless accepts that their treatments constitute 
two ‘different kinds of healing’, and this distinction seems to be predicated on the 
particular mixture in the body-soul duality, conceptually delineated, which the 
philosopher or doctor seeks to induce back to equilibrium.254 The argument at 
PHP V 2.22-24 suggests that while the pattern of potential transformations is 
analogous (generating a shared terminology),255 the conceptual distinction of the 
substances considered has some kind of material basis; the physician of the body 
must have knowledge of the body; the physician of the soul must have knowledge 
of the soul. But while the soul can be deconstructed into fire and air, the body into 
water and earth, their mutual coextension – and the role of the former in the 
qualification of the latter – would seem, on first analysis, to preclude independent 
pathologies. Recall the fragment from Chrysippus’ On the Soul (also preserved 
in PHP) in which the philosopher conceives his subject as ‘breath innate within 
us, continuous, and penetrating the entire body, as long as the breath of life is 
within it.’256 The identification of soul with πνεῦμα, its nourishment with breathing, 
calls attention to the physiological processes essential to maintaining the soul’s 
disposition – the human soul is shaped by the body.257 Accordingly, the 
philosopher must have knowledge of the soul and the body if he is to advise 
effectively on the harmonious proportion of the former. 
 
253 Note Galen’s explicit reference to the ‘governing part’ (ἡγεμονικόν) at PHP V.3.8, 9. 
254 Gal. PHP V.2.22-24. 
255 Sedley (1993) p.325-331. 
256 Gal. PHP III.1.10 trans. De Lacy (1978) with a minor change for brevity. 
257 Tieleman (2003) p.147. 
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     The following question arises: if it is necessary for the Stoic philosopher to 
have knowledge of the body in order to treat the pathologies of the soul, can the 
reverse be said of the Stoicising physician? A fragment from Plutarch’s De libidine 
et aegritudine attributes a more sophisticated Stoic psychophysiology to 
Posidonius, Athenaeus’ teacher, the structure of which may have facilitated 
Athenaeus’ freedom from psychological concerns per se:  
[Of affections] Certainly Posidonius at least says in his classification that 1) 
some are of the soul, 2) some are of the body, 3) some do not belong to the 
soul but are physical with mental effects, and 4) others do not belong to the 
body but are mental with physical effects.  
1) Instances of what belongs to the soul without qualification are those 
having something to do with rational decisions and suppositions, like 
desires, fears, fits of anger. 
2) Those which belong to the body without qualification are fevers, chills, 
contractions, opening up of the pores. 
3) Those which are physical with mental effects are lethargies, madness 
arising from black bile, mental pangs from physical gnawing pains, sense 
perceptions, feelings of relaxation 
4) And the other way round, those which are mental with physical effects 
are tremors and pallors, that is, changes of appearance in fear and grief.258 
Taxonomizing pathologies formalizes the territory for specialization. Athenaeus 
may concern himself with psychological pathology only insofar as it is an 
effect/proximate cause of physiological disturbances – i.e. he selects as his 
subject matter types (2), (3) and (with certain qualifications) (4). (2) should require 
no justification. As for (3), there is some evidence to suggest that Athenaeus had 
an interest in the physiological aetiology of psychological conditions; Galen writes 
at Temp. 1.3 that some followers of Athenaeus of Attalia identified melancholia 
with a surfeit of cold and dry qualities, explaining it in precisely the same terms 
as dropsy and fever.259 Melancholia, ‘the madness arising from black bile’260 is 
listed in the above taxonomy as a physical affection with mental effects (3). 
 
258 Plut. Lib. et Aeg. 6 trans. Kidd (1999). 




Moreover, a fragment from Oribasius has Athenaeus prescribe psychological 
exercise as a means of correcting, via regimen, the excessively cold and wet 
constitution of women, indicating that, in accordance with his theory, 
physiological disequilibrium can be amended in part by psychological means.261 
There is therefore a physiological component to psychological activity – a 
warming and drying quality, in this case – but we should note that Athenaeus’ 
τέλος is the realisation of physiological equilibrium; though he exploits the 
interconnectivity of body and soul granted him by his Stoic foundations, 
‘psychological medicine’ is not prescribed for an explicitly psychological 
malady.262 Concerning (4), while superficial physical responses to externally 
stimulated mental distress – e.g. anxious tremors, momentary pallors, and 
physical displays of emotion –  may fall outside the purview of the doctor, we 
have evidence from Oribasius that Athenaeus believed the emotional state of 
‘those entering into the production of children’ could endanger their offspring if 
their souls were not ‘tranquil’ (εὐσταθοῦσα).263 As Coughlin highlights in his 
analysis of this fragment, Athenaeus’ concern is once again with the physiological 
consequences for the offspring;264 the suggestion is not that distressed parents 
will produce distressed children, but sick children; one should regulate one’s 
moods as one regulates one’s diet in protection against the same unfavourable 
outcome.265  
     My suggestion, then, is that the taxonomy of pathologies enumerated by 
Posidonius provided Athenaeus with a map with which to navigate the confusing 
territory of Stoic psychophysiology. By isolating (1) and (2) above, Posidonius 
occludes territory from the doctor and the philosopher respectively and permits 
both access to (3) and (4) to address as their purposes demand. It is the physical 
parallelism at the root of the analogy upheld by Chrysippus at PHP V.2.22-24 that 
sees the Stoic and the Stoicising doctor crossing into the same intellectual 
territory with respect to their engagements with (3) and (4). In terms of activity, it 
is the partial independence of body and soul realised through (1) and (2) that 
 
261 Orib. Lib. Inc. 21.1-8. 
262 At Orib. Lib. Inc. 21.1-8, Athenaeus quotes part of Hipp. Epid. 6.5.5: ‘concern, for people, is the soul’s 
taking a walk.’ See Coughlin (2018) p.126-128 for an analysis of this obscure aphorism. For our purposes, 
it is important to note that Athenaeus appeals to a medical authority in justifying his psychological 
therapies. 
263 Orib. Lib. Inc. 23-1. See Coughlin (2018) p.130-133 for a thorough analysis of this passage. 
264 Coughlin (2018) p.132. 
265 Orib. Lib. Inc. 23-1. 
189 
 
permits the distinction in disciplines. The philosopher heals the soul, the physician 
the body, and both engage with the alternative component insofar as it is 
beneficial to their τέλη. 
III.5.3.3 The philosopher’s physician 
The distinction between philosopher and physician in PHP V.2.22-24 is one of 
proximate domain of inquiry but the domain is not strictly delineated in 
epistemological terms. Chrysippus does not specify different levels of inquiry 
pertinent to each discipline;266 he simply distinguishes body and soul at the level 
of the discipline which seeks to redress their imbalances. The implication at PHP 
V.3.8 is that the elemental qualities and substances could be used 
interchangeably. If this was the case, then the philosopher was more liberal with 
his terminology than the physician, whose narrow epistemic domain was a 
condition of his status as a specialist. If the inclusion of ‘air and fire’ at PHP V.3.8 
was a Galenic insertion, and Chrysippus preferred to analyse the soul into 
qualities in contexts pertaining to pathology, then he would be conforming to the 
template established by Aristotle and, in the manner of his predecessor, 
constraining the ambit of inquiry in a practical – in this case therapeutic – 
context.267 His behaviour would be that of a productive scientist, a true ‘physician 
of the soul’, but one whose epistemological restrictions were temporary and 
context defined.268 This would still place him in contrast to Athenaeus, whose 
status as a physician seems to be predicated on his scrupulous adherence to this 
epistemological territory defined by his τέλος – his never transgressing into 
philosophical speculation, and only contributing to theory (as with the  αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον) from a single, well-fortified vantage point. 
     A further function of medical analogy in On Affections is to announce to the 
reader that the discussion has moved into practical territory; medicine is 
introduced as a well-defined body of practices against which philosophy’s 
therapeutic aims are to be understood. Medicine is the template for practical 
 
266 That is left to the specialist. See e.g. ps.-Gal. Def. Med. 31. See supra III.2.1.1. 
267 See supra III.3, esp. III.3.2. 
268 Note that, according to Galen (PHP V.7.52), the Therapeutics is the fourth book of Chrysippus’ On 
Affections and the practical text that sits on a foundation of three theoretical works. The need to lay the 
theoretical foundations at such length is a characteristic of philosophy. We would not expect Athenaeus 
to write three lengthy books on Stoic/Pneumatist physics before he feels comfortable enough to 
introduce his therapies. We may speculate that Chrysippus’ resolution of the soul into qualities might not 
have been prefigured in the theoretical texts. 
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philosophy, and its function as a template seems to be predicated on a certain 
unyielding rigidity vis-à-vis its singular aim. That philosophy and medicine are to 
be distinguished on the grounds of disparate (but correlatively affinitive) τέλη is 
apparent in our fragments from On Affections. Athenaeus’ innovation – within a 
Stoicising context – may have been the recognition that medicine’s distinct τέλος 
constrained its inquiry along an epistemological vector, defined by the limits of 
perceptibility, and that the generative capacity of his discipline could only be 
defended if the epistemological boundaries by which it was defined were nearly 
impermeable; medical innovations may be exploited by philosophy, but they must 
be sourced from an unambiguously medical territory. For Chrysippus, following 
Aristotle, ‘doctor’ is a mantle the philosopher may wear to elucidate his correlative 
τέλος – albeit one that demands a considerably broader theoretical foundation 
(III.3) – or indulge in a mode of specialised inquiry which, while constrained, 
always gestures towards a broader philosophical system. For Athenaeus, the 
boundaries established by the τέλος of medicine are, by design, impenetrable 
walls to the intellect. The broader epistemological domain of the philosopher is 
evoked only to illuminate the territory through which the doctor must not travel.269 
III.6 Conclusion: the medical reception of doctrinaire Hellenistic philosophy 
(part I)   
The boundary between Pneumatism and Stoicism is an epistemological 
boundary erected by the medical school within the physical territory established 
by the mother-doctrine. At III.2, I argued that Pneumatism distinguished itself from 
Stoicism by enforcing the boundary of its apposite epistemological domain of 
inquiry, defined by the limits of perceptibility; Pneumatist element theory is not to 
be read as a challenge to Stoicism, but as an assertion of medicine’s intellectual 
independence. In producing a theory of the ‘elements of medicine’, distinct from 
the elements of the cosmos, Athenaeus is to be located in a tradition that includes 
Herophilus of Chalcedon and Erasistratus of Ceos, and appears to have its roots 
in the seminal Hippocratic text, On the Nature of Man, one that distinguished the 
apposite domain of medical and philosophical inquiry in epistemological terms. I 
argued at III.3 that Pneumatism’s anti-cosmological peculiarity becomes more 
intelligible when understood in the context of Aristotle’s taxonomy of sciences set 
 
269 ps.-Gal. Def. Med. 31 (= XIX.356 K.). 
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out in his Nicomachean Ethics and enforced elsewhere in the Aristotelian corpus. 
It serves the Stoic’s τέλος to emphasise the concinnity of the whole; it serves the 
Pneumatist’s τέλος to confine his analysis to the medically pertinent domain, to 
begin from Stoic assumptions founded on cosmological analysis, but to ignore 
the theorical territory that is not practically serviceable, along with its overarching 
ethical incline (III.3.3). Stoicising physicians are Pneumatists, not Stoics, because 
their τέλη, though structurally similar, are ultimately distinct. Through my analysis 
of Pneumatist causal theory at III.4, I concluded that Pneumatism’s intellectual 
independence is most clearly evidenced through the invention of the αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον from the elements of medicine, for which attempts to identify a 
genuine Stoic precedent have proven unconvincing. I noted, nonetheless, that 
Pneumatist contributions to theory do not threaten the integrity of the mother-
doctrine – indeed, it may be possible to retroject Pneumatist causal analysis onto 
Chrysippus’ analysis of psychological pathology, but to do so is to do just that, to 
retroject. At III.5 I identified in the fourth book of Chrysippus’ On Affections a 
template for Pneumatist medical theory and suggested that Stoicism’s relatively 
frictionless incorporation into the medical sphere was a consequence of both the 
closeness of its physics-ethics interconnexion – i.e. the physical foundation of its 
therapeutic τέλος – and the aforementioned self-similarity. The significance of this 











Asclepiades of Bithynia  
On the medical reception of doctrinaire Hellenistic philosophy, part II  
* 
IV.0 Both the Stoics and the Epicureans present themselves as physicians of the 
soul.1 But where the former, through the teleological affinity of its physics and its 
ethics, produced a ‘physics of healing’, the latter, as explored at II.5, did not 
ground the realisation of εὐδαιμονία/ἀταραξία in a sufficiently rigorous physical 
process such that a physician, drawing from Epicurean principles, could 
incorporate the same mechanics into a robust theory of disease. This distinction 
must be born in mind as we approach part II of our inquiry into the medical 
reception of doctrinaire Hellenistic philosophy; though Aristotle’s taxonomy of 
sciences remains pertinent to the medicalisation of each school, the properties of 
the mother-doctrine determine, in large part, the manner of its medical adaptation. 
The subject of this chapter is Asclepiades of Bithynia,2 Greek medicine’s first 
successful exponent in Rome whose theory, which identified health with the 
unimpeded motion of ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι (seamless masses) through πόροι (void-
gaps) in the body, drew extensively upon Epicurean physical and epistemological 
precedents. Physics – which, for the Epicurean, is more closely entwined with 
epistemology than it is with the realisation of the philosophy’s τέλος, being without 
its own teleological impulse – once more provides the theoretical foundation from 
which the specialist begins his inquiry (cf. III.3.2). To suggest, however, that 
Asclepiades of Bithynia was to Epicureanism what Athenaeus of Attalia was to 
Stoicism is to overlook the far more radical adjustments that Asclepiades makes 
to the mother-doctrine. Epicurean physics, in its transposition into the medical 
τέχνη, is not merely pruned by the discipline’s limited purview or nurtured in a 
manner that maintains the integrity of the mother-doctrine; it is transformed 
beyond its philosophical application, converted into something distinct. In this 
chapter, we ask the question of what motivated Asclepiades to modify to such a 
degree the theory he selects as the foundation of his science and we explore the 
 
1 e.g. Chrysippus at Gal. PHP V.2.22-24 (see III.5.2) and Epicurus at Porphyry, Letter to Marcella, 31 = Epic. 
fr. D54 Bailey (= Usener 221) (see II.5.1).  
2 See II.1 for a general introduction to Asclepiades of Bithynia. The controversy concerning his dates is 
addressed at II.1, n.3. 
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similarities and divergences between the Asclepiadean and Athenaean models 
of medical-philosophical interaction. 
     This chapter begins with an evaluation of the evidence for Asclepiades and 
his school at IV.1.1 and an overview of the debate concerning Asclepiades’ 
Epicurean heritage at IV.1.2. The following three sections are structured around 
the divergences of Asclepiadean physics from its Epicurean predecessor. IV.2 
concerns the transformation of atomic bodies into frangible ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι, the 
implications of this alteration and potential motivations. IV.3 addresses 
Asclepiades’ determinism. At IV.4 we examine his novel model of the soul and at 
IV.5 I make the case that Epicureanism’s medical appeal resided in its 
epistemology. Repurposing Epicurean epistemology as a remedy for Empiricism 
brought the rudiments of Epicurean physics into the medical domain. Viable 
amendments to Epicurean physics, instituted to satisfy a medical requirement3 – 
that is, a demand made by Asclepiades’ τέλος – are restricted to those which will 
not compromise the integrity of the epistemological model he has drawn out by 
its roots. 
IV.1 Evidence and contemporary scholarship  
Epicureanism’s transposition into the medical τέχνη has attracted more attention 
than its Stoic equivalent, both in antiquity and in recent scholarship. The 
complexity of Asclepiades’ relationship to Epicureanism, earlier medical writers, 
and other ancient thinkers, has spawned a lively debate centred on the question 
of Asclepiades’ Epicurean heritage. I divide this section into an overview of 
Asclepiadean testimonia at IV.1.1, and of the subsequent scholarly tradition at 
IV.1.2. 
IV.1.1 Evidence  
From Pliny, our principal source for Asclepiades’ biography, comes a disorderly 
picture of a doctor who is by turns a pre-eminent medical innovator whose 
longevity is a monument to his talent,4 and an opportunistic former rhetorician 
 
3 Under which rubric I include and will expound below (esp. IV.2.5), Asclepiades’ need to manufacture 
distance between his theory and Epicurean physics in service to medicine’s status as an independently 
generative art. 
4 Pliny NH VII.37. According to this passage, Asclepiades’ staked his reputation as a physician against his 
immunity from illness. He died at an extreme old age after falling down some stairs, his reputation secure. 
He also won renown for inventing a method of successfully treating disease with wine and healing a man 
on his funeral pyre. 
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who, despite (or perhaps, because of) his ignorance of medical tradition, seduced 
an ingenuous populace with congenial therapies.5 One is hesitant to take either 
depiction at face value. On the one hand, Asclepiades’ theory demonstrates a 
degree of critical engagement with physical, physiological and epistemological 
ideas that would tax the epistemic toolkit of the charlatan, on the other, 
encomiastic narratives such as those preserved at NH VII.37 say more about the 
efficacy of self-mythologizing and posthumous reputation building than they do 
about the person at their root. However, the popularity of Asclepiades’ sect is 
uncontroversial, and its longevity suggests that its appeal did not reside solely in 
the charisma of the founder. Asclepiadeans spread throughout the Roman world. 
Though their influence is likely to have peaked in the late Republic/early 
Principate,6 doctors continue to assert their allegiance to Asclepiades’ theories 
into the third or fourth centuries AD.7 
     Nothing of Asclepiades’ writing has survived. Galen is our most prolific 
witness. Though his works postdate the life of Asclepiades by centuries, his 
familiarity with Asclepiadean element theory – if not, of course, the veracity of his 
polemical reconstructions – is beyond dispute; it is Galen who refers to 
Asclepiades’ principal text, On Elements.8 He also wrote an exposition of 
Asclepiadean element theory in a lost work On the Opinions of Asclepiades.9 
Galen finds Asclepiades’ materialism ripe for condemnation, being largely 
antithetical to the Hippocratic and Aristotelian foundations of his own medical 
theory. If Athenaeus was obscured by Galen’s ‘suffocating friendship’,10 
Asclepiades has been partially revealed by the dull glow of the Pergamene’s 
hostility. Galen writes much on Asclepiades’ theory of matter, always with intent 
to discredit, but his work is no less indispensable to the question of Asclepiades’ 
debt to Epicureanism; it is Galen who asserts the similarity between atoms and 
 
5 Pliny NH XXVI.7. Pliny writes that Asclepiades championed the intake of wine as one of his five principles 
of treatment alongside diet, massage, ‘exercise on foot’ and the yet more passive ‘exercise in a carriage 
or on horseback.’ The gratuitous ‘pleasantness’ of Asclepiades’ treatments as depicted in NH is called into 
question in Leith (2019) p.66-70. Having investigated Pliny’s use of Celsus, whom he cites as a source for 
all eight of the books of NH in which Asclepiades is mentioned, and having revealed how he distorted 
Celsus’ data, Leith concludes that Pliny ‘had little interest in trying to understand Asclepiades’ 
therapeutics in general, or indeed in representing it accurately as a whole.’ – Leith (2019) p.73. 
6 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 3.14.113 identifies M. Artorius, an Asclepiadean, as court physician to Octavian.  
7 Bean and Mitford (1970) no.31 for the commemoration of the late Asclepiadean doctor Aurelius 
Varianus Pantauchus in Cibrya, Eastern Pamphylia (Southern Turkey). 
8 Gal. Hipp. Elem. 9.25-26, 33-35 (= I.487-490 K.). 
9 Gal. Lib. prop. 8 (= XIX.55 K.). 
10 To paraphrase Nutton (2013) p.207. 
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ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι, as it is Galen who grants us insight into Asclepiades’ theory of 
void. Beyond Galen, passages from Caelius Aurelianus, Sextus Empiricus and 
various pseudo-Galenic texts are invaluable to the question of the genealogy of 
the ὄγκος. Details of Asclepiades’ psychology and epistemology, which occupy 
sections IV.4 and IV.5, are sourced from a yet more eclectic selection of 
testimonia, though Galen, Calcidius and Sextus Empiricus provide the greater 
part of our material. 
IV.1.2 Asclepiades and Epicureanism 
Since the publication of J. T. Vallance’s The Lost Theory of Asclepiades of 
Bithynia (1990), scholarship on Asclepiades of Bithynia has developed around 
the question of the doctor’s intellectual debt to Epicurean atomism. Before 1990, 
Asclepiades’ theory – to say nothing of its medical context – received little 
independent attention, being instead used primarily as a tool with which to 
reconstruct the physics of Heraclides Ponticus,11 a pupil of Plato, to whom a 
theory of ‘fragments’ (θραύσματα) is attributed in Aëtius’ Placita.12 The 
identification of Heraclidean θραύσματα with Asclepiades’ splintered ἄναρμοι 
ὄγκοι13 was lent credence by various witnesses to Heraclides’ earlier application 
of the term.14 Vallance completed Asclepiades’ liberation from his sole function 
as a source for Heraclides,15 concluding simply that our evidence for Heraclidean 
ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι is too meagre to substantiate his influence on Asclepiades’ medical 
school – for it is the medical context of Asclepiades’ theory that Vallance is eager 
to foreground.16 I will spend scarcely any time in this chapter entertaining 
Asclepiades’ purported Heraclidean inheritance. A recent attempt by Roberto 
Polito to consider the evidence for Heraclides Ponticus independently of 
Asclepiadean testimonia has located Heraclides’ language vis-à-vis ‘ὄγκοι’ in the 
Platonic tradition of elemental polyhedra, recasting Heraclides as a more 
 
11 Heidel (1909); Lonie (1960); Gottschalk (1980). 
12 Aët. Plac. 1.13. 
13 cf. Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-7. See IV.2.2 below. As we shall see, the fragments into which the 
ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι are divided in Asclepiades’ theory are themselves ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι – i.e. ontologically 
equivalent bodies. 
14 S. E. PH III.32-33; M X.318; ps.-Gal. Hist Phil. 18; Euseb. Praep. Evang. 14.23.4 though in this final case 
the word ἄναρμοι is omitted. 
15 With earlier steps taken by Rawson (1982) and Harig (1983). Though Asclepiades has since seen 
substantial independent treatment, scholars such as Roberto Polito (2013) – for all that he is willing to 
consider Heraclides Ponticus independently of the Asclepiadean evidence – maintain that Asclepiades 
owed some kind of intellectual debt to Heraclides. 
16 Vallance (1990) p.146. 
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traditional Platonic figure.17 With the (putatively) mutually illuminative bond 
between Heraclides and Asclepiades frayed, the differences between 
Asclepiadean ὄγκοι and Heraclidean θραύσματα, conceived as minimal 
structures within a Platonic four-elemental theory, are clearer than their 
similarities.18 
     In seeking to foreground the medical context of Asclepiades’ theory, Vallance 
argued against the doctor’s Epicurean inheritance. He posits that the fragility of 
Asclepiadean ὄγκοι is too radical a departure from the atomist tradition to 
constitute an adaptation made from within an Epicurean framework19 and that 
Galen’s assimilation of Asclepiades and Epicurus is rooted in their shared anti-
teleology (see IV.3.1)20 – their fundamental opposition to the goal-directed 
structure of Aristotelian/Galenic physics. Vallance advocates instead that we 
locate Asclepiades of Bithynia within his own intellectual tradition;21 though 
moved, as all doctors are, by developments in philosophy, Asclepiades, Vallance 
reminds us, is a ‘doctor first and foremost.’22 I agree with this proposition in 
essence but would emphasise, contra Vallance, that a ‘doctor’ is an adherent of 
a goal-directed methodology whose structure carries no implicit restrictions as to 
what theoretical models might provide the structure’s roots. Vallance proposes 
that Asclepiades’ ‘paring down’ of ‘the multiplicity of explanations of physiological 
and pathological phenomena’ through his corpuscular hypothesis be read as ‘a 
stage in a reductionist process that may have begun with Erasistratus.’23 He 
credits Asclepiades with a ‘simplified’ account of Erasistratean physiology and 
pathology, with vague echoes of Heraclidean terminology and Epicurean 
 
17 Polito (2013) p.127.  
18 For the shared properties of ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι and Epicurean atoms, by contrast, see IV.2.3 below. Leith 
addresses the question of Asclepiades’ relationship with the theory of Heraclides Ponticus in his 
forthcoming book. He concludes that Asclepiades may have found use for Heraclides’ terminology in 
relation to his non-atomic corpuscular materialism, but that it stretches credulity to suggest that the 
doctor was committed to the adaptation of a Platonic – let alone Heraclidean – theory of matter into the 
medical domain, considering how little impact the geometric component of Plato’s element theory had 
in antiquity. 
19 Vallance (1990) esp. p.42. 
20 Ibid. p.145. Vallance notes that ‘much of Galen’s assimilation of Epicurus and Asclepiades takes place in 
his two great hymns to teleology, the De naturalibus facultatibus and the De usu partium.’  While this is 
true, it does not undermine the likelihood that the shared anti-teleology of Epicurus and Asclepiades 
resulted from the fact that the latter based his causal analysis on that of the former (distinctions re 
fatalism accounted for (see IV.3)). 
21 Vallance (1990) p.146. 
22 Ibid. p.9. 
23 Ibid. p.147, see also esp. p.124-130. 
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atomism somewhere faintly in the mix.24  While I agree that Asclepiadean 
physiology – and, most relevantly for our purposes, Asclepiadean 
psychophysiology, as we will see at IV.4 – indicates a significant Erasistratean 
influence, Vallance has to ignore several (fairly glaring) similarities between the 
nature of the atom and the ὄγκος (laid out at IV.2.3 below) in the process of 
contorting Asclepiades into the medical tradition as he conceives it. 
     Vallance’s tendency to gloss over the properties which Asclepiades’ physical 
system shares with Epicureanism has been noted in subsequent scholarship. 
Casadei called attention to Vallance’s suppression of such properties as the 
shared basis for their anti-teleology – their particulate materialism and the 
unguided nature of elemental motion in both systems.25 To deny Epicurean 
atomism a prominent place in the genealogy of Asclepiades’ medical theory is 
misguided, but so too is the interpretation that Asclepiades reproduced 
Epicureanism in the medical sphere. Roberto Polito’s 2006 article ‘Matter, 
Medicine and the Mind’ reminds us of the distinctions between Epicurean and 
Asclepiadean theories of mind and matter, most significantly Asclepiades’ 
rejection of a localised ἡγεμονικόν (IV.4.3) and decidedly non-Epicurean 
commitment to determinism (IV.3.2-3). Though some of the conclusions Polito 
draws from these disparities go further than the testimonia allows (IV.4.3.2), both 
instances of discontinuity, as we shall see below, have something to impart about 
the relationship between Epicureanism and medicine in this period. Yet more 
recently, David Leith’s articles ‘The Qualitative Status of the Onkoi in Asclepiades’ 
Theory of Matter’ (2009) and ‘Pores and Void in Asclepiades’ Physical Theory’ 
(2012),26 along with his forthcoming book, have strengthened the case for 
Asclepiades’ Epicurean heritage. The former article made the case for the 
analogous role atoms and ὄγκοι play in the assemblage of phenomenal objects 
– they are invisible bodies, perceptible to reason, whose shifting constellations 
account for the reality of secondary/phenomenal qualities such as colour, sound, 
taste, etc. The latter article considers the evidence for Asclepiades’ πόροι and 
concludes that they are perfectly analogous to Epicurean-style void-gaps 
 
24 See esp. Vallance (1990) p.130. 
25 Casadei (1997).  
26 The question of Asclepiadean void-theory is first addressed in Vallance (1990) p.44-91 but he reaches 
no firm conclusions. Casadei (1997) accepted that Asclepiades was a void theorist with minimal analysis. 
Gottschalk (1980), who maintained that Asclepiades’ theory was a replication of the theory of Heraclides 
Ponticus, entirely ignores the question of void. 
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between atoms; they are interstices between ὄγκοι whose presence is indicative 
of a theory of large-scale void – that is, void as a place of activity, the intangible 
contrasted with the tangible, which is essential in the materialist tradition to 
motion and plurality.  
     As we shall see over the course of this chapter, Asclepiades’ deep 
engagement with Epicureanism is well attested in ancient testimonia. As we 
proceed, I will argue that Asclepiades’ modifications to Epicureanism are 
instituted in full knowledge of the consequences of those changes within an 
Epicurean framework. It is in this context that the question of motivation becomes 
most interesting, and it is to that question that we now turn. 
IV.2 Atoms and ὄγκοι 
Our inquiry starts with the material, the Epicurean and non-Epicurean properties 
of Asclepiades’ ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι. This section is divided into five subsections. 
IV.2.1, via the question of the void/πόροι dichotomy in Epicurean/Asclepiadean 
exposition, addresses how the rudiments of the mother-doctrine constrain the 
means by which Asclepiades can express his independence. IV.2.2 concerns the 
role of ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι in Asclepiades’ theory of health and disease through 
assessment of Caelius’ Aurelianus’ Celeres Passiones (Cel. Pass.) 1.14.107-5, 
our fullest source for the doctor’s conception of matter and medicine. IV.2.3 
addresses the theory’s Epicurean inheritances. IV.2.4 addresses the introduction 
of frangible elements into the Epicurean system and its implications. Here, I will 
make the case for Asclepiades’ intimate familiarity with the philosophy at his 
theory’ foundation. At IV.2.5, with the foundations in place, I attempt to answer 
the question of what might have motivated Asclepiades’ radical departure from 
Epicurean atomism. 
IV.2.1 Pores, void, and the proximate domain of medical inquiry 
Asclepiades’ credentials as a void theorist in the Epicurean mode are laid out 
convincingly in Leith’s 2012 article and I shall refrain from reproducing Leith’s 
argument in this section. I will simply draw the reader’s attention to the variety of 
instances in which Galen gestures towards an Asclepiadean theory of Epicurean-
style void27 and references the doctor alongside Epicurus as one of the two 
 
27 Gal. UP 6.13 (= III.474 K.) has Asclepiades resolve everything into ὄγκοι and void. 
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principal proponents of void-theory.28 Calcidius, moreover, includes Asclepiades 
among those who intersperse void with bounded elements.29 I am less interested 
in reaffirming this particular continuity between Epicurean and Asclepiadean 
physics than I am in emphasising the resultant discontinuity between 
Asclepiades’ method of adapting from philosophy while affirming the status of his 
discipline and that of Athenaeus of Attalia. 
     For the physician, to posit a theory of large-scale void – as anyone adapting 
from Epicurean physics must do given the role of void in defining the parameters 
of elemental motion (II.3.7) – is to extend the proximate domain of medical inquiry 
throughout the universe. The doctor is immediately engaged with physical 
processes which underpin everything in the cosmos. In adapting from 
Epicureanism, Asclepiades assimilates the two-tier epistemological model of 
reality – the mutually illuminative worlds of perception and reason (IV.2.3.1) – 
which will restrict his options when it comes to defining himself and his discipline 
against the mother-doctrine. He cannot, for example, set the boundaries of 
medical inquiry at the limit of the senses, claiming that deeper speculation into 
physical mechanics would lead him, like Aristotle’s overzealous carpenter,30 into 
theoretical territory that has no bearing on his τέλος, because he cannot properly 
comprehend phenomena in his adopted system without recourse to elemental 
activity.31 Applying the (broadly Aristotelian) model used by Herophilus, 
Erasistratus and (later) Athenaeus to determine the elements of medicine inside 
an Epicurean framework would plausibly lead Asclepiades into something 
resembling an Erasistratean analysis of the body, with the uniform parts of the 
 
28 Gal. SMT 1.14 (= XI.405 K.) presents Asclepiades and Epicurus as proponents of the same theory of 
‘empty space’; Gal. Hipp. Epid. VI 4.11 (= XVIIB.162 K.) pairs Asclepiades and Epicurus against Aristotle and 
the Stoics on the question of void within the cosmos. 
29 Cal. In Tim. 214: ‘qui dividuam fore silvae substantiam censuerunt interponentes immenso inani modo 
expertia modo partes quidem, sed indifferentes, sui similes, tum atomos vel solidas moles, nullum locum 
certum definitumque principali animae parti dederunt’. See Polito (2006) p.291-292, (2007) p.316 for the 
identification of ‘solidas moles’ with Asclepiadean ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι. This passage from Calcidius wrongly 
groups Anaxagoras’ homoiomeries and Diodorus’ Cronus’ partless bodies in with those who resolve the 
cosmos into void and some species of discontinuous material. But he also wrongly includes all apart from 
Asclepiades in the category of those who reject the existence of a localised ἡγεμονικόν (see IV.4 below). 
Polito (2006) p.291-92, 297-299, (2007) p.316 argues convincingly for Calcidius having based the 
description at In Tim. 214 on Asclepiades’ doctrine, and therefore we would expect the theory of large-
scale void to be appropriately ascribed to him if it was appropriately ascribed to anybody. See also Leith 
(2012) p.170-172. 
30 Arist. NE I.13. 
31 The Pneumatist, by contrast, as we saw at III.2, can explain the manifestation of disease without 
recourse to Stoic element theory. 
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body fulfilling the role of ‘elements of inquiry’,32 but he would deprive himself of 
whatever medical utility he identified in Epicurean philosophy.33 Stoicism, by 
contrast, with the coextensivity of its elements and its central proposition that the 
harmony exemplified by the cosmos can be realised at different scales and at 
different conceptually bounded localities, can surrender a portion of its physics to 
the medical sphere – ‘uprooted’ from its most primitive constituents  – and have 
it remain recognisably ‘Stoic’. If Asclepiades wants to affirm the value of his 
discipline against the philosophy to which he is indebted, he has no access to the 
purely epistemological boundaries that Athenaeus will later erect to this end. We 
will return to this at IV.2.5.2. 
     Asclepiades can, of course, find some independence in language. The 
Anonymus Londinensis preserves a crucial piece of evidence for the synonymy 
of Asclepiades’ πόροι and Epicurus’ void-gaps: an Asclepiadean argument for 
the existence of pores in the body which reflects an early atomist argument for 
void.34 I quote Leith’s translation of Anon. Lond. xxxix 10-15: 
Since, says [sc. Asclepiades], every part of our body is nourished 
and…body does not pass through body, both the whole and the individual 
parts of the body grow by means of nourishment permeating it and passing 
to every part of the body through the existence of pores perceptible to 
reason.35 
Growth is a consequence of nourishment which depends on the existence of 
channels in the body whereby nutriments can be distributed since, according to 
materialist doctrine, ‘body does not pass through body’. This argument reflects 
the third atomist argument for void in Aristotle’s Phys. 4.6, 213b, 18-20, cast in 
sharper relief by the commentaries of Themistius and Simplicius on Phys. 4.6.36 
I quote the former: 
It is clear furthermore that growth cannot exist without the existence of void. 
For it is necessary that growth occurs by the assimilation of nutriment 
everywhere in the body which is being increased, and this would not happen 
 
32 See Gal. MM 2.5 (= X.107 K.), III.2.2 and Leith (2015a). 
33 As we discussed at III.2.2, the corporeality of the Stoic system permitted Athenaeus a deeper look into 
the elements of human physiology than was afforded his third century predecessors.  
34 Leith (2012) p.174-177. 
35 Anon. Lond. xxxix 10-15 trans. Leith (2012) p.175. 
36 Leith (2012) p.175. 
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if it was not dispersed everywhere. But it is impossible for it, being body, to 
pass through the whole body, unless we place some void in bodies.37 
As Leith argues, Asclepiades’ version at Anon. Lond. xxxix 10-5 corresponds so 
closely with that described at Them. Phys. 124.3-9 and Simp. In Phys. 651.2-8 
that it is harder to believe that he was not familiar with some early formulation of 
the argument.38 That he employed an atomist argument for void suggests that he 
accepted the atomists’ conclusion and permits us to synonymise πόρος with 
‘void-gap’ in our own exposition of Asclepiades’ theory, but we should 
acknowledge Asclepiades’ use of πόρος over κενόν in Anon. Lond. xxxix 10-5. 
He and his atomist predecessors refer to the same thing, but emphasising πόρος 
focusses his (and thus our) attention; emptiness shrinks to that which owes its 
dimensions to corpuscular activity – i.e. void-as-unoccupied-space over void-as-
intangible-substrate. Though he adopts without adjustment an argument for 
atomist conclusions, his emphasis on πόρος alerts us to his independent 
purpose. The atomists argue from the particular to universal principles; 
Asclepiades constrains our focus on particularity, foregrounding a conceptual 
distinction between void-as-plane-of-activity and void-as-interstice. This is most 
clearly evident if we contrast the argument at Anon. Lond. xxxix 10-5 with the 
Epicurean version included among a list of arguments for porosity in DRN I.350-
353: 
And however solid things are thought to be 
Here is proof that you can see they are really porous. 
In rocky caverns water oozes through, 
The whole place weeping with a stream of drops. 
Food spreads to every part of an animal’s body. 
Trees grow and in due time put forth their fruits 
Because all over them through trunks and branches  
Right from the deepest roots food makes its way. 
 
37 Them. Phys. 124.4-9 trans. Leith (2012) p.175; cf. Simp. In Phys. 651.2-8. 




Sound passes through walls, and flies into closed buildings, 
And freezing cold can penetrate to the bones. 
But if there were no void for bodies to pass through 
You would not see things happen in this way.39 
The argument from growth, emboldened, is a subset of arguments from porosity. 
For Lucretius, observation indicates porosity which indicates the presence of void 
in all solid bodies which confirms the presence of void inside the cosmos.40 
Asclepiades makes no move to undermine the final step in this process, but his 
use of ‘πόρος’ in Anon. Lond. xxxix 10-15 diverts attention from it – in his 
formulation, observation indicates porosity.  
     Of course, this particular application of the term is not an Asclepiadean 
innovation; Epicurus uses the word πόρος to signify a path of no obstruction to 
atomic motion on two occasions in Ep. Hdt.,41 albeit never in relation to activity 
taking place within human physiology.42 It is likely that Asclepiades adapted the 
term from Epicureanism,43 but I am courting little controversy when I suggest that 
he favoured the term over those which gesture towards void in its broader, multi-
functional application. When the author of On Theriac, to Piso 11 (= XIV.250 K.) 
tells us that in Asclepiades’ preference for πόροι over void ‘he changes only the 
terms’,44 we see a deliberate move on the part of Asclepiades to adjust the focus 
of traditional atomism away from multi-functional κενόν towards more narrowly 
applicable πόροι.45 A similar passage from pseudo-Hero’s Definitions invokes a 
parallel between Democritean atoms and void, and Asclepiadean ὄγκοι and 
πόροι,46 signifying, as Leith argues, an ontological equivalence between the two 
sets of similar hypotheses but also, in its contrasting of void and πόροι, some 
 
39 Trans. Melville (1997). The emboldened line is clearly derived from an Epicurean version of the 
argument we see preserved at Them. Phys. 124.4-9 and Simp. In Phys. 651.2-8. 
40 Leith (2012) p.177. 
41 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 47, 61. Leith (2011) p.182 indicates these passages as evidence for Asclepiadean πόροι 
being equivalent to Epicurean void-gaps.  
42 The reference at Ep. Hdt. 47 is used to explain the speed of εἴδωλα in relation to the impingement of 
sense-impressions, but the πόροι in question are located between the eye and the object of sensation. 
43 There are multiple uses of πόρος in medical literature, but it is only in Epicurus that we see an 
application of the term that supposes an ontological equivalence between the pores and the materials 
traveling through them. See Lonie (1965) p.128 for alternative medical applications of πόρος. 
44 See Boudon-Millot (2016) p.lii-lxxx for the authorship of this text. 
45 Though, of course, the author of Ther. Pis. 11 also tells us that atoms and ὄγκοι are differentiated only 
in name. This, as we shall see throughout the section, is emphatically not the case. 
46 Ps.-Hero Def. 138.8. 
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kind of independence of the latter from the former, even if all that independence 
amounts to is Asclepiades’ preference for more narrowly applicable terminology. 
The pseudo-Galenic Introduction has Asclepiades resolve the human into the 
elements ὄγκοι and πόροι;47 Caelius Aurelianus, our fullest source for 
Asclepiades’ medical theory (see IV.2.2), makes no explicit reference to void in 
his exposition, nor does Sextus Empiricus.48 Galen is our only witness who refers 
explicitly to an Asclepiadean theory of void (κενόν), and on all but one occasion 
the reference seems intended to clarify Asclepiades’ debt to Epicurus.49 Vallance 
reads the paucity of references to void in Asclepiadean testimonia as a factor that 
should caution us against drawing parallels between his theory and Epicurean 
physics.50  But I suggest that this paucity is simply reflective of Asclepiades’ 
physiological emphasis.51 The medical utility of Epicureanism must lie in the 
behaviour of the seeds, the apprehension of which inflates medical speculation 
to reality’s most primitive components – i.e. it assumes the dimensions of 
philosophical inquiry. Void-as-plane-of-activity cannot be ignored by the 
physician – the behaviour of his elemental particles depends on it (IV.2.3) – but 
it can be relegated to an ancillary consideration in the context of specialised 
inquiry. Eschewing the universalising κενόν is a means of focusing our attention 
on the particular within a physical system that will not permit firm epistemological 
boundaries to take hold.52 The emancipation earned through this method is, 
undoubtedly, in large part superficial; perfecting independence from the mother-
doctrine requires additional, far more radical steps. 
     As a final note – and thorough exploration of this a line of inquiry must be 
delayed until the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι have been properly introduced – the emphasis 
on πόροι brings the ‘seamlessness’ of the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι into sharper relief, 
reducing Asclepiadean physiology into the relationship between simple, 
seamless entities and those whose complexity is contingent on their interior 
 
47 Ps.-Gal. Int. 9.5 (= XIV.698 K.). 
48 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.106; S. E. M 3.5. 
49 The exception being Gal. UP 6.13 (= III.474 K.). 
50 Vallance (1990) p.56-57, 59. 
51 A suggestion also made in Leith (2012) p.177 in the specific context of the language of Anon. Lond. xxxix 
10-15. 
52 To be clear, these ‘epistemological boundaries’ are those which a doctor might establish within an 
existent physical model, such as we see Athenaeus of Attalia erect at III.2. Asclepiades can, of course, 
close his eyes to the ethical component of Epicurean philosophy, and it is clear – as we shall see at IV.3 
below – that he does precisely that. I argued at II.5, and will elaborate at IV.3 below, that the discontinuity 
between Epicurus’ physics and his ethics facilitates its full abandonment. 
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channels. As we shall see, distinguishing the element from the compound is not 
a matter of frangibility in Asclepiades’ system; dissolution does not require pores. 
The human body, in Asclepiades physiology, is reticulated by subsensible πόροι. 
Pathology is rooted in the operations of his/her materially continuous constituents 
within the pores of materially discontinuous bodies. 
IV.2.2 Caelius Aurelianus, Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-7: atoms, ὄγκοι, and 
pathology 
The most informative account of Asclepiades’ corpuscular hypothesis is also our 
fullest source for his theory of health and disease. In seeking to understand how 
the ὄγκοι and pathology relate, Caelius’ Aurelianus’ Celeres passions (Cel. 
Pass.) 1.14.105-7 is a natural starting point:53  
Before giving our reply to Asclepiades let us first set out his doctrine, since 
those who have been caught up in its misconceptions are also caught up in 
errors of treatment. For he had first (primo) established atoms (atomos) as 
the principles (primordia) of the body, but in the second instance (secondo) 
(he established) onkoi perceptible by reason, without any usual quality (sine 
ulla qualitate solita), in motion from the beginning and moving perpetually. 
When these run into each other and are hit by mutual blows they are 
resolved into fragments of infinite parts (infinatarum partium fragmenta), 
differing from each other in size and shape (magnitudine atque schemate 
differentia). On the other hand, when in their course they (Sc. the onkoi) are 
thrown together or combined they generate all sensible things, having in 
themselves the power of change either through their size, number, shape 
or arrangement. And it does not seem to be unreasonable, he says, that 
bodies with no quality should generate (sc. all sensible things). For one thing 
follows the parts, another follows the whole: so silver is white, but the filing 
from it is black; goat’s horn is black, but the shaving is white. (He says) that 
pores, too, are created out of the combination of the onkoi, and are 
perceptible by reason and differ in size and shape. The flow of liquids travels 
through these in its usual course, and if it is not held back by any 
 
53 Other than Caelius’ source, Soranus, Asclepiades is the most frequently mentioned physician in Cel. 
Pass. We learn of no less than eleven Asclepiadean works through Caelius’ writing. It is possible that the 
following, abbreviated exposition is sourced from multiple works form Asclepiades’ corpus, written at 
different stages in his career. See Leith (2009) p.316, n.89. 
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impediment, health is maintained, but when it is impeded by the obstruction 
of onkoi it produces diseases. The obstruction of these (sc. onkoi) occurs 
either though their size, shape, number or very swift motions, or by the 
bending or closing up of the pores…54 
What we infer of Asclepiades’ Epicurean inheritances from this passage will be 
explored in IV.2.3. Corpuscular fragility per se is the subject of IV.2.4-5. For the 
time being, let us consider how, if at all, fragility (established at Cel. Pass. 105) 
relates to the theory of disease laid out at Cel. Pass. 1.14.106-107. 55  
     Disease is produced when the passage of ὄγκοι through πόροι becomes 
impeded. Obstructions, we may infer, occur because a change of some sort 
precipitates alterations in the behaviour of the ὄγκοι which, over time, creates 
impediments of various kinds. Caelius lists ‘size’, ‘shape’, ‘number’ and ‘very swift 
motions’ as the properties/activities of ὄγκοι which may bring about impaction 
(ἔνστασις). But it is not obvious how the property of frangibility fits into this picture. 
On first analysis, smaller ὄγκοι resulting from the fragmentation are not intuitively 
more likely to be obstructive than their larger counterparts.56 Similarly, frangibility 
permits ὄγκοι to change their shape in a manner that could plausibly precipitate 
obstruction – an ὄγκος, we might speculate, newly chipped from its predecessor, 
could form a wedge that might cause ὄγκοι to compound – but the concomitant 
reduction in mass would seem to limit the risk of this outcome and, in any case, 
in the absence of information as to why the ὄγκοι sometimes fracture on impact 
– for the doctrine of ἔνστασις would surely make deflection the most likely 
outcome of elemental contact – there is an intractable element of arbitrariness in 
 
54 Trans. Leith [forthcoming] = Leith 16.  
55 Caelius proceeds in Cel. Pass. 1.14.107-108 to list a small number of diseases that, according to 
Asclepiades, were not caused by the impaction of corpuscles. These include phrenitis, lethargia, pleuritis 
and violent fevers. The role of the ὄγκοι in the aetiology of these diseases is not at all clear. Solubiles 
fevers, for which Cel. Pass yields some information, arise from generalised disturbances in the body’s 
liquids and spiritus. With compaction ruled out of their aetiology, we are left with the ‘excessive looseness’ 
or distance between corpuscles as the primary cause. This is explicit at Cel. Pass. I.14.108 in which 
Asclepiades attributes bulimia, fainting, bodily flux and uncontrollable looseness to the openness of the 
pores (though whether or not these conditions always arise from the openness of the pores independently 
of some previous impaction seems ambiguous). Vallance (1990) p.117-122 sees a role for corpuscular 
fragility in solubiles diseases (which Vallance identifies as a separate category of disease, going further 
than Cel. Pass. 1.14.107-108 allows) but he speculates from very little evidence. The maladies at Cel. Pass. 
I.14.107-108 are (cursorily) discussed in terms of the body’s viae but the corpuscles are absent form 
Caelius’ account. See further IV.2.5.1, n.147. For the purpose of this section, I will focus on the species of 
disease for which the ὄγκοι play a specified role. 




this hypothesis that would surely expose the Rationalist’s limitations. We might 
suppose that attributing blockages to an increase in the ‘number’ of  ὄγκοι makes 
room for corpuscular fragility; the sudden resolution of an ὄγκος into fragments 
births chains of mechanical interactions that have knock-on effects for the size or 
direction of the pores. ‘Very swift motion’ may result from this if read as ‘very swift 
alterations to trajectory’ i.e. ’very swift individual motions’ with the speed of the 
ὄγκοι remaining constant;57 the smaller ὄγκοι bounce about between their larger 
counterparts, influencing their trajectory and causing a break in the salubrious 
pattern of activity that concludes in ἔνστασις. But, as before, this hypothesis 
attributes the cause of disease to a (presumably) unpredictable event taking 
place within the body. That we are reduced to such feats of speculation in our 
attempt to reconcile corpuscular fragility with Asclepiades’ theory of health in Cel. 
Pass. 1.14.105-7 should indicate just how uninformative our most informative 
witness is on this question. 
     However, in his reference to atoms at Cel. Pass. 1.14.105, Caelius suggests 
an answer as to why the doctrines under consideration prove so difficult to 
reconcile. This, I believe, is key to understanding Asclepiades’ relationship to 
Epicureanism; the confusion engendered by Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-7 is instructive 
if we allow for the possibility that Asclepiades’ interpolation of frangible elements 
into Epicurean physics was not principally motivated by pathological 
considerations (see IV.2.5.2). Vallance is dismissive of Caelius’ use of atomus at 
Cel. Pass. 1.14.105, proposing that the Latin word had lost its original meaning 
in the Greek.58 But, as he himself admits, a search for atomus in ancient literature 
uncoupled from its Democritean or Epicurean application will come up fruitless.59 
Leith takes Caelius’ use of atomus seriously.60 He argues, convincingly, that 
editions of Cel. Pass. 1.14-105 that print ‘primo’ (first) as ‘prima’, qualifying 
‘primordia’ are conspicuously tautologous, and that the stronger reading takes 
‘primo’ together with the pluperfect ‘constituerat’ to read ‘at first he had posited’ 
or variations thereof.61 This reading gives us two stages in the development of 
Asclepiades’ theory: ‘…he had first established atoms as the principles of the 
 
57 I revisit this somewhat confusing inclusion in Cel. Pass. 1.14.107 at IV.2.3.2 below. 
58 Vallance (1990) p.24-25. 
59 Ibid. p.25. 
60 Leith (2009) p.314-317. 
61 Ibid. p.315-316. 
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body, but in the second instance (he established) onkoi perceptible by reason.’62 
An alternative reading might pair atomos with fragmenta, on the assumption that 
onkoi and fragmenta refer to two different ontological tiers in Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-
107.63 But this would relegate the ὄγκοι to the peculiar (and surely superfluous) 
role of ‘fragment producers’, whose sole function is to lie deep beneath perception 
and burst into reality’s constituent seeds. A fuller treatment of the argument 
against this hypothesis will be visited in the next section; for now, we note that 
Leith’s rendering of Cel. Pass. 1.14.105, which emends ‘in infinita partium 
fragmenta solvantur’ to the decidedly less awkward ‘in infinita<rum> partium 
fragmenta solvantur’ (‘…resolved into fragments of infinite parts’) does not permit 
the pairing of atomos with fragmenta.64 I am confident that Cel. Pass. 1.14-105 
records an evolution in Asclepiades’ thinking which would see him first develop a 
medical theory from within the Epicurean atomist tradition and then, at a later 
stage, introduce corpuscular fragility into the system for some as-yet-unclear 
purpose. The rudiments of Asclepiades’ medical theory were in place before the 
interpolation of frangible ὄγκοι. 
     In support of this claim, I suggest that the theory of health preserved in Cel. 
Pass. 1.14.105-107 can easily be reconciled with Epicurean atomism. Epicurean 
atoms differ in size and shape; we do not need to introduce frangible ὄγκοι to 
facilitate corpuscular heterogeneity. I will deal with ‘number’ shortly below. As for 
the variable of speed, Epicurean physics does not permit variation in the speed 
of the corpuscles, but I am not at all convinced that an increase in speed is what 
is meant at Cel. Pass. 1.14.107. Certainly, an increase in the number of ‘very 
swift motions’ – an increase in arousal/agitation – is intelligible within an 
Epicurean system; it brings to mind the brief (and by itself unsatisfactory) atomic 
explanation for pain at DRN II.963-967, discussed at II.5.6, in which ‘pain occurs 
when particles of matter attacked by some force in the limbs and flesh quiver and 
tremble in their deep abodes’ if ‘motion’ refers to motion between collisions, 
elemental tumult.65 While I argued at II.5.6 that we can glean very little of 
Epicurus’ physical theory of pain from this passage, it is highly likely that 
Asclepiades’ medical theory, set out at Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-107, was initially an 
 
62 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.105 trans. Leith = Leith 16. 
63 As maintained by Gottschalk (1980) p.45-52; Pigeaud (1980) p.198-198. 
64 Leith (2009) p.312-313. See [Forthcoming] Leith 16. 
65 Trans. Melville (1997). Comparisons can also be found at Lucr. III.487-509; IV.664-670.  
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elaboration of a perfunctory atomic treatment of disease that attributed its 
emergence to vaguely defined atomic displacements. In identifying disease with 
the impaction of corpuscles in the body, he offers a more complete account of 
what atomic displacement might entail within the parameters established by his 
Epicurean predecessors. Moreover, if we suggest that corpuscular fragility played 
a minor role in Asclepiades’ theory of pathology – introduced, as it was, after the 
basic theory had become entrenched – we are less reliant upon seemingly 
random occurrences at the elemental level in our reconstruction of his theory of 
disease. If the passage of ὄγκοι through the πόροι can become impeded without 
the occurrence of a fracture, then the aetiology of obstruction spreads beyond the 
human body, becoming – at least potentially – intelligible, predictable and 
manageable to a degree. 
     In Sextus Empiricus’ exposition of Asclepiades’ theory at M. III.3-5,66 the 
‘continuous effluences’ of corpuscles from the body to the outside world is listed 
alongside the existence of πόροι in the body and the perpetual motion of the ὄγκοι 
as one of three hypotheses necessary to explain the obstruction that brings about 
fever. There are two relevant details to be extracted from this passage that 
supplement our analysis of Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-107. The first is that the theory 
necessitates the reciprocal exchange of ὄγκοι between the body and the external 
world, allowing for externally derived obstruction. Reciprocal replenishment is 
Epicurean doctrine;67 we would expect a medical theory developed within this 
system to incorporate this doctrine into the aetiology of disease. The mechanics 
of external to internal atomic interaction certainly allow for an aetiology of 
pathology; we need only posit an intruding pattern that contains some property 
that disrupts the body’s equilibrium – that, in Asclepiadean terms, precipitates 
ἔνστασις. The second is that effluences vary depending on circumstances inside 
the body. The context of M III.3-5, in which the foundational hypotheses for fever 
in Asclepiades’ system are discussed, suggests that we read the reduction in 
effluences as a consequence of obstructed πόροι, such that the body retains 
more ὄγκοι and produces more localised obstructions from which pain/disease 
 
66 Sextus’ credentials as a commentator on Asclepiades of Bithynia are enforced by his apparently 
extensive treatment of the doctor’s theories in his Medical Memoirs, sadly lost (M VII.202). Asmis (1993) 
argues that Sextus’ reports offer a more lucid starting point than Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-107. But subsequent 
work on Cel. Pass. 1.14-105-107, particularly in Leith (2009), cleared up much of the ambiguity that Asmis 
(1993) takes issue with. 
67 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 48. 
209 
 
proliferates. The number of ὄγκοι in the body is thus a variable independent of 
corpuscular fragility. The mechanics of fever hinted at in M III.3-5 are explicable 
in broadly Epicurean terms – indeed, the doctrine of corpuscular fragility seems 
to threaten to the intelligible aetiology of fever hinted at in M III.3-5; the breaking 
of the ὄγκοι is only reconcilable with Asclepiades’ pathology if it is either a) an 
extremely rare occurrence or b) somehow predictable (or c) both). We will return 
to both these possibilities below. 
     I submit, therefore, at the outset of our inquiry, that the theory preserved in 
both Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-107 and S. E. M III.3-5 was initially developed within 
the constraints of a broadly Epicurean physics,68 and that the doctrine of 
corpuscular fragility represents a later development in Asclepiades’ thought. 
Evidently, in Asclepiades’ view, the introduction of fragile corpuscles into the 
existent system did not compromise the initial theory but served some additional 
purpose, one that could – perhaps with some additional tinkering (see IV.2.4.2) – 
be reconciled with the theory of pathology derived from atomism. As Vallance’s 
work has inadvertently taught us, the fragility of the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι represents 
such a radical departure from atomism that the similarities – particularly with 
respect to the Epicurean model – can become obscured. It is important that we 
foreground the continuity between Epicurean and Asclepiadean corpuscularism 
before we narrow our focus to the question of what motivated Asclepiades’ 
modification. The next section completes the foundations of our inquiry. 
IV.2.3 Epicurean inheritances   
How Epicurean are the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι? They are imperceptible, exist in perpetual 
motion, possess only primary qualities – size, shape and tangibility –, and behave 
in accordance with mechanical principles, ungoverned by intelligence or 
teleology. 
IV.2.3.1 λόγῳ θεωρητοί/intellectu sensa  
The mechanism by which ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι are apprehended is integral to the 
question of Epicureanism’s medical value, but our assessment of Asclepiades’ 
epistemology awaits us in IV.2.5. For now, note that both Caelius Aurelianus and 
 
68 I qualify ‘broadly’ in anticipation of our discussion of Asclepiades’ determinism at IV.3.2.  
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Sextus Empiricus describe the ὄγκοι as being ‘perceptible to reason’.69 This 
phrase is earliest attested in Epicurus’ writings and is standard Epicurean 
phraseology.70 We see it used to describe the atoms in Aët. 1.3.18.71 The 
phenomenal world is divided from the world of per se entities by the mechanism 
of their apprehension in both the Epicurean and Asclepiadean system. Reason 
reaches further than the senses; ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι, like atoms, cannot be perceived, 
but can be inferred. 
IV.2.3.2 Motion 
Through their motion, the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι reveal their specifically Epicurean 
genealogy. Caelius Aurelianus and Sextus Empiricus refer to their perpetual 
motion.72 ‘Obstruction’, ἔνστασις, refers to clusters of vibrating ὄγκοι impeding the 
passage of approaching bodies but never coming to a stop.73 That atoms are by 
nature restless is, as noted at II.3.7, an Epicurean addition to the atomist tradition, 
part of his more sophisticated doctrine of atomic motion developed in response 
to Aristotle’s criticisms of void theory in Physics IV.74 As covered in IV.2.1, the 
perpetual motion of the ὄγκοι contributes to our conception of Asclepiades as a 
void theorist in the Epicurean mode.75  
     Epicurus also argued – again, responding to Aristotle’s critique of 
Democritean atomism in Physics IV76 – that all atoms move through void at equal 
speed (ἰσοτάχεια).77 We find no confirmation that Asclepiades adopted this 
doctrine in the extant testimonia. However, given the depth of his engagement 
with Epicurean physics – the argument for which I will continue to develop as we 
proceed through this chapter (see esp. IV.2.4.2) – that he was ignorant of this 
doctrine is near impossible. It is unclear, moreover, what medical advantage 
disavowing ἰσοτάχεια might avail him. The reference to ‘very swift motion’ 
 
69 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.106 describes the ὄγκοι as ‘intellectu sensa.’; S. E. M III.3-5 uses the phrase 
λόγῳ θεωρητοί in relation to the ὄγκοι. See also e.g. Cass. Probl. 61. 
70 e.g. Epic. Ep. Hdt. 47 in relation to minimum units of time. 
71 Atoms are σώματα λόγῳ θεωρητά, cf. S. E. M III.3-5. 
72 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.105; S. E. M. III.3-5. 
73 The cognate verb ἐνίσταμαι means merely ‘to resist’. 
74 Arist. Phys. IV.8, 215a 19-22. Epic. Ep. Hdt. 43-47 for the perpetual motion of the atoms. For Epicurus’ 
adaptation of Democritean void theory, see Inwood (1981).  
75 That void is seldom referenced directly with respect to Asclepiades reflects the doctor’s preference for 
the vocabulary of ‘seams’ and ‘seamlessness’ over multifunctional terminology (IV.2.1), but the 
mechanics of corpuscular motion in his theory betrays its Epicurean frame. 
76 Arist. Phys. IV.8, 216a 12-21. 
77 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 61. 
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(‘celerrimi motus’) as a variable contributing to blockages in Cel. Pass. 1.14.107 
is the only line in any of our sources that might cause us to doubt Asclepiades’ 
commitment to the ἰσοτάχεια of the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι. I suggested above that we 
read this variable as referring to the number of swift motions, as opposed to 
variation in speed per se. This would be to read ‘celerrimi motus’ as ‘very swift 
arousal’ which could denote an adjustment in the flow of ὄγκοι through the πόροι 
that increases the frequency of collisions.78 An alternative suggestion is made by 
David Leith in his forthcoming book. Leith speculates that ‘very swift motion’ 
refers to that of a group of ὄγκοι in a singular direction; no individual ὄγκος 
accelerates, but a period without obstruction permits great distance to be covered 
in minimal time.79 He does not explain precisely how this precipitates ἔνστασις; 
presumably, these ὄγκοι will converge upon an obstacle and immediately 
precipitate the kinds of chaotic interactions that resolve themselves into 
impaction, or else cluster abruptly in a pore. Both suggestions are speculative, 
but either is preferable to the alternative proposition that Asclepiades’ discarded 
this consequence of Epicurean void-theory for some uncertain purpose. 
Aristotle’s argument in Phys. VI.2 that differences in speed are only possible if 
matter is infinitely divisible is the only relevant consideration.80 As we shall see at 
IV.2.4.2 below, Asclepiades’ (I will argue explicit) rejection of the Epicurean 
theory of minima engendered a cosmos that was structurally – though of course 
not materially – continuous. But I fail to see how Asclepiades’ rejection of 
Epicurean minima would override the argument that the activity of the ὄγκοι takes 
place within an intangible substratum which, by its very definition, offers no 
physical resistance. We know that Asclepiades’ accepted that particles in void 
were perpetually restless. The least conjectural assumption is that Asclepiades’ 




78 cf. Lucr. II.963-967. 
79 Leith [forthcoming] II.1.1.2. 
80 Arist. Phys. VI.2, 232b 20-233a 12. See Furley (1967) p 111-130, Sedley (1999) p.379 for the Epicurean 
incorporation of Aristotle’s observation into their theory. 
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IV.2.3.3 Qualitative status81  
Caelius Aurelianus tells us that the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι are ‘without any usual quality’ 
(sine ulla qualitate solita).82 Accepting that the fragmenta referenced at Cel. Pass. 
1.14.105 are not ontologically distinct from the corpuscula intellectu sensa 
introduced in the same passage,83 we also learn from Caelius Aurelianus that the 
ὄγκοι differ in size and shape,84 rendering ‘qualitate solita’ a reference to 
secondary or phenomenal qualities.85 In On the Elements according to 
Hippocrates (Hipp. Elem.), Galen attributes the argument that ‘the first element 
is without qualities’ to all ‘those who suppose that the element is by nature one’, 
whether they call it ἄτομον or ἄναρμον,86 and Sextus Empiricus further confirms 
the qualitative disparity between the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι and the phenomena 
generated through their interactions. He writes at M X.318 that the ὄγκοι, like the 
atoms of Democritus and Epicurus, are ‘dissimilar’ (ἀνομοίων) to the bodies 
which follow from them, referring to the discontinuity between phenomenal 
qualities and their material basis. At PH III.32-33 he tells us Asclepiades and his 
followers posit elements that are ‘qualityless’ (ἄποια).87 Thus, for Asclepiades, as 
for Epicurus, phenomenal qualities are accidents of specific constellations of 
elemental bodies of specific shapes which, individually, contain no trace of their 
consequence in sense-reality beyond that which is predicated of a body.88 
 
81 Leith’s 2009 article ‘The qualitative status of the onkoi in Asclepiades’ theory of matter’ remains the 
most authoritative and comprehensive treatment of this question. What follows is a summary of the 
primary evidence for Asclepiades’ ὄγκοι being without secondary/phenomenal qualities. 
82 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. I.14.105.  
83 See Leith (2009) p.289-290 and IV.2.4.1 below. 
84 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. I.14.105 – ‘…magnitudine atque schemate differentia.’ 
85 Leith (2009) p.290. 
86 Gal. Hipp. Elem. 2.9-11. Though Asclepiades is not referenced by name in this passage, we can be sure 
that the Asclepiadeans are included among those listed; Galen never refers to the ἄναρμον element in 
connection with anybody else. See Vallance (1990) p.16. 
87 Note that the Mutschmann-Mau’s Teubner edition of PH III.32-33 (p.142) reads ‘ποιά’, not’ ἄποια’, 
‘qualified’ not ‘qualityless’/’unqualified’. Leith (2009) p.294-299 argues that ‘ποιά’ is a mistaken 
emendation of a corruption in the manuscript tradition, which originally described Asclepiades’ corpuscles 
as ‘τοῖα’ (of this sort, such) which is nonsensical in context. To summarise Leith’s argument, given that the 
purpose of PH III.32-33 is to illustrate the disparities between the various dogmatic element theorists 
listed, emending  ‘τοῖα’  to ‘ποιά’ fails to illuminate a distinction between Asclepiades’ ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι and 
the homoiomeries of Anaxagoras which possess every perceptible quality. The internal logic of the 
passage is thus distorted. Amending ‘τοῖα’ to ‘ἄποια’ preserves the logic of Sextus’ argument and brings 
PH III.32-33 into agreement with M X.318. 
88 cf. Epic. Ep. Hdt. 54, Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. I.14.105. Cel. Pass. 1.14.106 records an Asclepiadean argument 
for the dissimilarity of part and whole which uses empirical data to illustrate a relationship which extends 
beyond the senses: ‘…it does not seem to be unreasonable…that bodies with no quality should generate 
(sc. all sensible things). For one thing follows the parts, another follows the whole: so silver is white, but 
the filing from it is black; goat’s horn is black, but the shaving is white.’ – trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 
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IV.2.4 Implications of corpuscular fragility 
Asclepiades’ particulate theory of matter shares too much with Epicurean 
atomism to support the hypothesis that it was independently invented. Our 
reading of Cel. Pass. 1.14.105 as evidence for an initial ‘atomist’ stage in 
Asclepiades’ thinking is supported by the evidence for his theory’s Epicurean 
inheritances. Against this background, the introduction of fragile corpuscles 
constitutes a radical departure from an inherited physics that demands an 
explanation, but one which our sources are reluctant to yield. I suggested at 
IV.2.1 that a radical departure from Epicurean doctrine was necessary if 
Asclepiades wanted to affirm the independence of his discipline in the manner 
we see more conservatively undertaken by the Pneumatists in late first century 
BCE, given the fewer opportunities for selective adoption afforded by 
Epicureanism’s two-tier epistemology. Replacing atoms with frangible ὄγκοι 
would certainly have proven an effective method of severing ties with 
Epicureanism. But the challenge is surely to retain whatever medical utility 
Asclepiades found in Epicurus’ philosophy as he denudes his predecessor’s 
elements of their defining characteristic. In this section, we explore the 
consequences of introducing frangible elements to Epicurean physics. I will argue 
that Asclepiades demonstrates a comprehensive awareness of the second-order 
effects of this adaptation within an Epicurean framework, and I will suggest, 
following Asmis,89 that he took measures to ensure that his rejection of Epicurean 
 
16. Note the parallel between the argument preserved at Cel. Pass. 1.14.106 and the Epicurean argument 
for the same conclusion at DRN II.788-94 (identified in Leith (forthcoming) II.1.1.3). cf. also Epic. EP. Hdt. 
55. Lucretius warns his reader against attributing colours to ‘first-beginnings’ since ‘white things are not 
made from white, nor what are black from black’ and though he does not repeat Asclepiades’ silver or 
goat’s horn examples, Leith (forthcoming) II.1.1.3 makes a convincing case that the poet and the doctor 
share a source in Epicurus’ On Nature. In his exposition of Aenesidemus’ seventh Trope leading to the 
suspension of judgement (a subject we return to at V.2.1), Sextus Empiricus uses both examples at PH 
I.129 to illustrate the transformative effects of ‘composition’ on sense impressions. For Aenesidemus, this 
is an argument for sceptical conclusions where the variable of ‘composition’ has a distortive effect on the 
truth-value of sense-data, but Annas and Barnes (1985) p.120-121 have drawn attention to the 
argument’s Epicurean background; in a passage from his Symposium, reported in Plut. Adv. Col. 1109f-
1110a, Epicurus argues that wine is not innately warming, but can have a cooling effect in certain 
quantities and under certain circumstances. For Epicurus, this is not an argument for scepticism but the 
opposite; it is an attempt to assure his followers that disparities in sense-data do not preclude their 
validity (Ibid. 1109c-1110a). If the seventh Trope has an Epicurean origin, it is likely that the examples 
used to demonstrate that Trope were derived from the same source (a plausible candidate is Epic. Nat. 5, 
see Sedley (1998) p.116-119). Asclepiades’ silver and goat’s horn example at Cel. Pass. 1.14.106 shares a 
common origin with that repurposed at PH I.129. It is no coincidence that the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι share their 
qualitative status with Epicurus’ atoms; unlike Aenesidemus, Asclepiades adopts Epicurean arguments for 
Epicurean conclusions. 
89 Asmis (1993) p.154. 
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atomism did not preclude the facility of his system to account for phenomenal 
constancy.  
IV.2.4.1 Multiplication of ὄγκοι (or the rejection of the two-tier hypothesis) 
First, a more sophisticated reconstruction of what corpuscular fragility entails. 
Much of twentieth-century Asclepiadean scholarship has misguidedly ascribed to 
Asclepiades a two-tier element theory,90 whereby a frangible molecule or seed-
like entity is resolved into more fundamental fragments.91 This tradition developed 
from the confusion generated by the inconsistent terminology we find in our 
sources with respect to Asclepiades’ particles, and perceived contradictions in 
our testimonia concerning their qualitative status.92 It reaches its peak with 
Pearcy’s 1991 review of Vallance’s Lost Theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia in 
which Pearcy’s dedication to the two-tier hypothesis forces him to read the onkoi 
in Cel. Pass. 1.14.105 as being entirely without qualities – that is, not even size 
and shape – and the fragmenta into which they are resolved as somehow 
attaining primary qualities in the aftermath of their (one is inclined to think, 
impossible) collisions.93 The resolution of purely metaphysical entities into bodies 
of size and shape through some unfathomable interaction is pleasing to 
contemplate, but we have little reason to believe that Asclepiades indulged. 
Vallance established that our sources for Asclepiades’ corpuscular hypothesis 
can only be made consistent if we assume that the references to ὄγκοι, ἄναρμοι 
ὄγκοι, ἄναρμα στοιχεῖα, corpuscula, fragmenta and moles all refer to the same 
basic particle.94 Leith’s rendering of Cel. Pass. 1.14.105 in which the onkoi are 
resolved into ‘fragments of infinite parts’ removes the disparity between onkoi and 
fragmenta upon which Pearcy bases his conclusion.95 
     As the ὄγκοι already possess the minimal complement of properties necessary 
for existence in a materialist system, the only variable by which a yet more 
 
90 Not to be confused with his two-tier epistemology (see IV.2.1). 
91 Lonie (1964), for example, who identified Asclepiades’ physical theory with that of Heraclides Ponticus, 
used Plato’s two-tier geometric theory of elements (Plat. Tim. 53-57) as a model. Gottschalk (1980) p.45-
52 distinguishes onkoi/corpuscula from fragmenta in Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.105, proposing that the 
former, a seed-like compound, possesses phenomenal qualities, where the latter are unqualified, more 
fundamental and essentially atomic. 
92 Contradictions which are resolved, to my satisfaction, in Leith (2009) esp. p.294-299. 
93 Pearcy (1991) – ‘…the quality-less corpuscula, the context of Caelius’ statement suggests, are distinct 
from the qualified fragmenta…The corpuscula lack qualities; the particles called fragmenta have at least 
some.’ 
94 Vallance (1990) p.7-43. 
95 Leith (2009) p.312-313. See IV.2.2 above. 
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primitive particle could be distinguished from an ὄγκος is that of frangibility. It is 
difficult to see how Asclepiades’ corpuscularism would not eventually devolve into 
an atomist system under these conditions. The suggestion that particles in 
Asclepiades’ system can recombine into ἄναρμοι (seamless) ὄγκοι – a theory 
which might protect those clinging to the two-tier interpretation of Asclepiades’ 
element theory from the charge that this is merely atomism with a cumbersome 
and pointless extra step – will be treated at IV.2.4.3 below, but while I am 
sympathetic to the recombination hypothesis, the evidence does not support the 
supposition that Asclepiades imposed a limit on the physical divisibility of his 
ὄγκοι such that he could accurately be said to have proposed two distinct types 
of particle. Leith’s rendering of Cel. Pass. 1.14.105 precludes the possibility that 
ὄγκοι will eventually be resolved into atomic particles; the fragmenta that spring 
from collisions are themselves infinitely divisible. Caelius can describe 
Asclepiades’ corpuscula as primordia despite their fragility because corpuscula 
and fragmenta refer to the same particle.96 Fracture an ὄγκος, you have multiple 
ὄγκοι. The quality and quantity of material in the cosmos remains constant. The 
quantity of bodies has increased. 
IV.2.4.2 Rejection of Epicurean minima  
ὄγκοι are as atoms in form but not in material; though they share with atoms the 
properties of size and shape, their motion, their ability to act on one another and 
their alienation from phenomenal qualities, their internal structure is of a 
fundamentally different order. In his rejection of atomic indivisibility, Asclepiades 
rids his particles of Epicurean minima; if the ὄγκοι were assembled of minimal 
magnitudes then a limit would be imposed upon their physical divisibility which, 
when reached, would yield atomism.97 The ὄγκος is a structural continuum, 
infinitely divisible and without internal limits.98 
 
96 Vallance (1990) p.42. 
97 Albeit a novel form of atomism in which the ‘minimum in thought’, not typically extricable from the 
structure in which it belongs, is equal to the smallest bounded physical magnitude. 
98 Asclepiades’ cosmos thus shares with that of Aristotle and the Stoics the property of structural 
continuity, where its material discontinuity is inherited from Epicurus and Democritus before him. A 
hybrid system such as this is not peculiar to medical theory. Strato of Lampsacus held that the cosmos 
was materially discontinuous on account of the existence of interstitial pockets of void but was structurally 
continuous (see Furley (1999) p.415-516). The dialectician Diodorus Cronus – though one is hesitant to 
ascribe him a bone fide physical theory – suggested the opposite through his arguments against motion. 
See Sedley (1999) p.356-362, II.3.7 above and further below. We should note, however, that a particulate 
theory of matter that upheld both large-scale void and structural continuity is a novelty. It is interesting – 
and, I think, significant – to note that despite the popularity of Asclepiades’ medical school we detect no 
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     Two pieces of evidence indicate that Asclepiades knowingly rejected 
Epicurus’ theory of minima and that he regarded his theory of matter as the 
superior alternative. At Cel. Pass. 1.14.105 we learn that Asclepiades’ fragmenta 
(= ὄγκοι) contain infinite parts. Lucretius argues that minima are a ballast against 
the absurd proposition that the smallest bodies in the universe consist of infinite 
parts,99 affirming the opposition between the two systems. But it is a mistake to 
suggest that this opposition is merely incidental. The language of ‘parts’ in the 
context of Caelius’ exposition seems to have curious, anti-Epicurean implications 
if read in conjunction with our sources for Epicurean minima. Atoms are 
conceptually divisible into magnitudes, not ‘parts’ as commonly understood.100 
Minima cannot be conceived separately from the atoms of which they are internal 
limits;101 they are ‘parts’ only as far as reason measures the atom in the units they 
embody.102 Expounding his doctrine of minima in Ep. Hdt. 56-59, Epicurus begins 
by discarding the physical system that Asclepiades would later adopt. He uses 
the word ‘ὄγκος’ (translated as ‘bit’ in LS 9 A) in Ep. Hdt. 56 to denote precisely 
the kind of constituent into which atoms cannot be conceptually resolved, one 
among an infinite number of parts. The name of Asclepiades’ corpuscles – by 
itself an unqualified descriptor of a ‘mass’ – thus acquires a new significance, an 
oppositional quality in light of the doctor’s Epicurean inheritances, and so too 
does Caelius’ wording at Cel. Pass. 1.14.105. The ὄγκοι are resolved into bodies 
‘of infinite parts’ – or ‘ὄγκοι of infinite ὄγκοι’, with the two-tier hypothesis (IV.2.4.1) 
having been ruled out. Caelius foregrounds the infinite divisibility of the emergent 
ὄγκοι (though he himself does not use this particular appellation) as if the doctor’s 
hostility to the Epicurean theory of minima were somehow in the background; 
Asclepiades’ rejection of atomic indivisibility is already clear in the fragmentation 
of the corpuscula, emphasising that the fragmenta are themselves potentially 
infinitely divisible – when surely this is already implied – is a tantalising extra step. 
 
influence of this model on subsequent philosophical discussions. Whatever the utility of this system to 
Asclepiades’ objectives it had no life beyond his school. Is this because the distance it created between 
Asclepiades and his philosophical predecessors was its primary purpose? I return to this question at 
IV.2.5.2. 
99 Lucr. I.615-618. 
100 Vlastos (1965) p.135-136. 
101 Lucr. I.599-634. 
102 Vlastos (1965) p.136. From Verde (2013) p.331-332 (English summary): ‘From Aristotle’s definition [of 
πέρας, ‘limit’] Epicurus borrows the idea that limits can never be separated from that which they limit, 
yet he does not accept the idea that limits cannot be constitutive parts. Minima, in this respect, are 
‘constitutive limits’ but not parts of atoms. ἐλάχιστα/ πέρατα thus ensure the indivisibility of atoms.’ 
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The Asclepiadean ὄγκος, physically indivisible and, conceptually, an abundance 
of infinite ‘bits’, each with the potential to be released from its mass, may be 
interpreted as a consciously anti-Epicurean invention, exhibiting the kind of 
hostility towards the original system that one would expect, not from a 
philosophical rival, but from an offshoot, a pupil straining to assert his intellectual 
independence from his teacher. 
     The depth of Asclepiades’ familiarity with Epicurus’ theory of minima is 
clarified by our second piece of evidence, a prima facie anomalous testimony 
from Aëtius’ Placita, upon which David Leith has recently thrown light.103 Aët. 1.23 
reports that, for Asclepiades, ‘all motion is sense-perceptible’ (πᾶσαν κίνησιν 
αἰσθητήν). The status of the ὄγκοι as perceptible only to reason would appear to 
contradict this claim.104 Leith suggests that we understand this statement in the 
context of Diodorus Cronus’ argument against motion, since he is listed nearby 
in Aët. 1.23 in conjunction with his theory of granular progression.105 The theory 
rests on Diodorus’ pre-Epicurean analysis of matter and space into partless 
magnitudes; a partless body cannot exist between partless spaces therefore it 
cannot move between them, but it can be said to have moved from one partless 
space to the next.106 Epicurus accepted Diodorus’ conclusion that partless 
magnitudes entail granular motion107 and drew a further epistemological 
conclusion that Diodorus, the dialectician, was apparently uninterested in 
pursuing – that is, that motion per se is not sense-perceptible for it can only be 
acknowledged retrospectively.108 S. E. M X.62-65 provides perhaps the only 
discussion of the imperceptibility of motion in our sources.109 Sextus writes of 
motion that ‘those who maintain that it is grasped not by sense-perception, but 
by thought through sense-perception, say that every motion occurs in virtue of 
simultaneous recollection; for by calling to mind that this body was once in one 
place, but is now in this place, we grasp the conception of motion and having 
moved.’110 The Epicurean identity of those who maintain that motion is grasped 
only by reason is revealed in M X.65: ‘…all motion is conceived in terms of the 
 
103 Leith (forthcoming) II.1.3. 
104 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.105; S. E. M III.3-5. 
105 Or ‘staccato’ motion, summarised at II.3.7. See Leith (forthcoming) II.1.3. 
106 S. E. M.10.85-86. See Sedley (1999) p.356-362. 
107 Simp. In Ar. Phys. 934.23-30. 
108 Leith (forthcoming) II.1.3. 
109 Cited in Ibid.  
110 Trans. Bett (2012). 
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leaving and taking up of a place. But sense-perception cannot grasp either place 
(for no place is perceptible) or taking up and leaving; for these are observed by 
memory, but sense-perception, being non-rational, is without memory. Therefore, 
motion is not something perceptible.’111 Epicurus describes perception as being 
‘non-rational and capable of no memory’ in the Κανών (as reported in D. L. X.31) 
and described place as imperceptible in Ep. Hdt. 40. That memory is essential to 
grasping motion in a cosmos where material jumps from partless space to 
partless space is clear; if sense-perception is without memory then it is easy to 
see how the Epicureans might have taken the view that motion per se was not 
sense-perceptible, and how this epistemological conclusion would arise from 
their theory of minima. Returning to Aët. 1.23, Asclepiades’ claim that ‘all motion 
is sense-perceptible‘ can be reconciled with his doctrine of ὄγκοι perceptible to 
reason if understood as a deliberate contradiction of the Epicurean view.112 
Motion occurs fluidly as one might intuit from perception alone (hence πᾶσαν 
κίνησιν αἰσθητήν), but the fluid motion of individual ὄγκοι, grasped by reason, is 
never witnessed by the senses.  
     How are we to read a physician’s theorising on the sense-perceptibility of 
motion? Two conclusions suggest themselves, one firm and one more 
speculative. 1) Asclepiades’ familiarity with Epicurean physics was such that he 
understood the second and third order effects of introducing corpuscular fragility 
into the system; fragility precludes partless bodies which precludes partless 
spaces which entails fluid/theoretically perceptible motion. Our reading of 
Asclepiades’ physics as an adaptation of Epicurean atomism receives further 
support. 2) Asclepiades’ works contained critiques of Epicurean atomism. It is a 
challenge to identify the medical value of a doctrine of fluid corpuscular motion. 
We should perhaps be unsurprised that Asclepiades was in the habit of venturing 
outside medicine’s disciplinary boundaries in defence of his core thesis, given its 
foundation (at least in its maturity) in a novel physics. That the third order effects 
of his rejection of atomic divisibility featured in at least one of his works permits 
us to speculate that some effort was dedicated to justifying his medical theory 
against Epicurean physics. We learn from Galen that a portion of On Elements 
was dedicated to defending his physics against those who blend substances 
 
111 Trans. Bett (2012). 
112 And novel enough to warrant recording in Aëtius’ Placita. 
219 
 
together through-and-through;113 one can easily imagine a similar attack on those 
who argue that the elements consist of partless bodies. Reading Aët. 1.23 in 
conjunction with Cel. Pass. 1.14.105, in which a critique of Epicurean minima is 
plausibly inferred, we might conclude that Asclepiades considered the 
Epicureans to be especially vulnerable on this question. The value of capitalising 
on this vulnerability, when the tenor of the debate seems too intrinsically 
theoretical to be of obvious practical (i.e. medical) utility, may simply be to 
generate distance between his theory and the philosophy to which it was 
indebted. Asclepiades’ hybrid cosmology, where the cosmos is structurally 
continuous but materially discontinuous, was never incorporated into subsequent 
physics arising from outside his school. Its value, I suggest, was derived from its 
novelty, a sign of Asclepiades’ independence from Epicurus and perhaps, by 
extension, of medicine’s independence from philosophy. Its value is therefore 
peculiar to Asclepiades and his school, those for whom innovation was essential 
to their intellectual emancipation. 
IV.2.4.3 Preserving phenomenal constancy  
If we take the view that Asclepiades was perfectly acquainted with Epicurean 
physics, as the evidence above (IV.2.4.2) would seem to indicate, then we must 
accept that he was sensitive to the more destructive implications of rejecting 
atomic indivisibility. On the necessity of atomism, Lucretius is clear:  
For we see things can be dissolved more quickly 
Than reconstructed. Therefore what past years  
And bygone days of all eternity  
Had broken up before now, dissolved and shattered,  
In time remaining could never be made new.  
But as it is, a certain end is given of breaking,  
Since we see all things renewed  
And fixed times stand for things after their kind  
 
113 Gal. Hipp. Elem. 9.25-26.  
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In which they can attain the flower of life.114 
Destruction outpaces generation; without limits on destruction nothing can be 
renewed. Fixed cycles of generation also signify an underlying constancy, as do 
the recurrence of other patterns in nature, such as the patterns displayed on the 
feathers of birds and the transmission of qualities from a parent to a child.115 
Asclepiades is protected, to an extent, from the argument at DRN I.584-598 
against qualitative change, given that his corpuscles are without qualities beyond 
size, shape and resistance (the latter of which remains constant through each 
fracture), but not entirely.116 Gabor Betegh has shown that Epicurus’ argument 
for atomism in Ep. Hdt. 40-41 concerns itself primarily with the quality of 
unalterability, of which uncutability is a subset.117 Betegh casts Epicurus as a 
‘bundle theorist’, one who, in metaphysical contexts, reduces bodies to the sum 
of their properties.118 He suggests that Epicurus emphasised the distinction 
between permanent and accidental properties – a consequence of the atomism 
on which his conception of permanence rests  – in order to ensure that changes 
in accidental properties do not entail the destruction of the entity in question.119 
This consideration is necessary because Epicurus, for reasons I lay out at II.4, 
regards the phenomenal properties of composite bodies and the intrinsic 
properties of atoms to be equally real;120 if change entails the destruction of ABC 
in the birthing of ABD, it would result in transformations occurring into and from 
non-being.121 Being without secondary qualities, the alterability of the ὄγκοι is 
confined to transformations in size and shape. A distinction between permanent 
and accidental attributes – which is certainly implied by the division of reality into 
the binary world perceptible to reason and the diversified, mutating world of the 
senses, as well as Asclepiades’ atomist beginnings (IV.2.2) – may be upheld with 
reference to the qualitative constancy of the corpuscles. After all, for Asclepiades, 
macroscopic qualitative change occurs not through the mutations of the ὄγκοι, 
but through their ‘transposition, addition and subtraction,’ as is typical of ancient 
 
114 Lucr. I.556-564 trans. Melville (1997) 
115 Ibid. I.584-598. 
116 The argument at Lucr. I.584-598 would appear to have a general account of qualitative alterability in 
mind, not change as consequence of divisibility per se.  
117 Betegh (2006) esp. p.277-283. 
118 Ibid. p.280. 
119 Ibid. p.280-281. 
120 Contrast with Democritus. See S. E. M. VII.135. 
121 Betegh (2006) p.282. Cf. Epic. Ep. Hdt. 54. 
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particulate theories of matter.122 Nevertheless, Epicurus makes it clear in Ep. Hdt. 
54 that fixity of shape and mass are essential to his analysis of qualitative change 
in the phenomenal world. It is not enough that the properties of body remain 
constant; the bodies themselves cannot admit change. Perhaps, if we were to 
conjecture a defence of Asclepiades’ system in light of the argument for 
Epicurean atomism unveiled by Betegh, we might posit that the atom – an 
unspecific (though very likely irregular) solid shape – being in perpetual motion, 
struck from every angle, travelling in all directions and (we are probably safe to 
presume) often rotating, is perpetually transforming with respect to its disposition 
relative to other atoms. As Betegh notes, the Greek word for ‘unalterable’, 
ἀμετάβλητος, used in Ep. Hdt. 40-41 can be used with respect to relational 
properties.123 We might argue that Epicurus places too high a value on 
permanence of shape under these circumstances, particularly if shape could be 
altered in such a way as to prevent material from perishing into non-being (which 
is to say, through cutting). Given the evidence for Asclepiades having shared 
Epicurus’ epistemology (which we will examine in detail at IV.5) it is reasonable 
to suppose that a defence of corpuscular alterability that explained perceptible 
change without recourse to destruction into non-being was merited. But even if 
such an epistemological defence could be mounted – leaving aside how 
convincing we might find it – it would not address the argument at DRN I.556-564 
that ongoing reduction to the size of the corpuscles will inevitably outpace 
generation. How can Asclepiadean physics preserve phenomenal constancy?  
     Was Asclepiades, the doctor, simply uninterested in these consequences? 
The evidence for his engagement in the question of granular vs. non-granular 
motion – a non-medical and entirely theoretical consequence of a medically 
motivated adaptation to the Epicurean system – makes this conclusion 
unlikely.124 A rejection of Epicurean minima is a defence of corpuscular fragility 
against the mother-doctrine; it would stretch credulity to suggest that Asclepiades 
 
122 See Betegh (2006) p.282 and Leith [forthcoming] II.1.2. 
123 Betegh (2006) p.279, n.30. The etymology of μεταβάλλω implies change in position rather more 
strongly than change per se. 
124 The contributions to theory we ascribed to Athenaeus of Attalia in III.4 are, by contrast, elaborations 
of existing Stoic doctrines – that is, ideas build upon foundations that survive the new weight. The αἴτιον 
προηγούμενον, which I suggested at III.4.4 was an Athenaean innovation, does no harm to existing Stoic 
doctrine. Athenaeus found emancipation through self-imposed epistemological restrictions which his 
adopted physical framework permitted. Asclepiades, being without such an option, innovates more 
radically and must justify his adaptation against his adopted framework. See further IV.2.5. 
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ignored the most obvious Epicurean objection to his reformulation. Elizabeth 
Asmis, in her 1993 review article of Vallance’s Lost Theory of Asclepiades of 
Bithynia, proposed that Asclepiades must have introduced a doctrine of 
corpuscular fusion alongside corpuscular fragility to preserve phenomenal 
constancy.125 She points to two passages in the Anonymus Londinensis in which 
Asclepiades reportedly cited the outflow and inflow of substances from and into 
the body as evidence of nature’s facility to ‘preserve law’ and ‘preserve what is 
just and consequential.’126 Nature is an aggregate of balancing mechanisms 
predicated, we might assume, on a singular, primitive balancing mechanism 
perceptible only to reason. Unfortunately, the evidence to support a doctrine of 
corpuscular fusion is limited. Asmis cites a passage from Galen’s Natural 
Faculties in which he attributes to Asclepiades the novel theory that urine gathers 
in the bladder out of vapours that percolate through its walls.127 She reads the 
dissolution of liquid into vapours as an account of the breaking of the ὄγκοι and 
the subsequent reconstitution of the liquid as an account of their coalescence into 
larger particles.128 This interpretation goes beyond what the evidence tells us 
explicitly; the account in Nat. Fac. II.32 K. necessitates neither corpuscular 
fragility nor fusion and seems equally explicable by the separation and 
recombination of atomic corpuscles.129 It also raises questions about the 
corpuscular operations of human physiology that are difficult to answer; though it 
is easier to imagine conditions in the body, at a subsensible level, that might 
precipitate fracture,130 it is not obvious what the particulate constitution of the 
bladder must be like such that it precipitates fusion. There is nothing in the 
evidence upon which to ground our speculations. My suggestion, building upon 
Asmis’ proposal, is that whatever physiological/pathological advantages a 
doctrine of corpuscular fusion might have afforded Asclepiades – if, indeed, there 
were any – they were secondary to its function as a solution to the problem of 
phenomenal constancy brought about by the introduction of fragile corpuscles 
 
125 Asmis (1993) p.154. Asmis favours the term ‘coalescence’ instead of ‘fusion’ but I am concerned that 
this word has connotations pertaining to mixture which are potentially misleading. See below. 
126 Anon. Lond.  xxxvi.48-55, xxxix.1-12. See Asmis (1993) p.154. 
127 Asmis (1993) p.155. See Gal. Nat. Fac. II.32 K. 
128 Asmis (1993) p.155 also points to the similarity of Galen’s terms ἀναλυόμενον and συνιόντων and the 
words solvantur and comitata in Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-107 respectively. Asmis posits that fusion may be 
included under Caelius’ general description of comitata. 
129 Leith (forthcoming) II.1.2. 
130 We revisit this at IV.2.5.1 below. 
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into Epicurean physics. Like the sense-perceptibility of motion, corpuscular fusion 
is a necessary second-order effect of introducing fragile elements into a system 
that developed around the assumption that atomism was a necessity of the 
stability we notice in the phenomenal world. Naturally, positing corpuscular fusion 
would increase Asclepiades’ options – the variability of corpuscular size as a 
potential cause of obstructed πόροι in Cel. Pass. 1.14.107 acquires more force if 
we allow fusion into this system131 – but I am reluctant to suppose that the 
doctrine was introduced for this particular reason.  
     The best argument for Asclepiades having posited corpuscular fusion pertains 
to the recurrent description of his elements as ἄναρμον.132 Gottschalk, in his work 
on Heraclides Ponticus, produced a comprehensive survey of the possible 
definitions of ἄναρμος and argued for the translation ‘without internal 
articulations’ – i.e. ‘seamless’ – with respect to what he regarded as Asclepiades’ 
atomic particles.133 While his reading of Asclepiades’ element theory was in many 
ways mistaken, his argument for the meaning of ἄναρμος remains sound. Asmis 
argued that Asclepiades emphasised the property of seamlessness in order to 
distinguish an ὄγκος which may, she proposes, result from the fusion of multiple 
ὄγκοι, from a compound of ὄγκοι – that is, to guarantee its status as a unified 
body: ‘The term ἄναρμος makes clear that the primary particles have no internal 
divisions or articulations: each is  seamless body, forged by an infinite process of 
breaking and coalescence. Each is a ‘jointless mass’, ἄναρμος ὄγκος.’134 The 
term ἄναρμος distinguishes the element from the compound not on the basis of 
fragility – as in Epicurean atomism –, but that of seamlessness, the absence of 
internal articulations. Asclepiadean bodies are organised around this peculiar 
dichotomy. Leith has argued that this interpretation is strengthened if we 
understand Asclepiades to be a void-theorist in the Epicurean mode.135 He cites 
Polito’s observation, based on Calc. In Tim. 214, that the phrase solidae moles – 
Calcidius’ translation of ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι – likely referred to the absence of internal 
 
131  Asmis (1993) p.155 suggests that the imprecision of Caelius’ language masks Asclepiades’ doctrine of 
corpuscular fragility, but the evidence is by no means conclusive on this issue. 
132 Made in Asmis (1993) p.155-156 and developed in Leith (forthcoming) II.1.2. 
133 Gottschalk (1980) p.42-47. 
134 Asmis (1993) p.155. 
135 Leith (forthcoming) II.1.2. 
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void.136 If we frame Asmis’ ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι in the context of Epicurean void-theory 
we can speculate on the mechanism of their fusion. David Konstan addressed 
the problem of contact in Epicurean physics.137 At point of collision, two atoms 
cannot possibly be separated by void. If bodies are divisible only along the lines 
of their void interstices then there is a question, unanswered in our sources, of 
how these two atoms can be divided. Konstan finds his answer in the Epicurean 
theory of minima;138 the discreteness of the minima must account for the 
discreteness of adjacent atoms. This cannot be said of Asclepiadean ὄγκοι. Leith 
suggests that ‘seamlessness’ in Asclepiadean physics refers not only to the 
absence of void within an ὄγκος, but the absence of void between two ὄγκοι at 
point of contact.139 The Asclepiadean ὄγκος, being divisible, is without the 
independence of the Epicurean atom; its boundary is no fixed entity. The closing 
of a void-gap between ὄγκοι constitutes the closing of a seam. The resultant entity 
is voidless thus qualifying, at point of collision, as an ἄναρμος ὄγκος. This 
process, however, cannot always result in fusion, just as contact cannot always 
result in fracture. We are left to speculate as to what variable determines whether 
contact results in deflection, fusion, or separation. Given that the preservation of 
phenomenal constancy demands that fusion and fracture occur at the same rate, 
it strikes me that if fusion were the consequence of a single point of touch – as is 
far less problematic than something more akin to absorption, given Asclepiades’ 
attacks on the Stoic theory of mixture140 – then the unified ὄγκος may be more 
fragile at the point of conjunction, thus increasing the likelihood that a well-placed 
collision may divide its mass along the ‘isthmus’ of unification. Over time, balance 
may be ensured. An ὄγκος can be divided at any point but is it not intuitive that 
the areas of slender mass are more vulnerable to being severed? 
     In any case, let us lay out the implications of this doctrine that are most 
relevant for our purposes. 1) The doctrine of corpuscular fusion, if a real 
Asclepiadean doctrine, is a counterpoint to the doctrine of corpuscular fragility; it 
was implemented to preclude epistemological inconsistencies that are based in 
 
136 Ibid.; Polito (2007a). cf. e.g. Lucr. I.538 in which the lack of internal void renders the atom solidus. 
Polito’s conclusion is consistent with the meaning of ἄναρμος proposed by Gottschalk (1980) p.42-47 on 
independent grounds. 
137 Konstan (1979) p.398-407. 
138 Konstan p.407. He cites Epicurus’ lost text On the Corner in the Atom listen at D. L. X.28 as a candidate 
for text in which Epicurus addressed this problem. 
139 Leith (forthcoming) II.1.2. 
140 Gal. Hipp. Elem. 9.25-36, 33-35. 
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Epicurean premises – the constancy of phenomena entails a commensurate 
constancy in the world perceptible to reason. 2) The doctrine affords more force 
to the term ἄναρμος and makes the dichotomy of ‘seamed’ and ‘seamless’ the 
more important variable in Asclepiades’ physics (centred, as it is, on processes 
in human physiology). Pathology is explained by the activity of seamless 
corpuscles within the internal channels of posterior bodies, reticulated by πόροι. 
It is this relationship that Asclepiades wants to foreground – that of the seamless 
and the porous –, which further explains his preference for the language of πόροι 
– of ‘gaps’ – over that of multifunctional κενόν. The relationship between 
compound and element is organised around a prima facie novel principle. 3) With 
the twin doctrines of corpuscular fragility and fusion, Asclepiades radically 
distances his physics from that of Epicurus. However, given how, for 
epistemological purposes, these doctrines essentially cancel one another out, we 
are entitled to ask whether this ostensibly radical divergence from Epicurean 
physics is not, in the final analysis, superficial. Asclepiades has purified his 
physics of its Epicurean signature but what, beyond the appearance of intellectual 
emancipation, has he actually achieved?  
IV.2.5 Motivations 
The foundations are now sufficiently secure that we may proceed to the question 
of motivation. Why did Asclepiades introduce the doctrine of corpuscular fragility 
into a medical theory drawn from Epicurean physics? I have divided this 
discussion into two parts. The first (IV.2.5.1) addresses possible practical 
motivations; the second (IV.2.5.1) explores the wider context of Asclepiades’ 
relationship to Epicureanism. 
IV.2.5.1 Practical motivations 
The following passage, identified by Leith as the only ‘relatively unambiguous’ 
piece of evidence for the positive function of corpuscular fragility in Asclepiades’ 
theory, is from Cassius the Iatrosophist’s Problemata: 
Why does sea water, which is salty, become sweeter when it is boiled to a 
high degree? …One should say that sea water, which is composed of large 
ὄγκοι is made fine by being divide by fire. Therefore, when it has undergone 
226 
 
an alteration because of its being rendered fine from being thick, by throwing 
off its previous quality, (sc. the seawater) becomes sweet instead of salty.141 
Asclepiades is not named in this passage, but his presence is revealed by the 
distinctive terminology. We learn from DRN IV.622-626 that the Epicureans 
believed the shape of the elements to have a direct bearing on the quality of 
taste.142 Notably, in DRN IV.633-626, the relevant variable is ‘smoothness’; sweet 
tastes emerge from bodies made from smooth atoms; unpleasant tastes emerge 
from bodies made from rough atoms.143 In Cass. Probl. 65, size is the variable 
that dictates the relationship between the shape of a substance’s ὄγκοι and the 
quality of its taste. As Leith remarks, ‘this would undoubtedly have given 
Asclepiades’ system a more flexible and elaborate account of qualitative 
change.’144 Moreover, it is worth noting that the account of corpuscular fragility in 
Cass. Probl. 65, which contextualises the event within a broader recurrent 
process, seems to indicate that fracture is – at least, in large part – non-random. 
Apply great heat to a body made of large ὄγκοι and the elements themselves will 
be divided. We are invited to suppose that the ‘dividing fire’, a constellation of 
ὄγκοι of a particular shape interacting with each other in a particular way, contains 
some property at the level of its elements which precipitates fracture in larger 
ὄγκοι.145 Note the implicit division of vulnerable and invulnerable ὄγκοι in this 
context; the fire particles change the nature of the water particles they interact 
with, not the other way around. The context of their interaction is obviously a 
relevant factor. Though we have little else to build on, the passage does hint at a 
more sophisticated model of corpuscular interaction – whereby fracture, 
 
141 Cass. Probl. 65 trans. Leith (forthcoming) II.1.2. cf. Cass. Probl. 64: ‘Why is rainwater sweet, even though 
it is evaporated from the sea? …Or (one should say) that, even if it is the sea water itself that is evaporated, 
the pneuma moves it with great force, and, having been moved, it becomes finer. For what is moved is 
always naturally disposed to rarefaction. What is fine is also sweet, since it is <not> composed of large 
ὄγκοι. This is why rainwater is sweet.’ Trans. Leith (ibid.). 
142 Explored at II.5.6. See also Lucr. II.398-407. 
143 Note also Lucr. II.464-477, see below. 
144 Leith (forthcoming) II.1.2. 
145 We might submit ‘sharpness’ as the obvious candidate for this property. If we entertain the notion that 
the ὄγκοι are more susceptible to division at a point of previous fusion – which may contribute to the 
rougher texture of the larger ὄγκοι, indicating further parity between Asclepiades’ system and its 
Epicurean precedent – then sharper particles are more likely to make contact with the larger ὄγκοι at their 
most vulnerable points. That fire is composed of pyramidical elemental solids does, of course, have 
precedence in Plato’s Timaeus (56a-b). Plato’s geometric model of elemental bodies was likely the source 
of the Heraclidean terminology that may have influenced that of Asclepiades. See Polito (2013) p.127. See 
also Lucr. II.431-433: ‘And fire with heat and frost with cold have teeth that bite our senses in quite 
different ways.’ Trans. Melville (1997). 
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deflection and possibly fusion146 result from predictable causes – than the 
evidence has yielded. We may speculate that Asclepiades found a role for his 
more flexible – but decidedly rule-governed – account of qualitative change in 
physiological contexts – indeed, the example in Cass. Probl. 64 can easily be 
read as an explanatory analogy for a more esoteric process. But speculate is all 
that we may do.147 
     Before we broaden our inquiry in IV.2.5.2, note how the practical basis for 
Asclepiades’ innovation is fundamentally Epicurean. The too-perfect alignment of 
atomic shape and associated sense-quality which, for some, has signified 
Epicurus’ inability to uncouple to the fullest extent sense-reality from the 
properties at its root,148 is the feature of Epicurean physics that Asclepiades 
elaborates.149 We find an Epicurean account of the transformation of salt water 
into sweet in DRN. II.464.477. In this passage, seawater – which is a mixture of 
rough and smooth atoms (the former accounting for taste, the latter for liquidity) 
– is filtered through many layers of earth such that only the smooth (thus sweet) 
atoms are retained. The end result is the transformation of seawater’s constituent 
atoms – not their relative disposition but their shape. The mechanism of 
transformation is filtration. Epicurean physics remains Asclepiades’ foundation; 
his innovation makes the existing explanation for qualitative change more flexible. 
Yet one wonders how often Asclepiades availed himself of the opportunities he 
created. We will see below in our discussion of Asclepiades’ psychophysiology 
(IV.4) that the refinement of bodies through filtration had a role to play in 
Asclepiades’ system.150 It seems unlikely that Asclepiades conceived the 
 
146 Although, as I noted in IV.2.4.2 above, it is difficult to conjecture in elemental terms what 
circumstances might precipitate this latter consequence. 
147 As I wrote in IV.2.2 n.55 above, the attempt at Vallance (1990) p.117-122 to identify a role for 
corpuscular fragility in the account of ‘solubiles diseases’ (incorrectly identified as a separate category of 
disease) in Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. I.14.107-108 is, by his own admission (p.177), ‘conjectural’. Wary of this, 
he proposes that ‘corpuscular dissolution can be seen most clearly not in a disease aetiology, but in his 
account of digestion.’ (p.119). Asclepiades’ account of digestion, preserved at Cel. Pass. I.14.113, involves 
the dissolution of food into solutio ciborum which then passes through the various parts of the body via 
‘all the fine passages’ (omnes tenuis vias) distributing nutriment. Unfortunately, nowhere in Cel. Pass. 
I.14.113 does Caelius specify that the corpuscles themselves are broken in this process. Asmis (1993) 
p.154-155, as we have seen (IV.2.4.2) proposed something similar regarding the transmutation of liquid 
into vapour before it penetrates the wall of the bladder but her argument has the same basic vulnerability. 
Vallance (p.121-122) builds on his reading of Cel. Pass. I.14.133 and argues that the account of dropsy in 
ibid. I.14.107-108 describes a process whereby the ὄγκοι constituting solutio ciborum are individually 
broken down, but he does so with no firm evidential basis. 
148 e.g. Hankinson (1999) p.501. 
149 Lucr. II.398-477. 
150 See esp. Cass. Probl. 8 and Calc. In Tim. 214.  
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breaking of the ὄγκοι as the most salient explanation for macroscopic qualitative 
change. Our sources for the specifics of Asclepiadean physiology/pathology in 
which scholars have sought evidence of the role of corpuscular fragility remain 
recalcitrant; the details therein are typically explicable in atomistic terms.151  
     It is puzzling, given the conspicuous novelty of Asclepiades’ system, why so 
few of our sources seek to emphasise its novel aspect. It is possible that this is 
merely a quirk of the surviving material.152 Galen’s lamentably lost treatise On the 
Doctrines of Asclepiades, in which we are told that two books (4 & 5) were 
dedicated to a refutation of Asclepiades’ element theory,153 evidently contained 
some targeted critique of Asclepiades’ frangible ὄγκοι.154 But we may surmise 
from the available evidence that Galen’s argument against Asclepiades’ element 
theory overlapped considerably with his critique of Epicurean atomism.155 In MM 
12.7 (= X.851-853 K.), the passage in which his critique of corpuscular fragility in 
the fifth book of On the Doctrines of Asclepiades is alluded to, the basis of the 
critique is that positing frangible ὄγκοι does little to protect Asclepiades from the 
argument Galen levels at the atomists –that ‘those who constitute the body out of 
insensitive atoms or anarma elements’ cannot account for pain even if the bodies 
in question may fracture upon impact ‘since the bodies broken remain insensitive 
(unless we shall say that stones feel pain when they are divided)’.156 For Galen, 
Asclepiadean element theory is a novel species of atomism whose novelty affords 
it little armour against the deficiencies of the original system. The implication is 
that the system adhered to the Epicurean model in many respects. Whatever 
flexibility corpuscular fragility afforded Asclepiades, it was never so liberally 
 
151 e.g. Vallance (1990) p.117-122; Asmis (1993) p.154-155. 
152 Though it remains a mystery why Caelius Aurelianus – or why his source, Soranus – who records the 
earlier atomistic stage in Asclepiades’ thought, does not enlighten us as to what motivated the reported 
evolution in Asclepiades’ thinking. 
153 Gal. Cur. Rat. Ven. Sect. 3 (= XI.256-257 K.). 
154 Alluded to at Gal. MM 12.7 (= X.851-853 K.). 
155 For Galen, as is revealed elsewhere (Gal. Hipp. Elem. 2.10-11 (= I.417 K.)), it is the position on the 
qualitive status of the elements shared by Asclepiades and the atomists – i.e. that they are without 
secondary, phenomenal qualities – that leaves them vulnerable to a common critique. For a detailed 
analysis of Galen’s argument against atomism/anarma elements, see Leith (2014). 
156 Trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 32. That material monism cannot account for pain (or, more broadly, 
sensation) is Galen’s central argument against monistic element theories, sourced from [Hipp.] Nat. Hom. 
2.3 (Gal. Hipp. Elem. 2.3 (= I.415 K.)) but repurposed as an argument against atomism, where it is clear 
that the author of Nat. Hom. is concerned, in his formulation of the argument, with the Ionian Monists 
(Hipp. Elem. 2.4 (= I.416 K.), see Leith (2014) p.217). 
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exploited as to free Asclepiades from the atomists’ shadow in the eyes of his 
theory’s detractors. 
IV.2.5.2 Asclepiades in context 
My thesis is that Asclepiades’ doctrine of frangible ὄγκοι is most intelligible when 
framed by the conjunction of two contexts, namely 1) the increasingly formalised 
uncoupling of medical and philosophical inquiry in the Hellenistic period and 2) 
the peculiar antipathy between Epicureanism and the medical art per se. Let us 
deal with them in turn. 
     At III.2.2 I addressed the evidence for the third century anatomists having 
deliberately constrained their epistemologies to the domain of the medically 
pertinent.157 I argued, following Leith,158 that Athenaeus of Attalia applied the 
same self-restricting methodology to his own Stoicising element theory, and that 
we can detect in the scrupulousness with which he maintains the epistemological 
perimeter of the medical τέχνη a need to firmly distinguish his methodology from 
that of his precursors in philosophy. Asclepiades’ familiarity with the work of 
Erasistratus is not controversial (we will address at IV.4 the influence of the 
anatomist on Asclepiades’ psychophysiology). I locate him in a loose tradition of 
physicians who self-consciously practised medicine as a singular craft, a tradition 
which I argued at III.3 finds its formal genesis in Aristotle’s taxonomy of sciences, 
organised around the constraints of his teleological cosmology.159 But with 
Asclepiades’ Epicurean inheritance comes the challenge of signalling his 
intellectual independence within a system whose simplicity granted him few 
opportunities to do so.160 Athenaeus of Attalia – whom I locate in the same post-
Aristotelian tradition161 – affords us an example of how disciplinary independence 
can be enforced from within an existing physical system, how limiting the capacity 
of one’s theoretical toolkit and innovating from a position of self-imposed 
constraint can serve to emphasise the generative potential of the medical τέχνη 
 
157 See Gal. MM 2.5 (= X.107 K.); Anon. Lond. xxi 18-23, 32-35. See Leith (2015a). 
158 Leith (forthcoming). 
159  Which is not to discount precedent in, for example, Nat. Hom. 1 (see III.2.1.2). As I wrote in my 
introduction (0.2), the tension between medicine and philosophy is long lived. Aristotle merely formalised 
the distinction between the two disciplines on the basis of their independent τέλη. 
160 Recall my argument first made at III.3.1 and developed further at III.4 that for Athenaeus to claim 
ownership of his innovations for himself and for his discipline they must arise from the first principles of 
medicine, with all the theoretical limitations this implies. 
161 See esp. III.3. On Flemming’s (2012) p.57-69 reading of Asclepiades’ dates, Athenaeus likely founded 
his school roughly thirty years after Asclepiades’ death. 
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against that of indiscriminate physical inquiry. But, as I argued at IV.2.1, Stoic 
cosmology is conceptually multi-tiered162 and self-similar163 in a way that 
Epicurean physics simply is not; the Stoic cosmos can be considered at different 
scales all the while retaining its essential Stoic quiddity. Athenaeus was 
presented with a multi-layered physics in which to carve out the dimensions of 
his discipline’s theoretical foundation. Asclepiades can limit his use of multi-
functional – i.e. philosophical – vocabulary to hem Epicurean physics into a 
physiological context. He can also, as we shall see at IV.3.2 below, jettison 
Epicureanism’s most eccentric physical doctrine – the atomic-swerve – by virtue 
of his emancipation from Epicurus’ ethical τέλος. But what else can he do to 
indicate the proximate territory of medical inquiry so as to signify his 
independence from Epicurean physics – such that, crucially, any innovations he 
might make can be claimed by the medical art – that does not involve tinkering 
with the foundations themselves? 
     The most obvious answer is that he can adopt Epicurus’ cursory analysis of 
physical pathology and rigorize it, concentrating his attention on perfecting his 
predecessor’s unfinished thoughts. As I argued at IV.2.2 above, Caelius 
Aurelianus’ summary of Asclepiades’ medical theory at Cel. Pass. 1.14.105-107 
can be read as evidence for precisely that, a rigorization of the Epicurus’ vague 
theory of bodily pain hinted at DRN II.963-967 – albeit with the spectre of 
corpuscular fragility hovering somewhere in the background. The reference to the 
early, atomistic stage in the development of Asclepiades’ thinking implies strongly 
that this was his original intention. But if he makes no alteration to his 
predecessor’s doctrine and cannot claim, as Athenaeus would claim, to have 
developed his theory from the ‘elements of medicine’164 can he not be accused 
of merely throwing light on an implicit doctrine in Epicureanism? A commendable 
feat for a philosopher, but no defence of the medical art’s generative potential. It 
is here that the argument at II.5 (context (2) above) must be reintroduced. The 
guiding premise of my argument in this chapter, that Asclepiades was concerned 
at all with defending medicine’s value against philosophy, is not based solely on 
his intellectual debt to Erasistratus and position in a lineage of medical thinkers 
 
162 There are several stages in the ontological journey from principle to sensible phenomena. Contrast this 
with Epicureanism’s two-tier model subsensible elements and sensible compounds. 
163 A feature I sought to emphasise throughout I.3. See also e.g. III.3.3 and III.5.3.1. 
164 See ps.-Gal Def. Med. 31 for the contrast with Athenaeus of Attalia. 
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who sought to contrast their specialised mode of inquiry with the generalised 
alternative. As I argued at II.5, Epicureanism was, at best, dismissive of the value 
of the medical art per se, distilling its promises to their rhetorical value (esp. II.5.1-
2), and at worst, hostile to a rival means of pain-negation whose neglect of the 
mind in favour of the body, coupled with its unconscionable – but, in practical 
terms unavoidable – tolerance of uncertainty, engendered more suffering than it 
could claim to have cured (esp. II.5.3). I suggest that Asclepiades was particularly 
motivated to defend the medical art against philosophy, given the ill-treatment of 
his discipline by the philosophy whose medical utility he sought to exploit. What 
better way to defend medicine against its Epicurean critics than to challenge 
Epicureanism’s foundational doctrines on medical grounds, to propose that 
atomism, a central Epicurean tenet,165 was inadequate to the task of explaining 
the breadth of physiological phenomena? Medicine would thus possess a 
generative value – a means of contributing to physical theory166 – that 
Epicureanism’s τέλος caused it to neglect, occupied, as it was, with matters of 
psychological equanimity. The evidence from Aët. 1.23 and (arguably) Cel. Pass. 
1.14.105 suggests that Asclepiades was engaged in critique of Epicurean 
atomism (IV.2.4.2). His magnum opus, the suggestively titled On Elements, which 
contained critiques of rival theories of matter,167 was no doubt the ideal place to 
reveal that specialised investigation into the elements of man – discerned a 
posteriori for the phenomena of human physiology – uncovered the insufficiency 
of Epicurus’ element theory. It would perhaps exceed credulity to propose that 
these contextual considerations forced the discovery of a practical application for 
the doctrine of frangible ὄγκοι, – after all, Asclepiades was initially satisfied that 
atomism was a sound basis for his theory and I maintain that his theory of 
pathology remained (at least broadly) consistent with Epicurean principles. 
Rather, I propose that Asclepiades’ introduction of corpuscular fragility into a 
broadly Epicurean physics should be interpreted against the background of this 
conjunction of frames. These contextual considerations – the gradual 
formalisation of medicine’s independence from philosophy and the antipathy of 
 
165 Preceded only be the (mostly) mechanistic nature of activity perceptible to reason in its importance to 
Epicurus’ ethical claims. 
166 cf. Arist. Resp. 480b22-31 and see esp. III.3.2. 
167 Gal. Hipp. Elem. 9.25-26 (= I.487-490 K.). 
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the mother-doctrine towards the τέχνη which, through Asclepiades, seeks to 
appropriate its physics – are catalysts for innovation. 
     Of course, any adaptations Asclepiades may make to Epicurean atomism 
cannot jeopardise whatever medical utility he initially discovered in the doctrine. 
We can be confident that the appeal of Epicureanism to the medical thinker did 
not reside in atomism per se. Doubtless, upholding Epicurus’ basic division of the 
cosmos into ontologically undifferentiated bodies and void was conducive to the 
formation of uniform explanations for bodily affections and, correspondingly, the 
development of streamlined therapeutics.168 The rejection of atomic indivisibility 
will have complicated this picture. But if a balancing mechanism were introduced 
in turn, such as that which we discussed at IV.2.4.3, the stability and simplicity 
afforded by the atomists’ basic division could be preserved. Yet there must be 
more to Epicureanism’s appeal. The missing piece of our investigation is the 
answer to the question of why a physician would draw so heavily upon a 
philosophical tradition his debt to which he would take measures to obscure. 
Clearly, if we want to discover what it was about Epicurean philosophy that initially 
attracted Asclepiades, we should attend to the components of the mother-
doctrine that survive the introduction of corpuscular fragility. Our answer, I will 
argue at IV.5, resides in the utility of Epicurus’ epistemology. But we are not yet 
equipped to explore this hypothesis. Positing frangible elements – with all the 
second and third-order effects of this move within the context of Epicurus’ physics 
– was not the only point of depart between Asclepiades and Epicureanism. The 
next two sections complete our investigations of Asclepiades’ methods of dissent. 
IV.3 Medical materialism 
The unity of physics and ethics in Hellenistic thought is nowhere more in evidence 
than in the questions of intelligent design and human volition. Is a) one’s moral 
obligation encoded within nature’s transformations, or b) does the manifest 
absence of primitive intent leave the rational inquirer to assemble an ethic out of 
the extremes of sensory experience? Is our behaviour a) explicable, in the final 
analysis, in terms that relegate agency into the realm of illusion, or b) do nature’s 
laws confirm that our choices are our own? The Stoics answer (a), the 
Epicureans, (b). Fortified behind epistemological barriers, Athenaeus of Attalia 
 
168 Note Pliny NH XXVI.7. 
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need not impinge on Stoicism’s answers to these questions; (a) is implied by his 
system if read in conjunction with the philosophy at its root but the questions 
reside outside the parameters dictated by the Pneumatist’s τέλος. Asclepiades of 
Bithynia, by virtue of the Epicurean doctrines he chooses to retain and to discard, 
engages more directly with the questions above.169 His treatment of 
Epicureanism’s ethical signature as evidenced in its physics should reveal 
something of how he sought to enforce medicine’s autonomy. In this section we 
deal first with Asclepiades’ anti-teleology at IV.3.1 then proceed to his 
determinism at IV.3.2. I conclude this section with a discussion of the depiction 
of Asclepiades and Epicurus in Galen’s Natural Faculties at IV.3.3. 
IV.3.1 Anti-teleology 
Galen, who is more exercised by Asclepiades’ denial of Nature’s craftsmanship 
than he is by any other single aspect of his thought, is our principle source for 
Asclepiades’ anti-teleology. His attacks on Asclepiades in this domain, most of 
which derive (unsurprisingly) from his treatises On the Utility of the Parts of Body 
(UP),170 are by and large attacks on Epicurus also.171 In UP, Epicurus and 
Asclepiades are foils for Galen’s ruminations on purpose in physiology. Epicurus 
is the aggressor from philosophy, Asclepiades from medicine, but both unite in 
opposition to Galen’s conception of Nature as ‘artificer’. Though we cannot expect 
from Galen an objective summary of the debate, UP 1.21 reveals its parameters:   
Now, as to what is said [of the tendons of the hands] by some of those who 
embrace the arguments of Epicurus the philosopher and Asclepiades the 
doctor when they raise objections over such issues, it is worthwhile, not to 
pass over them, but go through their arguments in detail and to point out 
where they go wrong. So, it is the opinion of these men neither that it is 
because the tendons were made thick that their activities are strenuous, nor 
 
169 He is the cited authority on materialism in Gal. Nat. Fac. II.29 K. which Polito (2006) p.290-297 makes 
much of. Asclepiades’ championing of materialism from within the medical sphere doubtless made him 
the most convenient foil for Galen’s exposition of teleology. It is also possible that Asclepiades’ 
determinism (see IV.3.2-3 below) made his system the more straightforward example of materialist 
physics. 
170 With an additional significant critique being located at Gal. Nat. Fac. 2.6 (= II.97-98 K.). 
171 Vallance (1990) p.145 reads the shared anti-teleology of Asclepiades and Epicurus as the reason for 
Galen’s assimilation of the two doctrines. I hope I have shown at IV.2 (esp. IV.2.3) that Asclepiades’ 
Epicurean inheritances are far clearer than Vallance maintains. Galen can treat Asclepiades and Epicurus 
as interchangeable on the question of teleology because Asclepiadean physics is derived from the 
principles of Epicurean materialism. 
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that it is because they were made thin that their activities are weak, but 
rather that these are made to become like this or like that by their uses in 
day-to-day life, and that the size of the tendons depends on the magnitude 
of the movement, so that when the tendons are exercised, they acquire, as 
is reasonable, a good condition and become thick, while those that are idle 
atrophy and waste away. It is certainly not, they say, because it would have 
been better for tendons involved in more strenuous activities to be strong 
and thick, and for those involved in weaker activities to be thin and weak, 
that they were fashioned like this by Nature – for monkeys would not have 
fingers of this sort – but, as was said previously, it is by necessity that 
thickness follows upon those that are exercised, because they are well 
nourished, thinness upon those that are idle, being less well nourished.172 
For Asclepiades, as for Epicurus, activity precedes purpose. The tendons of the 
hand are thick through use rather than to facilitate their use. ‘Usefulness’ is an 
accident of the aleatory movements of elements perceptible to reason. Epicurean 
arguments against specific examples of biological teleology can be found at DRN 
IV.823-876. Arguments against the fine-tuning of the cosmos are set out in DRN 
V,173 where the emergence of the world from a tumult of atoms accumulates 
complexity. Monsters ‘strange in form and aspect’ fail to ‘hammer out the pattern 
of their kind’ because their bodies, senselessly forged, lack means of 
procreation.174 Those creatures endowed with the means to survive and ‘hammer 
out a chain of progeny’ are preserved, and thus we have no designing principle 
to credit with the advantages of our physiology.175 Asclepiades assumes 
responsibility for Epicurus’ non-teleological cosmogony when he builds a medical 
theory from Epicurean mechanics. Though we need not ascribe to the physician 
an account of human evolution to rival DRN V in its detail, the frequency with 
which he is aligned with Epicurus on this question attests to his having argued, 
positively, for de facto Epicurean outcomes. Elsewhere in UP, Galen’s attacks on 
Asclepiades and Epicurus are uniform. At UP 7.14 (= III.571-572 K.), marvelling 
 
172 Trans. Leith = Leith 46 (= III.74-76 K.). 
173  Lucr. V.126-145 for the argument that intelligence cannot reside outside the body; Ibid. V.146-155 for 
the argument that gods do not reside ‘in any regions of this world’, being so slight in nature that they 
cannot ‘touch anything that we can touch’; Ibid. V.156-180 for the argument against anthropocentric 
creation. From Ibid. V.181, Lucretius expounds Epicurean cosmogony. 
174 Ibid. V.837-857. Trans. Melville (1997) 
175 Ibid. V.855-877.  
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at how nature equipped the muscles with nerves, Galen argues that both 
Asclepiades and Epicurus, by stripping Nature of her creative power, are guilty of 
affording human ingenuity undue precedence. At UP 11.8 (= III.873-874 K.), 
seeing the hand of the designer in the sockets of the teeth, Galen acknowledges 
that the anti-teleology of Epicurus and Asclepiades emerges from their aleatory 
element theories and presents atoms and ὄγκοι as equivalents on this 
question.176 At Nat. Fac. 2.6 (= II.97-8 K.)177 an apparent dispute within the 
Erasistratean school about the constituents of the elemental nerve is framed as 
a dispute between teleological and anti-teleological theories of matter, with 
Epicurus, Leucippus, Democritus and Asclepiades offered as champions of the 
latter.178 It seems that Asclepiades found no cause to oppose Epicurus on this 
issue, and likely argued for the merits of the traditional materialist position within 
the context of human physiology. The Asclepiadeans are referenced 
independently at UP 5.5 (= III.364-5 K.) as ‘those who accuse Nature of labouring 
in vain’179 and Palladius, in his commentary of Hippocrates’ Epidemics VI, offers 
Asclepiades as the exemplar of those who believe Nature to be without skill.180 
     The purposelessness of Asclepiades’ cosmology is a further inheritance from 
his precursor in philosophy; it is a necessity of mechanistic physics as Galen’s 
introduction to the teleological debate at Nat. Fac. (= II.27-29 K.) makes clear. 
But note that for Epicurus the doctrine of anti-teleology was a base-ingredient in 
the balm he sought to apply to human fears.181 We have no cause to suggest that 
the Asclepiadean version, though the same in form, was oriented towards an 
ethical τέλος. No longer is it a component of an integrated philosophy, given 
‘purpose’ not by nature but by the philosophy’s founder; it is now merely a 
necessity of prior conditions. Though this point may appear superficial in isolation, 
 
176 In Gal. Nat. Fac. 1.14 (= II.51 K). Galen laments the continued ‘respectable existence’ of the 
Asclepiadean and Epicurean schools, who unite in their commitment to similar principles, bodies and void.  
177 A text in which, we should note, the unity between Asclepiades and Epicurus is not so consistently 
apparent. See IV.3.2 below. 
178 Although Asclepiades is not, strictly speaking, listed alongside Epicurus, Leucippus and Democritus in 
this passage, the argument goes that were the Erasistrateans to resolve the elemental nerve into 
materials redolent of atoms, then they would be positing some sort of anarmon element leading us back 
to Asclepiades ‘by the garden gate’. Trans. Leith = Leith 51. See Gal. Nat Fac.1.12 (= II.27-29 K.) for Galen’s 
general summary of the two irreconcilable schools of thought regarding the relationship between matter 
and intentionality. Polito (2006) p.287-290 for more on this passage. 
179 Trans. Leith = Leith 47. 
180 Vol. 2 p.128-150 Dietz = Leith 52. 




it is important to remember, as we noted at II.3.8, how Epicureanism’s ethical 
τέλος reaches back into the premises of the atomist tradition and remodels them. 
Asclepiades’ medical τέλος permits him to liberate Epicurean physics from its 
ethical obligations. Though this has no functional implication for his position on 
teleology, it is clear that Epicureanism, redirected from its τέλος in human 
behaviour, will jettison its most eccentric doctrines. The question of Asclepiades’ 
determinism looms. 
IV.3.2 Necessity and non-ethical physics  
Caelius Aurelianus can once more be relied upon to indicate the places where 
Asclepiades’ system deviates from its Epicurean precursor: 
Next (Asclepiades says) that everything occurs through necessity and 
nothing occurs without a cause, and that nature is nothing other than body 
and its motion. Lastly, he says that (nature) not only helps (prodest) but also 
harms (nocet).182 
That nature is nothing over ‘body and its motion’ can be said of its Epicurean 
conception; that everything occurs through necessity and nothing occurs without 
a cause is Asclepiades freeing corpuscular materialism from its ethics-directed 
eccentricities. There is no room for Lucretius’ clinamen in Asclepiades’ physics, 
no mechanism by which voluntas can be preserved and why should it be 
otherwise?183 The question of free will is the province of the ethicist. The clinamen 
is the invention of one who perceived fatalism and divine tyranny to be near-
equivalent evils and sought to rescue our volition through his physics.184 It stands 
out in Epicureanism – now as it did in antiquity185 – as an inelegant concession 
to an ethical doctrine that was not otherwise emergent from the principles at root. 
If one wishes to claim that medical investigation, beginning from Epicurean 
principles but distinct in its aims, produces a more coherent fundamental physics, 
it is, on first analysis, the simplest move to reject the component of the mother-
doctrine that aims exclusively at the psychological portion of ἀταραξία; the target 
lies beyond the doctor’s ambit. On more considered analysis, there is a question 
 
182 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.115 trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 45. 
183 cf. Lucr. II.251-293. See II.3.8. 
184 Fatalism, as we have seen (II.3.8), is in face depicted as the worst of the two systems in Epic. Ep. Men. 
133-134. 
185 e.g. Cic. Fin. I.19. 
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of whether Asclepiades is free to adopt Epicurus’ epistemology wholesale – as I 
will argue he does at IV.5 – without incorporating this doctrine, but I will defer this 
discussion until the penultimate section of this chapter (IV.5.3.3).186 
IV.3.3 Asclepiades vs. Epicurus in Galen’s Natural Faculties  
In Nat. Fac. 1.12 (= II.29 K.), Asclepiades is invoked as the champion of the 
materialist, anti-teleological school that Galen has acknowledged as his enemy. 
Roberto Polito (2006) cites Ibid. (= II.27 K.), in which Galen sets out his criteria 
for awarding a rival thinker a mention in his works, as an explanation of 
Asclepiades’ place of prominence.187 Galen claims to contend only with those 
who ‘realise the logical sequence of their hypotheses, and stand by them.’188 
Galen, who is elsewhere content to assimilate Asclepiades and Epicurus, regards 
the former in Nat. Fac. to have been truer to the principles of materialism. He 
summarises the relationship between Asclepiadeanism and Epicureanism at Nat. 
Fac. 1.14 (= II.51-52 K.): 
For if one diligently familiarizes oneself with the writings of Asclepiades, one 
will see clearly their logical dependence on his first principles, but also their 
disagreement with observed facts. Thus, Epicurus, in his desire to adhere 
to facts, cuts an awkward figure by aspiring to show that these agree with 
his principles, whereas Asclepiades safeguards the sequence of principles, 
but pays no attention to the obvious fact…[the tenets] of Epicurus have been 
confuted by Asclepiades, who adhered always to logical sequence, about 
which Epicurus evidently cares little.189 
This passage follows Galen’s refutation of (his account of) Epicurus’ explanation 
of attraction whereby atoms shedding from the attractor interlock with atoms 
‘related in shape’ and drag them after impact back towards the original source.190 
Galen notes that Asclepiades ‘viewed with suspicion the incredible character of 
the cause mentioned’ and was moved instead to deny the existence of attraction 
on the basis of his physics despite the evidence of his senses.191 We should be 
 
186 Referring to the question first raised in this thesis at II.3.8, n.125. 
187 Polito (2006) p.295-296. 
188 Trans. Brock (1916). 
189 Trans. Brock (1916). 
190 Gal. Nat. Fac. 1.14. (= II.44-51 K.). 
191 Gal. Nat. Fac. 1.14 (= II.45-46 K.). 
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hesitant to accept Galen’s reading of Asclepiades on attraction;192 it would be 
characteristic of ancient medicine’s arch-commentator to simplify the disputes 
between his opponents when his purpose demands it. But the point Galen builds 
to at Nat. Fac. 1.14 (= II.51-52 K.) is a general one.193 He writes of Asclepiades 
that it is his ‘constant aim…to follow out logical consequences and to upset 
obvious fact, in this respect being opposed to Epicurus; for the latter always 
stated the observed fact, although he gives an ineffective explanation for it.’194 I 
will argue at IV.5 that Asclepiades adhered closely to Epicurus’ argument for the 
truth of ‘observed fact’. The complexity of reconciling this adherence with the 
‘impression’ of choice making is addressed at IV.5.3.3. Galen wants to play the 
respective strengths of Epicureanism and Asclepiadeanism against one another 
and though we cannot expect him to reproduce either theory in a sufficiently 
penetrating light, we are invited to speculate as to which additional Asclepiadean 
doctrines, adhering to the logical consequences of materialism but conflicting with 
sense-data, lie at the root of Galen’s generalisation. Polito points to Asclepiades’ 
psychology,195 which we will review in the next section, but the question of 
Asclepiades’ determinism in particular casts a shadow on this passage. Galen 
writes at Nat. Fac. 1.12 (= II.27-29 K.) ‘All people, therefore, who can appreciate 
the logical sequence of an hypothesis hold that, according to the [materialistic] 
teaching, there does not exist any substance or faculty peculiar either to nature 
or to the soul, but that these result from the way in which the primary corpuscles, 
which are unaffected by change, come together.’196 ‘Some of these people’, 
Galen continues, ‘have even expressly declared that the soul possesses no 
reasoning faculty, but that we are led like cattle by the affections of our senses, 
and that we are unable to refuse or dissent from anything.’197 Asclepiades is the 
only named representative of the materialist camp at Nat. Fac. II.29 K.. His 
determinism leaves him vulnerable to the accusation of having bovinized 
humankind through his element theory and though I will argue below (at IV.4.3 
 
192 Though there is perhaps a comparison to be made between Epicurus’ clinamen and the atomic theory 
of attraction at Nat. Fac. 1.14 (= II.44-51 K.). If we entertain Galen’s account of the latter, both are jarring 
insertions into a materialist system that, unadjusted, conflicts with the impressions Epicurus seeks to 
validate.  
193 Polito (2006) p.296. 
194 Gal. Nat. Fac. 1.14 (= II.47 K.) trans. Brock (1916). 
195 Polito (2006) p.296-307. 
196 Trans. Brock (1916). 
197 Ibid. trans. Brock (1916). 
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and IV.5.3.3) that we need not identify Asclepiades’ determinism with his denial 
of human reason – any more than we would make this claim of the Stoics –, 
Galen was motivated neither to interrogate nor faithfully present the complexity 
of Asclepiades’ position. But it is because of Asclepiades’ adherence to the logical 
consequences of unalloyed materialism that he could be cast – if not always fairly 
– as its truest representative.198  
     The Physician, disaligned with the philosopher’s ethical obligations, has, in the 
construction of his theory, fewer objectives to satisfy and fewer concessions to 
make. A more streamlined physical doctrine would be expected to emerge from 
a discipline with narrower objectives, and we read Asclepiades’ determinism as 
contingent on his non-ethical τέλος. Asclepiades could thus ‘confute’ Epicurus’ 
physical concessions to ethics from a position of security and, in doing so, 
emphasise the advantages of medical inquiry (either explicitly or implicitly). Note 
the particular conflict this creates between Epicurus’ psychological salve and 
Asclepiades’ theory of health and disease. Asclepiadean physics preserves the 
sophistication of Epicurean atomism over its Democritean predecessor but 
retreats from an adjustment made in order to secure the philosophy’s ‘medicinal’ 
value. Though it may test credulity to attribute too much intentionality to 
Asclepiades on this particular point, if Asclepiades criticised Epicurus on the 
question of determinism – which Nat. Fac. 1.14 (= II.51-52 K.) indicates but does 
not confirm – he will have defended medicine’s value on two fronts, its 
investigative clarity and its monopoly on ‘healing’. In decontaminating Epicurean 
physics of explicitly ‘curative’ components, Asclepiades denies Epicurus 
medicine’s rhetorical misappropriation. 
IV.4 Psychophysiology 
The novelty of Asclepiades’ medical theory is most apparent in his discourse on 
the soul. In a move that sets him apart from other doctors in the Hellenistic era, 
he colonised psychology for the medical art, pronouncing not merely on the 
physiology of psychic functions – indeed, in certain areas we see physiology 
recede from his concern (IV.4.4) – but on the substance of the soul and its 
topography. The πνεῦμα-centric theory of Athenaeus of Attalia invites 
 
198 Polito (2006) p.296. Polito, as I will argue at IV.4.3 below, is insufficiently critical in his acceptance of 
Galen’s characterisation of Asclepiades. But I find little to contest in p.290-297. 
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comparisons between bodily and psychological healing, but where his theory is 
suggestive of Stoic psychology it is suggestive of an untouched philosophical 
inheritance (III.5).199 The self-cordoned technical epistemology of Herophilus and 
Erasistratus prevented them from expounding on the soul beyond its perceptible 
functions.200 If Asclepiades’ tinkering with Epicurean atomism strikes us as a bid 
for medicine’s creative independence, Asclepiades’ psychological writings may 
be read as a claim for its reach.201 Certainly, in antiquity, it was the psychological 
aspect of Asclepiades’ theory – in particular, his rejection of a localised 
ἡγεμονικόν –  that brought him the attention of commentators outside the medical 
sphere;202 it is the component of his theory that is most intuitively ‘philosophical’, 
hinting at a reductionist theory of mind that denudes human psychology of any 
vestige of its traditional privilege. But this reading attributes proactivity to 
Asclepiades which is not, in this case, warranted. Rather, I read Asclepiades’ 
discourse on the soul as an attempt to recover the essentials of Epicurean 
psychology in the wake of the emergence of neurophysiology, motivated by a 
desire to preserve the physical basis of Epicurean epistemology. Asclepiades’ 
psychological innovations were thus begotten not of a desire to correct 
misconceptions in philosophy or to make bold assertions about the ontology of 
deliberation, as Roberto Polito claims,203 but of necessity. I will argue in this 
section that Asclepiades’ psychophysiology is the domain of his theory in which 
the tensions between his medical and philosophical influences are most salient, 
that the eccentricities of Asclepiadean psychology are an attempt to marry 
Epicurean psychology with contemporary psychophysiological orthodoxy. The 
rejection of the localised ἡγεμονικόν is a reactive doctrine. 
     To this end, IV.4.1 is an outline of Asclepiades’ psychology, its Epicurean 
inheritances and basic points of deviation. In IV.4.2 we explore Asclepiadean 
πνεῦμα, soul-generation, respiration and the strained marriage of corpuscular 
 
199 For Stoic πνεῦμα see I.5. 
200 Anon. Lond. xxi 18-23, 32-35; Gal. MM 2.5 (= X.107 K.) respectively. See III.2.2. See Leith (2020) p.45-
48 for a recent argument to this end. 
201  Gal. Lib. Prop. 11 refers to Galen’s short work On the Substance of the Soul according to Asclepiades. 
Though no extant titles of Asclepiadean works suggest an exclusive devotion to the subject of psychology 
– with the possible exception of On Respiration and Pulses (see Leith (forthcoming) IV.2), given the 
important of respiration to Asclepiades’ theory (see IV.4.2) – we can be confident, given the broad 
circulation of Asclepiades’ psychological hypotheses (e.g. Tert. DA 15.1-3) that Asclepiades devoted 
considerable effort to the exposition of this theory, in whatever form such exposition took. 
202 e.g. his inclusion in the Placita tradition, as represented by Aëtius. 
203 Polito (2006) p.297-307. 
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physics with Hellenistic physiology. The non-localised ἡγεμονικόν is the subject 
of IV.4.3. I shall argue that it be read as an attempt to reconcile Epicurean 
psychology with the discovery of the nerves, the instruments of motion, in the 
third century BC, which were traced by Erasistratus to the meninges of the brain. 
This section closes, at IV.4.4, with a note on nerves in Asclepiades’ psychology, 
concluding this section on the subject of sensation, a bridge to the discussion of 
Asclepiades’ epistemology. 
IV.4.1 Introduction to Asclepiadean psychology 
Asclepiades’ psychological pronouncements are in keeping with the Hellenistic 
vogue for corporeality; the soul’s interactions with the body are those of matter 
upon matter. Calcidius, our fullest source for Asclepiades’ elemental model of the 
soul, informs us that Asclepiades identified its substance with πνεῦμα, a 
compound of smooth, spherical and very fine ὄγκοι.204 At the elemental level, this 
is standard atomist doctrine; Democritus identified the substance of the soul with 
fire whose smooth, small spherical constituents accounted for its ease of motion 
through the body;205 for Epicurus, as set out at II.3.9, the soul ‘is a fine-structured 
body diffused through the whole aggregate.’206 The Epicurean soul resembles 
πνεῦμα in its diffuse nature (and heat in other respects) but it is distinguished 
from sensible πνεῦμα by the extreme fineness of its atomic composition.207 The 
qualities of smoothness and roundness are attested at DRN III.208 In all three 
cases, the soul is distinguished from the rest of the aggregate by the shape of its 
elements; their small size, smooth texture and round shape account for the soul’s 
diffusion throughout the body. Diffusion, in turn, is a necessary condition of the 
soul’s function as governing principle;209 the body is uniformly animate so the soul 
must be all-present.210 
 
204 Cal. In Tim. 215. 
205 Arist. DA 1.2, 403b 31-404a9 for Democritus’ identification of the soul with fire and its constituent 
spheres. See D. L. IX.44 for their smooth, round nature, Arist. DA 405a 813 and Aët. Plac. 4.3.5) for their 
small size. 
206 Epic. Ep. Hdt. 63 (LS 14 A). 
207 Ibid. 
208 Lucr. III.177-189, 191-195, 203-205. 
209 Diffusion throughout the aggregate does not, of course, necessitate equal concentration. See IV.4.3. 
210 Note that though the soul is the complex of ultra-fine atoms/ὄγκοι in the body, we nonetheless 
understand its constituent atom/ὄγκοι as ‘soul-atoms’/’soul-ὄγκοι’. The soul is enmeshed with the body, 
soul-atoms/ὄγκοι pinging between their larger, coarser cousins. The claim that the corpuscular soul is a 
unified substance, distinct from the body, is not easily maintained – indeed, in Epicureanism, this works 
to the philosophy’s advantage (see e.g. Epic. Ep. Hdt. 63-67). We naturally default to apprehending the 
242 
 
     Soul-ὄγκοι mirror soul-atoms in all but the substance they comprise. Epicurus, 
as we have seen (II.3.9), posited a quadripartite model of the soul. The four parts, 
though thoroughly juxtaposed, are distinguished by their function.211 The πνεῦμα-
like part is responsible for motion, a further part warms the body, an air-like part 
produces rest and a nameless part is responsible for sensation.212 Asclepiades 
promoted the pneumatic component to the singular substance of the soul. This, 
in effect, is to streamline Epicurean psychology, to absorb all pre-established 
psychic functions into πνεῦμα. This development aligns his theory of psychic 
activity (as distinct from psychology) with that of Erasistratus;213 though we have 
no reason to suppose that Erasistratus identified psychic πνεῦμα with the soul, it 
was certainly, on his analysis, instrumental in the performance of psychic 
function.214 Asclepiades also implicitly discards the various alignments of 
Epicurean psychology and topographies of personality which Lucretius touches 
on at III.288-232. The question of one’s inclination towards particular emotional 
responses was evidently too remote from medical utility to warrant Asclepiades’ 
consideration.215 Beyond substance, there is the variable of concentration. The 
Epicurean soul was divided into mind and spirit, into rational (λογικόν) and 
irrational (ἄλογον) parts, with the former – a functional ἡγεμονικόν216 – 
concentrated in the chest.217 Asclepiades, strikingly, rejected the notion of a 
localised ἡγεμονικόν.218 The implications of this departure are discussed at 
IV.4.3. What reads, on first analysis, as a further (and decidedly more radical) 
step towards the simplification of Epicurean psychology, may in fact have been a 
means of diversifying the function of πνεῦμα through the mechanism of variable 
concentration.219 The pseudo-Galenic Historia Philosopha informs us that the 
concentration of soul-πνεῦμα in Asclepiadean psychophysiology was not 
 
corpuscular soul as a complex of elements rather than a singular compound. This will have consequences 
for how the materialist can integrate corpuscular psychology into physiology, the process of reducing the 
soul-body aggregate to its perceptible architecture (see IV.4.2) 
211 Aët. Plac. 4.3.11 (LS 14 C). 
212 Ibid.; Lucr. III.62-322. 
213 The most sophisticated exponent of a lineage of medical thinkers that began with Praxagoras of Cos. 
See I.3.9. 
214  ps-Gal. Int. 9.3 (= XIV.697 K.). 
215 Although even within Epicureanism, Lucr. III.288-322 suggests that this question was approached with 
hesitation, perhaps on account of its fatalistic implications. 
216 Aët. 4.5.5. 
217 Lucr. III.231-287. 
218 Calc. In Tim. 216; Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.155. 
219 Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.1 
243 
 
homogeneous (see IV.4.3).220 Without the topological fixity imposed by a ruling-
part, the structure of the soul is uniformly mutable, a trait we might anticipate in a 
substance that exists beneath the organs and the vessels of the body. 
IV.4.2 Soul-πνεῦμα: Hellenistic physiology vs. corpuscular physics 
The centrality of πνεῦμα to Hellenistic philosophy and science is well established 
at this point in our discussion. Unlike Chrysippean πνεῦμα (I.3.8-9, I.4,4 & I.5), 
Asclepiades’ soul-particles are juxtaposed with the rest of the aggregate. They 
are also, being ὄγκοι, without phenomenal content.221 To identify ψυχή with 
πνεῦμα is to encumber respiration with a role in the soul’s generation and/or 
nourishment.222 Asclepiades is faced with the question of how to reconcile 
corpuscular πνεῦμα with the mechanisms of post-third century Hellenistic 
physiology which was unconcerned, by design (III.2.2), with the subsensory roots 
of the mechanisms it identified. 
     Let us flesh out the theory as far as we are able. Galen informs us that, for 
Asclepiades, respiration is the process by which soul-πνεῦμα is generated.223 
Asclepiades’ account of the formation of psychic-πνεῦμα is preserved in 
Calcidius’ commentary on Plato’s Timaeus (In. Tim.) 214: 
…pneuma, they [the Asclepiadeans] assert, travels though the mouth to the 
lungs, and having been rarefied in respiration makes its way to the location 
of the heart, then through the arteries which extend from the heart, and 
arrives at the carotid vessels, so called because when they are wounded 
they cause sleep-bringing death; through these the same pneuma is 
brought to the head through the fine and narrow passages of the nerves, 
and they say that there the origin of sensation is first generated and spreads 
throughout the rest of the body.224 
 
220 Ps.-Gal.  Hist. Phil. 24 = Leith 112. 
221 i.e. qualities beyond size, shape and tangibility. 
222 See I.4.4 for the role of respiration in Chrysippus’ account of soul-πνεῦμα. For Chrysippus, respiration 
is a process whereby the microcosm is bridged to the macrocosm. Incorporating it into Stoic psychology 
was likely a relatively frictionless affair. For Asclepiades, by contrast, respiration presents the problem of 
reconciling corpuscular psychology with the posterior processes of contemporary physiology. 
223 Gal. Ut. Resp. 1.2. (= IV.471 K.). It is not, therefore, the process by which soul-πνεῦμα is nourished, as 
claimed by Praxagoras of Cos.  
224 Trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 110. See Polito (2006) p.291-291 for confirmation that the 
Asclepiadeans are the subject of this passage. 
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Respiration is the mechanism by which πνεῦμα enters the body. It is converted 
into soul-πνεῦμα via a two-stage process of rarefaction, first in the lungs and then 
in the head, shuttled by the respiratory system through the body’s perceptible 
channels. By the time πνεῦμα reaches the heart via the lungs it is somehow 
distinct from the air inhaled. In the head πνεῦμα acquires the full complement of 
psychic functions and thereafter it is diffuse. The reference to the ‘fine and narrow 
passages of the nerves’ in relation to this final stage of rarefaction is a clue to the 
mechanics of the process; ‘refinement’ in Asclepiades’ physiology, is the process 
of squeezing ὄγκοι through ever finer pores. Given the soul’s permeation of the 
body following its generation in the head, it is clear that we should herein 
understand the soul in elemental terms.225 The ‘fine and narrow passages of the 
nerves’ likely refer to the πόροι within the nerves – the interstices between their 
constituent ὄγκοι; they are only passages sufficiently narrow to release the ultra-
fine soul-ὄγκοι into the primitive network of void-gaps whereby, impervious to 
posterior boundaries, they may pervade the aggregate. Questions arise as to 
where the soul-ὄγκοι were before this final stage of rarefaction. But let us first 
locate the theory in its appropriate context.  
     Where Asclepiades’ corpuscular model of the soul is adapted from Epicurean 
psychology, his physiological account of the soul’s generation is derived from 
Erasistratus.226 For Erasistratus, as for Asclepiades, πνεῦμα is replenished 
through respiration.227 It enters the body through the mouth and travels to the 
arteries of the lungs, then to the heart, and from the aorta to the rest of the arteries 
in the body including, of course, those which lead to the brain.228 πνεῦμα  thus 
travels to the brain via the heart as mirrored in Calc. In Tim. 214.229 The two-stage 
process of pneumatic rarefaction in In Tim. 214 further aligns his account of soul-
generation with Erasistratean respiration. Erasistratus distinguished vital 
(ζωτικόν) πνεῦμα from psychic (ψυχικόν) πνεῦμα, where the former stimulates 
underlying organic processes and the latter mediates motion and sensation. 
Inhaled air acquires its vital functions in the heart; its psychic functions are 
 
225 Calcidius, having set out the process by which soul-πνεῦμα is generated through respiration, proceeds 
to elucidate the soul’s elemental constituents at In Tim. 215. 
226 See Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.2. 
227 Gal. Ut. Resp. 1.2. (= IV.471 K.) = Garofalo fr. 99. 
228 Gal. Art. Sang. 2.2 (= IV.706 K.) = Garofalo fr. 101; Gal. Ut. Resp. 5.1 (= IV.502 K.) = Garofalo fr. 112. 
229 This contrasts with the account at Hipp. Sacr. 7 in which πνεῦμα travels directly from the nostrils to 
the brain which Galen would continue to adhere to. See Gal. Et. Resp. 5.1 (= IV.502 K.) = Garofalo fr. 112. 
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acquired in (or around) the brain.230 The nature of each transformation in 
Erasistratus’ account is unknown.231 But what is significant, with respect to 
Asclepiades, are the locations at which these transformations take place – first in 
the heart and then in the brain, after which πνεῦμα is functionally ‘psychic’. The 
parallels in Calc. In Tim. 214 are clear. That rarefaction needed to occur twice in 
Asclepiades’ system – an eccentricity in isolation – indicates his Erasistratean 
inheritance. He did not, however, inherit Erasistratus’ formal bifurcation of 
internalized πνεῦμα. His paring down of Epicurean psychology suggests a 
general tendency to subsume all psychic processes into the agency of a singular, 
undifferentiated substance – a process which was itself most likely motivated by 
third century πνεῦμα-centricism (of which Erasistratus was a leading proponent). 
Differentiating between types of πνεῦμα within Asclepiadean physics – where the 
soul’s functions are explained by the individual properties of its constituent 
elements – would force him to distinguish types of soul-corpuscle. This was 
evidently an Epicurean device that Asclepiades was eager to avoid (IV.4.2). It is 
not, after all, a necessity of Epicurean epistemology (see IV.5.3).232 Extremely 
fine ὄγκοι are not given freedom of the body until the final stage of the soul’s 
refinement. There is scant room in Asclepiades’ corpuscular physiology for the 
release of (presumably) larger/coarser soul-ὄγκοι from the confines of the body’s 
perceptible channels before the ultimate stage of rarefaction. Corpuscular 
physics limits Asclepiades’ options in psychophysiology. The outline of his theory 
of soul-generation is Erasistratean,233 but a question remains as to how far 
Asclepiades’ two primary influences are, in fact, reconcilable. 
 
230 Gal. Ut. Resp. 5. (= IV.502 K.) = fr.112 Garofalo; Gal. PHP. II.8.38 = fr.112B Garofalo. 
231 Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.2 points to Gal. Art. Sang. 2 (= IV.706 K.) = fr. 101 Garofalo (= fr. 18 Lewis) in 
which Praxagoras of Cos, Erasistratus’ predecessor, maintains that the πνεῦμα within the body is more 
coarse-structured than external air to caution us against the assumption the Erasistratus explained the 
bifurcation of πνεῦμα in terms of degrees of rarefaction. According to Galen, Erasistratus failed to specify 
the degree of pneumatic ‘thickness’ to his satisfaction. 
232 Moreover, the distinction between vital and physic πνεῦμα is fundamental to the Erasistratean theory 
of disease (see e.g. Gal. Adv. Er. (= XI.153f. K.) = Garofalo fr. 198; Gal. At. Bil. 5.18 (= V.124 K.) = Garofalo 
fr. 240) which, being the product of Erasistratus’ deliberately constrained epistemology (Gal. MM 2.5 = 
X.107 K.), and focused on the cross contamination of substances within the triplokia, the ‘threefold web’ 
(see Leith (2015b)) of perceptible vessels in the body, could not be incorporates into Asclepiades’ 
elemental theory of disease while retaining the essentials of Epicurean epistemology. See IV.4.4.  
233 There are, however, a couple of outlying fragments that cannot be ignored in this discussion. An 
anomalous testimony from ps.-Gal Hist. Phil. 24 states that ‘Epicurus thought that the soul is the air drawn 
in form outside through respiration’ (trans. Leith = Leith 112). This is not corroborated elsewhere. It is, 
moreover, difficult to reconcile the account of the soul as being the air inhaled through respiration with 
Epicurus’ quadripartite model of the soul of which a part merely resembles the air (Epic. Ep. Hdt. 63-67). 
Polito (2006) p.299 suggests that ps.-Gal. Hist. Phil. 24 contains a misattribution of Asclepiadean doctrine 
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     The question is as follows: why do soul-ὄγκοι, being extremely fine, round, 
and smooth in texture, keep to the body’s perceptible channels before the final 
stage of rarefaction? Where (distinctly meagre) precedent for soul-replenishment 
through respiration in the atomist tradition – limited to Aristotle’s account of 
respiration in Democritean psychology in De Anima 404a 9-16234 – merely 
recognises that breathing is the mechanism whereby soul-atoms-in-potentiality 
enter the body, the physiological specificity of Asclepiades’ account, born of his 
engagement with contemporary neurophysiology, raises questions of the 
capacity of physiological structures to shepherd ontologically primitive entities. 
The first point of focus is that πνεῦμα is inhaled through the mouth; despite the 
porosity of the body, and the ongoing reciprocal exchange of ὄγκοι between the 
body and its environment,235 the mouth is apparently the only gateway to πνεῦμα 
in Asclepiadean physiology.236 Is it therefore the case that appropriately shaped 
soul-ὄγκοι only emerge from the respiratory system? Or is it perhaps that identical 
ὄγκοι, elsewhere derived, having entered the body through the πόροι in the skin, 
never acquire a role in psychic function? Competing influences clash before we 
move beyond the lips. Either option is dubious. The former finds some support in 
the testimonia. Aëtius records that, for Asclepiades, outside air is composed of 
coarse particles,237 whereas soul-ὄγκοι are smooth and spherical.238 Coarse 
πνεῦμα is converted into smooth soul-πνεῦμα through the two-stage process of 
rarefaction. But we require a fuller explanation as to what this process entails in 
elemental terms. As in other areas of Asclepiades’ physiology – such as, for 
example, in digestion239 – rarefaction in Calc. In Tim. 214 entails the release of 
 
to Epicurus. This is plausible, in my view, but we should note that there is some evidence for Democritean 
precedence on this issue (Arist. DA 404a 9-16, see Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.2). Aristotle writes that 
respiration had a role in both replacing and containing soul-atoms in Democritus’ theory. But this account 
of respiration, as abbreviated in DA 404a 9-16, is notable for being a purely elemental account of the 
mechanics of soul preservation. A distinction is made only between soul-atoms functioning inside the 
body and similarly shaped atoms outside the body, pending psychological functions. The Asclepiadean 
model is considerably more physiologically complex. 
234 Assuming that ps.-Gal. Hist. Phil. 24 does, in fact, include a misattribution of Asclepiadean doctrine to 
Epicurus. See supra n.233. 
235 This is certainly implied in S. E. M. III.3-5; Marcellinus De Pulsibus 2 may preserve an Asclepiadean 
account of πνεῦμα tending, on account of its fine structure, towards the outside of the body where it 
escapes through the skin. Asclepiades is not mentioned by name, however. 
236 Further evidence for Asclepiades’ Erasistratean influence on this question. But Erasistratus was not 
working with a corpuscular theory of matter (or any theory of matter beneath what was perceptible in 
the body (see Gal. MM. 2.5 5 (= X.107 K.))). If Marcellinus De Pulsibus. 2 is indeed an Asclepiadean 
testimony, then evidently refined πνεῦμα could exit the body via any of its pores.  
237 Aët. 4.22.2 = Leith 63. 
238 Calc. In Tim. 215. 
239 Cael. Cel. Pass. I.14.113 
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ever finer particles through ever finer pores. If we understand this as a filtration 
process and assume that Aët. 4.22.2 refers to external πνεῦμα that is composed 
mostly of coarse particles, the question of why soul-ὄγκοι-in-potentially, which are 
fine enough to permeate the body, do not escape the respiratory system through 
larger pores before they reach the brain seems unavoidable. 
     Can corpuscular fragility come to Asclepiades’ aid? Vallance saw 
Asclepiades’ account of digestion in Cel. Pass. 1.14.113 as an indication of the 
controversial doctrine’s physiological role, but his argument is speculative.240 It is 
not obvious why the breaking of ὄγκοι would entail smoothness. I suggested at 
IV.2.4.3 that if we allow corpuscular fusion into Asclepiades’ system and assume 
that division is most likely to occur at a point of prior unification, from there we 
may speculate that coarse ὄγκοι are irregular clusters of previously independent 
ὄγκοι. Division, precipitated by the narrowing of passageways, would produce 
smaller and likely smoother ὄγκοι. Leaving this hypothesis in play for a sentence 
longer, the suggestion that Asclepiades found in corpuscular fragility a means of 
reconciling corpuscular (quasi-Epicurean) psychology with Erasistratean 
physiology begins to emerge. But it is difficult to hammer even this assumption-
littered hypothesis into something that would yield soul-ὄγκοι as described in In 
Tim. 215.241 Rather, we may be better served allowing that inconsistencies are 
inevitable when one tries to force two distinct systems from two independently 
motivated fields into reconciliation.  
     Erasistratus’ project of uncovering as much as he could about human 
physiology is – as hardly merits noting – far removed from Epicurus’ τέλος of 
neutralising fear by reducing the soul-body aggregate into seeds. We should not 
expect two distinct models of psychic functionality, oriented towards different τέλη 
and, correspondingly, hemmed within distinct discipline-derived epistemological 
parameters, to be amenable to seamless, retrospective reconciliation. 
Asclepiades’ attempt to recover the particulate nature of Epicurean psychology 
from Erasistratean physiology exposes the friction between his guiding 
influences, between the epistemology that he seeks to medicalise and cutting-
 
240 Vallance (1990) p.119-120. Asclepiades’ account of digestion is less vulnerable to the accusation of 
incoherence levelled at his account of soul-generation because there is, on my reading, little ambiguity as 
to whether we should understand the process in terms of the interactions of compounds.   




edge neurophysiology. We may suppose that, from Asclepiades’ perspective, 
resolving this tension was a question of updating Epicurean psychology into 
alignment with more recent anatomical discoveries; he may have seen in 
Erasistratus’ refusal to opine on subsensible elements an opportunity to insert 
corpuscular physics beneath the physician’s epistemological threshold.242 As I 
noted at II.3.9 – and as I shall discuss further below – both Epicurean and Stoic 
psychology were imperilled by third-century advancements in anatomy;243 
Asclepiades, writing in the late second/early first century BC, wrote with the 
benefit of more sophisticated anatomical knowledge than his predecessor. In this 
context, that he sought to recover as much of Epicurus’ psychology as he did – 
sometimes at the expense of anatomical sophistication – is significant, and I will 
argue at IV.5 that his epistemology depended on it.  
IV.4.3 The non-localised ἡγεμονικόν 
The physician’s rejection of the localised ἡγεμονικόν was – at least, in 
philosophical circles – his most notorious doctrine. Sextus Empiricus, expounding 
not psychology but epistemology, introduces Asclepiades in M VII.202 as ‘the 
physician who abolished the ἡγεμονικόν’.244 Calcidius frames the rejection of a 
‘certain or defined place to the ruling part of the soul’ as an inextricable 
component of Asclepiades’ materialism.245 Tertullian, the early Christian author, 
reads Asclepiades’ rejection of a localised ἡγεμονικόν as the assertion that the 
‘soul itself is nothing’ and that the mind should be discarded in favour of the 
senses.246 Evidently, the abolition of the ἡγεμονικόν was regarded as a proactive 
doctrine in antiquity, and often with radical implications for the human’s psychic 
status. 
 
242 See Gal. MM 2.5 (= X.107 K.). 
243 See Sedley (1998) p.68-70 and IV.4.3 below. 
244 The context (S. E. M. VII.202-203) is Asclepiades’ yielding to sense-data. I examine this passage in depth 
at IV.5.1.1. Asclepiades is again mentioned in S. E. M VII.380 as the champion of those who claim that the 
soul is without a ruling part. 
245 Indeed, so essential was this association that he seems to believe it was a key component of all 
materialist theories. I propose that so radical-seeming was Asclepiades’ rejection of a localised ἡγεμονικόν 
that, for some, it came to tar all previous particulate theories of matter by association. Polito (2006) p.291-
292 is perhaps right to suspect that Calc. In Tim. 214 preserves no mere error but a deliberate retrojection 
of Asclepiades’ view onto his atomist predecessors. 
246 Tert. DA 15.1-3 trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 119. A comparison with Gal. Nat. Fac. II.27-29 K. 




     Originated by the Stoics (I.4.1, I.4.4), the ἡγεμονικόν quickly came to dominate 
the discussion of the soul’s topology in antiquity, such that Asclepiades’ theory 
was eccentric. Epicurus, as we have seen (II.3.9), located the soul’s deliberative 
component in the chest.247 This was later reported as a claim about the location 
of the ἡγεμονικόν, given the functional equivalence of the Stoic ἡγεμονικόν and 
the Epicurean mind.248 Asclepiades’ rejection of a localised ἡγεμονικόν 
represents a further departure from Epicureanism, but one whose significance, I 
propose, lies not in its intimations of a radically new psychology – the  irruption of 
non-ethical, medically oriented materialism into the philosophical domain – but, 
to the contrary, in what it reveals of Asclepiades’ commitment to the essentials of 
the Epicurean soul. I suggest, following Leith,249 that we read Asclepiades’ 
psychophysiology as a creative solution to the problem of preserving the 
fundamentals of Epicurean psychology in the wake of subsequent developments 
in anatomy. In this subsection, I first address the context of Asclepiades’ 
innovation at IV.4.3.1, then argue against the proposition that Asclepiades’ 
rejection of the localised ἡγεμονικόν constituted a rejection of the mind in IV.4.3.2. 
IV.4.3.1 Post-Alexandrian corpuscular psychology 
With the conquest of Egypt in 321-320 BC came the convergence of Greek 
science and Egyptian post-mortem practices which introduced, however  briefly, 
human dissection into the physician’s investigative toolkit.250 With dissection 
came the discovery of the nervous system; with the discovery of the nervous 
system came a physiological justification for locating the seat of psychic function 
in the brain.251 Epicureanism, like Stoicism, founded a generation prior to 
discoveries of Herophilus and Erasistratus, located the mind/ἡγεμονικόν in the 
chest and heart respectively, conforming, broadly – though distinguished by 
physiological specificity – to contemporary medical orthodoxy. As discussed in 
II.3.9, evidence from the Herculaneum papyri points to a debate within second 
century Epicureanism concerning the location of the mind that was stimulated by 
‘arguments used by many doctors to prove that reason is located in the head’.252 
 
247 Lucr. III.136-140. 
248 Aët. 4.5.5. 
249 Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.4. 
250 Cels. Med. pref. 23-26 reports that vivisection was also practiced. See Nutton (2013) p.133-134 for an 
overview of the controversy surrounding this particular claim. 
251 See Herophilus fr. 63-66 von Staden (1989), 
252 P. Herc.1012 xlcii 7-11. See Sedley (1998) p.69-70. 
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Evidently, Epicurus’ phenomenologically derived psychological topography was 
confronted with physiological reality and had its insufficiency laid bare. 
     Drawing his physics from Epicurus and his physiology from Erasistratus, 
Asclepiades has an obvious problem. Erasistratus never had to marry his 
discoveries to a cosmology designed in ignorance of the concealed architecture 
of the human body (III.2.2).253 Epicurus never had to elucidate soul-generation in 
terms of the body’s sensible vessels to make the point that suffering ends at 
death.254 How, then, does the doctor proceed? We might expect, given the 
mechanism of soul-generation in In Tim. 214 and its clear Erasistratean 
influence,255 that the brain might fulfil the function of the ἡγεμονικόν in 
Asclepiades’ psychology, being the location whence ‘sensation spreads to the 
rest of the body’.256 Although the ἡγεμονικόν would be localised in a different part 
of the body – and why should we expect Asclepiades to be especially concerned 
with superficial deviations from Epicureanism, given our argument at IV.2? – the 
relationship between soul-in-brain and soul-in-body in Asclepiades’ 
psychophysiology invites parallels with the mind-spirit dichotomy in 
Epicureanism, where the latter spills from the former.257 But nowhere does 
Asclepiades make this move. It seems significant that Epicurus does not name 
the heart as the seat of the mind, merely the thorax.258 Lucretius makes a 
phenomenological argument for the confinement of the ‘deliberative element’ to 
the chest in contrast with the Stoics’ anatomical/embryological explanation for 
cardiocentric psychophysiology.259 The claim that emotions emanate from the 
chest is an appeal to first-person experience; it presumes no knowledge of, nor 
demonstrates an interest in, the sensible topography of the human body beneath 
one’s awareness of oneself. This is consistent with Epicurean psychophysics. 
Given the ontological primacy of atoms and ὄγκοι over the organs of the body, 
the challenge posed by third-century physiology to particulate physics is not that 
it locates the ruling-part-of-the-soul in the wrong organ, but that it locates the 
ruling-part-of-the-soul in any organ at all; the body’s sensible, internal 
 
253 Recall esp. Gal. MM 2.5 (= X.107 K.). 
254 The exposition of Epicurean psychophysiology at Lucr. III (esp. 136-176, 323-358, 445-546, 576-614) is 
motivated by Lucretius’ desire to establish the mortality of the mind. 
255 See supra IV.4.2 
256 Cal. In Tim. 214. 
257 Lucr. III.136-176. 
258 Ibid. III.136-140; Aët. 4.5.5. 
259 Lucr. III.136-139; Gal. Foet. 4.698, 2-8 (LS 53 D).  
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architecture cannot define the boundaries of a mind composed of ultra-fine ὄγκοι 
any more than one of equivalent atoms. For Asclepiades, the conflict between 
Epicurus and Erasistratus is not between cardiocentricism and 
encephalocentrism but particulate psychology and sophisticated human 
anatomy; a tightly – and more to the point, sensibly –  bounded ἡγεμονικόν, 
suggested by the discovery of the nerves,260 was incompatible corpuscular 
psychology. Epicurean/Asclepiadean epistemology (see IV.5.1) holds sense-
impressions to be apprehensions in reality and truth.261 Once physicians 
extended their awareness inside the architecture of the body, once the 
phenomenological argument for Epicurean psychology was shown to conflict with 
sense-data and once the thorax was divested of its prominence, Asclepiades 
elected to dispense with the localised ἡγεμονικόν entirely. What this amounts to, 
in terms of the distribution of psychic function and the status of the human as a 
thinking individual, is the subject of the next section. 
IV.4.3.2 The rejection of the mind? 
What is it, therefore, to deny the existence of a localised ruling-part-of-the-soul? 
Asclepiades advanced a series of empirical examples to demonstrate that the 
enactment of the soul’s functions was not dependent on a singular organ. The 
following passage is from Tertullian’s De Anima, which ascribes to Asclepiades 
a kind of anti-psychology, equating the rejection of the ἡγεμονικόν with the 
rejection of the mind: 
…those who deny that there is a ruling part believed first that the soul itself 
is nothing. One Dicaearchus of Messene, and among doctors Andreas and 
Asclepiades, did away with the ruling part in this way, while they want the 
senses, for which they claim the role of ruling part, to take the place of the 
mind itself. Asclepiades is also moved by the following argument, that many 
animals, when the parts of the body in which the ruling part is most often 
thought to reside is removed, nevertheless continue to live to a certain 
extent and sense no less, such as flies, wasps and locusts, if you cut off 
their heads, or like she-goats, tortoises and eels, if you remove their heart. 
Therefore (he thinks) that the ruling part does not exist, since if it did, when 
 
260 How Asclepiades incorporates the nerves into his explanation of sensation is addressed at IV.4.4. 
261 S. E. M VII.201.  
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removed along with its seat, the soul’s power would not persist. But against 
Dicaearchus many philosophers – Plato, Strato, Epicurus, Democritus, 
Empedocles, Socrates, Aristotle –, and against Andreas and Asclepiades 
many doctors – Herophilus, Erasistratus, Diocles, Hippocrates, Soranus 
himself -, and now, greater than all these, we Christians, who are lead away 
from each side according to God, (all these believe) both that there is a 
ruling part of the soul and that is had been consecrated in a particular recess 
of the body.262 
Asclepiades championed a theory of the soul which, on Tertullian’s account, was 
as far removed from the Christian ideal as it was possible to be. That Asclepiades’ 
rejection of the ἡγεμονικόν is equated to the Peripatetic Dicaearchus’ rejection of 
the soul as an independent entity should give us pause.263 Though the argument 
Tertullian preserves indicates a more nuanced psychology, Tertullian himself 
conflates ἡγεμονικόν with soul, the rejection of the former with the de facto 
rejection of the latter. The same argument-from-animal-mutilation is recorded by 
Calcidius. I quote his version also, for it includes an additional detail which is 
essential to grasping Asclepiades’ understanding of what it is to act as if one were 
ensouled: 
The same people [the Asclepiadeans] deny that the ruling faculty of the soul 
is located in the head, because of the fact that many animals after their head 
has been cut off continue to live for some time and carry on their usual 
behaviour, as though the loss of the body’s integrity were no loss at all – 
such as bees and drones, which after being beheaded may for a short time 
live, fly around and defend themselves with their stings in conformity with 
their nature. They would not so do if the part which ruled in their soul was 
located in the head. They also deny that it is in the heart, for crocodiles (as 
they say), when their hearts are torn out, live for some time and fight back 
 
262 Tert. DA 15.1-3 trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 119. The grouping of Asclepiades with the Peripatetic 
philosopher Dicaearchus of Messene is misleading; there is nothing to suggest that Dicaearchus had any 
interest in refuting the localised ἡγεμονικόν in his own idiosyncratic conception of the soul. See Caston 
(2001). S. E. M VII.349 informs us that Dicaearchus claimed the soul was nothing ‘but the body in a certain 
state’; at PH II.31, Sextus informs us that, for Dicaearchus, the soul did not exist. Whatever Asclepiades’ 
thoughts on the mind, that he affirmed the soul as an independent corporeal entity is not controversial. 
As for the Andreas, if Tertullian is referring to the pupil of Herophilus (the only prominent physician of 
that name), we know nothing of his theory of the soul; if this is not a reference to this particular Andreas, 
then we are even less the wiser. 
263 Supra n.262. 
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against the injury, and the same is observed in the case of sea-turtles and, 
among land animals, goats.264 
Both passages recall Aristotle’s argument against Plato’s tripartite 
psychophysiology wherein the rational component of the soul is located in the 
head, the spirited in the chest and the appetitive in the abdomen.265 Aristotle had 
made similar observations about wasps, bees and tortoises when he argued that 
the functions of the soul cannot be separated from one another.266 Asclepiades 
used the same observation to demonstrate that the full complement of physic 
function was active throughout the body, receiving no orders from a localised 
command centre. His methodology is consistent with Epicurean sign-inference – 
phenomena direct reason towards subsensible processes (II.4) – though on this 
question external observations have – at least on the first analysis – come to 
displace the phenomenological data of first-person experience. The precedent 
for these observations in Aristotle suggests that Asclepiades incorporated them 
into his argumentation after his conclusion was already in his sights; he required 
an a posteriori justification for a doctrine birthed by reason to solve the problem 
of aligning the essentials of Epicurean psychology with contemporary physiology.  
     However, our sources are conflicted as to precisely what conclusion 
Asclepiades sought to defend. Calcidius tells us that Asclepiades ‘assigned no 
certain or defined place to the ruling part of the soul’;267 Caelius Aurelianus writes 
that Asclepiades ‘denies that the ruling part of the soul is fixed in any part of the 
body; for he says that the soul is nothing more than the combination of all the 
senses.’268 Both testimonies allow for the existence of a non-local ἡγεμονικόν, 
but other witnesses encumber Asclepiades with a more radical claim. Tertullian, 
as we have seen, understands the Asclepiadean soul to be without a ruling 
component; the senses, on his reading, replace the mind.269 Sextus Empiricus 
distinguishes Asclepiades and his followers from those who uphold the existence 
of the ἡγεμονικόν but dispute its location; he states plainly that for Asclepiades 
 
264 Calc. In Tim. 216 trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 110. The attribution to Asclepiades is less explicit in 
this passage but it is clear from context that Asclepiades is the source of the arguments listed; he is the 
only figure mentioned in In Tim. 214-217 to whom the rejection of a localised ἡγεμονικόν can accurately 
be attributed. 
265 This parallel is drawn in Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.4. 
266 Arist. Iuv. 2, 468a 21b 12.  
267 Calc. In Tim. 216. trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 110. 
268 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 114.115. trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 111. 
269 Tert. DA 15.1-3. 
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‘there is no ruling part at all.’270 The arguments preserved by Tertullian and 
Calcidius quoted above, despite Tertullian’s own reading of Asclepiades, only 
suffice as arguments against the existence of the ἡγεμονικόν per se if we accept 
that the head and the heart are the only places where ruling-part-of-the-soul can 
possibly reside.271 Notably, the philosophical tradition to which Asclepiades was 
indebted did not make this claim; the argument against locating the ἡγεμονικόν 
in the chest never materialises, nor does the argument against a non-localised or 
‘wandering’ ἡγεμονικόν.272 His targets are those who propose the ἡγεμονικόν to 
be coextensive with (or otherwise hemmed by) a specific organ, the heart in the 
case of the Stoics, and the brain in the case (at least, by implication) of the 
Herophileans and Erasistrateans. Tertullian’s testimony, for all that it neglects to 
treat reason as a separate entity (to which I return at IV.5.1.1), nevertheless 
preserves the functions of the ἡγεμονικόν; to bestow the functions of mind upon 
the senses is not to abolish the mind but to broaden it. Sextus Empiricus does 
not elaborate what consequences abolishing the ἡγεμονικόν might have had for 
psychic activity in Asclepiades’ view, but the arguments in Tertullian and 
Calcidius preserve the full complement of psychic functions despite the absence 
of a localised control-centre.273 That the ἡγεμονικόν persists without a fixed 
locality seems like the more plausible reading. 
    Polito (2006) has an alternative interpretation.274 Calc. In Tim. 214-217 draws 
a clear (if confused/deliberately misleading) association between materialist 
physics and the rejection of the localised ἡγεμονικόν. The association he wants 
to make is between those who permit the soul ‘no special substance of its own’ – 
i.e. those who do not distinguish it from body/corpuscles – and those who deny 
its rigid structure.275 We may be tempted to speculate whether Asclepiades’ 
psychology, like his determinism, can be read as an extension of his materialism 
– unburdened, as it is, by the moral demands of a philosophy garbed as a 
 
270 S. E. M VII.380. 
271 Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.4. 
272 Hinted in ps.-Gal. Hist. Phil. 24 = Lieth 122. See below. 
273 Note esp. Cal. In Tm. 216 who specifies that bees ‘defend themselves with their stings in conformity 
with their nature.’ The point is not simply that bees continue to display some psychic function after they 
have been decapitated, but that they maintain all of their previous psychic faculties, responding to stimuli 
as ‘rationally’ as the intelligence of bees would typically permit. See Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.4. 
274 Polito’s account is bound up in his face-value reading of a fragment of Antiochus of Ascalon at S. E. M 
VII.202-203 (see Polito (2006) p.324.). I return to this fragment at IV.5.1. 
275 Cal. In Tim. 217. 
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medicine for the mind. Polito reads the accounts of animal activity post-mutilation 
in Tert. DA 15.1-3 and Cal. In Tim. 216 as referring only to involuntary movements 
and concludes that Asclepiades, who considers all activity to be the product of 
necessity and regards animals to be sufficient analogues for intelligent life,276 
made no meaningful distinction between voluntary and involuntary action; all 
behaviours, considered without pretension, are mindless spasms.277 The 
ἡγεμονικόν, on this reading, is superfluous.278 He further cites a passage from 
Galen’s Commentary on Hippocrates’ In the Surgery in which Asclepiades is 
reported to have done away with such concepts as intelligence, memory and 
deliberation.279 I will argue at IV.5.1 why I think the claims made in this passage 
are misleading. For the time being, it is sufficient to point out that the association 
between the abolition of the ἡγεμονικόν and corpuscularism in Calc. In Tim. 214 
belongs entirely to Calcidius;280 the non-localised ἡγεμονικόν is not a logical 
conclusion of materialism minus ethics in the manner of Asclepiades’ 
determinism; it is, I will argue, a resolution to the conflict of Epicurean 
epistemology plus sophisticated physiology. Moreover, Calc. In Tim. 216 does 
not permit the interpretation that Asclepiades deliberately conflates voluntary with 
involuntary action; Calcidius writes that mutilated beasts continue to ‘act in 
conformity with their nature’ – i.e. as normal; were they merely twitching, then it 
is not clear how the argument recorded would succeed in proving that absence 
of a localised ἡγεμονικόν.281 Asclepiades’ determinism does not necessitate the 
abolition of the ἡγεμονικόν;282 the ἡγεμονικόν is, after all, a Stoic invention, 
alongside prototypical compatibilism.283 
 
276 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.115 and IV.3.2 above for Asclepiades and necessity. Polito (2006) p.306 cites 
Tertullian’s reference to sensation in DA 15.2 (vivere et sapere) as the basis for his claim that these 
‘involuntary actions’ are to be equated with intelligence. 
277 Polito (2006) p.306. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Gal. Hipp. Off. Med. 18b, 660. Cf. Nat. Fac. II.27-29 K. 
280 Calcidius may have viewed Asclepiadeanism as the conclusion of the materialist tradition, but to assert 
that Democritus and Epicurus were on a logical course towards the abolition of the ἡγεμονικόν is forced. 
It is, in fact, in Democritean atomism that we may first locate the alignment of physical premises with 
ethical conclusions in Greek philosophy, with the ‘undisturbedness’ (ἀθαμβίαν) of the human mind 
among his philosophy’s aims. See e.g. Cic. Fin. V.87. 
281 Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.4, n.94. 
282 As suggested in Polito (2006) p.306-307. 
283 Cic. Fat. 39-43 is the key text for (proto-)compatibilism in Stoicism. See Sales (2001) for the relationship 
between ancient and modern conceptions of compatibilism. 
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     How does Asclepiades preserve the mind? The blueprint, Leith suggests,284 
may be found in Epicureanism, in the blurring of the boundary between mind 
(animus) and spirit (anima); the two components ‘constitute a single nature’ as 
evidenced by the speed at which the spirit bestows motion at the mind’s 
behest.285 The spirit is a tool by which the mind’s functions are enacted. As the 
spirit is wedded to the body, so the operations of the mind are wedded to the 
spirit. The mind’s partial independence from the spirit is advanced in DRN III as 
an explanation for first-person experiences that lack an obvious physiological 
complement – an activity of the spirit in conjunction with the body; we may think 
independently of our movements,286 but this fact does not in itself necessitate a 
fixed locality for the deliberative element – nor, indeed, is there a suggestion in 
the Epicurean testimonia that the composition of the mind is distinct from the spirit 
in terms of the proportion of its constituents; air, wind, fire and the sensory 
component have roles to play in mind and spirit alike.287 The variable by which 
they are distinguished is concentration. The pseudo-Galenic Historia Philosopha 
ascribes to the followers of Asclepiades the claim that ‘the soul is πνεῦμα 
distributed through the whole body, in some places more, in others less.’288 If 
concentration is the only variable whereby one may distinguish the 
mind/ἡγεμονικόν from the spirit/wider soul in Epicurean psychology, if 
Asclepiades’ arguments against the localised ἡγεμονικόν were restricted to its 
confinement in particular organs and if, as we shall see at IV.5.1 below, 
Asclepiades made no move to underplay the functions of the Epicurean mind, 
then ps.-Gal. Hist. Phil. 24 may preserve Asclepiades’ solution to the problem of 
the seat of the intellect that vexed Epicureans of his era.289 Higher-psychic 
functions may emanate from the chest as they may emanate from the head as 
they may emanate throughout the soul-body aggregate. Asclepiades, were he 
inclined, need not even completely part ways with the phenomenological 
arguments for the mind’s placement in the chest; there is nothing in his system 
that necessarily precludes emotions from arising in the thorax – indeed, the 
system seems apt to incorporate Epicurean argumentation into a more 
 
284 Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.4. 
285 Lucr. III.136-176. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid. III.417-462. 
288 ps.-Gal. Hist. Phil. 24 trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 112. 
289 See Sedley (1998) p.69-70. 
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sophisticated corpuscular phenomenology, but we have no evidence for 
Asclepiades having exploited this opportunity. 
     As I argued at IV.4.3.1, Asclepiades’ rejection of the localised ἡγεμονικόν is a 
reactive doctrine; it was instituted to preserve the essentials of Epicurean 
psychology, not to assert the supremacy of medically oriented/non-ethical 
psychophysical speculation over its forerunner in philosophy. Why, then, is 
Asclepiades so concerned to salvage what he can of Epicurus’ psychological 
model, when he has elsewhere revealed an inclination to emphasise the 
distinctions between his theory and the mother-doctrine (II.2)? Why was it 
necessary to engage with psychology at all? The answer lies in Epicureanism’s 
medical appeal in the late Hellenistic period, located at the intersection of physics, 
epistemology and psychology. The final part of this section is a bridge into this 
closing discussion. 
IV.4.4 Soul, πνεῦμα and nerves (a prelude to IV.5) 
Psychic πνεῦμα mediates both sensation and voluntary motion in Erasistratus’ 
physiology.290 Its activity is confined to the nerves, as vital πνεῦμα is confined to 
the arteries and blood to the veins. Cross contamination between the three 
constituents of Erasistratus’ ‘threefold web’ was the primary cause of disease in 
his system,291 a system that extended no further than the body’s homoiomerous 
parts (III.2.2). Asclepiades, who yielded to Erasistratean neurophysiology 
wherever the essentials of Epicureanism permitted, could not permit the nerves 
a specific role in the distribution of the senses. He granted only that the nerves 
mediate motor function;292 sensation is imparted by πνεῦμα diffused throughout 
the body, beneath the ontological tier where sensible vessels are impediments to 
motion.293 As Calcidius tells us, sensation is spread throughout the body after its 
refinement in the brain.294 That soul-ὄγκοι are released into body through the ‘fine 
 
290 Gal. UP 7.8 = Garofalo fr. 88; Gal. AA 2.11 = Garofalo fr. 90. 
291 e.g. Gal. Adv. Er. (= XI.153f. K.) = Garofalo fr. 198; Gal. At. Bil. 5.18 (= V.124 K.) = Garofalo fr. 240. See 
Leith (2015b) for an in-depth analysis of Erasistratus’ triplokia. 
292 fr. 81 Von Staden (1989) p.201. 
293 In several testimonia, the exercise of the senses in identified by Asclepiades as the soul itself. Cael. Aur. 
Cel. Pass. 1.14.115; Aët Plac. 4.2; ps.-Gal. Def. Med. 116 (= XIX.379 K.); Macrobius, Commentarium in 
Somnium Scipionis 1.14.19-20. The temptation to read these sources as an argument for Asclepiades’ 
novel psychology to be without the faculty of reason may be forestalled by the fact that similar attacks 
were made on Epicureanism (e.g. Plut. Adv. Col. 112B-C). See Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.5, supra IV.4.3.2 
and IV.5.1 below. 
294 Calc. In Tim. 214. 
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and narrow passages of the nerves’ may be read as a concession to 
contemporary neurophysiology,295 but from this point Asclepiades’ account of 
sensation has, in its essentials, retreated into Epicureanism. The question of 
Asclepiades’ epistemology can no longer be kept in the shadows. 
IV.5 Epistemology 
This section is divided into three parts. At IV.5.1 I will establish that Asclepiades 
did, in fact, adhere to Epicurean epistemology, for all that he sought to distance 
his theory from the mother-doctrine in other crucial respects. IV.5.2 examines the 
medical context of Asclepiades’ epistemological pronouncements, locating them 
in the ongoing debate between Rationalists and Empiricist physicians in the 
Hellenistic period and further emphasising their Epicurean affiliation. Here, I 
argue that Epicureanism’s medical value was located in its scientific method. At 
IV.5.3 we return to physics. I will argue that, tellingly, Asclepiades’ innovations in 
this domain preserve the essentials of Epicurean epistemology. 
IV.5.1 The Scientific Method 
We return to the guiding premises of Epicurean epistemology: 1) experiential data 
is non-illusory; 2) subsensible reality is accessible to a posteriori reasoning via 
experiential data (II.3.1).296 For Asclepiadean epistemology to be Epicurean in its 
essentials it must conform to both stated premises. I approach each premise in 
reverse order, beginning with the most controversial evidence and concluding 
with a summary of sense-perception in Asclepiadean epistemology/physics.  
IV.5.1.1 Antiochus of Ascalon (S. E. M VII.201-202) 
The fullest source for Asclepiadean epistemology is a quote from the physician’s 
near contemporary, the first century Platonist Antiochus of Ascalon,297 preserved 
in the following passage from Sextus Empiricus: 
Not far off [the Cyrenaics’] view appear to be those who assert that 
perceptions/the senses are the criterion of truth. The Academic Antiochus 
has made it clear that there were some who thought this when we he wrote 
the following explicitly in the second book of his Canonica: ‘But someone 
 
295 Calc. In Tim. 214. 
296 and e.g. S. E. M VII.211-216. 
297 On the vexed question of what is was to be a Platonist in the first century BC, Bonazzi (2012) is 
comprehensive. For Antiochus’ biography, see Hatzimichali (2012). 
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else, in medicine second to none, but who tried his hand also at philosophy, 
believed that perceptions are apprehensions in reality and truth, while we 
apprehend (καταλαμβάνειν) nothing by reason.’ With these words Antiochus 
seems to be putting forward the position mentioned, and also to be hinting 
at Asclepiades the doctor, who abolished the ἡγεμονικόν, and lived at the 
same time as him.298 
The Antiochus quotation preserves premise (1) but appears, on first reading, to 
do away with premise (2). Roberto Polito champions this face value reading;299 
where Epicurus recognises reason as a necessary tool for sifting valid inferences 
from sense-reports, ‘Asclepiades…bans reason totally’.300 His reading runs into 
trouble almost instantly. As noted at IV.2.3.1, multiple sources identify 
Asclepiadean ὄγκοι as being ‘perceptible to reason’.301 Polito later clarifies that, 
according to his reading, ‘Asclepiades did not do away with reasoning altogether’ 
but instead ‘abolishes reason as a separate faculty, and yet allows reasoning as 
an activity of the senses.’302 He writes: ‘His point is not that we do not think. It is, 
rather, that both thinking and sensing are a product of physical processes that 
the soul’s breath (πνεῦμα) undergoes,’303 and earlier, building from Cael. Aur. 
Cel. Pass. I.14.115,304 ‘the idea appears to be that the breath that fuels the 
senses processes incoming data by associating them with those previously 
stored, and that in this way it accomplishes a certain degree of 
conceptualization.305 But I fail to see how this is meaningfully distinct from 
Epicurus’ doctrine of preconception (πρόληψις),306 a component of his threefold 
criteria for truth which, alongside perception (αἴσθησις) and feeling (πάθη) (see 
II.3.2), form the matrix from which reason reaches into the non-evident; there is 
nothing on sign-inference in Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. I.14.115 that is especially anti-
 
298 S. E. M VII.201-202 trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 103. 
299 As noted at IV.4.3.2 above, Polito also cites Gal. Hipp. Off. Med. 18b, 660 in support of this claim. 
Galen’s polemic, in the face of the evidence considered in this section, reveals less of Asclepiades’ 
psychological/epistemological doctrine and more about his own preconceptions. 
300 Polito (2006) p.323. 
301 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.106; S. E. M III.3-5. See also e.g. Cass. Probl. 61. 
302 Polito (2006) p.328-329. 
303 Ibid. p.329. 
304 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. I.114.115: ‘…for he [Asclepiades] says that the soul is nothing more than the 
combination of all the senses. But he says that the discerning of hidden or concealed things occurs by 
means of the easy motion of the senses, and it is brought about by impinging sensibles and previous 
perception, while memory by the alternate operation of these.’ Trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 111. 
305 Polito (2006). p.328-329. 
306 D. L. X.33, Epic. Ep. Hdt. 37-38. 
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Epicurean.307 Asclepiades, like Epicurus,308 evidently did conceive of reason as 
distinct from sense-impressions; had he not, then his hostility towards 
Empiricism, the subject of IV.5.2 below, would be without basis.309 
     So what, therefore, of Antiochus’ testimony? Antiochus was a Stoicising 
Platonist.310 As such, as Leith points out,311 particular attention must be paid to 
his use of specialist Stoic vocabulary.312 Antiochus refers to ‘apprehension as 
ἀντιλαμβάνειν, a neutral term, elsewhere in his testimonia,313 but at S. E. M 
VII.201-202 he chooses the word καταλαμβάνειν, cognate with κατάληψις, the 
Stoic doctrine of cognition. In Stoic epistemology the ‘cognitive impression’ 
(φαντασία καταληπτική) is that ‘which arises from what is and is stamped and 
impressed exactly in accordance with what is, of such a kind as could not arise 
from what is not’314 – it is an apprehension of what is true. The claim is therefore 
not that we apprehend nothing at all by reason, but that we apprehend nothing 
with certainty from reason alone.315 Asclepiades’ epistemology is thus aligned 
with that of Epicurus whereby opinions – falsifiable sorties into the domain of the 
non-evident – can only be true if uncontested by self-evidence.316 Sextus reads 
Antiochus’ words as confirmation that Asclepiades belongs with Epicurus in the 
broad category of thinkers who uphold the senses as the criterion of truth (II.4.2). 
His immediate juxtaposition with Epicurus is itself revealing; the similarities 
 
307 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.115 does make the familiar claim that Asclepiades thought the soul to be 
nothing more than the combination of all the senses. But, as discussed above, similar claims were made 
of Epicurus (e.g. Plut. Adv. Col. 112B-C) and I have been unable to find evidence for how the Asclepiadean 
soul was functionally distinct from its Epicurean precursor. 
308 e.g. Epic. Ep. Hdt. 51. 
309 Not to mention the variety of sources that include Asclepiades among the Rationalists/Dogmatists in 
the medical sphere. See Anon Paris. Gr. 2286 fol. 104 (p.395.15-27 Cramer = Leith 100); Anon. Bamb. 
(p.412 sudhoff = Leith 101); Agnellus of Ravenna in De arctic ch.4 (= Leith 102). 
310 Brittain (2012) defends the Stoicising reading of Antiochus’ epistemology. 
311 Leith (forthcoming) IV.1.1. 
312 A detail of Antiochus’ testimony which, in context, Sextus has no cause to alert his readers to, being 
superfluous to his present task of organising his predecessor’s views on the criterion of truth into those 
who deny its existence, those who attribute it to λόγος, those who point to ἄλογος ἐνάργεια, or those 
who find a role for both. 
313 S. E. M VII.162. 
314 Ibid. VII.248 (LS 40 E), VII.402-410 (LS 40 H)); D. L. VII.46; Cic. Acad. 2.77-78 (LS 40 D). 
315 Leith (forthcoming) IV.1.1. At Cic. Luc. 18 we are informed of Antiochus’ approval of the Zenonian 
‘cognitive impression’. Stoic epistemology was apparently the tool with which Antiochus sought to 
redogmatize the Academy. See also Ibid. 14, 18, 29 and 31. Cicero’s Antiochus attributes to his sceptical 
opponents the view that ‘nothing can be apprehended’ (nihil posse percipi/comprehendi); he is not 
claiming that the sceptics believed that nothing can be grasped by the mind, merely that we apprehend 
nothing with certainty.  
316 cf. S. E. M VII.211-216. 
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between their physical models correspond – as we would expect, given the 
mutuality of the two branches in Epicureanism – to a shared epistemology. 
IV.5.1.2 Sense perception vs. mental perception317  
Calcidius writes of Asclepiadean sense-mechanics that ‘the common sense is 
touch, but it becomes particular because of differences in the parts by which we 
sense’ – i.e. the sense organs.318 Sensation is mediated by πνεῦμα,319 and thus 
we read Calc. In Tim. 214 as referring to physical contact between external 
bodies and those from which soul-πνεῦμα is comprised. The Anonymus 
Londinensis indicates an Epicurean-style account of sensation whereby ὄγκοι 
emitted from the surfaces of sense objects penetrate the sense-organs via πόροι 
and interact with πνεῦμα which, in concert with the particulate makeup of the 
organ in question, produces an appropriate sense-impression.320 At In Tim. 216 
Calcidius confuses Epicurean and Asclepiadean psychology in his tantalizing 
account of one’s synaesthetic response to sense-impressions; he writes that 
‘because of the similarity of the atoms, when one of them is moved the πνεῦμα 
as a whole, i.e. the soul, is moved at the same time. For this reason (he thinks) it 
often happens that people sense brightness and cold as soon as they hear the 
word ‘snow’.’321 Because of the unity of soul-particles, singular impressions 
stimulate responses throughout the body, including via πνεῦμα localised in the 
sense-organs; the soul, being all penetrating, reacts as one in response to the 
slightest stimuli (such that a word produces light in the mind). The conflation of 
Epicurus, Democritus and Asclepiades in this passage is illuminating; Calcidius 
evidently felt that the distinction between the Epicurean and Asclepiadean 
models of the soul were immaterial on the question of sensation; Asclepiades 
preserves everything of Epicurean psychology that permits his adoption of 
Epicurean sense-mechanics. The quality of individual sensations is contingent on 
the size of the impinging ὄγκοι322 which corresponds to the role played by 
 
317 For comparisons with the mechanics of sense/mental perceptions in Epicureanism, cf. II.4.1. 
318 Calc. In Tim. 214 trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 110. 
319 Ibid.  
320 Anon. Lond. xxxiii 52-xxxiv 53. cf. Epic. Ep. Hdt. 46 on εἴδωλα. 
321 Trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 110. He continues ‘…or, when someone eats something bitter, those 
who see it spit repeatedly from the increase in saliva, and people yawn when they see others yawn, and 
we move rhythmically in time with music.’ cf. Cass. Probl. 74 which is likely based on Asclepiadean 
doctrine. 
322 Cass. Probl. 61, 64, 65. As above (IV.2.5) Asclepiades is not mentioned by name in these passages but 
there is little doubt that his is the doctrine in question. 
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variations of atomic shape in Epicurean sense-mechanics.323 As with 
Epicureanism, variants of size/shape must correspond to phenomenal qualities 
only with respect to the constituents of compounds;324 digestion, for Asclepiades, 
is the process by which foodstuffs are shorn of their qualities through their 
resolution into finer compounds, ensuring that food is not re-tasted/smelt/seen as 
it diffuses through the body.325 
     If Asclepiades uprooted Epicurean epistemology for his own ends – and 
‘uprooted’ in the truest sense, with its roots in physical theory dangling in its wake 
– we would expect that, had he a theory of mental perceptions, it would share the 
same basic mechanics. However, our evidence is inconclusive. I am unconvinced 
that Caelius Aurelianus’ (vexingly gnomic) reference to the mechanics of 
discerning ‘hidden or concealed things’ (occultarum vel latentium rerum) at Cel. 
Pass. 1.14.115,326 which he juxtaposes with that of memory, refers to the 
mechanics of mental/imaginary perception as Leith suggests.327 In what respect 
are mental perceptions ‘hidden or concealed’ to those who experience them? 
‘Hidden things’ seems to refer more naturally to objects perceptible to reason – 
ὄγκοι and void – which are signified by the combination of ‘impinging sensibles’ 
(accidentibus sensibilibus) and ‘previous perception’ (antecendenti perspectione) 
which form the basis of πρόληψις. I am hesitant to accept Leith’s reading of 
sensibilia as referring to eidola, for εἴδωλα are not themselves sensible;328 and 
the more natural reading seems to be ‘impinging sense-impressions’ – i.e. εἴδωλα 
emitted from sensibles, not the ultra-fine progenitors of mental images, unrooted 
 
323 Cf. Lucr. II.464-477. It is curious that size is the variable that Asclepiades is most concerned with. See 
IV.2.5.1 for the possible role of corpuscular fragility in this preference. Fission guarantees only a reduction 
in size, where additional changes of shape cannot obviously be predicted within this system. 
324 How far Epicurean sense-mechanics successfully maintain the separation between atomic geometry 
and phenomenal qualities is another question. 
325 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. I.14.113.  
326 The Latin, for reference: ‘somnum enim etiam fieri spiritus sensibilis crassificatione asseverat. deinde 
regnum animae aliqua in parte corporis constitutum negat; etenim nihil aliud esse dicit animam quam 
sensuum omnium coetum. intellectum autem occultarum vel latentium rerum per solubilem fieri motum 
sensuum, qui ab accidentibus sensi<bi>libus atque antecedenti perspectione perficitur, memoriam vero 
alterno eorum exercitio dicit.’ = Leith 111: ‘For (Asclepiades) maintains that sleep is also caused by a 
condensing of the perceptive pneuma. Then he denies that the ruling part of the soul is fixed in any part 
of the body; for he says that the soul is nothing more than the combination of all the senses. But he says 
that the discerning of hidden or concealed things occurs by means of the easy motion of the senses, and 
it (sc. the discerning) is brought about by impinging sensibles and previous perception, while memory (is 
brought about) by the alternate operation of these.’ Trans. Leith (forthcoming). 
327 For the argument contra, see Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.6. 
328 Lucr. IV.256-268. 
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in discrete phenomena.329 The juxtaposition with memory may be explained by 
the fact that memory is the process by which preconceptions accumulate. 
‘Discerning’ occurs when impinging sensibles align with a deep-seated 
preconception, confirming the reality of something ‘hidden’; memories are 
created when impinging sensibles imprint themselves upon us, thus allowing 
preconceptions to be formed.330 
     Better – though imperfect – evidence may be found in Asclepiades’ account 
of hallucination, 331 a phenomenon that sits neatly within the doctor’s purview. 
Caelius Aurelianus records that Asclepiades advised against keeping sufferers 
of phrenitis in the dark ‘for in the light…the impressions of the mind or intellect 
are made feeble and meagre since they are confuted by the sense 
impressions.’332 Hallucinations – i.e. involuntary mental impressions – are 
brought about by the same basic mechanism as sensation and can thus be 
crowded out by more immediate impressions.333 A further hint as to the 
mechanism of hallucination is found in Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. I.pref.15 in which 
mental aberrations are explained by the incompatibility of externally derived 
impressions with the appropriate pores in the sense-receptors. Though the 
particulars of this are not seamlessly reconciled with Epicureanism – which hold 
mental-perceptions as emerging from distinct species of εἴδωλα334 – it does at 
least seem clear that mental aberrations – which must, in context, involve a 
hallucinatory component – are derived from external impressions. Despite the 
state of the evidence, I find little reason to doubt that Asclepiades adhered to an 
Epicurean-style account of mental impressions; that we find no conclusive 
answer to this question in our testimonia may be explained by Asclepiades’ τέλος; 
the physician is concerned with aberrations, with hallucinations as distinct from 
 
329 According to Epicurean epistemology (Lucr. IV.808-817) we actively render impinging mental-εἴδωλα 
perceptible to the mind through application.  
330 Hence, it is the ‘alternate operation of these’. cf. Diog. Oen. 5.3.3.-14 (LS 15 E) for the physical basis 
for memory creation in Epicureanism. 
331 As is also highlighted in Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.6. 
332 Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. I.15.118. 
333 Leith (forthcoming) IV.2.6 identifies an Epicurean parallel in Lucr. IV.757-765 in which dream-
impressions are sharpened by the absence of conflicting sense-data. Asclepiades’ account of phrenitis in 
Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. I.15.118 continues with an analogy with dream-impressions, hinting at the possibility 
that Asclepiades and Lucretius shared a source in Epicurus’ On Nature.  
334 Lucr. IV.722.822 informs us that the εἴδωλα that act directly on the mind are much more ‘delicate-
textured’ than the ones which stimulate vision, bypassing entirely the organs of sensation. The account 




imaginary constructs which presuppose voluntary application (II.4.1). We only 
encounter mental perceptions in Asclepiadean testimony in the context of 
pathology. This is not true, as we have seen above (and will revisit below), for 
sense perceptions; the mechanics of sensation concern the physician for reasons 
of epistemology. 
IV.5.2 Asclepiades vs. Empiricism 
Around 260 BC, Philinus of Cos founded the Empiricist school (named for 
ἐμπειρία, ‘experience’) in response to what he considered to be the undue 
emphasis afforded hidden causes by the new anatomists whose chief luminary, 
Herophilus of Chalcedon, was his teacher.335 Though a detailed analysis of 
medical Empiricism awaits us at V.2.2, we may summarise their project as the 
wholesale rejection of reason (λόγος) as a viable tool for discerning hidden 
causes, maintaining instead that ἐμπειρία, the data of perception, cross-
referenced with an ever-growing corpus of documented observations, was the 
basis of all useful medical knowledge. The Empiricists, in their attacks against 
those whom they disparage as ‘Rationalists’,336 focus attention in the medical 
sphere on matters of epistemology. In so doing, they – perhaps 
counterproductively – expand the apposite territory of medical inquiry to include 
a further layer of abstraction; it was in response to the emergence of the 
Empiricist sect that their Rationalist opponents sought to develop – or, indeed, to 
appropriate – sophisticated epistemologies of their own. Asclepiades is the first 
Rationalist doctor for whom we have evidence of anti-Empiricist argumentation. I 
will argue in this subsection that Asclepiades discovered in Epicureanism the 
necessary tools to defend λόγος against Empiricism. He takes ownership of those 
tools – as I argued in IV.2 – for himself and for his discipline by refashioning the 
nature of the elements. But when he does so – as I argue at IV.5.3 below – he 
preserves the physical essentials of Epicurean epistemology. 
IV.5.2.1 A physician’s defence of reason 
In On Sects for beginners, (SI) Galen informs us that Asclepiades maintained that 
unsupplemented experience was ‘entirely incoherent and unable to make the 
smallest discovery’ because ‘nothing is of a nature to be able to be seen often in 
 
335 ps-Gal. Int. 4.2 (= XIV.683-684 K.). 
336 Used interchangeably with ‘Dogmatists’ below. 
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the same way.’337 Similarly, in his Outline of Empiricism (Subf. Emp.) Galen 
attributes to Asclepiades the view that ‘experience is incoherent.’338 Late antique 
commentaries on SI attribute to Asclepiades the analogy between materiality and 
a river, whereby he rejects the perception of constancy implicit in the Empiricist’s 
devotion to ἐμπειρία.339 This is not, as Sextus Empiricus seems to suggest, 340 an 
argument against the truth-value of perceptions, but an argument against the 
Empiricists’ indiscriminate devotion to ἐμπειρία – that is, to perceptions without 
the organising principle of λόγος. Asclepiades’ critique of Empiricism receives its 
fullest treatment in Galen’s On Medical Experience (Med. Exp.) 1-4. Here, Galen 
records a Dogmatist’s argument against Empiricism which is said to be ‘similar to 
Asclepiades’ view’.341 The Dogmatist chastises his Empiricist opponent for failing 
to recognise that reason alone identifies subtle homogeneities in phenomena, 
generates categories from similarities and translates the cacophony of 
experiences into intelligible patterns and formal, functional systems (τέχναι).342 
Disease involves too many variables for ἐμπειρία alone to guide the physician 
towards the correct diagnosis/course of treatment;343 every new occurrence is a 
novelty, teaching nothing per se. The Dogmatist proceeds to demonstrate the 
taxonomizing power of λόγος by analogising medical analysis to similar 
disciplinary practices which were sculpted by λόγος from phenomena’s prima 
materia; ‘…the sounds of speech, though endless in number, could not be 
retained and comprehended by mere memory, but…a wise man grasped and 
limited them, because, having reflected upon them and examined them, he 
discovered that the principles and the elements of which these sounds are 
composed…the letters…are 24 in number according to Greek reckoning.’344 The 
Dogmatist’s project, in matters of practical science, is to ‘grasp’ and to ‘limit’, to 
intimate the structure of a something and refine it to its elements.345 It is, in 
 
337 Gal. SI V (= I.75 K.) trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 106. 
338 Gal. Subf. Emp. 12, 88.19-88.1 Deichgr. = Leith 706 
339 John of Alexandria, In Librum De Sectis Galeni 4rb70-4va64 = Leith 108a; Agnellus of Ravenna, In De 
Sectis ch. 20,21 = Leith 108b.  
340 S. E M VIII.6-7 states erroneously that Asclepiades employed the river analogy as Plato did, to discredit 
the epistemic value of perceptions per se. But this is clearly not what Asclepiades intended. 
341 Gal. Med. Exp. 2.3 trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 109. That Galen has Asclepiades in mind in Med. 
Exp. 4-1 is self-evident. Though Galen tells us that the Dogmatist he witnessed employed Asclepiades’ 
arguments in ‘different terms’ their structure is certainly Asclepiadean. 
342 Gal. Med. Exp. 3 = Leith 109. 
343 Ibid. 3.4. 
344 Ibid. 3.5. 
345 The analogy between physical elements and elements in language is one that Lucretius would famously 
exploit at Lucr. I.912-914 – ‘quo pacto verba quoque ipsa inter se paulo mutatis sunt elementis’. It is 
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structure, the physicist’s project, applied within a limited epistemological 
framework. Galen’s Dogmatist finds further examples of this mechanism in 
geometry – where ἐμπειρία yields infinite unique triangles ‘it was discovered by 
means of reason that the sides of the triangle are three kinds in all’ – and music 
– ‘reason alone, which musicians make use of, encloses and confines’ the 
numerous musical sounds and organises them ‘into finite categories’.346 All four 
examples – medicine, grammar, geometry and music – are species of τέχναι.347 
Each is drawn from ἐμπειρία by λόγος and organised around the realisation of a 
particular τέλος. The Asclepiadean Dogmatist, advancing an epistemological 
argument, emphasises the methodological unity of the practical sciences while 
reaching back into philosophy to acquire the appropriate tools. A parallel with 
Plato’s Philebus, in which Socrates describes the invention of τέχναι as the paring 
down of infinite occurrences into a finite number has been noted by Leith.348 But 
it is in Epicureanism that this argument finds its most significant precursor, where 
the relationship between reason and sensation as (nonetheless distinct) tools of 
sense-making is mutually dependent.349 Sextus Empiricus writes of Epicurean 
epistemology that ‘the peculiar function of sensation is to apprehend only that 
which is present to it and moves it, such as colour, not to make the distinction 
that the object here is a different one from the object there.’350 A similar claim is 
attributed to Asclepiades at M VII.91, taken from his work On Wine-giving,  in 
which the physician would appear to deny sense-perception the ability to 
distinguish mixed from simple colours.351 The point, in both cases, is not that 
perceptions yield false data but that reason is the instrument with which 
 
Asclepiades’ reduction of the medical art to ‘an estimation solely of primary causes’ that earns him Pliny’s 
scorn at NH XXVI. 
346 Gal. Med. Exp. 3.5 = Leith 109. 
347 As noted in Leith (forthcoming) IV.1.2. 
348 Plato. Phlb 16a-18d. See Leith (forthcoming) IV.1.2. The parallel was first suggested to David Leith by 
David Sedley. 
349 The symbiosis of sense and reason in Epicureanism is perhaps best summarised in D. L. X.31-32 (LS 16 
B): ‘All sensation, he [Epicurus] says, is irrational and does not accommodate memory. For neither is it 
moved by itself, nor when moved by something else is it able to add or subtract anything. Nor does there 
exist that which can refute sensations: neither can like sense refute like, because of their equal validity; 
nor unlike unlike, since they are not discriminatory of the same things; nor can reason, since all reason 
depends on the senses; nor can one individual sensation refute another, since all command our attention. 
And also the fact of sensory recognitions confirms the truth of sensations. And our seeing and hearing are 
facts, just as having pain is.  Hence sign-inferences about the non-evident should be made from things 
evident.’ 
350 S. E. M. VII.210 (LS 16 E).  
351 The connection between these passages is identified in Leith (forthcoming) IV.1.2. 
267 
 
perceptions reveal structural truths about the world;352 without reason, we have 
merely εἴδωλα, real but inert impressions, illuminating nothing beyond 
themselves. Asclepiades does not need to defend the truth-value of perceptions 
from the Empiricists; his task is to communicate the limits of perceptions in the 
accumulation of useful – i.e. teleologically productive – data while preserving their 
value as the foundations of inquiry.353 Epicurean epistemology furnished him with 
the tools with which to make such an argument. The earliest documented defence 
of reason in the medical sphere is, I suggest, an Epicurean one, repurposed to 
confront a threat that confined its critique to the medical τέχνη. 
IV.5.2.2 Verification by non-contestation  
To defend the claim that Asclepiadean epistemology is singularly Epicurean, we 
need only recall the argument at Cael. Aur. Cel. Pass. 1.14.106 concerning the 
unqualified nature of the ὄγκοι. 
‘…it does not seem to be unreasonable, he says, that bodies with no quality 
should generate (sc. all sensible things). For one thing follows the parts, 
another follows the whole: so silver is white, but the filing from it is black; 
goat’s horn is black, but the shaving is white.’354 
The Epicurean heritage of this passage is explored at IV.2.3.3 (n.88) above. Here, 
I add only that the methodology on display aligns perfectly – as we would of 
course expect – with that of Epicurus as laid out in S. E. M VII.211-216. The 
hypothesis that unqualified particles can combine to generate phenomenal 
qualities – a ‘non-evident thing’ – is demonstrated to be uncontested ‘by that 
which is evident’. At Cel. Pass. I.15.151-152 Asclepiades is reported to have 
supported his claim that wine both suppresses and causes sweating by 
highlighting that rennet has opposing effects on milk, thickening and rarefying it 
at once;355 he has not proven anything by making this comparison, but he has 
demonstrated that the hypothesis that an agent may have opposing effects on a 
 
352 The mechanism of discernment in each case seems to be more or less identical. Discerning that a colour 
has been mixed from base ingredients involves comparing it to similar and distinct colours encountered 
in the past when the nature of the colour was known – via witnessing its mixing, for example – and 
reasoning whether the colour presently observed belongs to the category of mixed or unmixed. 
353 Lucr. IV.483-465, 507-510 and D. L. X.31-32 for the dependency of reason on sensation in Epicureanism. 
354 Trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 16. 
355 The mechanism by which wine both causes and suppresses sweating is the simultaneous production 
of coagulation and rarefaction. 
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substance is uncontested by phenomena.356 An example of the reverse, already 
encountered, is Asclepiades’ argument against the localised ἡγεμονικόν at Tert. 
DA 15.1-3 and Calc. In Tim. 216; the hypothesis that the ἡγεμονικόν is situated 
either in the head or in the heart is contested by self-evidence. Perceptions are, 
in Epicurean terms, the κανών against which the viability of hypotheses are 
measured. 
IV.5.2.3 The medical utility of Epicurean epistemology 
But why might Epicurean epistemology be uniquely suited to combating 
Empiricism? Comparisons with Stoic epistemology, the equivalent branch of 
Epicureanism’s principle dogmatic rival in the Hellenistic period, may prove 
illuminating. Epicurean epistemology shares with Empiricism two premises: 1) All 
sense-impressions are non-illusory; 2) the application of reason and the receipt 
of sense-impressions are meaningfully distinct things. Stoic epistemology, by 
contrast, permits no such common ground. Stoicism does not grant that all sense-
impressions are true.357 Moreover, the doctrine of the ‘cognitive impression’ 
disintegrates the membrane between inert ἐμπειρία and λόγος as, in Stoic usage, 
the principle of rationality that precedes everything in the cosmos; the cognitive 
impression is one that reveals its own truth; it is nature’s method of speaking 
directly to the human soul.358 The binary of λόγος vs. ἐμπειρία cannot long be 
entertained within a cosmos that explains everything as an expression of nature’s 
intent. Asclepiades, adopting Epicurean epistemology, can engage with 
Empiricism on something closer to its own terms, accepting the universal truth of 
sense-impressions and granting that λόγος is a separate entity – posterior, in 
Epicureanism, to ἐμπειρία 359 – but challenging the Empiricist conclusion that the 
intrusion of λόγος into medicine inevitably leads doctors astray.360 
     The Epicurean argument for the epistemological value of λόγος is unburdened 
by theological and teleological assumptions – those premises which an Empiricist 
can wave off on first contact. The Asclepiadean-inflected argument at Med. Exp. 
 
356 Leith (forthcoming) IV.1.3. 
357 Cic. Acad. 2.83-5 (LS 40 J). 
358 The cognitive impression is conceived as a ‘gift’ from nature at S. E. VII.253-60 and Cic. Acad. I.41-2 (LS 
41 B). 
359 D. L. X.31-2. Reason depends on the senses, but the senses do not depend on reason; ‘all sensation is 
irrational and does not accommodate memory.’ 
360 e.g. Cel. Med. Pr. 27-29. 
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1-4 posits that reason is empirically justified. The spokesperson for Dogmatism 
appeals to the Empiricist’s own recognition that the variety of diseases, symptoms 
and contingent factors is, self-evidently, ‘almost endless’.361 The need to pare the 
medical art down to its essentials follows from cumulative observations; the 
variables that the Dogmatist introduces in Med. Exp. 4 to illustrate the medical 
necessity of λόγος reveal themselves in this manner. Even if symptoms are 
identical, severity will vary.362 A disease that manifests exactly the same way – a 
vanishing rarity in itself – cannot be expected to do so a third time.363 The 
observer is himself a variable; he cannot cross-reference his observations with 
those of another and conclude with certainty that he has witnessed the exact 
same thing.364 All such confounding observations emerge through prolonged 
attention to sense-data. The mechanism of their revelation is mnemonic 
signification, the mode of sign-inference which Sextus Empiricus would deem 
essential to the ‘normal course of life’.365 The grounding of one’s argument for the 
epistemological value of λόγος in ἐμπειρία is doubly evident at Med. Exp. 3. Here, 
as we saw above (IV.5.2.1), the Dogmatist seeks to emphasise the unity of 
medicine and other examples of τέχναι whose value, he asserts, can be readily 
observed. His argument recalls the Empiricist’s justification for ‘transitioning from 
the similar’ when confronted with a patient whose affliction has no documented 
history.366 In such cases, the Empiricist administers a treatment that has proven 
effective under similar circumstances in the past and justifies this ‘lapse’ into 
(quasi-)reasoned judgement on the grounds that this method is itself empirically 
justified – it has a documented history of positive results.367 The Dogmatist makes 
a similar move at Med. Exp. 3 when he analogises medicine to self-evidently 
viable τέχναι whose invention depended on the identification of imperfect 
similarities – the parents of categories – around which to organise the data of 
experience. The methodology is viable on two counts: 1) it can be seen to work 
 
361 Gal. Med. Exp. 3.4 = Leith 119. Methodism is mentioned by the Dogmatist at Ibid. 3.2 as an example of 
a school which both he and his Empiricist opponent recognise as insufficiently sophisticated. The 
Dogmatist assumes a shared assumption that medicine is bewildering complex, that there is nothing 
about singular manifestations of disease that induces the physician to intuit the correct method of 
treatment. For the conflict between Methodism and Empiricism, see V.3.2. 
362 Gal. Med. Exp. 4.1 = Leith 119. 
363 Ibid. 4.3. 
364 Ibid.  
365 S. E. PH 2.102. For Sextus’ Empiricism, see V.3. 
366 Gal. Subf. Emp. 9, 70.10-20, 74.9-23 Diechgr.; Cel. Med. Pr. 38. See also V.2.2. 
367 A point explicitly made in Gal. Subf. Emp. 9, 70.10-20. 
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in other contexts and thus has ἐμπειρία at its root; 2) in its identification of 
imperfect similarities as the scaffolding around which one formulates a τέχνη, it 
is already reflective of an Empiricist concession to inexact mnemonic 
signification.368 Epicurean epistemology, which holds that reason is posterior to 
sense-date, preserves enough Empiricist premises that it can be utilised to 
undermine Empiricist conclusions in empirical terms. 
     Epicureanism was also uniquely situated to accommodate a universalising 
Empiricist argument against the Rationalist project, namely, that the λόγος 
beloved of all Rationalists and dogmatic philosophers alike, which they uphold as 
their infallible guide, has led them all to radically different conclusions, and has 
thus undermined its illuminative property.369 Epicureanism affords no divine 
quality to λόγος; nature does not reveal its secrets to the Epicurean philosopher 
(as it does the Stoic); he/she merely infers details of the world perceptible to 
reason from cumulative impressions and tests his/her opinions against self-
evidence.370 That other dogmatists, failing to attend to Epicurus’ scientific 
method, might theorise from an incorrect – i.e. sense-contested – premise and 
arrive at conclusions wholly alien to Epicurean philosophy is a feature of 
Epicurean epistemology; it is a system that clarifies and accommodates human 
error – and thus the existence of myriad alternative dogmatic cosmologies – in a 
way that Stoicism, which claims that nature’s plan exists to be discovered and 
taxonomizes sense-impressions, the foundations of inquiry,371 according to which 
impressions are purposefully revealed by nature to be true, fails to do so.  
     A final point, the medical utility of Epicurean epistemology cannot be entirely 
abstracted from that of Epicurean physics. This is to say both that adopting 
Epicurus’ epistemology necessitates the adoption of the greater portion of his 
physics (to which we return for a final time at IV.5.3 below), and that the physics 
itself may have presented additional opportunities. That Epicureanism might have 
lacked a sophisticated aetiology of disease may have increased its appeal to the 
young intellectual, looking to establish his own medical sect. The partial 
 
368 i.e. ‘transition from the similar’. For commemorative vs. indicative signification, see V.3.1. 
369 Cel. Med. Pr. 27-29 records this argument for why the Empiricists dogmatically assert that nature 
cannot be comprehended. See V.2.1 for the tension between the Empirical and sceptical versions of this 
argument. 
370  S. E. M VII.211-116. Recall Sextus’ quotation of Antiochus of Ascalon at M VII.201-202 (supra IV.5.1.1) 
371 Cic. Acad. 2.145 (LS 41 A). 
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discontinuity between Epicurean physics and ethics, addressed at II.5.5-6, 
facilitated the abstraction of Epicurus’ physical/epistemological model from the 
objectives of philosophy. Concomitantly, the subordination of physiological health 
to psychological wellbeing in Epicureanism (II.5) – permissible because of the 
aforenoted discontinuity – afforded the Epicurean-influenced physician more 
freedom to innovate (cf. III.5). Vallance’s argument that Asclepiades’ medical 
project can be summarised as an attempt to simplify Erasistratean physiology 
and pathology is unconvincing,372 but the evidence that some Erasistrateans 
might have toyed with some manner of corpuscular hypothesis indicates that the 
bridge between contemporary physiology/pathology and atomism might have 
been suggested in the literature of Asclepiades’ day;373 expanding on these 
speculations to incorporate Epicurean epistemology may suggest itself as a 
countermeasure to Empiricism. All such factors may have contributed to 
Epicureanism’s medical appeal; I suggest only that Epicurus’ epistemological 
model was the most attractive component. 
IV.5.3 Negotiable and non-negotiable Epicurean doctrines  
If I am correct in my hypothesis that the greater part of Epicureanism’s medical 
utility was to be found in its epistemology, then we would expect Asclepiades’ 
modifications to Epicurean physics to preserve its essential components. Dividing 
Epicurean physics into doctrines which are ‘negotiable’ and ‘non-negotiable’, 
where the former indicates doctrines that can be disposed of without jeopardising 
the integrity of Epicurus’ epistemology and the latter those which cannot, I shall 
argue in this final section that Asclepiades modifications to Epicurean physics 
either a) leave the Epicurean epistemology untouched or b) where a case can be 
made for Epicurean epistemology being threatened by a particular adaptation, 
the threat is either neutralised by countermeasures or to be dismissed as an 
encroachment of ethics-oriented semantics into a non-ethical materialist system. 
 
 
372 Vallance (1990) p.130. 
373 Gal. Nat. Fac. 2.6 (= II.07-98 K.) discusses a debate between Erasistrateans on whether the elemental 
nerve is continuous ‘or composed of many small bodies as Epicurus, Leucippus and Democritus posited.’ 
Trans. Leith (forthcoming) = Leith 51. Ps.-Gal Int. XIV.699 K. records that Asclepiades and Erasistratus 
advanced comparable elemental theories. While the attribution of a corpuscular hypothesis to 
Erasistratus himself seems erroneous (see III.2.2 and Leith (2015a)), the possibility that later 
Erasistrateans flirted with the idea remains open. 
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IV.5.3.1 The ineradicable physics of Epicurean epistemology 
Epicurean epistemology is built on a foundation of perceptions (II.4.1-2). We 
would expect the mechanics of sensation to be sacrosanct. On this basis, I 
determine the following Epicurean physical doctrines to be non-negotiable: 1) 
Phenomena must be analysed into body and void; three-dimensional elements, 
distinguished from void by their tangibility, establish contiguity between subject 
(perceiver) and object (perceived). Interaction, thus perception, is made possible 
by the shared tangibility of the eye (for example) and εἴδωλα. 2) Phenomenal 
qualities must be posterior to elemental bodies; phenomena are parasitical on the 
pattern of elements transmitted from the surface of an object to the sense-
receptor. 3) Sense objects shed and accrue elemental bodies in equal measure, 
ensuring contiguity from a distance via εἴδωλα while retaining structural integrity. 
4) The mechanical components of elemental movement must be retained; they 
must travel at immense speeds from object to receptor and behave as atoms on 
occurrence of collision in the vast majority of cases, in order to account for the 
parity of εἴδωλα and the surface of the object proper once the eidolic corpuscles 
have been ejected by ongoing, internal collisions. 5) An ontological addendum: 
the status of perceptions as reliable transmissions of external reality must be 
retained so as not to invalidate the boundaries of rational inquiry. 
IV.5.3.2 The threat of corpuscular fragility  
Treating first points 1-4, points 1-3 are comfortably accommodated by 
Asclepiadean physics. The threat of corpuscular fragility hovers over 4. Clearly, 
however, in matters of epistemology, the atomic nature of the elements is 
subsidiary to their tangibility and the mechanics of their movement. I suggest that 
the frangibility of the ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι does not perturb the underlying mechanics of 
the system if we suppose that instances of fracture are either a)  extremely rare 
or b) brought about under particular conditions that are not present in the 
emission and reception of εἴδωλα;374 the transmission of εἴδωλα depends on the 
elements surviving ejection from the sense-object intact. Scattered instances of 
fracture may not perturb the transmission appreciably, but it stands to reason that 
the overwhelming majority of the elements ejected must retain the shape they 
 




held immediately prior to ejection. The attribution of Epicurean-style εἴδωλα to 
Asclepiades in the Anonymus Londinensis papyrus implies that physician 
envisaged his ὄγκοι as behaving like atoms in the matter of remote contiguity.375 
The model he adopts depends on a continuity between object and εἴδωλα that 
myriad fractures would inevitably dissolve.  
     Where the frangibility of the ὄγκοι might be expected to derange Epicurean 
epistemology is not in the process by which perceptions are received, but in the 
nature of perceptions themselves. However, the hypothesised doctrine of 
elemental fusion, posited first by Elizabeth Asmis and for which the case is made 
at IV.2.4.3 above,376 would appear to go some way towards resolving this 
problem (at least to Asclepiades’ satisfaction). Though I find Asmis’ proposed 
solution to the problem of phenomenal constancy in Asclepiadean physics 
convincing, we need not be persuaded by the countermeasure she attributes to 
Asclepiades in order to accept that Asclepiades sought to preserve an Epicurean 
epistemological framework; we need only be satisfied that efforts were made to 
reconcile the frangibility of the ὄγκοι with phenomenal constancy. 
IV.5.3.3 The threat of determinism 
Though our sources explicitly indicate that 5) can be reconciled with 
Asclepiadean physics – Asclepiades held, to return to the testimony of Antiochus 
of Ascalon,377 that ‘perceptions are apprehensions in reality and truth’ and thus, 
as I argued at IV.5.1.1, the foundations of rational inquiry – we should 
acknowledge that Epicurus might have contested this point on the grounds of 
Asclepiades’ fatalism.378 O’Keefe (2005) makes a convincing case for the atomic 
swerve, absent from Asclepiades’ physics (IV.3.2), being necessary to preserve 
the causal efficacy of reason,379 the instrumentality of which is essential for 
inferring non-evident ‘truths’ from evident signs. The argument rests on the 
disparity between Epicurean and Democritean ontology: Democritus was an 
eliminativist who held that only atoms and void exist in truth; Epicurus, though a 
 
375 As Calc. In Tim. 214 confirms, ‘the common sense is touch’. 
376 Asmis (1993) p.154. 
377 S. E. M VII.201. See supra IV.5.1.1. 
378 More precisely: the fatalist conclusions that one might reach by perusing Asclepiadean determinism to 
its logical conclusion with regard to the human mind and human reason. 
379 O’Keefe (2005) esp. p.65-109, 123-152. 
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reductionist in O’Keefe’s view,380 maintained that such eliminativism fosters a 
debilitating scepticism,381 and that rejecting Democritus’ view was essential to 
building an effective epistemology.382 Once a mechanism for establishing the 
verity of phenomena had been established – i.e. the argument that perceptions 
invariably corresponded to external reality, that εἴδωλα are unique prospects on 
a shared objective world – Epicurus’ task was to account for the causal efficacy 
of reason in terms of the activity of atoms in void without yielding to fatalism.383 
In the absence of the swerve, to take the Epicurean view, the act of deliberation 
is denuded of its ontological verity, being an ultimately illusory activity draped 
over the mechanics of necessity.384 The swerve, overriding necessity, leaves the 
future open, and permits one to identify by reason the ‘correct’ mode of behaviour 
– i.e. that which is most conducive to attaining ἀταραξία – given the data of our 
senses.385 The Epicurean scientific method necessitates the freedom to think 
between the limits set by perceptions, not to be led by necessity from sign to sign-
inference. The swerve, on this argument, might be considered non-negotiable. 
     To make this claim, however, is to suggest that Asclepiades shared the 
Epicurean contention that the causal efficacy of deliberation was invalidated by 
fatalism. Epicurus’ antipathy towards fatalism, born of the situation of his τέλος in 
the domain of human behaviour, is external to the physician’s objectives. Contra 
the argument by Roberto Polito, addressed at IV.4.3.2 above, which frames 
Asclepiades’ rejection of a localised ἡγεμονικόν as equivalent to the rejection of 
the mind,386 we have little reason to believe that Asclepiades considered 
deliberation to be invalidated by universal necessity. A quasi-compatibilist view, 
such as that of the Stoics, would account for Asclepiades’ faith in the 
epistemological value of reason given the τέλος of his craft and the restrictions 
 
380 Ibid. p.67-81. I argued at II.5 that there are certain deficiencies in attributing to Epicurus a fully formed 
reductionist view of the mind, namely that pain, the mediator of human behaviour in Epicurean 
philosophy, is never adequately  expressed in terms of atoms in our sources. 
381 Plut. Col. 1108f. 
382 O’Keefe (2005) p.76. cf. Poly. De cont. 23.26-26.23 (LS 7 D). See II.3.3. 
383 See Epic. Ep. Men. 133-134. 
384 O’Keefe (2005) esp. the summary at p.46-47 of what can actually be gleaned of Epicurean voluntas 
from Lucr. II.251ff and p.149-152. 
385 O’Keefe (2005) p.149. 
386 The rejection of the localised ἡγεμονικόν, the third of Asclepiades’ modifications to Epicureanism 
alongside corpuscular fragility and the rejection of the swerve, once seen for the reconciliation of 
Epicurean psychology and Erasistratean physiology that it is (supra IV.4.3), poses no threat to Epicurean 
epistemology.    
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this imposes on his thinking.387 He is free to uproot Epicurus’ conception of the 
truth-value of perceptions without signing on to the extra-medical doctrine of the 
swerve – particularly as the doctrine has deleterious implications for his own 
goals; the swerve denudes the elements of a predictability that is essential in the 
construction of an aetiology of disease that claims the activity of prima materia 
as the root cause. It is, moreover, indefensible without recourse to ethical or 
cosmogonical arguments, both of which must surely fall beyond the physician’s 
purview. 
IV.6 Conclusion: the medical reception of doctrinaire Hellenistic philosophy 
(part II) 
The transposition of Epicureanism into the medical τέχνη is marked by three 
salient modifications: 1) the replacement of atomic particles with frangible 
ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι (IV.2); 2) the reinstatement of determinism into particulate 
materialism (IV.3); 3) the rejection of the localised ἡγεμονικόν (IV.4). All three 
modifications tell us different things about Asclepiades’ relationship to the 
mother-doctrine.  
     I argued at IV.2 that the introduction of corpuscular fragility into an essentially 
Epicurean physical system is most intelligibly read as a bid to uncouple 
Asclepiadean physics from its Epicurean forebear. It has no clear explanatory 
utility in the domain of pathology (IV.2.2) and the question of how much 
explanatory versatility the doctrine brought Asclepiades remains largely 
unanswered (IV.2.5.1). I have suggested that the two-tier nature of Epicurean 
epistemology leaves little room for technical epistemologies to be erected within 
its structure (IV.2.1, IV.2.5.2). In stark contrast to Athenaeus’ annexation of the 
apposite territory of medical inquiry within a Stoic framework – a move that was 
facilitated by the structure of the Stoic cosmos –, for Asclepiades, intellectual 
emancipation from the mother-doctrine could only be ensured through 
 
387 Of course, compatibilism is an ideology concerned with the reconciliation of morality and determinism, 
and we should not suppose that questions of morality were ever Asclepiades’ concern. The term ‘quasi-
compatibilism’ is here being used as a shorthand for the belief that reason is not deprived of causal 
efficacy in a deterministic system. Unconcerned with matters of psychological distress, the ‘threat’ of 
tyrannical necessity to one’s psychological wellbeing is remote from Asclepiades’ concern. It is easier to 
separate, conceptually, the phenomenon of deliberation from its root-mechanics when one’s goals are 
unimpeded by an ethicist’s anxiety about the bottom-up aetiology of thought-processes. Owing to the 
disparity between the medical and philosophical arts, the ‘reason’ which Asclepiades deems essential to 
medical inquiry (e.g. Gal. Med. Exp. 1-4 = Leith 199) should be judged independently of its capacity to 
illuminate moral truth. It is a physician’s tool, for a physician’s ends. 
276 
 
adaptation. Though both doctors were motivated by a desire to secure medicine’s 
reputation as a generative science, their methods were constrained by the nature 
of the philosophies they drew upon. I have further suggested the tension between 
Epicureanism and the medical τέχνη in antiquity (II.5, IV.2.5.2) may have further 
influenced Asclepiades’ conclusion that it served his interest to modify Epicurean 
physics within certain parameters. 
     The reinstatement of determinism into particulate materialism is explicable by 
Asclepiades and Epicurus’ disparate τέλη (IV.3.2-3). Where the latter was 
motivated to shape his physics to accommodate his anti-fatalism, the former, 
unmoved by ethical considerations and eager to signify his intellectual 
emancipation, could cast off Epicureanism’s most controversial doctrine – the 
swerve – without imperilling his purpose. To the suggestion that the swerve was 
somehow essential to the scientific method which Asclepiades inherited, we need 
only respond that, given his non-ethical τέλος, Asclepiades did not consider the 
causal efficacy of deliberation to be invalidated by fatalism (IV.5.3.3). 
     Finally, Asclepiades’ rejection of the localised ἡγεμονικόν, for all its inferred 
philosophical implications, is in fact a reactive doctrine implemented in a bid to 
unify a refined Epicurean psychology with contemporary Erasistratean 
neurophysiology (IV.4.3) with no clear implications for the existence of the mind. 
It is interesting not as a sign of medicine’s incursion into philosophical territory, 
but as an indicator of Asclepiades’ devotion to the psycho-physical foundations 
of Epicurean epistemology despite their ostensible incompatibility with 
contemporary neurophysiology (IV.4.2) 
     Asclepiades’ adherence to Epicurean scientific methodology answers the 
question of Epicureanism’s medical appeal. Moreover, it provides us with a 
framework within which to reconcile his three distinct modifications to Epicurean 
doctrine. Asclepiades’ freedom to modify Epicurean physics is constrained by his 
devotion to Epicurean epistemology (IV.5.3). The appeal of Epicurean 
epistemology to Rationalist medicine lay in its capacity to challenge medical 






Pyrrhonian Empiricism  
The curious alliance of the anti-doctrinaire  
* 
V.0 In the legacy of Pyrrhonian scepticism we find an alternative model for the 
transposition of Hellenistic philosophy into medicine. Where the Stoics and 
Epicureans found their ideas trimmed by the epistemological constraints of the 
more attenuated discipline, or else transformed on contact with the physician’s 
demands, Pyrrhonism finds its way into the medical sphere through its 
incorporation into Empiricism in the first and second centuries AD.1 Though both 
the Pyrrhonian and Empiricist sects flourished in the Hellenistic period, they 
originated independently; their roots, as we will examine shortly, are in crucial 
respects oppositional. Nevertheless, by the second century AD Empiricist 
physicians are included among the noted successors to the Pyrrhonist tradition, 
foremost among whom being Sextus Empiricus, our most informative 
representative of Pyrrhonian scepticism, whose extant works, the Outline of 
Pyrrhonism (PH) and Against the Physicists/Mathematicians (M),2 summarise 
five centuries of sceptical arguments. 
     The purpose of this chapter is to examine the nature and integrity of the 
Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance. My objective is to uncover how the conflicting 
aspects of these two schools were reconciled with one another (to the extent that 
we can claim that they were). What concessions does Pyrrhonism make to 
ensure the viability of its merger with Empiricism? What issues remain unsolved? 
In the broader context of my thesis, the existence of the Pyrrhonian Empiricists 
raises a further question. In our analysis of Pneumatism and Asclepiadeanism, 
we saw evidence for the role of modification – or, at least, scrupulous 
enforcement of disciplinary boundaries within a preestablished cosmology – in 
protecting the physician’s independent identity, and thus the generative capacity 
 
1 D. L. IX.116. for a list of successors to the Pyrrhonian tradition, a number of whom can be identified as 
Empiricist physicians. 
2 See Bett (2012) p.viii-ix and V.3 (intro.) below for a brief explanation of how Against the 
Logicians/Physicists/Ethicists and Against the Mathematicians came erroneously to be abbreviated as one 
unified work, ‘M’, with the first six books now universally acknowledged as a distinct text. I have used the 
conventional referencing throughout this thesis and will continue to do so in this chapter, but I 
acknowledge the confusion here. 
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of their τέχνη. Why do the Pyrrhonian Empiricists indicate no similar aversion to 
association with the Pyrrhonist school? We may accept that their union was 
facilitated by their shared aversion to dogma, but what was the impetus for 
unification? 
   This chapter is structured as follows. V.1 is an overview of the evidence and 
contemporary scholarship. At V.2 we examine independent origins of Pyrrhonism 
and Empiricism and elucidate their disalignment. At V.3 we examine how this 
epistemological disparity surfaces as internal contradictions in the works of 
Sextus Empiricus, as well as the framework within which such contradictions 
might be tolerated. At V.4 I ask the question of why Pyrrhonism and Empiricism 
became so intertangled in the second century AD, and why the relationship 
between the schools appears so novel in comparison to other alignments of 
Hellenistic philosophy with medicine’s τέλος.  
V.1 Evidence and contemporary scholarship  
Here I introduce the sources (V.1.1) and summarise the treatment of the 
Pyrrhonian Empiricists in contemporary scholarship (V.1.2). 
V.1.1 Evidence 
Our most informative source for Pyrrhonism properly so-called – the movement 
founded by Aenesidemus of Cnossus in the first century BC (V.2.1) – is Sextus 
Empiricus. He is also, on account of his dual identity (explored throughout V.3), 
our clearest window on the nature of the Pyrrhonian-Empiricist alliance. As 
Sextus is treated in some detail at V.3, I will withhold my overview of the Roman 
philosopher-physician until later in the chapter. Beyond Sextus, Diogenes 
Laertius offers scattered glimpses into the writings of Aenesidemus. However, 
among the Pyrrhonists, it is Pyrrhonism’s ‘spiritual founder’, the eponymous 
Pyrrho of Ellis, and his pupil Timon of Phlius, who receive the bulk of Diogenes’ 
attention. The eight books of Aenesidemus’ chief-work, the Pyrrhonist 
Discourses, are given cursory summary in Photius’ Bibliotheca. 
    Of the Rationalists, the Methodists and the Empiricists, the Empiricists were 
most sparsely treated by the manuscript tradition.3 For the most part, we 
 
3 Accounting, of course, for the wealth of medical theories which came to be subsumed under the 
‘Rationalist’ rubric. The Methodists are survived by Soranus of Ephesus’ Gynaecology and the translations 
of Caelius Aurelianus. 
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reconstruct the school from fragments and testimonia. We are fortunate, 
however, to have three Galenic treatises which tackle Empiricism systematically, 
namely, On Sects for Beginners (SI), Outlines of Empiricism (Subf. Emp.) and On 
Medical Experience (Med. Exp.). On Sects for Beginners is an invaluable 
introduction to the methodological issues separating the three schools of Greek 
medicine, broadly defined.4 The Outlines of Empiricism is a more advanced 
analysis of Empiricist methodology. In On Medical Experience – likely a very early 
work – Galen defends aspects of Empiricist methodology against Rationalist 
critique (for which see IV.5.2.1). Despite his own theoretic inclination, Galen 
treats the Empiricists with peculiar respect, believing the marriage of theory and 
rigorous observation to be central to the physician’s craft.5 
V.1.2 Scholarship 
In recent decades, the nature of the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance has been 
freshly interrogated.6 A few works stand out. The first, Roberto’s Polito’s ‘Was 
Skepticism a Philosophy? Reception, Self-Definition, Internal Conflicts’ (2007b), 
is an address to the question of why the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance was 
advantageous to the Pyrrhonian school. I consider Polito’s argument at V.4.3. 
The second, James’ Allen’s ‘Pyrrhonism & Medicine’ (2010), examines the 
relationship between Pyrrhonism and both the Empiric and Methodic sects, 
inspired by Sextus Empiricus’ anomalous endorsement of Methodism at PH 
I.236-241 (V.3.2). Though Allen’s article is largely devoted to weighing the 
sceptical credentials of the Empiricists and the Methodists, the contest has 
broader significance. I will argue at V.3.2 that Sextus’ qualified endorsement of 
Methodism illuminates the bifurcation of his intellectual identifies, an angle that is 
largely unexplored in Allen (2010), but one which is present, at least implicitly, 
throughout Allen’s chapter on Sextus Empiricus in his landmark Inference from 
Signs: Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence (2001). This text is 
indispensable to my analysis of Sextus’ work (V.3.1), casting the internal 
contradictions in PH and M – arising, I will argue, from the disunity of Sextus’ 
professional (Empirical) and philosophical (Pyrrhonian) personae – in sharp 
relief. A further text of particular significance to this chapter is Morison, ‘The 
 
4 ‘Genera’ is perhaps a more appropriate taxonomic rank. 
5 e.g. Gal. HNH XV.159-161 K. 
6 The first text to give the nature of the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist bond due consideration is Philippson (1881). 
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Sceptic’s Modes of Argumentation’ (2018). Though Morison’s article is 
unconcerned with the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance, his convincing assessment 
of the purpose and application of Aenesidemus’ Tropes/Modes (V.2.1) reframes 
Aenesidemus’ method of argumentation in such a way as to reveal its potential 
susceptibility to Empiricist influence. 
V.2 Pyrrhonism vs. Empiricism 
Let us approach the two schools separately. We treat first Pyrrhonian scepticism 
(V.2.1) then proceed to medical Empiricism (V.2.2). 
V.2.1 The origin of Pyrrhonism 
Through her perceptions, the human interfaces with the world. The possibility that 
the mechanisms of inquiry might yield inaccurate results, such that our senses 
do not provide the aperture onto reality that our intuition guides us to suspect, lies 
at the root of all epistemological inquiry. That we cannot state with certainty that 
perceptions are non-illusory is the premise that unites the Pyrrhonian sceptics 
across the school’s long and complex history. Pyrrhonian scepticism properly so-
called7 was founded by Aenesidemus of Cnossus, a disaffected Academic, in the 
first century BC in response to blooming doctrinaire tendencies within the 
contemporary Academy.8 Sextus Empiricus, our fullest source for the motives of 
the Pyrrhonist school, encapsulates the ‘Sceptic Way’ as follows: 
The Sceptic Way is a disposition to oppose phenomena and noumena to 
one another in any way whatever, with the result that, owing to the 
equipollence among the things and statements thus opposed, we are 
brought first to ἐποχή [complete suspension of belief] and then to ἀταραξία 
[the state of being unperturbed].9 
Where the scepticism of the Academy was first and foremost an epistemological  
position, Aenesidemus subordinated epistemology to ethics; by upholding the 
lifestyle of the historic Pyrrho of Ellis as the ideal, he imbues his philosophy with 
a moral τέλος – ‘he who philosophizes after the fashion of Pyrrho is happy not 
 
7 The extent to which Pyrrhonism can rightly be treated as a ‘sect’ is the subject of Polito (2007b). See 
V.4.3 below. 
8 Phot. Bibl. 169b18-170b3 (LS 71 C). The Academy at the time was led by Philo of Larissa, the philosopher 
whom history holds responsible for completing the Academy’s slide back into dogmatism. The definitive 
full-length study of Philo of Larissa is Brittain (2001). 
9 S. E. PH I.8 trans. Mates (1996). 
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only in general but also, and especially, in the wisdom of knowing that he has a 
firm cognition of nothing.’10 Suspension of assent is the means of attaining 
equanimity; ‘as end the sceptics name suspension of judgement, upon which 
freedom from disturbance follows like a shadow.’11 To this end, the Pyrrhonists 
compiled the most persuasive arguments against the possibility of knowledge, 
gathered under the heading of the Ten Tropes (or Modes) of Aenesidemus.12 
    The confusion concerning the precise number of systemised Tropes may 
result, in part, from the fact that the arguments listed can be resolved into one or 
two distinct types.13 I favour Striker’s (1983) interpretation that there are two types 
of argument in the Tropes14 – A) the argument from conflicting impressions and 
B) the argument from relativity –  and adopt her model for the purpose of this 
exposition. The majority of the Tropes fall into category A. Adhering to the order 
supplied by Sextus Empiricus in PH – the most complete account of the Tropes 
– Tropes 1-7 and 9 are examples of the variables which (may)15 account for 
conflicting sense impressions. These include such variables as the species of the 
observer, the person observing, the sense-organ receiving the information, the 
disposition of the observer (is she/he drunk, ill etc.), the position of the observer 
relative to the object perceived, the distortive effects of other objects of 
perception, modes of configuration and the relative quality of strangeness or 
novelty, rooted in the culturally inherited assumptions of the observer.16 The final 
Trope in Sextus’ list is a further variation of argument A, only this time the concern 
is conflicting value judgements made in response to the object of perception; 
 
10 Phot. Bibl. 169b26-27 (= LS 71 C), reporting the words of Aenesidemus. 
11 D. L. IX.107 (LS  71 C). 
12 We find the list summarised in S. E. PH 1.31-9 and expanded on throughout PH I. Sextus Empiricus 
attributes the modes to Aenesidemus in M 7.345. Controversies as to the precise number of tropes 
abound. Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius (IX. 79-88) number them at ten; Philo of Alexandria (De. 
Ebr. 169-202) provides us with eight. Aristoc. (ap. Euseb. Praeb. Ev. 14.18.9-10) gives us nine. 
13 Striker (1983) resolves the Ten Tropes into two distinct types of argument. Annas & Barnes (1985) p.25 
find all ten Tropes to be expressible under a single schema. Hankinson (1995) p.156 attributes to each 
Trope a single basic form. The most recent treatment of the Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus, Morison (2018) 
p.286-293 treats the Tropes as versions of a singular argument. 
14 Though both types serve a singular purpose, for which see Morison (2018) p.286-293 and n.15 
immediately below. 
15 Morison (2018) p.291 argues that the purpose of the Ten Modes ‘is to furnish the sceptic with a supply 
of premises from which to construct counter-arguments to a certain group of arguments put forward by 
dogmatists, namely, those arguments which proffer, as consideration in favour of the proposition that x 
is F, propositions which appeal to the fact that x appears F in situations S.’ They are, in short, ‘devices for 
constructing equal and opposing arguments to the arguments of the dogmatists’ (p.293). The Tropes are 
not, as Morison lays out convincingly (p.286-293), endorsements of the premise that conflicting sense 
impressions (etc.) prove that perceptions are unreliable.  
16 S. E. PH I.40-61, 79-91, 91-8, 100-112, 118-120, 124-8, 129-32, 141-4 respectively. 
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disparate laws and customs are offered as further variables accounting for why 
objects seem to manifest differently to different kinds of observers. As such, we 
cannot trust our impressions – be they sensory or evaluative – to provide us with 
a definitive picture of the nature of what we perceive.17 This does not amount to 
dogmatic rejection of appearances, as Sextus makes clear: 
Those who claim that the Sceptics deny appearances seem to me not to 
have heard what we say. For…we do not reject the things that lead us 
involuntarily to assent in accord with the passively received φαντασία, and 
these are appearances. And when we question whether the external object 
is such as it appears, we grant that it does appear, we are not raising 
question about the appearance, but rather what is said about the 
appearance; this is different from raising a question about the appearance 
itself. For example, honey appears to us to be sweet. This we grant, for we 
sense the sweetness. But whether it is sweet we question insofar as that is 
to do with the [philosophical] theory, for that theory is not the appearance, 
but something said about the appearance.18 
The objection enforced by the Tropes is to the grounding of theory in φαντασία; 
perceptions tell us nothing conclusive about the ‘real nature’ of the world we 
inhabit, as the sundry variables affecting how a single object manifests are 
intended to demonstrate. This goes part way to explaining the ‘equipollence’19 of 
beliefs opposed; all spring from the same unverifiable assumption that what is 
observed has a positive relationship with what is. ‘What is’, we should note, is a 
presumed existent. The potential disalignment of ‘what is’ and ‘what seems to be’ 
is the bedrock of Pyrrhonian epistemology. 
     Argument B is introduced at PH I.135 as the eighth Trope in Sextus’ list: ‘since 
everything is in relation to something, we will suspend judgement as to what 
things are in themselves and in their nature.’20 The conclusion that nothing is 
anything absolutely – that is, nothing is not defined by its relationship to 
something else – is softened by the following qualification: ‘…here, as elsewhere, 
we use “are” for “appears to be”, saying in effect “everything appears in 
 
17 Striker (1983) p.99. 
18 S. E. PH I.19-20 trans. Mates (1996). 
19 See S. E. PH I.8 quoted above. 
20 Trans. Mates (1996).  
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relationship to something.”’21 With sense-data uncoupled from reality per se, the 
domain about which sceptics speak is always that of observation. Sextus uses 
‘relative’ in two ways. The first application refers to the relationship between 
object and observer and therefore falls under argument A. The second refers to 
the relationship between sense objects. Though this definition recalls the sixth 
Trope in PH concerning the supposedly distortive property of admixtures whereby 
nothing can be observed ‘by itself’,22 the account of Diogenes Laertius clarifies 
the distinction.23 Diogenes refers to this Trope (the tenth in his list) as the Trope 
‘by the comparison with other things.’24 He lists pairs of relative qualities – ‘light 
and heavy’, ‘strong and weak’, ‘greater and less’, ‘up and down’ – and frames the 
argument as one that denies relational features a foothold in explaining the nature 
of that which is observed; ‘thus that which is on the right is not so by nature, but 
is so understood in virtue of its position with respect to something else.’25 The 
Pyrrhonist, though not committed to the thesis that an object’s relational features 
cannot be features of what an object is ‘in its nature and absolutely’,26 exploits 
this potential disalignment to neutralise dogmatic claims. To revisit my 
comparison with the sixth Trope in PH, the capacity of constituents of an 
admixture to distort one’s perception is expanded in the eighth Trope to include 
constituents of memory. We base our assessment of the weight of objects on our 
memory of heavier/lighter things. Our faculties of observation remain the cause 
of our permanent estrangement from the truth.27 For this reason, the Pyrrhonist 
withholds his assent to the non-evident; his observations proffer no firm 
foundations upon which to develop a methodology for inferring hidden truths 
about the world.28 
 
21 S. E. PH I.135. trans. Mates (1996). 
22 S. E. PH I.124-128. 
23 D. L. IX.87. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Morison (2018) p.286-293. 
27 We should note, however, that the broadening of this conception of distortive admixtures to include 
constituents from memory would seem to presuppose a certain continuity in one’s perceptions over time. 
While object B (directly perceived) being smaller than object A (held in memory) does not make 
‘smallness’ an inextricable characteristic of object B, there is no suggestion that its quality of ‘smallness’ 
relative to A is invalid. This detail is worth noting before Empiricist epistemology is expounded. 
28 I have focussed on the ‘Ten Tropes’ in this section because of their association with Aenesidemus 
himself. They are the list of arguments at the root of Pyrrhonism properly so-called. Sextus records a 
further Five Modes at PH I.164-177, attributed to ‘the most recent sceptics’ (PH I.164). They are the Tropes 
of Dispute, Infinite Regress, Relativity, Hypothesis and Reciprocity. The third of which, the Trope from 
Relativity, arguably encompasses Aenesidemus’ original Tropes against assenting to the truth-value of 
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     The character of Pyrrho of Elis  (c.365-c.270) from whom the Pyrrhonian sect 
takes its name, played a largely propagandistic role in Aenesidemus’ school; the 
sequence of teachers and pupils reaching back to Pyrrho himself in D. L. IX.115-
116 cannot be independently verified, and reads like a retrospective attempt 
(probably on the part of Aenesidemus) to fortify first century Pyrrhonism with a 
historical pedigree.29 Pyrrho functions as a pseudo-historical ideal to which the 
Pyrrhonian sceptic must aspire – an exemplar of ἀταραξία as attained through 
suspension of assent.30 But the man himself evidently had a role to play in the 
reorientation of Greek thought towards the problem of knowledge.31 The historical 
Pyrrho is a mysterious figure.32 He committed nothing to writing but his pupil, 
Timon of Phlius, preserves what may amount to his only dogmatic assertion (itself 
preserved in Aristocles’ On Philosophy, quoted by Eusebius): things by their own 
nature ‘are equally indifferent, unmeasurable, and inarbitrable. For this reason 
neither our sensations nor our opinions tell us truths or falsehoods.’33 Pyrrho’s 
claim, if accurately reported, is a metaphysical one; reality is equally indifferent, 
unmeasurable and inarbitrable and our descriptions of reality should reflect its 
indefiniteness.34 On Bett’s reading, the claim recorded in Eusebius that one 
should, on discovery of reality’s true nature, be ‘unopinionated, uncommitted and 
unwavering’35 does not equate to the later Pyrrhonist’s attitude of ἐποχή, being 
instead a commitment to the thesis that nature is without definite characteristics.36 
 
perceptions (see Annas & Barnes (1985) p.142-143). Later Pyrrhonism retains Aenesidemus’ scepticism of 
perception and incorporates additional arguments against dogmatic claims.  For a recent discussion of the 
five Tropes, see Morison (2018) p.293-213 (the bulk of Morison’s article). 
29 Sedley (1983b) p.19. 
30 Phot. Bibl. 169b26-27 (LS 71 C). This is true of the philosophy as Aenesidemus conceived it but it was 
not universally accepted. Interestingly, the late sceptic and Empiricist physician Theodosius found conflict 
between the outlook of Pyrrhonism and its purported origin in the architecture of another’s mind. From 
D. L. IX.70: ‘…for if the movement of the mind in either direction is unattainable by us, we shall never 
know for certain what Pyrrho really intended, and without knowing that, we cannot be called 
Pyrrhonians.’ – trans. Hicks (1925). With that said, Diogenes nonetheless informs us that Theodosius 
continued to uphold the lifestyle of Pyrrho as the ideal. 
31 Which is not to claim that Hellenistic scepticism appeared ex nihilo (see shortly below). The claim is only 
that the philosophy of Pyrrho lies somewhere near the root of both branches of Hellenistic scepticism. 
For his likely (though unacknowledged in the ancient sources) influence on Arcesilaus, the founder of 
Academic scepticism, see Sedley (1983b) p.15-16.  
32 Bett (2003) remains the most comprehensive analysis of Pyrrho’s thought, antecedents and 
descendants. Studies of Pyrrhonism generally (and understandably) tread lightly on the question of 
Pyrrho’s own philosophy. Attempting my own comprehensive reconstruction of Pyrrho’s thought falls well 
outside the scope of this thesis. As this is a discussion of Pyrrhonism’s origins, however, it is important to 
include something of the tradition’s more distant roots. 
33 Aristoc. ap. Euseb. Praeb ev. 14.16.1-5 (LS 1 F) reporting the words of Timon of Phlius. 
34 This the reading of Bett (2003), summarised at p.39-40. 
35 Aristoc. ap. Euseb. Praeb ev. 14.16.1-5 (LS 1 F). 
36 Bett (2003) p.40. 
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The figure whom Aenesidemus adopted as his intellectual ancestor maintained 
that nature was unknowable. Though the Pyrrhonists (properly so-called) would 
denude Pyrrho’s philosophy of its negative dogmatism, it is important, for the 
purposes of this section, to emphasise the tradition from which Pyrrhonian 
scepticism emerges. 
     As to Pyrrho’s own influences, Diogenes Laertius connects Pyrrho with the 
Indian ascetics (named by the Greeks the γυμνοσοφισταί, ‘Naked Philosophers’) 
and the Persian Magi, whom he encountered during the expedition of Alexander 
the Great into India and western Asia, a detail which lends his thought a certain 
exoticism which may account for its ostensible novelty.37 But his precedent in the 
Greek epistemological tradition is worthy of note.38 On the evidence of his pupil, 
Philo of Athens, Pyrrho referred above all to Democritus, the atomist thinker of 
the century prior.39 Though the nature of Pyrrho’s recourse to Democritus is not 
expounded,40 his philosophy intersects with Democriteanism on the question of 
the truth-value of perceptions. Sextus Empiricus (M VII 136-140) preserves a 
series of Democritean fragments in which he denies the senses access to the 
truth. Democritus maintained that his atomistic model made of sense-reality an 
illusion whose properties were the products of conventional assumptions.41 For 
this reason our senses separate us from the truth.42 His famous proclamation that 
 
37 D.L IX.61-2. Sedley (1983b) p.15. The extent of these Eastern influences on Pyrrho’s thought remains 
controversial. Linguistic impediments seem likely to have limited the depth of Pyrrho’s intellectual 
engagement with either the gymnosophists or the Magi (see Brunschwig (1999) p.243-246 and Bett (2003) 
p.176-177). The tendency to associate Pyrrhonism with Eastern thought is common but difficult to 
substantiate. Bett (2003) p.169-178 identifies a number of parallels with what we are able to reconstruct 
of Pyrrho’s own thought – that is, distinguished from Pyrrhonism properly so-called – but ultimately 
concludes that the absence of linguistic communication likely prohibited anything more than superficial 
inspiration.  
38 See Bett (2003) p.152-160 for a more thorough treatment of Pyrrho’s Democritean influence. Bett 
ultimately concludes that Democritus’ ethical outlook was key to his influence on Pyrrho, but he accepts 
that Democritus’ epistemology cannot have been irrelevant.  
39 D. L. IX.67. 
40 Brunschwig (1999) p.236 warns against the assumption that the influence of Democritus on Pyrrho was 
firmly epistemological. He suggests instead, on the basis of the lines from Homer which Pyrrho was 
reportedly fond of quoting, that Democritus’ rejection of meaning in the universe was the source of his 
appeal. I do not believe there is sufficient evidence to outright dismiss Democritus’ epistemological 
influence. The similarities between Pyrrho’s conception of Nature as by nature – i.e. metaphysically – 
inarbitrable (Aristoc. ap. Euseb. praeb. ev. 14.18.1-5 (LS 1 F)) and Democritus’ conception of nature as an 
entity whose firm discernment is distorted by its all-transforming nature should not be neglected. 
41 D. L. IX.72.  
42 As Bett (2003) p.257-258 points out, Democritus’ position on sensation is, in fact, ambiguous. Arist. Gen. 
et corr. 315b9-10, De an. 404a27-9 and S. E. M VII.140 imply that Democritus cast the senses as a guide 
to the truth, despite never providing direct access to the world per se – that is, of atoms and void. This, 
on Bett’s reading, brings Democritean epistemology further into line with that of Pyrrho (if not his first 
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‘in reality we know nothing – for truth is in the depths’43 reads like a proto-sceptical 
claim and,44 indeed, the later Pyrrhonists – whose scepticism concerning sense-
data is less ambiguous than that of the movement’s ‘spiritual founder’45 – sought 
to claim Democritus as an ancestor alongside Xenophanes of Colophon and 
Zeno of Elea, both of whom are associated with denying the cognitive content of 
appearances.46 That Timon’s polemical text, the Silloi, paints all three 
philosophers in a favourable light (where he disparages, among others, Aristotle, 
the Megarians, Arcesilaus, Zeno of Citium, Epicurus…) seems to confirm that a 
mistrust of perceptions lay somewhere near the root of early sceptical (or proto-
sceptical) thought.47 Though Philo names only Democritus among the early 
atomists to whom Pyrrho was warmly disposed,48 Democritus’ fourth century 
successors, Metrodorus of Chios and Anaxarchus of Abdera, might be 
considered the bridge between the two philosophers.49 Metrodorus’ much-quoted 
declaration: ‘none of us knows anything, not even whether we do not know this 
very thing’ is variously cited as Pyrrho’s inspiration.50 To Pyrrho’s mentor 
Anaxarchus, who accompanied Pyrrho on Alexander’s expedition, is attributed 
the claim that existing things are comparable to ‘scene-painting’ and akin to the 
 
century successors), whose claims against nature’s arbitrability are metaphysical claims revealed, in some 
way, by sense-perceptions. See further n.45 below. 
43 B117 in D. L. IX.72. 
44 The distinction, of course, is that Democritus believed he had some insight into what was happening ‘in 
the depths’ to which no Pyrrhonist would assent. 
45 Bett (2003) esp. p.114-123 in the context of Pyrrho’s influences, argues that Pyrrho’s mistrust of 
perceptions stem from what he calls ‘the indeterminacy thesis’ – that is, the metaphysical thesis that 
nature is ‘indifferent, unmeasurable and inarbitrable’ (Aristoc. ap. Euseb. praeb. ev. 14.18.1-5 (LS 1 F)). 
Perceptions yield indeterminate data because nature is itself indeterminate. However, in order to arrive 
at this conclusion, perceptions must, in some way, indicate this fact (see n.42 above for the role of 
perceptions as guide in Democriteanism). Later sceptics, as noted above, do not share Pyrrho’s negative 
dogmatism; they withhold judgement on the question of nature’s indeterminacy, as they withhold 
judgement on the question of the truth content of perceptions. They remain, more truly than their 
predecessors, ‘sceptical’. But at the root of ancient scepticism is the suggestion, courtesy of Pyrrho and 
his ancestors, that nature might, by nature, be incomprehensible. 
46 See S. E. M VII.49 for Xenophanes’ proto scepticism. Zeno’s paradoxes are challenges to common 
assumptions about reality born of the data of our senses. 
47 D. L. IX.111 (Timon fr. 775) for Xenophanes in the Silloi, IX.25 (Timon fr.819) for Zeno of Elea, IX.40 
(Timon fr. 820) for Democritus. 
48 The text tells us more about Pyrrho’s fondness of Homer despite the poet being cited as secondary to 
Democritus. 
49 Though not, of course, without controversy. Although Metrodorus’ influence might be overstated – 
Brunschwig (1999) p.237-240 makes an intriguing case for Metrodorus having more faith in sense-reality 
than is implied by the much-cited opening to his work On Nature – the well-attested personal connection 
between Anaxarchus of Abdera and Pyrrho of Elis is undoubtedly significant. 
50 Euseb. Praeb. Ev. 14.19.18; Cic. Acad. II.73; S. E. M VII.88. Although the line more closely anticipates 
Arcesilaus, the founder of Academic scepticism, in its inclusion of human ignorance among the things 
about which humans are ignorant. See Cic. Acad. 1.43-6. 
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visions of a dreamer or a madman.51 These comparisons encapsulate the 
Democritean incline towards scepticism that the Pyrrhonists would pursue to 
fruition. Whether the fault lies in our senses or the sum of all apparent things, the 
world with which we interface, revealed through experience, does not allow us 
access to the truth. It is the dissociation of the human from reality, mitigated by 
untrustworthy perceptions, that lies at the root of Pyrrhonian epistemology. 
V.2.2 The origin of Empiricism 
The Empiricist sect (named for ἐμπειρία, ‘experience’) was formed c.260 BC by 
Philinus of Cos, a disaffected pupil of Herophilus of Chalcedon, in rejection of the 
emphasis afforded hidden causes by the new anatomists.52 It was therefore, by 
extension, a rejection of the logical basis of Rationalist medicine.53 Where the 
Rationalists sought by reason to unveil the hidden causes of disease, regarding 
medicine as a discipline which was developed from theory, the Empiricists denied 
reason access to the world beneath perceptions and restricted their epistemology 
to phenomena. Across the experiential plethora, signs are correlated and 
incorporated into an ever-growing body of medical lore – a record of all previous 
experiences.54 Thus, though the early Empiricists align with later Pyrrhonists in 
their dismissal of the truth-value of theoretical knowledge, their relationship to 
sense-data is, at least on first analysis, vastly divergent. 
     Though the birth of the Empiricist sect is contemporary with that of Academic 
scepticism, we find no compelling evidence for ‘cross-pollination’ between either 
school’s rejection of dogmatic orthodoxy in their respective intellectual domains. 
Empiricism springs not from the debate over the accessibility of truth but from the 
that over the relative merits of art vs. experience, τέχνη vs. ἐμπειρία, where the 
former is a prescribed body of knowledge grounded in one’s systematic 
understanding of the nature of one’s subject matter, derived from both ἐμπειρία 
and λόγος, and the latter in a body of knowledge born from observation and 
 
51 S. E. M VII.88. 
52 ps.-Gal. Int. 4.2 (= XIV.683-684 K). Attempts by later Empiricists to claim as ancestors earlier authorities 
such as Acron of Agrigentum (a contemporary of Empedocles) or, indeed, Timon of Phlius, as described in 
Gal. Subf. Emp. 1, 42.22-43.6 Deichgr., are as unconvincing as extravagant genealogical claims made by 
innovators in the ancient world tend to be. See Hankinson (1987a) p.330. 
53 A term intended to disparage. It was used by the Empiricists to distinguish themselves from their 
opponents. 
54 Gal. Subf. Emp. 2-4, 44.4-51.9 Deichgr. 
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memory, with no recourse to λόγος.55 The distinction is first analysed in Plato, 
whose Socrates lauds the former as the superior species of knowledge.56 In the 
Phaedrus, Socrates, analogising rhetoric to medicine,57 gives the example of a 
person who has learned by ἐμπειρία to bring about certain effects in the body 
through the application of certain drugs, but who lacks the knowledge one 
associates with τέχνη to apply with optimal efficacy the knowledge he absorbed 
by rote.58 The example Plato conjures in the Laws is the distinction between true 
doctors and their assistants, where the former learn through inquiry into nature 
and the latter learn by mimicking them.59 The τέχνη vs. ἐμπειρία debate is taken 
up by Aristotle, who makes a distinction at the beginning of the Metaphysics 
between those who rely only on ἐμπειρία and those who operate within the 
structures of theory.60 Aristotle accepts τέχνη as the higher form of knowledge – 
‘the experienced know the fact, but not the wherefore; but the artists know the 
wherefore and the cause’61 –  but he includes the caveat that theory, uncoupled 
from the wealth of experience from which it emerged,62 is inferior, in practical 
terms, to simple experience.63 He explains, using the example of medicine, that 
the experienced, though ignorant of causes, operate at the level of particulars, 
where the theoretician, learned in natural law but innocent of all case-specific 
requirements, can only think in universals.64 
     The τέχνη-ἐμπειρία distinction analysed in Plato and elaborated in Aristotle 
lies at the root of the Empiricist-Rationalist debate in Hellenistic medicine. Where 
Aristotle claimed that theory minus experience is of limited practical value, the 
 
55 Set out in Schiefsky (2005) p.343-359. 
56 Schiefsky (2005) p.347. Plat. Gorg. 462b introduces the distinction. Medicine is introduced as a 
prominent example from 464a. 
57 At Plat. Phaed. 270b we find an early version of the following, familiar formulation: as medicine must 
be based on knowledge of the φύσις of the body, rhetoric must be based on knowledge of the φύσις of 
the soul. 
58 Ibid. 268a-c. At Ibid. 271d-272b, Plato makes it clear that the knowledge upon which τέχνη is based 
includes an experiential component; τέχνη is not a rejection of ἐμπειρία as ἐμπειρία, in Plato’s 
formulation, is a rejection of τέχνη. 
59 Plat. Leg. 720a-e. A τέχνη of sorts, Plato acknowledges, may emerge from ἐμπειρία (if the doctor 
observed was a true practitioner of the art), but the Empiricist will always lack the knowledge necessary 
to individualise his treatment. cf. Leg. 857e. Schiefsky (2005) p.249. 
60 Arist. Met. I.981a. See further Frede (2011) p.118. 
61 Ibid. trans. Tredennick (1933); Schiefsky (2005) p.451: ‘τέχνη is explanatory while ἐμπειρία is not.’ 
62 Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not conceive technical and rational knowledge to be simply opposed to one 
another. τέχνη emerges from ἐμπειρία, while remaining distinct from it. For a detailed analysis of the 
relationship between τέχνη and ἐμπειρία in Aristotle, see Chiaradonna (2013). 
63 Arist. Met. I.1981a. See Chiaradonna (2013) p.383-386. 
64 Arist. Met. I.1981a. See Chiaradonna (2013) p.383-386. 
289 
 
Empiricist speaking in Galen’s Med. Exp. uses the same argument to discredit 
theory per se; experience is the only essential epistemological component in 
Aristotle’s formulation.65 Theory, as well as being superfluous to medical inquiry, 
was judged, in general, to be a fruitless extravagance, incapable of throwing light 
on non-evident things. As put by Celsus: 
That nature cannot be comprehended is in fact patent, they [the Empiricists] 
say, from the disagreement among those who discuss such matters; for on 
this question there is no agreement, either among professors or 
philosophers or among medical practitioners. Why then, should anyone 
believe rather in Hippocrates than in Herophilus, why in him rather than in 
Asclepiades?66 
That contradictions among theoreticians are upheld as evidence for nature’s 
inscrutability recalls the methodology of Arcesilaus, the founder of Academic 
scepticism, who first emphasised the equipollence of arguments as an argument 
for withholding assent.67 But the Empiricists employ this technique in defence of 
the validity of ἐμπειρία in the context of the τέχνη-ἐμπειρία opposition. This is not 
an argument for ἐποχή but a positive argument, derived from ἐμπειρία, against 
the value of τέχνη. Note also the disparity between the positive statement ‘nature 
cannot be comprehended’ – which does not, we should note, reflect Academic 
scepticism – and the Pyrrhonist’s universal suspension of judgement;68 the 
arguments from conflicting impressions prohibit the Pyrrhonist from assenting 
even to this (V.2.1). 
     The Empiricists had unquestioning faith in the data of experience;69 ἐμπειρία 
formed the basis upon which their body of medical lore was based.70 But we must 
note that their conception of ἐμπειρία was richer than that which Plato has 
subordinated to τέχνη, and which Aristotle conceived as the appropriate grounds 
for theory. Galen tells us in On Sects for Beginners (SI) that the Empiricists based 
their art on two modes of apprehension: the data of one’s senses (including one’s 
 
65 Gal. Med. Exp. 10. See also Cel. Med. Pr. 36-37. 
66 Cel. Med. Pr. 36-37 trans. Spencer (1935). We encountered this passage in IV.5.2.3. 
67 e.g. Cic. Acad. I.45. Burnyeat (1983) p.10-11. 
68 I refer here to the Pyrrhonists properly so-called (see supra V.2.1). 
69 Indeed, there is no sign that the question ever arose for the early Empiricists. 
70 Gal. SI II (= I.66-68 K.); Cel. Med. Pr. 33-35.  
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own memory), and history, one’s knowledge of the experience of others.71 The 
Empiricist’s history of medicine is one of documented trial and error, with time 
being the measure of the breadth and depth of accumulated medical 
knowledge.72 Doctors distinguish between ‘the pernicious and the salutary’ 
treatments by observing and recording what has worked and what has failed in 
the past and then administering their treatments accordingly.73 On the occasion 
that the Empiricist encounters a patient with an unfamiliar affliction – i.e. one for 
which there is no documented history – his recourse is to ‘transition from the 
similar’: he administers a treatment that has previously proven effective under 
similar circumstances, records the results, and thus the art continues to 
develop.74 
     Empiricist medicine is defined by the twin processes of documentation and 
systematisation. The art hinges on the proposition that knowledge is attainable 
through ἐμπειρία, that perceptions impart real facts about the world and, 
moreover, that our receipt of these facts permits us to make judgements about 
how we should proceed in the face of novelty. The model of ‘transition from the 
similar’ (previously encountered at IV.5.2.3) depends on the Empiricist’s 
willingness to make (at least, tentative) inferences about the perceptible world; x 
has been observed to effectively treat y1, therefore there is a likelihood of its 
effectiveness as a treatment for y2 on the basis of y. But how much hope the 
Empiricist was permitted to invest in the success of x as a treatment for y2 is 
controversial.75 In Subf. Emp.,76 Galen records a system for determining the 
Empiricist’s expectation of success based on the number of similarities between 
the tested and proposed cases, where expectation is (predictably) proportionate 
to similarity.77 Significantly, the application of this model was itself rooted in 
ἐμπειρία; Galen tells us explicitly that the Empiricists justify their recourse to 
‘transition from the similar’ by appealing to their experience of the method having 
 
71 Gal. SI II (= I.66-68 K.). 
72 Cel. Med. Pr. 33-35. 
73 Ibid. The example given in Gal. SI II (= I.66-68 K.) is that of a physician noticing that a spontaneous 
nosebleed seemed to aid in the recovery of a fever. When he next encounters a patient stricken with 
fever, he lets blood from a vein, such is his faith in experience. 
74 Cel. Med. pr. 38 Gal. Subf. Emp. 9, 74.9-23 Diechgr. 
75 See Hankinson (1987a) p.332-334. 
76 An account of the sect in a developed stage. 
77 Gal. Subf. Emp. 9, 74.9-23 Diechgr. 
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proven effective in the past.78 Thus, the Empiricist makes inferences from 
experience about the world of experience, and the method by which such 
inferences are made is determined via recourse to experience. Though the 
Empiricist never makes inferences about the non-evident from ἐμπειρία – for such 
is the province of the Rationalist – his faith in the data of experience in 
unambiguous. 
     As the Pyrrhonist’s arguments rest on his refusal to assent to the cognitive 
value of perceptions – the mechanism by which experiences are extracted from 
the external world – the purpose and sustainability of the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist 
alliance in the second century AD must be interrogated. We treat next how this 
conflict surfaces in the work of Sextus Empiricus – our aperture into the 
Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance – then explore how the alliance may nonetheless 
have proven beneficial. 
V.3 Interdisciplinary conflict in Sextus Empiricus 
Our best sources for Pyrrhonian scepticism are the works of an avowed 
Empiricist. The Outlines of Pyrrhonism (hereafter PH) is a concise exposition of 
Pyrrhonist philosophy, written as the sun was setting on the school’s extensive 
history.79 It consists of three books. The first book provides the ‘outlines of 
Pyrrhonism’. The latter two interrogate branches of doctrinaire philosophy from 
the perspective established in book one, structured around the trisection of 
philosophy into τόποι – into Logic (book two), Physics and Ethics (book three). 
The second text, standardly abbreviates as M, is in fact a chimera of two distinct 
works, the first six books comprising Against the Mathematicians proper – a 
complete, self-contained work – and the latter five comprising part of an 
incomplete second work.80 Adhering to the commonplace (and firmly entrenched) 
abbreviation, M 7-11 covers the same ground as PH 2-3 in finer detail (albeit 
occasionally in (complicatedly) different ways). In M 1-6 Sextus applies his 
scepticism to the so-called ‘cyclical’ (ἐγκύκλια) disciplines – bodies of theoretical 
knowledge (collected by the Grammarians, the Rhetoricians, the Geometers, the 
 
78 Ibid. 9, 80.10-20 Deichgr.  
79 D. L. IX.1160 mentions a student of Sextus Empiricus named Saturninus but we know nothing of this 
individual beyond his name. Our evidence for the continuation of the Pyrrhonist tradition beyond Sextus 
Empiricus is meagre. 
80 Bett (1012) p.vii-ix. Thus, Against the Logicians became M 7-8, Against the Physicists became M 9-10, 
and Against the Ethicist became M 11. 
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Arithmeticians, the Astrologers and the Musicians respectively) whose 
propagation he is unable to countenance on the grounds of both his Pyrrhonism 
and his Empiricism. 
     Of the man himself we know almost nothing. He is traditionally dated to the 
second century AD but the curious absence of his name in Galen has been taken, 
by some, to suggest a slightly later date for his period of activity.81 Two details 
can be asserted with confidence. The first, his Pyrrhonism; if his subject matter 
alone were not sufficient indication – he is ‘the author of ten books on  
scepticism’82 –, he recurrently refers to the Pyrrhonists as ‘we’ throughout his 
extant works and is listed in Diogenes Laertius’ genealogy of successors to the 
Pyrrhonist tradition. 83 The second, that he was a doctor; he volunteers this 
information on several occasions and Diogenes Laertius confirms it.84 On the 
subject of philosophy’s transposition into medicine, he provides us with a 
counterpoint to Athenaeus of Attalia and Asclepiades of Bithynia, not merely on 
account of his antipathy towards dogmatism – for the Stoics and Epicureans were 
of a piece in their conception of truth as something accessible to the intellect – 
but because he operated in both medical and philosophical domains 
simultaneously, where, as I have argued throughout this thesis, the former pair 
were champions of medical knowledge as something that escaped the reach of 
broader epistemologies. As I hope to explore throughout this section, Sextus 
Empiricus is a figure with two intellectual identities: he is Sextus the Physician, 
and he is Sextus the philosopher. These identities may overlap considerably – as 
the arguments of the Pyrrhonist may, in certain contexts, align with those of the 
Empiricist – but they remain distinct on account of their τέλη; Pyrrhonism and 
Empiricism are oriented towards different ends, as philosophy and medicine are 
unique disciplines. Sextus’ engagement with medicine was more than merely 
practical; he refers to his (lamentably lost) works the Medical Treatise and 
Empirical Treatise in M at VII.202 and I.61 respectively and expounds on the 
philosophy of medicine at PH  I.236-261.85 He divided his intellectual life between 
elucidating two distinct methodologies, and is therefore a crucial figure in the 
 
81 e.g. Bett (2018) p.1. 
82 D. L. IX.116. 
83 Ibid. 
84 S. E. PH II.238, M I.150, II.47. cf. D. L. IX.116. 




history of Hellenistic philosophy’s transposition into medicine. In the absence of 
his medical treatise – whose Pyrrhonian character can only be guessed at – our 
analysis of PH and M will be guided by the following questions: 
1) How far was Sextus’ Pyrrhonism tempered/distorted by his Empiricism? 
2) Where contradictions arise, what does this tell us about the disparity between 
medical and philosophical τέλη? 
3) To the extent that they were, how were these disparities accommodated? 
Questions (1) and (2) will concern us In V.3.1 and V.3.2. Answering (3) in V.3.3 
will bring this section to a close. With Sextus’ Pyrrhonism, his Empiricism, the 
tension in their alliance and the framework within which such tension might be 
accommodated fully established, we will then explore the question of how such 
an alliance came about in V.4. 
V.3.1 Mnemonic vs. Indicative signification 
At PH II.96, having disassembled ‘truth’ as debated by the Dogmatists, Sextus 
turns his attention to species of sign. He introduces the distinction between 
commemorative/mnemonic and indicative signification, attributed broadly to his 
Dogmatist opponents: 
…they call a sign ‘mnemonic’ if, having been observed together with the 
thing signified, it, by its clearness at the time when it occurs to us (while the 
thing signified is non-evident), leads us to recall what was observed together 
with it and is not occurring clearly now, as is the case with smoke and fire. 
A sign is ‘indicative’, as they say, if it is not clearly observed together with 
what is signified, but it signifies that of which it is a sign by its own individual 
nature and constitution; for example, the motions of the body are signs of 
the soul.86 
The background of this passage is the dogmatic frame in which objects of 
discourse (τὰ πράγματα) are divided into ‘evident’ and ‘non-evident’ matters 
where the former, like daylight, ‘come to our awareness directly’ and the latter, 
like that claim that the number of stars is even, ‘do not naturally fall within our 
apprehension’.87 ‘Non-evident’ things are divided further into the ‘temporarily non-
 
86 S. E. PH II.100-101 trans. Mates (1996). 
87 Ibid. II.97, M VIII.145-147. 
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evident’ and the ‘non-evident by nature.’88 τὰ πράγματα are ‘temporarily non-
evident’ when they are sense-apprehensible by nature, but temporarily occluded 
by some contingent factor.89 τὰ πράγματα are ‘non-evident by nature’ if their 
remoteness from perception is integral to their character.90 According to Sextus, 
the Pyrrhonist argues only against the truth-value of the indicative sign, it being 
a Dogmatist invention.91 He defends his restricted opposition on the following 
grounds: 
…the mnemonic sign is relied on in the normal course of life, since fire is 
signified to the person who sees smoke, and if he observes a scar he says 
that there has been a wound. Hence, not only do we not fight against the 
normal course of life, but we are allied with it in that we assent 
undogmatically to what it relies on, while opposing peculiar creations of the 
Dogmatists.92 
The question of how it is that a Pyrrhonist, for all that he might temper his assent 
by skirting around the language of belief, can justify his adherence to mnemonic 
signification – rooted, as it is, in assumptions of phenomenal continuity and the 
reliability of memory and perception as instruments of pattern recognition – has 
alerted scholars to the origin of the mnemonic-indicative distinction in the 
Empiricist-Rationalist debate;93 the Empiricist is permitted to infer facts about the 
temporarily non-evident through a combination of memory and the evidence of 
his senses; the Rationalist conceives the evident as indicative of the non-evident 
by nature. The example Sextus gives for inference to the non-evident by nature 
at PH II.98 – that the body contains intelligible pores ‘which can never appear 
themselves but may be thought to be apprehended’ via evident things such as 
perspiration – recalls not merely generic Rationalist methodology but Asclepiades 
of Bithynia, one of the earliest and most prominent critics of Empiricism (see esp. 
IV.5.2), in particular.  
 
88 S. E. PH II. 98. 
89 In the example at S. E. PH II.98, the city of Athens is classified as ‘temporarily non-evident’ on account 
of its location relative to Sextus as he writes. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. II.102. 
92 Ibid. trans. Mates (1996). 
93 Allen (2001b) p.88-89, 107-108. 
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     J. Allen, in his 2001 study of sign-inference in the ancient world, remarks in 
his chapter on Sextus Empiricus that ‘the division of epistemic labour’ to which 
Sextus attributes all contending dogmatic schools, where objects of knowledge 
are either grasped immediately through the evidence of the senses or inferred by 
means of sign-inference from the evident to the non-evident, seems particularly 
suited to Epicurean epistemology.94 This is despite Sextus’ tendency to pass over 
Epicurean contributions of semiotics in favour of the Stoic analysis, of which far 
less is known.95 If we understand Sextus’ discussion of sign-inference to be 
framed within the Empiricist-Rationalist debate – in which arguments for 
Epicurean epistemology, repurposed as anti-Empiricist arguments by 
Asclepiades of Bithynia, form part of the bedrock of Rationalism’s defence for 
several centuries (see IV.5.2) – then this disparity becomes less perplexing; what 
Allen identifies as the Epicurean character of the Dogmatist’s ‘division of 
epistemic labour’ in Sextus Empiricus might best be framed as the Asclepiadean 
character of the Rationalist’s division of epistemic labour which Sextus identifies 
with all bodies of theoretical knowledge. The foregrounding of Stoicism is 
explicable by the school’s prominence during Sextus’ lifetime, as well as the long 
history of rivalry between the Stoics and the sceptics, dating to the founding of 
the New Academy.96 The tendency in Sextus to conflate the Empiricist-Rationalist 
debate with the Pyrrhonist-Dogmatist/Stoic debate and what we may infer from 
this confusion of the relationship between his Pyrrhonism and Empiricism is 
covered below. I raise it here as further evidence for why, regarding the question 
of sign-inference, the Epicurean character of Sextus’ generic Dogmatist goes 
unaddressed; it stems from the Empiricist-Rationalist dispute which Epicurean 
arguments informed. The confusion indicates the influence of Empiricism on 
Sextus’ Pyrrhonist exposition. It is in his discussion of sign-inference that ‘Sextus 
the Empiricist’ would seem to earn his title; the question of whether he does so 
at the expense of his Pyrrhonism naturally arises. 
     Given Aenesidemus’ systematised arguments against assenting to the truth-
value of perceptions,97 Sextus’ endorsement of mnemonic signification appears, 
 
94 Allen (2001b) p.87-88. 
95 Ibid. 
96 See e.g. Cic. Acad. II.16 for evidence that Arcesilaus was principally concerned with refuting the Stoic 
theory of knowledge. For more on the relationship between Stoicism and scepticism, see Couissin (1983) 
p.31-63; Frede (1983) p.65-93. 
97 Recorded by Sextus himself in PH I. 
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on first analysis, to conflict with his scepticism; it presumes a more or less pristine 
correspondence between sense-data and the external world. Some (though, 
crucially, not all) accounts of Aenesidemus’ writing on sign-inference ascribe to 
him the stronger position against signs which we would expect from the compiler 
of the Ten Tropes. Photius of Constantinople, reporting on Aenesidemus’ 
Pyrrhonist Discourses, records that the founder of the Pyrrhonist school adopted 
a general opposition to sign-inference, denying the possibility that any non-
evident information could be discerned from the evident.98 Diogenes Laertius 
attributes a similar blanket opposition to sign-inference to Aenesidemus.99 A 
successful inference from the evident to the temporarily obscure can only be 
made within an epistemic framework which held the natural world, as gifted to 
perception, to be (to some degree) predictable. In the absence of this assumption, 
our knowledge of the evident is on no surer epistemic footing than our knowledge 
of what is not evident. Thus, the epistemic hierarchy on which the endorsement 
of mnemonic signification depends collapses into rubble.100 We will circle back to 
the compatibility of mnemonic signification and Pyrrhonism once the details of 
Sextus’ arguments in favour have been fully explored. I will treat the arguments 
in PH and M separately, as they provide distinct insights into the nature of the 
Empiricist-Pyrrhonist bond. 
V.3.1.1 Mnemonic vs. Indicative signification in PH II.94-188 
At PH II.103, having set out the basis of the indicative-mnemonic distinction, 
Sextus announces his intention to ‘show completely the nonexistence of the 
indicative sign.’101 However, in the following argument, spanning PH II.104-118, 
Sextus instead proceeds to dismantle the logical basis of Stoic semiotics.102 This 
 
98 Phot. Bibl. 170b3-35 (LS 72 L). Much of the fourth discourse is reportedly devoted to refuting sign-
inference to the non-evident, which would seem to include mnemonic signification in its scope. This is, of 
course, to take Photius’ summary of the fourth book the Pyrrhonist Discourses at face value. It is quite 
possible, as we shall see below, that Aenesidemus was not universally dismissive of sign-inference, as 
Photius implies. 
99 D. L. IV.96. 
100 Allen (2001b) p.114. Sextus allows at PH II.95-6 and M VIII.141-2 that there are matters which are 
evident by nature only provisionally. The distinction between evident and non-evident objects of 
discourse, he tells us at PH II.97, is fathered on the Dogmatists. The Pyrrhonist, he asserts, cannot begin 
to make claims about the non-evident because non-evident matters are accessible via observation of the 
evident, whose place of epistemic privilege rests upon premises to which the Pyrrhonist does not assent. 
And yet, the endorsement of commemorative signs over indicative signs is entirely dependent on the 
privileged status of the evident. 
101 Trans. Mates (1996). 
102 The remainder of the section, PH 2.118-133, where Sextus broadens the argument to include more 
widely held assumptions about sign-inference, similarly fails to live up to the promise of PH 2.103. 
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is a broader target than the indicative sign as defined in PH II.101. It is, moreover, 
of a different philosophical character to what PH II.103 led us to expect; the logical 
focus of the passage comes as a surprise after Sextus has prepared us for an 
attack upon dogmatist epistemology.103 To summarise Sextus’ argument, the 
Stoics maintain that signs are λεκτά, incorporeal ‘sayables’. The λεκτά are non-
evident. Therefore, proposing their existence demands proof. But proofs are also 
λεκτά. Thus the journey to proving the existence of signs per se is infinitely 
regressive.104 This jarring shift in emphasis arrives in tandem with the move away 
from the Empiricist-Rationalist debate indicated at PH II.97-103 (though not 
explicitly attested),105 and towards the debate between the Pyrrhonists and the 
Stoics. With this abrupt shift come casualties of coherence. Most damagingly, 
Sextus’ attack upon the logical character of a sign seems no less applicable to 
the mnemonic sign; Sextus is attacking the logical foundations on which the sign 
per se is proposed as an existent.106 J. Allen suggests this inconsistency is born 
of a possibly unconscious conflation of the distinction between mnemonic and 
indicative signification, which originated in epistemological debates within the 
medical sphere, with the conflict between sceptical and dogmatic approaches to 
sign-inference where the Stoics were the anointed champions of the latter.107 
     It is worth considering how closely entwined two independent schools of 
thought must become such that a conflation of this kind can be made 
‘unconsciously’, especially when, as we are already beginning to see, the 
conclusions the Empiricists and Pyrrhonists drew about the possibility of sign-
inference to the non-evident are not obviously consistent. For an error of the kind 
Allen proposes to have gone unnoticed, we might posit that Sextus had become 
accustomed to advancing both Empiricist and Pyrrhonists positions on this 
question without finding his identities in conflict. Assuming the level of 
compartmentalisation necessary to preserve this error is less outlandish if we 
consider – as we should – Empiricism and Pyrrhonism as differently oriented 
systems. Empiricism is an epistemology oriented towards the treatment of 
 
103 Allen (2001b) p.115-118. 
104  This recalls the second of the Five Tropes attributed to ‘more recent Pyrrhonists’ at PH I.164-177. 
105 The identification of the indicative sign with the Stoic sign at PH 2.101 has long been acknowledged to 
be out of place in PH 2.97-103, which is undoubtedly based on epistemological disputes in medicine, and 
at odds with the account of the Stoic conception of signs given from PH. 2.104. It was first suggested to 
be an interpolation nearly a century and a half ago by Natorp (1884) p.138. 
106 Ibid p.117. First argued in Phillipson (1881) p.61. 
107 Allen (2001b) p.115-122. 
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disease; Pyrrhonism is a system of arguments collected in pursuit of an ethical 
τέλος - ἀταραξία, the state of equanimity achieved through ἐποχή.108 When a 
Pyrrhonist is inducted into τέχνη (a productive science) – as he must be, 
according to Sextus Empiricus, since he cannot be wholly inactive109 – he 
accedes to the coterminous body of routines. His instruction in the art does not 
encroach upon ἐποχή providing that the discipline in question does not require 
his assent to a body of explicitly theoretical knowledge.110 Thus, his discipline 
functions as a self-sufficient enclave within the greater topology of his thought. It 
has its own τέλος, independent of that of his philosophy, and the presence of the 
enclave satisfies his innate need to act. Certain types of contradiction are 
sustainable if the systems that generate opposing views are never practically 
opposed; while the Pyrrhonist could never countenance a Rationalist 
epistemology – for to do so is to assent to one theory above others – a system 
that did not stray beyond appearances, even if some of its epistemological axioms 
might wither in the light of Pyrrhonist scrutiny, will seldom be found in direct 
opposition to the broader system of thought. We infer from the confusion in PH 
II.94-118 that Sextus’ interest in debating Rationalists is a consequence of his 
Empiricism, not his Pyrrhonism. When he moves away from the medical sphere 
at PH II.104 and argues as Sextus the Pyrrhonist, his target shifts abruptly to the 
Stoics. So here is our scenario: 
i) Sextus the Physician endorses mnemonic signification because without it the 
medical profession to which he belongs could not exist in any form. He opposes 
indicative signification on the grounds of his Empiricism. 
ii) Sextus the Philosopher advances Pyrrhonist arguments which, while intended 
to dismantle the Dogmatists’ conception of evident-to-non-evident sign-inference 
(with which he has conflated the Rationalists’ endorsement of indicative 
signification), are equally applicable to the mnemonic sign. 
Our full exposition of the behavioural framework which accommodates this 
compartmentalised approach to differing systems of thought in Pyrrhonism awaits 
us in V.3.3. I raise it here as an assessment of the plausible circumstances in 
 
108 S. E. PH I.8. 
109 Ibid.  I.23-24 
110 Ibid. This detail – that the profession he absorbs himself into be built on established routines and not 
theoretical knowledge – would appear to be the factor which distinguishes medical Empiricism from the 
kinds of disciplines to which Sextus objects in M I-VI. See Bett (2018) p.20. 
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which Sextus might have confused two different debates in PH II.84-118. It is 
obvious that the boundary between his Empiricism and his Pyrrhonism was 
vulnerable to a certain amount of permeation, most likely on account of both 
schools’ shared opposition to the accessibility of the non-evident by nature to 
rational inquiry (wherein I locate Empiricism’s sceptical appeal (V.3.3)), but the 
peculiar cognitive dissonance he exhibits in PH II.94-118 suggests that we treat 
Sextus’ τέχνη and his philosophy as distinct epistemic frames. Internal 
contradictions such as that at PH II.84-118 occur when Sextus confuses the 
‘enclave’ for the entire structure of his thought.  
V.3.1.2 Mnemonic vs. Indicative signification in M VIII.141-299 
That Sextus’ failure to produce an argument against indicative signification in PH 
results from an unconscious conflation of disparate epistemologies is supported 
by the fact that he does deliver on his promise elsewhere. At M VIII.141-299 we 
find an attack on indicative signification that preserves the truth-value of the 
mnemonic sign. Significantly, Sextus approaches indicative-mnemonic debate in 
a professional capacity. From M VIII.244, when ‘intelligible’ signs are the focus – 
distinguished from the ‘sensible’ in the language of M VIII.141-299 – the Stoic 
analysis of sign-inference is once again Sextus’ target; we see the same 
arguments against the logical foundations of the λεκτόν that we see in PH II.104-
188. However, in the preceding discussion of the ‘sensible’ sign, the missing 
epistemological arguments against indicative signification are unearthed. After a 
brief and typically Pyrrhonian excursion into the question of whether sensibles 
are illusory, in which the disputes between Democritus, Epicurus, the Stoics and 
the Peripatetics are accentuated,111 Sextus concedes, as he does in PH II.102, 
that the mnemonic sign ‘is generally trusted by everyone in ordinary life to be 
useful.’112 To summarise the argument at M VIII.187-188, around which the rest 
of the discussion of sensible signs is built, Sextus begins with the following 
proposition: 
…every sensible thing is of a nature to impinge on everyone in the same 
condition, and to be grasped equally. The colour white, for example, is not 
apprehended in one way by Greeks and in another way by foreigners, or 
 
111 S. E. M VIII.183-186. 
112 Trans. Bett (2005). 
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differently by craftsmen and by ordinary people, but in the same way by 
everyone who has unimpaired senses.113 
However, if signs of the non-evident by nature were included among the 
sensibles, then they too would affect the observer equally. And yet they do not: 
Thus in medicine, for instance, the same appearances are signs of one thing 
to this man (such as Erasistratus), but of another to that man (say, 
Herophilus), and of another to a third (such as Asclepiades).114 
Therefore the sign cannot be sensible; its purported effects on the observer 
vary.115 It follows, on Sextus’ account, that indicative signification is not, as its 
advocates claim, an inference from the evident to the non-evident, but an 
inference from the non-evident to the non-evident – an impossibility, for signs are 
necessarily apparent.116 Here then, is the epistemological argument against 
indicative signification. From M VIII.107-188 we learn two things. 1) Sextus’ 
failure to deliver on the promise of PH II.101 in PH was likely an oversight; it 
should be read as evidence for his tendency to confuse two distinct (and 
differently oriented) systems of thought. 2) Sextus’ epistemological argument 
against indicative-signification is entrenched in an ancillary debate about the 
nature of artistic/technical knowledge. 
     M VIII.187-188 foregrounds the disparity between the artists and the 
layperson. As Allen observed,117 this choice of dichotomy signifies the argument’s 
roots in the Empiricist-Rationalist debate. Two types of distinction are introduced: 
that between ‘craftsmen’ and ‘ordinary’ folk,118 and that between different 
Rationalists/misguided craftsmen.119 In the first example, the artist and the 
layperson experience the world in the same way so long as their faculties remain 
unimpeded. This claim is problematic from a Pyrrhonist perspective but 
foundational to Empiricism. In the second example, the Rationalists, through their 
 
113 S. E. M VIII.187 trans. Bett (2005). 
114 Ibid. VIII.188 trans. Bett (2005). 
115 See Allen (2001b) p.128-130 for a breakdown of the aetiological character of the argument at M 
VIII.187-188. 
116 This argument is recapitulated at D. L. IX.96. 
117 Allen (2001b) p.130-139. 
118 To which the distinction between Greeks and foreigners in M VIII.187 may be considered analogous. 
The Greeks are distinguished from non-Greeks by their linguistic skill. Sextus’ point is that acquiring this 
skill makes no difference to how sensible phenomena are perceived. 
119 S. E. M VIII.187-188. Note that medicine is employed synecdochally in M VII.188 to denote τέχναι; it is 
through medicine that technical knowledge is defined against broader systems of thought. 
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disagreements, are united by their misguided accession to the truth-value of 
indicative signification. The failure of bodies of theoretical knowledge to privilege 
the artist on the question of sign-inference is the focus in both cases. That Sextus, 
seeking an example of the failure of the indicative sign to move, as one, its 
learned observers, draws from the world of Rationalist medicine hints at the 
argument’s medical roots.120 The argument against indicative signification in M 
can only be properly understood in the context of the ongoing debate about the 
kinds of knowledge to which an artist can lay claim. It is an argument which 
Sextus himself summarised later in M VIII. At M VIII.280, Sextus raises the 
question of whether art necessitates theory – is it access to a wellspring of 
specialised knowledge that accounts for the artist’s deeper understanding of his 
subject than the layperson? The Rationalist’s answer, preserved in M VIII.280, is 
that the artist’s claim to specialised knowledge rests on his access to the non-
evident by nature which can only be discerned through indicative signification; 
knowledge of the evident, the Rationalist agrees, is equally accessible to all.121 
Sextus’ response at M VIII.291, though not explicitly labelled as such, is a 
defence of medical Empiricism. He agrees that art necessitates a theorem – i.e. 
a system of rules to which one’s adherence distinguished one from the layperson, 
stripped of all speculative and theoretical connotation; a valid theorem can only 
be exploited by the artist who confines himself to evident things: 
For [the art] brings about the construction of rules on the basis of things 
often watched or examined; and the things often watched and examined are 
peculiar to the people who have most often been watching – they are not 
common to everyone.122 
Galen, in Med. Exp., reports a similar Empiricist defence of disciplines minus 
theory, where observation and history are purported to account for the entirety of 
a professional’s specialised knowledge.123 The arguments at M VIII.187-188 are 
framed by this debate. As Allen argued, the Empiricists’ argument that specialised 
bodies of knowledge arise from codified observations of evident things permits 
 
120 As, indeed, does Sextus’ choice of doctors at M VIII.188. As noted in V.2.2, Empiricism developed in 
part in response to the anatomical discoveries of Herophilus and Erasistratus. Asclepiades, as discussed 
at IV.5.2, was one of the earliest and most prominent defenders of Rationalism against Empiricist critique. 
121 See Allen (2001b) p.132. 
122 S. E. M VIII.291 trans. Bett (2005). 
123 Gal. Med. Exp. 98-99. See Allen (2001b) p.133. 
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them to reflect the Rationalist argument back upon itself.124 If the Rationalist 
locates in sensory phenomena an indication of non-evident things – or, if nature, 
through phenomena, guides the mind towards her unseen transformations – then 
surely he must grant that this information is accessible to all? As Sextus puts it at 
M VIII.272: 
…whatever the sign may be like, either it itself has a nature suitable for 
indicating and revealing what is unclear, or we are capable of remembering 
the things that have been exposed together with it. But it does not have a 
nature indicative of unclear things, since in that case it ought to indicate 
unclear things to everyone equally. Therefore, the way we go with regard to 
the subsistence of objects parallels how we are doing in terms of our 
memory.125 
This, then, is the argument that was promised but omitted in PH II.94-118. It is 
demonstrably Empirical in character, oriented, as it is, towards defending the 
Empiricist’s conception of explicitly artistic knowledge, rooted in the truth-value of 
mnemonic signification.  
V.3.1.3 Mnemonic signification in the Pyrrhonian Discourses 
We return to the question of the mnemonic sign’s compatibility with Pyrrhonism.  
We have already seen how the argument at PH II.94-188 is applicable to both 
mnemonic and indicative forms of sign-inference. Recall the passages in Photius 
and Diogenes Laertius in which Aenesidemus’ opposition to all forms of sign-
inference is implied.126 Recall also how the Pyrrhonist’s attested scepticism 
regarding the truth-value of perceptions denudes evident things of the epistemic 
privilege bestowed on them by the Empiricists – the basis of their adherence to 
the mnemonic sign. 
     It was on these grounds that the nineteenth century scholar Robert Philippson 
– the first to give the conflict between Sextus’ medical and philosophical sects 
considered attention – concluded that Sextus’ endorsement of the mnemonic sign 
amounted to a late-stage ‘watering down’ of Pyrrhonian scepticism, brought 
about by the influence of Empiricism on some among their number in the twilight 
 
124 Allen (2001b) p.134-135. 
125 S. E. M VIII.271 trans. Bett (2005). 
126 Phot. Bibl. 170b3-35 (LS 72 L); D. L. IX.96. See supra V.3 (intro.). 
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of their sect.127 But Philippson’s conclusion neglects the evidence for a far earlier 
alignment of Pyrrhonist and Empiricist thought.128 In his attack on indicative 
signification in M, Sextus quotes the fourth book of Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonian 
Discourses, revealing his argument’s pedigree: 
…if apparent things appear alike to all who are similarly disposed; and signs 
are apparent things, signs appear alike to all who are similarly disposed; But 
signs do not appear alike to all who are similarly disposed; yet apparent 
things do appear alike to all who are similarly disposed; therefore signs are 
not apparent things.129 
Here, as in M VIII.187-188, it is only the indicative sign that is endangered. If 
apparent things appear alike to all then continuity in the phenomenal world can 
be established. With continuity comes rudimentary notions of cause and effect 
whereby history and observation allow us to make inferences from evident things 
to the temporarily obscure – from smoke to fire. A little later in M VIII, Sextus 
summarises the position he attributes to Aenesidemus with the argument’s 
epistemological premises more clearly defined: 
For that apparent things appear equally to those who have unimpaired 
senses is evident; for white does not appear differently to different people, 
nor does black appear differently to different people, nor does sweet appear 
differently, but they affect everyone similarly. Well then, if these things 
appear equally to everyone and have the power of indicating unclear things, 
then unclear things, too, necessarily strike everyone equally, seeing that the 
causes are the same and the underlying matter is similar. But this is not so; 
for not everyone recognises unclear things in the same way, even though 
they encounter perceptible things equally, but some do not even come to a 
conception of them, while others do, but are seduced into a variety of shifting 
and conflicting assertions.130 
If correctly attributed, the above is an argument against indicative signification 
attributed to Pyrrhonism’s founder which rests on the assumption that ‘apparent 
 
127 Philippson (1881) p.61. 
128 Allen (2001b) p.131. 
129 S. E. M VIII.215 trans. Bett (2005). 
130 S. E. M VIII.240-241 trans. Bett (2005). 
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things appear equally to those who have unimpaired senses’.131 Given that 
Aenesidemus’ enduring contribution to philosophy is a system of arguments 
designed to undermine one’s faith in the truth-value of ‘apparent things’ based 
upon the factors that prevent perceptions from telling a universal story,132 his 
reported endorsement of the premise that apparent things appear equally to all 
is, on first analysis, perplexing. We lack the context in which Aenesidemus’ 
argument against indicative signification is framed – Sextus is selecting an 
argument from the Pyrrhonian Discourses that aligns with his purpose at M 
VIII.187-244 – but it is plausible that this premise was chosen as one to which 
Aenesidemus’ dogmatic opponents would agree to, and then the argument’s 
unwelcome consequences – that indicative signification is refuted on the grounds 
that identical phenomena do not lead all healthy observers to the same 
conclusions about non-evident things – were drawn out.133 That the argument 
recorded at M VIII.240-241 reflects the Empiricist’s argument against the 
Rationalist model of specialised knowledge must be acknowledged.134 As Allen 
(2001b) argued, the components of this argument that are apt to confuse – 
Aenesidemus’ synonymising of phenomenal and semiotic content, for example – 
are made  intelligible when understood as Empiricist imports; insofar as M 
VIII.240-241 is jarring, it is because an argument in defence of Empiricist 
epistemology has been repurposed as part of a broader argument against sign-
inference per se.135 We need not suppose that Aenesidemus was concerned with 
defending the foundations of Empiricism – this is not an endorsement of a 
Empiricist premise, any more than the Ten Tropes are endorsements of the 
delusive quality of sense-data; we need only suppose that he found it useful to 
draw on Empiricist argumentation when indicative signification was proposed. As 
we will see at V.3.2, it was not outside the purview of the Pyrrhonist to utilise 
arguments derived from different schools/intellectual fields without committing to 
the systems of belief from which those arguments originated. From these 
tantalising hints in M we infer the possibility that the utility of some Empiricist 
 
131 Ibid. VIII.240. 
132 Supra V.2.1. 
133 On the reading of Morison (2018) p.286-293, the purpose of Aenesidemus’ Tropes was simply to 
construct equal and opposing arguments to those of the dogmatists. The Ten Tropes are not 
endorsements of an unknowable cosmos or the delusive nature of phenomena; they are a bundle of 
premises intended to neutralise arguments which hold the truth-value of phenomena to be axiomatic.  
134 cf. Gal. Med. Exp. 98-99. 
135 Allen (2001b) p.129-134. 
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arguments to Pyrrhonism was recognised early in the school’s development. We 
will return to Aenesidemus in V.3.2. 
V.3.1.4 Coda 
To maintain a meaningful distinction between mnemonic and indicative 
signification is to behave as a dogmatist. This, simply, is the problem at the root 
of Sextus’ schizophrenic treatment of sign-inference in PH and M. The question 
of dogmatism in Empiricism – and the manner in which Sextus deals with the 
dogmatism of the Empiricist sect – is sufficiently complex to merit a subsection of 
its own. With this final piece in place, we can examine how these distinct systems 
of thought can be reconciled and then ask, to what end? 
V.3.2 Empiricism vs. Methodism at PH I.236-241 (or, Sextus Empiricus vs. 
dogmatic Empiricism) 
For all that Sextus’ analysis of sign-inference is informed (and occasionally 
confused) by his Empiricism, for all that he articulates his sympathy for Empiricist 
ideas in his works,136 and despite his authoring of at least one work on the sect 
for which he is named, when, at PH I.236, he addresses the question of the 
Empiricism’s relationship to Pyrrhonism,137 his response is perplexing: 
…it needs to be recognised that inasmuch as Empiricism firmly maintains 
the inapprehensibility of the non-evident, it is not the same as scepticism; 
nor would it benefit a sceptic to take up that system. He might better adopt 
the so-called Method, it seems to me, for it alone of the medical systems 
seems not to make precipitate assertions about non-evident things by self-
assuredly telling us whether they are apprehensible or not apprehensible; 
and following the appearances, it takes from them what seems beneficial in 
accord with the sceptic practice. For we said above that everyday life, in 
which the sceptic shares, has four parts: one involving nature’s guidance, 
another involving the compulsion of the πάθη, still another the traditions of 
law and customs, and a fourth the teaching of the arts. Accordingly, just as 
the sceptic, in accord with the compulsion of the πάθη, is led by thirst to 
 
136 S. E. PH II.246, 244; M V.104, VIII.191, 288, 291. 
137 This comes at the end of a list of responses to popular comparisons between Pyrrhonism and another 
schools at PH I.210-241. It seems noteworthy that of all the schools to which Pyrrhonism is compared in 
PH I.210-241 (the Heracliteans, the Democriteans, the Cyrenaics, the Protagoreans and the Academics), 
the Empiricists are the only school belonging to a different discipline. 
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drink and by hunger to food…so too the Methodic physician is led by the 
πάθη to what is appropriate – by tightness to loosening up, as when one 
deems refuge in heat from a cold-induced attack of cramping…It is also very 
evident that conditions that are naturally alien to us impel us to their removal, 
seeing that even a dog, when stuck by a thorn, proceeds to pull it out. And 
so in sum…I consider that all the things thus said by the Methodics can be 
classed as instances of the compulsion of the πάθη, whether these 
compulsions are natural or unnatural.138 
Sextus goes on to cite the Methodist’s ‘undogmatic and relaxed use of words’ in 
support of their affinity with Pyrrhonism;139 according to Sextus, when the 
Methodist speaks of ‘indication’ (a Methodic concept expounded below) he 
makes no dogmatic assertion about nature’s proclivity to interface with reason;140 
he speaks instead in terms of ‘guidance of the apparent πάθη’ and is led to the 
appropriate remedy as a hungry man is led to food.141 Sextus concludes his 
discussion with the thoroughly destabilising claim that Methodism has a closer 
kinship with Pyrrhonian scepticism than any other medical system.142 
Pyrrhonism’s kindship with Empiricism is dismissed in a single line.143 
     PH I.236-241 is central to the question of the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance in 
the secondary century AD. On the one hand, it further indicates the friction 
between Sextus’ art and his philosophy – that generated when scepticism rubs 
flanks with medical dogmatism; on the other, it clarifies the nature of the bond. In 
this section, I ask the question of what PH I.236-241 can tell us about the nature 
of Empiricism’s sceptical appeal.  
V.3.2.1 Introduction to Methodism 
Before we proceed, some historical context and clarification of terms. Methodism 
came to prominence in the first century BC, in reaction to both Rationalist and 
Empiricist epistemologies.144 The Methodists dissent from the Rationalists in their 
unwillingness to allow that medicine ‘should consist in conjecture about hidden 
 
138 S. E. PH I.236 trans. Mates (1996) slightly altered, with some omissions. 
139 Ibid. I.239. 
140 Ibid. I.240. 
141 Ibid.  
142 S. E. PH I.241. 
143 Ibid. I.236. 
144 Cel. Med. Pr. 56-57. Frede (1987) p.261-278 remains a valuable introduction to Methodism and its 
relationship with rival schools of medical thought in later antiquity. 
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things.’145 They dissent from the Empiricists in their contention that the proper 
method of treating bodily affection is not revealed through observation and 
history, but is in fact ‘immediately evident’; the thirsty man is not led to water by 
his memory of water having sated his thirst in the past, but his instinctive 
understanding that water is required.146 Methodism recognises three readily 
observable recurrent features of disease (κοινότητες), namely ‘constriction’, 
where the movement of fluids in the body is impeded; ‘flux’, where the fluids move 
too freely, and ‘mixture’, where both constriction and flux are simultaneously 
evident in different parts of the body.147 Crucially, the relationships between the 
recurrent features of disease and the disease itself is not causal; constriction and 
flux do not cause disease; they are concomitant features which account for 
physical impairment. Treatments follow from the recognition of one of the three 
κοινότητες via the process of ‘indication’ (ἔνδειξις);148 the Methodists rely upon no 
physical theory, nor upon a corpus of accumulated ἐμπειρία. If the body is 
constricted, it needs to be relaxed. If the body is too relaxed, it needs to be 
constricted. In the case of a mixture, the most severe affection is prioritized and 
treated accordingly.149 Such is the Method. It presents itself as a system of natural 
responses to readily observable generalities. Indication does not follow 
immediately from observation; the purported self-evidence of κοινότητες did not 
invalidate training; one must, we infer, learn how to look. But the Methodists did 
not claim to be the keepers of a vast body of specialised knowledge. Indeed, they 
made the opposite boast; Thessalus, according to Galen, claimed that he could 
teach the art in only six months.150 Methodism is simple; once the initiate has 
been instructed where/how to look, nature shepherds him from recognition to the 
implementation of the cure.  
     The Methodists’ ‘undogmatic’ commitment to ἔνδειξις as the only reliable 
source of medical knowledge – at least on Sextus’ account – permitted them to 
operate at a remove from the epistemological debate that dominated medicine at 
the time of the school’s founding. Despite their self-confinement to the evident, 
they avoid the negative dogmatism Sextus attributes to the Empiricists (or certain 
 
145 Cel. Med. Pr. 57. 
146 Ibid.; S. E. PH I.238. 
147 Cel. Med. Pr. 58. 
148 See Frede (1987) p.263-266. 
149 Cel. Med. Pr. 55-57. 
150 Gal. MM 1.1 (= X.5 K.) 
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factions therein).151 For this reason, they attract the Pyrrhonist’s favour at PH 
I.236-241. This would seem to account, in part, for Sextus’ rejection of 
Empiricism’s sceptical value in this passage. But it is not the whole story. 
V.3.2.2 Guidance of the apparent πάθη 
When Sextus writes of the πάθη he refers to one of four modes of behaviour in 
accordance with which the sceptic can live the ordinary life without acquiescing 
to belief.152 They are ‘the guidance of nature’ (one’s acknowledgement of sense-
reality unmarred by claims to its veracity); compulsions of the πάθη (primitive, 
involuntary drives  exemplified by thirst); ‘the handing down of customs and laws’ 
and instruction in the arts.153 Sextus finds in the Methodic commitment to ἔνδειξις, 
where the phenomenal content of diseases are themselves instructive of the 
method of their treatment, an example of actions taken in accordance with the 
πάθη.154 This is not an example of indicative signification as decried at PH II.94-
103 and M VIII.141-299. Methodic indication, as Frede puts it, necessitates no 
‘detour via the non-manifest’ on the journey from identifying indicative generalities 
(a) to the administration of treatment (b).155 The Methodist is unconcerned with 
hidden things;156 a and b are both evident, as the sense-data tossed up by a thorn 
in a dog’s paw (a) indicates the correct method of treatment (b). This type of 
indication is identified with the πάθη at PH I.240 and owes its sceptical 
endorsement to the fact that it requires no belief of the physician; nothing external 
to the πάθη is assumed; the physician is merely moved to act. Note that the claim 
that an affection is indicative of its treatment is an appeal to a kind of reason, just 
not that which elaborates grand theoretical cosmoses to explain why a is 
indicative of b.157 The Method recognises that nature is instructive of the means 
by which humans can induce favourable changes to her structure without 
recourse to an esoteric roadmap. Whatever, if anything, occurs beneath 
perception, some problems have evident solutions. This is the basis of the πάθη-
ἔνδειξις parallelism; we infer from thirst (a) only our apparent need for water (b), 
we infer from diseases of constriction (a) only our apparent need to induce dilation 
 
151 See Gal. SI VI (= I.82 K.). 
152 Set out in S. E. PH I.23-24.  
153 S. E. PH I.23-24. 
154 Ibid. I.240. 
155 Frede (1987) p.265. 
156 Cel. Med. Pr. 57. 
157 Frede (1987) p.265-266. 
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(b). Thus, when Sextus argues for the kinship of Pyrrhonism and Methodism, his 
attack on Empiricism is two-pronged. 1) Their dogmatic assertion that the non-
evident is by-nature-inapprehensible is not sceptical; 2) their dogmatic anti-
Rationalism, which locates all medical knowledge in history and observation, 
would seem to run contrary to the πάθη. 
V.3.2.3 Pyrrhonian Empiricism in PH I.236-241 
We will postpone the question of Empiricism’s compatibility with the ‘fourfold 
ordinary regimen of life’ at PH I.23-24 until V.3.3. For the time being, I want to 
focus on what PH I.236-241 clarifies of the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance. First, a 
caveat. Sextus’ endorsement of Methodism is not elaborated beyond PH I.236-
241 and is not repeated in any of his extant works or other sources for 
Pyrrhonism. The complaint that Empiricism is too unsceptical in its insistence that 
the non-evident by nature is (by nature) inapprehensible does, however, appear 
elsewhere. In his Outline of Empiricism, Galen, adopting an Empiricist point of 
view, rebukes Menodotus, one of the four Pyrrhonian Empiricists listed in D. L. 
IX.115-116, for insisting that the theories of Asclepiades of Bithynia are 
categorically false despite maintaining that the Empiricist, like the Pyrrhonist, 
should withhold judgement on matters non-evident.158 Galen’s text hints at a self-
policing culture within Empiricism, where Empiricists take measures to steer each 
other clear of the perils of negative dogmatism. PH I.236-241 can certainly be 
read in this way; the polemical tone of the passage is more evocative of scolding 
than it is of refutation, a rebuke to one’s colleagues for lapsing into negative 
dogmatism. Sextus’ language is conditional: ‘it needs to be recognised that 
inasmuch as Empiricism firmly maintains the inapprehensibility of the non-
evident, it is not the same as scepticism.’159 Given the abundant evidence for 
Sextus’ Empiricism, the most plausible reading of PH I.236-241 is that it is an 
attack on a particular strain of Empiricism, not the sect’s foundational 
methodology.160 Note his singular use of the first person in PH I.237 – ‘He might 
better adopt the so-called Method, it seems to me.’161 – where typically Sextus 
writes of Pyrrhonian orthodoxy in terms of ‘us’ and ‘we’.162 There is little to indicate 
 
158 Gal. Subf. Emp. 20, 84.11-85.3 Deichgr. See Allen (2010) p.232-233. 
159 S. E. PH I.236 trans. Mates (1996); Allen (2010) p.233. 
160 Such is the argument in Allen (2010) p.232-248. 
161 Trans. Mates (1996). 
162 Allen (2010) p.234. 
310 
 
that Sextus’ stated preference for Methodism over (we should stress, dogmatic) 
Empiricism at PH I.236-241 speaks to a wider trend in Pyrrhonism. 
     PH I.236-241 does, however, cause us to refine our model of Pyrrhonist-
Empiricist relationship which came to light in the discussion of sign-inference 
(V.3.1). Contrary to Galen’s claim in Subf. Emp. that the Empiricist is to medicine 
what the Pyrrhonist is to life,163 the Pyrrhonist physician is not wedded to the 
tenets of Empiricism; his affinity for Empiricism is conditional and, if we are correct 
to read PH I.236 as an admonishment of a certain faction therein, it is limited to 
its most sceptical expression.164 His Pyrrhonism informs the extent to which he 
can absorb himself into the system of his art, if only – and this may be a necessary 
qualifier – on the occasion when he has cause to reflect on the affinity between 
his philosophy and his profession; the Sextus of PH II. 94-188 is so intellectually 
bimodal that he confuses Pyrrhonian and Empiricist arguments (V.3.1.1); the 
Sextus of PH I.236-241, whose only goal is to expound Pyrrhonism by 
comparison to a superficially similar system – one to which it is popularly 
compared –, can expose faults in (certain strains of) Empiricist thinking from an 
unpolluted Pyrrhonist perspective.165 Outside Empiricism, looking in, the 
Pyrrhonist is free to emphasise alternative approaches to the medical art which 
may map more precisely onto his broader epistemology. 
     Why, then, does he not embrace the Method? Allen (2010), comparing 
Empiricist epistemology with its absence in the Methodic school, suggests that 
‘Methodism, or Methodism as Sextus conceives it, has a better, more sceptical 
attitude towards the phenomena than Empiricism, or a form of it.’166 This claim 
invites the question of why we see no evidence for Pyrrhonian-Methodic 
association elsewhere, where the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist association was such that 
it needed to be qualified. Allen emphasises the fact that Sextus gives a rather 
‘scepticising’ account of Methodism, ignoring, for example, the accusations that 
Methodism was simply another species of Rationalism,167 and glossing over the 
disparity between the example of a thirsty man led by the πάθη to take water, 
 
163 Gal. Subf. Emp. 9, 82.28 et seq. Deichgr.  
164 We are left to wonder whether the various Empiricist factions were delineated in On Empiricism. 
165 That S. E. PH I.236-241 stands out so clearly as an outlying passage in PH, where Empiricist influence 
can otherwise be felt throughout Sextus’ work, is perhaps a testament to how rarely this reflection was 
performed.  
166 Allen (2010) p.243. 
167 Such as those reported in Cel. Med. Pr. 62-64. 
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and that of the physician led by the πάθη of the patient to administer the 
appropriate treatment; the estrangement of the physician from the patient’s direct 
experience would seem to presuppose a more deductive process on his part that 
resists the analogy to the πάθη.168 It is important to remember that Methodism is 
utilized in PH I.236-241 as a means of criticising dogmatic tendencies in 
Empiricism; it is evoked instrumentally, not as the subject of Pyrrhonist 
scrutiny.169 We might ask if Sextus had cause to exaggerate Methodism’s 
sceptical tendencies in service to his critique of ‘dogmatic Empiricism’. 
Concomitantly, in keeping with our reading of PH I.236-241 as, above all, an 
attack on a particular tendency within Empiricism, we might assume that the 
mode of Empiricism the Pyrrhonists practiced was, itself, of a sceptical variety. 
     The evidence for early Pyrrhonist-Empiricist interaction cannot be ignored 
here. We noted at V.3.1.3 the case for Aenesidemus having made use of 
Empiricist arguments as part of his more general attack on semiotics, and we will 
return to Aenesidemus at V.4.2. What the Empiricists had which the Methodists 
did not was a system of arguments against Rationalist premises, a selection of 
which could be appropriated as arguments against analogous tendencies in 
doctrinaire philosophy. Methodism’s de facto abstention from epistemological 
debate may, I propose, have made it less attractive to the earliest Pyrrhonian 
sceptics; if Pyrrhonian methodology consisted, in part, in neutralising dogmatic 
arguments via counterhypotheses,170 they would have surely found in venerable 
Empiricism a richer seam of anti-doctrinaire hypotheses – to be employed without 
endorsement when the situation demands – than in the tenets of their first century 
rival. Even if PH I.236-241 does represent a sincere acknowledgement, late in 
the life of the Pyrrhonian school, that (a certain interpretation of) Methodism was 
the more ‘Pyrrhonian’ school of medicine, the two schools had grown so 
intertwined that bond could not truly be severed.171 Sextus may favour Methodism 
when reflecting on the sceptical credentials of medical schools, but his 
 
168 Allen (2010) p.245-246. 
169 The question of ‘wherein scepticism differs from Methodism’ is not addressed, presumably because 
nobody was asking it. 
170 Morison (2018) p.306-307. Morison cites as examples M III.11-12 and M VIII.370. 
171 Recall, again, how Sextus Empiricus enacts his Empiricism when he argues against indicative 
signification in M VIII.141-299 from an ostensibly Pyrrhonist perspective (see V.3.1.2). 
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Empiricism surfaces in PH and M when medicine is not explicitly in focus, when 
it is no longer the object of inquiry. 
V.3.3 Reconciliation of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism (or, the performance of 
reconciliation) 
I have described Sextus’ Empiricism as an independently oriented enclave within 
the greater topology of his thought. How, precisely, can its presence be abided? 
The answer depends upon a fuller account of the Pyrrhonist’s conception of 
appearances. We will not find a model by which sceptical and Empirical 
epistemologies can be reconciled, but we find a model by which reconciliation 
can be performed. 
     The Ten Tropes of Aenesidemus, as set out at V.2.1 above, are not positive 
arguments for the delusive nature of perceptions. Rather, they are premises from 
which to build counterarguments against dogmatic claims that appeal to the data 
of appearances.172 The Pyrrhonist withholds judgement about the truth-value of 
perceptions but is nonetheless guided by his senses. We encountered at V.3.2.2 
the Pyrrhonist’s fourfold regime for the ordinary life.173 The ‘criterion for action’, 
as Sextus conceives it, is a methodology for living in accordance with 
appearances without assenting to dogma.174 Nature guides, the πάθη compel, 
our activities are hemmed by the laws and customs of the community in which 
we are resident and our professional lives are correspondingly constrained by the 
system of routines which form a discipline.175 These are instruction for avoiding 
the perilous life of the caricatured Pyrrho of Ellis, a figure of such scepticism that 
he withheld assent to the appearance of an incoming wagon,176 and for 
preventing the state of inaction we might expect to follow a wholesale rejection of 
perceptions.177 Crucially, a life lived in adherence to the sceptic’s criterion for 
 
172 Morison (2018) p.291: ‘…those arguments which proffer, as considerations in favour of the proposition 
that x is F, proposition which appeal to the fact that x appears F in situation S. The sceptic constructs the 
counterargument by appealing to the fact that x appears F* (i.e. something incompatible with F) in 
another situation S*.’ 
173 S. E. PH I.21-24. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid. I.23-24. 
176 D. L. IX.61-62. 
177 The argument that inaction follows from Pyrrhonist premises was advanced most famously by David 
Hume in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) 12.23: ‘…[a Pyrrhonian] must acknowledge, 
if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily 
to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in total lethargy, till the 
necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence.’ Hume continues that it is in 
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action is a life conducted by appearances.178 That such a life reflects the ‘ordinary 
life’ is enforced by Sextus throughout his works.179 Mnemonic signification is (for 
want of a better verb) ‘endorsed’ in both PH and M on the grounds that it is relied 
upon in the normal course of life.180 The endorsement is not intended to be read 
as a concession to the truth-value of appearances, but instead as a simple 
acknowledgement that to live an ‘ordinary life’ is to yield to the pressure of 
phenomena. We naturally infer from evident things the properties of the 
momentarily obscure based on our recollection of what typically follows or 
precedes or otherwise relates to the phenomenon observed. 
     Pyrrhonism is a ‘system’ insofar as ‘system’ denotes ‘a way of life that, in 
accordance with appearances, follows a certain rationale, where that rationale 
shows how it is possible to seem to live rightly…and tends to produce the 
disposition to suspend judgement.’181 Epistemology is subordinated to ethics; the 
Pyrrhonist is sceptical about knowledge – at least insofar as one professes to 
have knowledge of ‘what is’ – but his first enemy is belief, the force that terminates 
inquiry and condemns one to live a life remote from ἀταραξία.182 A life remote 
from belief is a life guided by appearances. The knowledge one acquires over the 
course of such a life is of a sort that never penetrates beneath the veil of 
phenomena, nor is it changeless; it is not knowledge of ‘what is’, but knowledge 
of ‘what seems to be’.183 The life described is a life lived empirically in all but the 
formally articulated assertion that phenomena have greater epistemic value than 
non-evident things. As Sextus puts it: 
 
fact impossible for the Pyrrhonian to live his scepticism. See Burnyeat (1983) p.117-141 for an account of 
how a Pyrrhonist might respond to Hume’s accusation. 
178 S. E. PH II.256 provides some insight into how the enactment of crystallised disciplinary practices 
coheres with the life conducted by appearances. In the context of Sextus’ critique of logical pathways 
towards the resolution of sophisms (i.e. superficially plausible but ultimately specious arguments), Sextus 
writes briefly of the correct method by which to resolve amphibolies: linguistic expressions with two or 
more meanings, pending assessment of the correct meaning in context. He argues that these must be 
resolved ‘not by the logician but by people practiced in each particular art, who themselves have the 
experience of how they have created the conventional usage of terms to denote the things signified…’ – 
trans. Mates (1996). 
179 e.g. S. E. PH II.102, 237, 244, 245; III.151; M VIII.158; XI.165.  
180 S. E. PH II.102; M VIII.156. 
181 S. E. PH I.16-17. 
182 Burnyeat (1983) p.126. 
183 Ibid. p.126. Burnyeat argued convincingly that ‘appearances’ should not be taken to mean ‘sense-data’ 




…I think it sufficient to live, empirically and undogmatically, in accord with 
the common observances and notions, suspending judgment about the 
things that are said as a result of dogmatic subtlety and are very far from 
the usage of daily life.184 
Prima facie (lower case) empirical epistemology is judged to be compatible with 
the ordinary practice of existence. There is little in (upper case) Empiricist 
methodology that draws the physician away from ‘common observances and 
notions’; his self-confinement to ἐμπειρία ensures this. It is, however, worth noting 
that Sextus does not synonymise ‘empirically’ and ‘undogmatically’ in PH II.246. 
As we saw in V.2.2, Empiricism is not in itself a denouncement of negative 
dogmatism, but evidently the practice of Empiricist methodology, mediated by the 
sceptic’s non-dogmatic vocabulary,185 cohered with the Pyrrhonist’s criteria for 
action. The Pyrrhonian Empiricist, therefore, is one whose non-dogmatic 
adherence to the guidance of appearances permits him to practise medicine in a 
manner that confines his thought to memory and observation.186 He does not 
credit his profession’s epistemological foundation with any indication of the Truth; 
he allows only that the practice seems compatible with ‘what seems to be’. It is 
tempting to submit, however, that this qualified adherence to Empiricist 
methodology – of the sort to which PH I.236-241 alludes (V.3.2.3) – was, in 
practice, hardly distinguishable from dogmatic Empiricism; though the Pyrrhonian 
Empiricist may reveal himself through his non-dogmatic treatment of non-evident 
things, and though he may reprimand negative dogmatic strains within his 
professional sect, his scepticism has minimal material impact on the nature of his 
therapeutics. To paraphrase Allen (2001b), it is the character, and not the content 
 
184 S. E. PH II.246 trans. Mates (1996). This passage follows immediately after Sextus recounts ‘an amusing 
tale’ of the physician Herophilus’s encounter with Diodorus who ‘exhibiting with logic his foolishness, was 
wont to rehearse sophistical arguments about many things’ (PH II.245). When Diodorus dislocates his 
shoulder and visits Herophilus for treatment, the physician jokingly explains, by means of the same 
sophistry Diodorus was wont to espouse, that his shoulder had not been dislocated. Diodorus begs him 
to skip over such arguments and just give him the treatment suited to his case. Though Sextus’ polemic in 
this passage is directed specifically towards sophism, the story he tells about Herophilus and Diodorus 
reads like an empiricist fable. Diodorus’ request can be read as a request for empirically effective 
treatment, unaccompanied by theoretical musings. Sextus’ endorsement of a life lived empirically at PH 
II.246 enforces this, and the story in turn gives PH. II.245 its medical relevance. 
185 Recall PH I.239 in which the Methodist’s ‘undogmatic and relaxed use of words’ explains, in part, their 
sceptical appeal. 
186 To quote Allen (2001b) p.140: ‘Medical Empiricism appealed to the Pyrrhonists because it appears to 
be little more than a more specialized and complicated version of ordinary experience, what one is left 
with if one cultivates experience of certain matters with enough diligence and concentration.’ 
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of the Pyrrhonist’s ‘beliefs’ which distinguish them from dogmatic beliefs.187 Thus, 
though the Pyrrhonist and the Empiricist remain divided on the epistemic fertility 
of evident things, the Pyrrhonist’s non-dogmatic adherence to sense-data, his 
ethical imperative, permits the performance of Empiricism. 
     But what of the Empiricist’s dogmatic anti-rationalism? We learn from PH 
I.326-241 that the Pyrrhonist, unlike the Empiricist, is not opposed to indicative 
signification of the sort the Methodists promote – the species which requires no 
‘detour via the non-manifest’, identified with the πάθη.188 However, by the time 
Sextus was writing, the Empiricist’s relationship to a certain species of deduction 
had (at least in certain factions) evolved into something more in keeping with the 
Pyrrhonist’s inclusive definition of phenomena189 – or rather, the manner in which 
certain Empiricists expounded their process was less averse to the vocabulary of 
rational deduction.190 As we touched upon in V.2.2, Galen’s SI, which introduces 
the Empiricist school at a developed stage, does suggest that the later Empiricists 
practised a form of deduction that confined itself to ordinary experience.191 
According to Subf. Emp., the practice of ‘transition to the similar’ was justified on 
the basis of experience; it is not employed in accordance with a guiding theory, 
but because it has been demonstrated to work in the past.192 Sextus’ precursors, 
Menodotus and Theodas, who were both Pyrrhonists and Empiricists, endorsed 
a mode of deduction that did not breach the surface of phenomena.193 To the 
extent to which the later Empiricists were dogmatically anti-rationalist (lower 
case), they were dogmatically anti-Rationalist (upper case), against the 
application of λόγος as their opponents conceived it. Naturally, the Pyrrhonist 
reflecting on the sceptical character of Empiricism would be moved to neutralise 
dogmatic assertions of any sort. But the distinction between the Pyrrhonian and 
the dogmatic Empiricist’s objection to (upper case) Rationalism is, as before, one 
of non-dogmatic vs. dogmatic vocabulary. The deductive tools themselves, 
beneath the level at which they are exposited, can be integrated into the 
Pyrrhonist’s criterion for action. 
 
187 Allen (2001b) p.97-106, 140. 
188 Ibid. p.143. See Frede (1987) p.265. 
189 i.e. not merely ‘perceptions’ but the variety of ways in which nature can be said to guide us.  
190 Allen (2001b) p.113. 
191 Gal. SI II (= I.66-68 K.). 
192 Gal. Subf. Emp. 70.9-23 Deichgr.  
193 Ibid. 50.3; 87.25 Deichgr. See Allen (2001b) p.112-113. 
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     The Pyrrhonist’s pursuit of ἀταραξία does not conflict with the physician’s 
τέλος so long as the physician can achieve his goals without succumbing to 
belief.194 Pain is a phenomenon of nature, one which naturally calls for its 
abatement (as an oncoming wagon incites its evasion).195 The need for a medical 
art per se is not predicated on belief; the art of medicine only undermines the 
Pyrrhonist’s τέλος when it reaches beyond perceptions in pursuit of its own. 
V.4 The novelty of Pyrrhonian Empiricism 
It remains to clarify the novelty of the Pyrrhonian-Empiricist alliance. Why does 
this intersection of medicine and Hellenistic philosophy differ so greatly in 
character from those which we have previously encountered? This final section 
has three parts. V.4.1 functions as a summary of a persistent theme in this 
chapter – that, in the case of the Pyrrhonian Empiricists, the separation of 
profession and philosophy is implicit in the nature of the alliance. V.4.2 examines 
the evidence for an Empirical influence on first century Pyrrhonism. V.4.3 asks 
the question of whether later Pyrrhonists conceived of Empiricism as more than 
merely a viable occupation.  
V.4.1 Incorporation vs. Adaptation  
This part is straightforward. Where the onus was on Athenaeus and Asclepiades 
to enforce the epistemological perimeter of their schools – developed, as they 
were, from the seedbeds of existing philosophies – the Pyrrhonian Empiricist 
enacts his devotion to Empiricism while, at a deeper level,196 remaining true to 
ἐποχή. Medicine, for the Pyrrhonian Empiricist, is not an exploratory endeavour 
–  it is not a means to discovery, but a rather inert species of τέχνη; it is not the 
generative capacity of Empiricism that appeals, but its formalised attendance to 
phenomena, nature’s guiding images. It is an occupation whose assimilation into 
one’s ‘ordinary regimen of life’ conflicts minimally – and, as we have seen (V.3.3), 
not insurmountably – with Pyrrhonism’s singular aim. The two schools’ (at least, 
 
194 In Pyrrhonism, ἀταραξία is attained through ἐποχή (S. E. PH I.8). By contrast, the Epicurean mode of 
ἀταραξία depends upon a degree of certainty which I argued at II.5 was considered to be incompatible 
with the medicine art, at least in a Rationalist mode (see esp. II.5.3). The disparity between how each 
school conceives the enactment of ἀταραξία accounts for their disparate attitudes towards the practice 
of medicine per se. 
195 See Polito (200b) p.355-356 and V.4.3 below for the argument that the Pyrrhonian Empiricist 
Menodotus sought, in preservation of his craft, to excise from the Pyrrhonist lineage early Pyrrhonist 
antecedents whose refusal to assent to phenomena such as pain made a nonsense of the medical art. 
196 The level of inquiry vs. the level of behaviour. 
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mostly (V.4.2)) independent roots facilitate this kind of qualified entanglement. 
Empiricism, as we saw in V.2.2, is not a reoriented outgrowth of scepticism (in 
any form); the Pyrrhonist takes no responsibility for Empiricism’s epistemological 
claims. ‘Empiricist’ is a role to be played. What is more, the affiliation of 
Pyrrhonism and Empiricism never amounted to the wholesale assimilation of one 
school into the other.197 PH I.236-241 alerts us to the distinction between 
sceptical (Pyrrhonism compatible) and dogmatic (Pyrrhonism non-compatible) 
Empiricism in the twilight years of the Pyrrhonian sect. Empiricism never became 
the formulation of Pyrrhonism with a medical τέλος. It remained a distinct entity, 
congruent, in certain sceptical strains, with the Pyrrhonist’s criterion for action. 
But there is a little more to this story. 
V.4.2 Empiricist influence on Aenesidemus? 
Empiricism predates Aenesidemus’ defection from the Academy in the first 
century BC. The chronology dictates that, insofar as one school influenced the 
development of the other, it was the medical sect that informed the development 
of the philosophical school. Already, we have seen hints of this. In V.3.1.3 we 
encountered evidence for Aenesidemus, the founder of the Pyrrhonian sect, 
having made use of an Empiricist argument against indicative signification.198 
This does not, as I argued above, attest to Aenesidemus’ Empiricist credentials. 
It does, however, speak to a tendency within early Pyrrhonism to collect diversely 
sourced counterarguments which can be used to neutralise dogmatic claims. 
There is a question, however, of whether Empiricist methodology had a more 
enduring impact on the development of the Pyrrhonist school. 
     There is one subtle but intriguing piece of evidence for Empiricist influence on 
Aenesidemus. The following passage is from Diogenes Laertius, translated by 
Polito (2014) in his compilation of Aenesidemean testimonia: 
The Pyrrhonist line of reasoning, then, is a kind of record of things that 
appear or are in any way thought of, a record (μνήμη τις) according to which 
everything is set alongside everything else and in being compared is found 
 
197 Contra Polito (2007b), see V.4.3 below. 
198 S. E. M VIII.215, 234, 240-241. Context is provided by Phot. Bibl. 170b3-35 (LS 72 L). Photius’ report 
that the Pyrrhonian Discourses set out to disprove the existence of signs per se hints at the inclusion of 
Pyrrhonian arguments against mnemonic signification. If this were discovered to be true, it would not 
invalidate my argument that the early Pyrrhonists discovered in Empiricist a rich seam of anti-dogmatic 
arguments in potentiality. 
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to contain much anomaly and disturbance, as Aenesidemus says in his 
Outline Introduction to Pyrrhonism. With regard to the contradictions that 
come to light in inquiries, they first set forth the modes according to which 
things persuade, and then, on the basis of those same modes, demolished 
conviction regarding them.199 
Our focus is the phrase μνήμη τις, ‘a record according to which everything is set 
alongside everything else’.  The phrase, as Polito argues, recalls the central tenet 
of Empiricist epistemology – that experience plus memory, not λόγος, is the 
foundation of empirical science.200 It is not otherwise employed as a technical 
term in the extant literature on Pyrrhonian scepticism.201 Confusingly, D. L. IX.78 
would appear to ground the Tropes of Aenesidemus –  counterpropositions to 
‘modes according to which things persuade’ –  on an empirical foundation.202 As 
with the passages from the Pyrrhonian Discourses referenced in S. E. M VIII 
(V.3.1.3), here we find an empirical premise which seems to persist through the 
Pyrrhonist’s sceptical manoeuvring. It was noticed by Aristocles, who argued that 
the phenomena Aenesidemus sought to discredit with the Tropes provided the 
tools with which he sought to interrogate their veracity.203 From Aristocles: 
‘…every time [the sceptics] reviewed [the justification for their scepticism], 
they speak of nothing but a sort of induction, showing what appearances 
and particulars are like. Just that kind of thing is, and is called, trust. Now, if 
they give assent to that trust, it is clear that they have beliefs; but if they do 
not put their trust in it, we would have no desire to pay any attention to them 
either.’204 
The conclusion, on Aristocles’ reading, refutes the methodology by which the 
conclusion was established. How Aenesidemus might have defended his 
recourse to such a record – if, indeed, he anticipated this critique – is unknown. 
We might suppose that just as the Tropes are not themselves endorsements of 
any negative epistemology, their basis in ‘a record according to which everything 
is set alongside everything else’ was not upheld with any conviction – indeed, 
 
199 D. L. IX.78 (= B16.1-4 Polito) trans, Polito (2014). 
200 Polito (2014) p.248. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. p.249. 
203 Aristoc. Ap Euseb. Praeb. Ev. 14.18.13 (= B18 Polito).  
204 Ibid. trans. Polito (2014). 
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that the Ten Tropes seem to nullify themselves might have been part of the 
dialectical game, ‘a final move’ in the guiding of one’s interlocutor towards ἐποχή. 
But the premise does not lose its Empirical flavour if, as above, we recognise 
Empiricist arguments as devices to be used by the early Pyrrhonists for sceptical 
ends and then discarded when they ceased to be productive. We should not be 
surprised that Empiricist epistemology, being a mechanism whereby sceptical 
arguments could be formulated without recourse to λόγος, was attractive to 
Pyrrhonism’s founder; submitting to the influence of memory and observation – 
to ‘the guidance of nature’, interpreted in an Empiricist (which is to say, more 
rigorous) framework205 – gave him grounds for argumentation that was preferable 
to those which relied upon an extra-sensory tool. A plausible reading of the 
argument at D. L. IX.78 is that if one attends to ‘a record according to which 
everything is set aside everything else’, one sees that Nature indicates the means 
by which arguments begotten of perceptions can be disassembled. If the implicit 
paradox is raised in objection, the Pyrrhonist responds that he affirms nothing; he 
merely floats a plausible counterhypothesis, crafted through cumulative 
perceptions, that is no more absurd than the dogmatist’s original thesis.206 The 
method is evocative of Empiricism; the conclusion is sceptical. Though his reason 
for referring to memory is at variance to that of the Empiricists, the outline 
preserved at D. L. IX.78 indicates an early form of Pyrrhonian – which is to say, 
passive – acquiescence to phenomena that recalls Empiricist argumentation. The 
fourfold regimen for an ‘ordinary life’ at PH I.21-24 is thus subtly recontextualised; 
one wonders whether there may be some Empiricist influence beneath the 
stipulation that the Pyrrhonist should submit to the guidance of phenomena, when 
phenomena is understood to communicate with both one’s faculties of sense-
perception and of recollection.  
     It is appropriate to note that Diogenes Laertius lists as a teacher of 
Aenesidemus a certain Heraclides.207 From the Empirical character of some 
Aenesidemean fragments it is tempting to identify this Heraclides with Heraclides 
of Tarentum, the Empiricist physician of the first century BC,208 known to us 
 
205 Which is to say, one that includes memory in its definition of phenomena. 
206 This additional step would seem to anticipate the Trope according to Hypothesis in S. E. PH I.116, 
particularly on the reading of Morison (2018) p.305-311. 
207 D. L. IX.115-116. 
208 Heraclides’ dates are established in Guardasole (1997) p.23. 
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through quotations in Galen and Caelius Aurelianus.209 The chronologies of 
Heraclides and Aenesidemus support this hypothesis, as does their shared time 
in Alexandria.210 A further conduit of early Empirical influence suggests itself. The 
Pyrrhonian Empiricist of the second century AD, Menodotus of Nicomedia, 
claimed that Aenesidemus inherited the Pyrrhonist tradition from one Ptolemy of 
Cyrene, whom Polito speculates might be the Empiricist doctor of the same 
name.211 Menodotus, of course, had his own agenda. His claim that Ptolemy of 
Cyrene re-founded the Pyrrhonian sect sometime after Timon’s death can be 
read as an attempt by the Pyrrhonian Empiricist to recontextualise contemporary 
Pyrrhonism by tracing it back to an Empirical provenance.212 This was not, in my 
view, intended to ‘Empiricise’ Pyrrhonism – the evidence from Sextus Empiricus 
suggests that the distinction between the sects was recognised and 
accommodated within Pyrrhonism (V.3.1). More plausible is Polito’s suggestion 
that Menodotus sought to prune Pyrrhonism’s lineage of those whose legendary 
disregard of the phenomenon of pain threatened to devalue the medical 
profession.213 It should be read, therefore, not as a retroactive bid to unify 
Pyrrhonism and Empiricism – to muddle the distinction between container and 
content –, but to ensure the compatibility of the former with the medical art per 
se.  
     Reported lineages should, in general, be treated with caution as evidence of 
downstream influence; they are inevitably (at least) partially retro-constructed, 
authored by the last links in the chain.214 But we need not argue that 
Aenesidemus inherited the substance of his philosophy from Heraclides or 
Ptolemy to suppose that his brand of scepticism was, in some small way, 
informed by Empiricist arguments. Safer to suggest that Aenesidemus’ 
philosophy was a concrescence of influences.215 The Empiricists, in their 
replacement of medicine’s logical foundations with a formalised attendance to 
 
209 Polito (2014) p.2. 
210 Ibid. Aenesidemus’ excursion in Alexandria is attested in Aristoc. ap. Euseb. Praeb. ev. 14.18.29. 
211 D. L. IX.115. Menodotus is listed at an Empiric physician at D. L. IX.116. See Polito (2014) p.57. 
212 Polito (2014) p.57. 
213 Polito (2007b) p.356-357. We know nothing of the individuals removed from Menodotus’ lineage 
except for what Diogenes Laertius (IX.115) tells us of one Praylus of the Troad, that he suffered a traitor’s 
death with remarkable ‘patience’. 
214 Polito (2007b) p.355-359. 
215 The spectrum of which would appear to range from Heraclitus (S. E. PH I.210-212) to the sceptical 
Academy (S E. PH I.220-235) with Pyrrho and Timon somewhere in between. The philosophy of Heraclitus 
seems to have been a point of fascination for Aenesidemus, explored in Polito (2004). 
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ordinary experience, may have furnished Aenesidemus with a method of 
argumentation that made no appeal to reason, which could therefore be 
reformulated sceptically – that is, as a means of sign-inference that limited its 
scope to the world as it seems to be; any method of inquiry that penetrates 
beneath the senses resists a sceptical framing; reason either guides us to the 
truth or begets ungrounded abstractions; a conception of experience that 
incorporates memory either keeps us to the truth or conforms to nature’s 
ostensible guidance – a distinction that is brought to light in exposition, not in 
practice.  
     As to whether Empiricism lay somewhere near the root of Pyrrhonism’s 
submission to nature, the answer is unlikely to be straightforward. Diogenes’ 
Laertius indicates that Timon, Pyrrho’s scribe and disciple, promoted a sceptical 
acquiescence to phenomena of the sort that we see upheld at PH I.23-24.216 
Though this may have amounted to all the literature Aenesidemus need indicate 
to justify his acquiescence to phenomena at any given moment, the scant 
fragments from Timon are not by themselves sufficient to accommodate his 
recourse to a record of phenomena – to memory’s epistemological role as 
phenomena’s ordering principle – reported at D. L. IX.78, to the guidance of 
nature over an extended period of time.217 Though we speculate, credulity will not 
be stretched to breaking point if we suggest that while recourse to Timon might 
have given Aenesidemus’ argumentation some sceptical pedigree – permission, 
perhaps, to incorporate memory into his argumentation218 – the Empirical model 
of ἐμπειρία was sufficiently abundant to give his scepticism a firmer ‘theoretical’ 
 
216 D. L. IX.104-105. We are not, of course, obliged to take these fragments at face value. An alternative 
plausible interpretation of the fragment from Timon’s Images (D. L. IX.105) – ‘But the appearance prevails 
everywhere, wherever it goes’ (LS 1 H) – is that Timon is bemoaning the hold that perceptions have over 
people. See e.g. Decleva Caizzi (1981) p.262-264. The fragment from On the Senses – ‘That honey is sweet 
I do not affirm, but I agree it appears so’ (LS 1 H) – relates nothing about how one is to behave, given the 
appearance of one’s senses. Bett (2003) p.84-83 argues, rather convincingly, for a face-value 
interpretation of the fragments at D. L. IX.105. 
217 Naturally, how we behave ‘in the moment’ is guided, in part, by our memories of how the situation in 
which we find ourselves typically unravels. Simple mnemonic signification is, we might think, instinctual. 
But Diogenes’ (IX.105) paraphrase of the Pytho – ‘Timon…says…that he has not departed from normal 
practice’ (LS 1 H) – seems like a defence of Timon and Pyrrho’s general (though sceptically framed) 
adherence to the most basic human conventions. It does not read like the basis for a method of 
argumentation.  
218 Aenesidemus’ likely reinvention of Pyrrho of Ellis (as reported at D. L. IX.196) attests to his desire to 
promote a more experience-friendly history of Pyrrhonism. See Bett (2003) p.84-85. 
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foundation,219 a rigorous means of mnemonic sign-inference which, as set out 
above, could, when required, be formulated non-dogmatically.220 What this 
amounts to is an (albeit, sporadic) Empirical presence in Pyrrhonian 
argumentation dating back the school’s first century foundation. If later 
Pyrrhonists found that Empiricism, being a rigorous attendance to ‘ordinary 
experience’, could be accommodated by their philosophy, this may be accounted 
for, in part, by Empiricism’s influence on how the Pyrrhonist interfaces with the 
world. The ‘novelty’ of Pyrrhonian Empiricism, then, in contrast with other 
intersections of Hellenistic philosophy and medicine, may be consequent, in part, 
on the river of influence running from the technical sect into the philosophy, a 
philosophy which, in its maturity, reincorporated its medical antecedent. 
V.4.3 The sceptical value of the Empiricist sect 
A final question. Does the Pyrrhonist practise medicine because he is moved to 
dedicate his life to an art, or is there more to be gleaned from the Empiricist sect 
than the satiation of his need for complex action, for intellectual fulfilment? 
Roberto Polito (2007b) proposes that the ‘coalescence’ (to adopt his – I think, 
somewhat misleading –  language) of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism in the second 
century AD ‘served the purpose of bridging the lack of public recognition and 
patronage that Skepticism was suffering on its own.’221 He builds his case around 
the institution of chairs of philosophy in Athens and elsewhere, sanctioned by 
Marcus Aurelius in AD 176.222 Salaried chairs are awarded to the Platonists, the 
Aristotelians, the Stoics and the Epicureans but not to the sceptics.223 This 
prejudice, Polito argues, ‘rests upon a revised sect canon that had already 
formalized this situation long before’ as reflected in the work of Augustus’s court 
philosopher Arius Didymus, which seems also to have restricted its scope to the 
 
219 Of Pyrrho’s pupils, Timon was the only one who shows any signs of being concerned with developing 
‘theory’. The account of Diogenes Laertius (IX.109-116), however, indicates that he followed his master in 
subordinating theory to praxis. See Polito (2007b) p.339-341. 
220 The matter is complicated further by the fact that Timon is listed among the leaders of the Empiricist 
sect in Gal. Subf. Emp. 1, 42.22-43.6 Deichgr. Though Diogenes Laertius (IX.109) reports that Timon taught 
medicine to his elder son, Xanthus, the claim is evidently a retrojection. Polito (2007b) p.353 suggests that 
Galen owes this interpretation to the Empiricists themselves, one of whom, one Aischrion, was his teacher 
at Pergamon. See V.4.3 for Polito’s account of why the later Empiricists may have been so motivated, and 
my reservations (esp. n.231 for Timon’s Empiricist reception). 
221 Polito (2007b) p.353. 
222 Ibid. p.349-151; Cass. Dio LXXII.32. 
223 Lucian Eunuchus 3. 
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four most salient Hellenistic sects.224 Thus, by the second century AD, the 
philosophical curriculum of the Roman elite failed to recognise the Pyrrhonists as 
equal in stature to their Hellenistic rivals. Polito cites Aenesidemus’ reported 
dedication of the Pyrrhonist Discourses to a Roman politician as evidence for the 
Pyrrhonists having been concerned with finding sponsorship from the inception 
of their school,225 and Seneca’s apparent ignorance of the Pyrrhonist tradition as 
evidence of their partial failure.226  
     Polito argues that Empiricism endowed a dwindling Pyrrhonism with ‘an 
institutional setting throughout the Roman age’.227 Menodotus’ Empiricised 
history of Pyrrhonism may be regarded in this light,228 and a more complete 
institutional amalgamation of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism in the second century 
AD would indeed account for the fact that virtually all the leading figures in post-
Hellenistic scepticism are known to have also been Empiricists.229 I am reluctant, 
however, to fully endorse Polito’s argument, at least not with an assertiveness to 
match that with which it is posed. I do not dispute the claim that Empiricism 
endowed late Pyrrhonism with an institutional structure, nor do I suggest that they 
were unconscious of this advantage; I push back against the proposal that the 
alliance came about solely because of the Pyrrhonists’ lack of an ‘institutional 
frame’, and that the two schools can ever be said to have ‘coalesced’ in the sense 
that evokes a seamless unification. I do not accept the claim that ‘Sextus’ 
specious schizophrenia’ – express through his critique of Empiricism at PH I.236-
241 –  ‘makes best sense on the hypothesis that he joined the Empiricist sect 
because the medical sect provided the institutional frame from which to teach 
skepticism in his day.’230 Surely, Sextus Empiricus’ qualified endorsement of 
Methodism at PH I.236-241 is most plausibly read as evidence against the 
uniformity of the contemporary Empiricist sect,231 and thus, it would seem, against 
 
224 Polito (2007b) p.250, see further n.78 in that same work. 
225 Polito (2007b) p.351; Phot. Bibl. 169b.18. 
226 Polito (2007b) p.351. In Ep. 88.44 Seneca conflates Pyrrhonism with the sceptical Academy. 
227 Polito (2007b) p.359. 
228 D. L. IX.115. See V.4.2 above. 
229 Polito (2007b) p.353. 
230 Ibid. p.354. 
231 See Allen (2010). This argument is glossed over at Polito (2007b) p.354. I am also hesitant to accept 
that the later Empiricists uniformly accepted that their views were ‘borrowed from Timon.’ (Ibid. p.355). 
Galen’s Subf. Emp. 1, 42.22-43.6 Deichgr., the source for this claim, merely lists Timon among a number 
of doctors for whom the Empiricist sect might have been named. While I accept that Galen’s 
interpretation was plausibly derived from his Empiricist teacher at Pergamon, I am reluctant to accept 
that this individual, of whom we know nothing, came to speak for the entire sect. 
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Polito’s model of Pyrrhonist-Empiricist ‘coalescence’. Two differently oriented, 
independently originating disciplines cannot ‘coalesce’ without engendering a 
third, unique school; as we saw at V.3 above, the school with the broader τέλος 
can accommodate the more narrowly occupied school, provided that their dual 
proponents can find a means of sealing one identity against the other. The 
inconsistency we identified at V.3.1.1 is an example of what happens when the 
Pyrrhonian Empiricist conflates his profession with his philosophy; the fact that 
this inconsistency persists is testament to the disjunction of Sextus’ professional 
and philosophical identities, to the boundary between the schools.  
     Moreover, while Empiricism may have served to preserve Pyrrhonism for a 
generation or two longer than history may have otherwise permitted, I am hesitant 
to accept that Sextus’ principal motivation for joining a medical sect – and thus 
enrolling himself in the performance of a τέχνη – was to teach the (as we have 
seen, not obviously compatible) values of an entirely different discipline. The 
assimilation of a certain kind of scepticised Empiricism into Pyrrhonism is unlikely 
to have been merely opportunistic; Empiricism – not least on account of its 
plausible influence on the development of the philosophy (V.4.2),232 and thus the 
familiar structure of its methodology, if not its dogmatic character – could be made 
compatible with Pyrrhonism, reformulated only in exposition (V.3.3). That the 
Pyrrhonist, seeking a means of occupation, would be drawn to Empiricism is not 
surprising; he would recognise the Empiricist’s devotion to memory and 
observation as reflective of familiar argumentation, remote from λόγος, and find 
it natural to practice medicine in this way, provided that his performed and 
undogmatically defended adherence to Empiricist epistemology – as distinct from 
certain modes of Empiricist argumentation (V.4.2) – was not permitted to escape 
into the enveloping philosophy, that it remain a ‘technical epistemology’, sealed 
against his scepticism. 
V.5 Conclusion: the curious alliance of the anti-doctrinaire  
Pyrrhonian Empiricism is not the product of fusion, a third body born of the 
mutually destructive union of prior substances; it results from the juxtaposition of 
independently oriented sects – the accommodation of the narrowly occupied, 
technical discipline by the broader ethical system, insofar as a ‘system’ describes 
 
232 For which Polito himself argues at (2014) p.248-249. 
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‘a way of life that, in accordance with appearances, follows a certain rationale, 
where that rationale shows how it is possible to seem to live rightly…and tends 
to produce the disposition to suspend judgement.’233 It is, in the broadest terms, 
a mixture that preserves the independence of the parts. But we should perhaps 
understand this as the terminal condition of a complex entanglement of differently 
oriented sects. 
     In V.2, we explored the independent origins of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism 
and found that, although the two schools share an aversion to theory-based 
deduction, the medical sect’s dogmatic faith in the authenticity of sense 
experience was incompatible with the Tropes of Aenesidemus, Pyrrhonian 
scepticism’s foundational (methodological) tenets. The discordance of Empiricist 
and Pyrrhonist epistemology is variously apparent in Sextus Empiricus’ analyses 
of sign-inference. I argued in V.3.1 that Sextus’ (apparently unconscious) 
conflation of Pyrrhonism’s (totalising, logical) and Empiricism’s (narrowly 
targeted, epistemological) arguments against sign-inference speaks to the 
bifurcation of Sextus’ intellectual personae, one made possible because the two 
intellectual traditions to which Sextus belonged are oriented towards distinct τέλη; 
the two schools, though imperfectly compatible, are seldom found in opposition 
to one another. Pyrrhonism is a philosophy; Empiricism is a productive science. 
The Pyrrhonist’s ethical τέλος does not obstruct the physician’s pursuit of bodily 
health provided the physician can achieve his goals without succumbing to belief. 
Incoherencies occur when the two sets of arguments which Sextus Empiricus 
retains – the professionally and the philosophically oriented – become comingled.  
     I argued in V.3.3 that the accommodation of Empiricism by Pyrrhonian 
scepticism is a performed reconciliation; empirical epistemology is considered 
compatible with the ordinary practice of existence – with the Pyrrhonist’s criteria 
for living in accord with appearances without assenting to dogma. The Pyrrhonist, 
however, strips his adopted τέχνη of its dogmatic character; he does not credit 
his profession’s epistemological foundation with any indication of the Truth; he 
allows only that the practice seems compatible with what seems to be. The 
distinction is not in found in the method by which he practices medicine, but in 
the vocabulary with which his τέχνη is expounded. The Pyrrhonist’s aversion to 
 
233 S. E. PH I.16-17. 
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dogmatic exposition of τέχναι is evident in Sextus’ ostensible endorsement of 
Methodism at PH I.236-241. I argued at V.3.2 that Sextus’ qualified critique of 
Empiricism in this passage reminds us that the boundary between Empiricism 
and Pyrrhonism retained much of its integrity; Sextus, writing as Sextus the 
Pyrrhonist, can reflect critically on the Empiricist sect as a distinct intellectual 
entity. His Empiricism, as we saw in V.3.1, bleeds into PH and M when his sights 
are directed elsewhere. Empiricist arguments, evidently, were found to have 
utility outside of their intended context. This, I have argued, lies at the root of 
Empiricism’s sceptical appeal over that of the Methodic sect. 
     Despite the preservation of the boundary between the sects – the duality of 
the Pyrrhonian-Empiricist, contingent on bifurcated τέλη –, the term ‘juxtaposition’ 
may not adequately capture the complex nature of their entanglement over time. 
At V.3.1.3 and V.4.2 I examined the evidence for an Empiricist influence on the 
development of Pyrrhonist argumentation in the first century BC. Pyrrhonism is in 
no sense an outgrowth of Empiricism; it is an independently originating sect but 
one whose founder may have identified in Empiricist argumentation a sceptical 
utility; the Empiricists, in their rejection of λόγος as the instrument of inquiry in a 
technical context, developed a method of argumentation, grounded in memory 
and experience, which Aenesidemus could, when necessary, reformulate 
sceptically and release from the context for which it was intended. The conflation 
of intellectual personae with which we diagnosed Sextus Empiricus of at V.3.1 
seems less implausible if we allow that the Pyrrhonist tradition had a long history 
of reformulating Empiricist arguments in non-technical contexts. We considered 
at V.3.1.3 an example of Aenesidemus ostensibly offering an Empiricist argument 
against indicative signification – one which preserved Empiricist methodology – 
for sceptical purposes. The difference between Aenesidemus and Sextus 
Empiricus is that, for the former, Empiricism is conceived as a deposit of anti-
doctrinaire hypotheses, ripe for reformulation and ultimately disposable; for the 
latter, it is technical methodology whose viability, in the context of his Pyrrhonism, 
depends upon its independent τέλος. Pyrrhonian-Empiricism describes the 
accommodation by the philosophical school of an intellectual antecedent. The 






Over the course of this thesis, I have sought to illuminate the mechanisms 
whereby Hellenistic philosophy, selected in these pages for its therapeutic 
affectation, was transposed or integrated into the subsequent medical tradition. 
My findings can be generalised as follows: i) Rationalist physicians, seeking to 
secure the medical art’s reputation as a generative epistemology, are motivated 
to stringently enforce the boundaries of their τέχνη; ii) excluding the appropriation, 
by Hellenistic philosophers, of medical vocabulary for rhetorical ends, there are 
three mechanisms by which philosophy and medicine become entangled, 
namely, adoption, adaptation and accommodation; iii) in matters of 
adoption/adaptation, the structure of the mother-doctrine determines the nature 
of the mechanisms employed. Let us examine these points in further detail. 
i) Technical epistemologies 
In chapters I & III I argued that the disjunction between Stoicism and Pneumatism 
is clarified by the disparity between the ethicist and the physician’s τέλος, 
between the goal of the true practical scientist and the productive 
scientist/technician in Aristotle’s taxonomy of sciences (III.3.1). The founding of 
the Pneumatist sect is the formalization of the territory pertinent to medical inquiry 
within the theoretical structure of the mother-doctrine, a goal-oriented cosmology 
which developed in pursuit of the correct mode of human behaviour, εὐδαιμονία. 
A τέχνη, in this case, is carved into the body of the antecedent philosophy, 
oriented towards an otherwise neglected goal. This is clear in Athenaeus of 
Attalia’s restrictive element theory (III.2), the anti-cosmological nature of which is 
explained by the physician’s aspiration to distinguish the ‘elements of medicine’ 
(τῆς ἰατρικῆς στοιχεῖα) from the elements per se, thus delineating the relatively 
narrow epistemic ambit of his τέχνη. Precedent for the formalization of technical 
epistemologies can be found in the work of Athenaeus’ Hellenistic predecessors, 
the anatomists Erasistratus of Ceos and Herophilus of Chalcedon (III.2.2), albeit 
without, in their case, an analogue for the Pneumatist’s engagement with a pre-
existing body of doctrines. Athenaeus, like his Hellenistic predecessors, locates 
the boundary of medical inquiry at the limit of ‘apparent things’ (τὰ φαινόμενα).  
     The aspiration to formalize and to enforce the parameters of a technical 
epistemology is, I argued at III.3, most intelligible when conceived as a response 
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to the hierarchy of sciences set out in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. We may 
partially identify Athenaeus with Aristotle’s model of the ‘productive scientist’, the 
technician (or specialist) who constrains his epistemic ambit to that which is 
productive of his τέλος. However, where Aristotle conceived of the specialist 
mantle as a system of constraints to be adopted and discarded according to one’s 
immediate purpose (III.3.2), Athenaeus contends with both the Aristotelian frame 
that subordinated medicine to ethics and the more immediate Stoic ethical 
taxonomy of ‘virtue’, ‘vice’ and ‘indifferents’ that questioned even the instrumental 
value of health to pursuing the ethicist’s goal (III.3.3). Thus, Athenaeus was 
motivated not merely to establish the epistemic ambit of his τέχνη within Stoic 
cosmology, but to emancipate, clearly and cleanly, his medical sect from 
Stoicism’s ethical objective. He is not a Stoic physician, but a Pneumatist, the 
founder of a medical sect whose eponymous substance can be traced beyond its 
centrality to Chrysippean physics into the crucible medically oriented, 
physiological discovery (I.3.9, III.3.3). From the formalized territory of medical 
inquiry, innovations can be claimed by the medical τέχνη. I argued at III.4 that 
Athenaeus introduced the αἴτιον προηγούμενον into an adopted Stoic analysis of 
causation – one designed with universal application in mind – to account for the 
peculiarities of physiological processes. His innovation does not constitute a 
challenge to Stoic theory; instead, he nurtures it from the limited domain of 
specialist inquiry, a vantage which the philosopher, pursuant to his τέλος, is not 
motivated to adopt. 
     I suggested in chapter IV that Asclepiades of Bithynia was similarly motivated 
to distance his medical theory from its philosophical roots, to emphasise the 
medical art’s generative potential. In his case, however, the nature of 
Epicureanism precluded the demarcation of a constrained, technical 
epistemology within a broader cosmological framework. We will return to this 
below (iii). In the case of Pyrrhonian Empiricism, as I sought to demonstrate in 
chapter V, the disparate nature of the Pyrrhonist and the Empiricist’s τέλη 
permitted the juxtaposition of distinct professional and philosophical identities; 
contradictions are tolerable because distinct τέλη render a direct conflict of 
personae unlikely (V.3.1.1). This permits the Pyrrhonist to adopt a de facto 
Empiricist epistemology in professional/technical contexts – albeit tempered, in 
exposition, by non-dogmatic vocabulary – while, in non-technical contexts, 
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advancing arguments which undermine Empiricist methodology. I argued 
throughout chapter V that the Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance depends upon a 
managed discontinuity between one’s philosophical and one’s technical 
personae. We return to this shortly below (ii). 
ii) Adoption, adaptation and accommodation  
Adoption refers to the wholesale transposition of ideas from one intellectual 
domain into another. It is the mechanism whereby Pneumatism selectively draws 
from Stoicism. What is adopted and what is discarded – more exactly, in the latter 
case, what is alluded to only as a means of clarifying the physician’s narrow ambit 
of inquiry (III.2.1.1) – is determined by what is productive of the physician’s τέλος. 
Asclepiades also adopts a variety of Epicurean physical doctrines. I argued in 
IV.2.2 that Asclepiades’ original medical theory was, in its essentials, rooted in 
Epicurean-style atomism. In its final iteration, several Epicurean doctrines survive 
intact: Asclepiadean πόροι correspond to Epicurean void-gaps (IV.2.1); atoms 
and ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι share their qualitative status and the nature of their motion 
IV.2.3.2-4); ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι, like atoms, are perceptible only to reason (IV.2.3.1) 
and Asclepiades’ epistemology is, I have argued (IV.5), extracted more or less 
wholesale from Epicureanism.1 
     Adaptation refers to the purposeful modification of ideas as they traverse 
disciplinary boundaries. Ideas are modified in order that they might better 
accommodate their new technical imperative. Asclepiades’ interaction with 
Epicureanism is in large part typified by adaptation. However, discerning a 
technical motivation for every deviation from the mother-doctrine is an intricate 
task, but one whose complexities may be resolved if we accept that a) 
Asclepiades was motivated to uncouple his physical model from its Epicurean 
predecessor for reasons that are not necessarily oriented towards the production 
of health – we might consider ‘signalling intellectual autonomy’ to be an additional 
purpose (an aberration in the context of Aristotle’s taxonomy of sciences) – and 
b) his scope to adapt Epicurean physics was constrained by his devotion to an 
essentially Epicurean epistemology. Concerning (a), I argued at IV.2 (esp. IV.2.5) 
that Asclepiades’ most striking adaptation to Epicurean physics, the replacement 
 
1 For the caveat concerning the threat of determinism to the Epicurean conception of reason, see II.3.8 
and esp. IV.5.3.3. 
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of atoms with frangible ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι, is best explained as having been catalysed 
by Asclepiades’ bid for intellectual emancipation, both for himself and for his 
τέχνη. This is not to suggest Asclepiades discovered no practical advantage to 
replacing atoms with ἄναρμοι ὄγκοι. My argument is that, in the absence of 
compelling evidence as to what that motivation might have been (IV.5.1), and 
accounting for the fact that Asclepiades’ theory of pathology can largely be 
accommodated by Epicurean-style atomism (IV.2.2), we need to consider the 
possibility that uncoupling one’s theory from its intellectual ancestor is, in itself, a 
compelling motivator for adaptation. We will return to the broader context of (a) 
below (iii). Concerning (b), Asclepiades’ rejection of the localised ἡγεμονικόν 
(IV.4) is most intelligibly conceived as a reactive doctrine, an attempt to reconcile 
his adoption of Epicurean epistemology – and thus, Epicurean-style psychology 
and sense-mechanics – with post-Erasistratean neurophysiology. Here, then, we 
have a case of adaptation introduced for the purpose of securing an adopted 
doctrine into an updated model of human (psycho)physiology. As Asclepiades’ 
epistemology is propounded in defence of the efficacy of Rationalist inquiry, the 
psychophysics upon which it depends is ultimately oriented towards the 
production of health. Of Asclepiades’ deviations from Epicurean physics, the 
doctor’s commitment to necessity is perhaps the most straightforward example 
of practically motivated adaptation – that is, adaptation as a means of aligning an 
adopted doctrine with a distinct τέλος. Necessity poses no (obvious) threat to non-
ethical, medically oriented materialism. Moreover, predictable – for the 
corpuscularist, wholly mechanistic – activity at the level of the elements of 
medicine – synonymous, for Asclepiades, with the elements per se – is essential 
to the Rationalist project. Adaptation, for Asclepiades, is at once a necessity of 
his practical τέλος and a mechanism for signalling intellectual emancipation. 
     As for Athenaeus, I have argued that the invention of the αἴτιον προηγούμενον 
constitutes an adaptation to Stoic causal analysis (III.4.4). Attempts to identify a 
Stoic precedent for the αἴτιον προηγούμενον have proven unconvincing 
(III.4.4.1). More likely, the αἴτιον προηγούμενον was designed to account for 
physiological peculiarities (III.4.4.2) which were not sufficiently accounted for by 
Stoicism’s original taxonomy of causes, designed with universal application in 
mind. The life that the αἴτιον προηγούμενον continued to have in the medical 
sphere, uncoupled from its Stoicising roots, attests to its peculiar utility to 
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explaining the aetiology of disease(s). In contrast with Asclepiades’ adaptations 
to Epicurean physics, Athenaeus’ invention of the αἴτιον προηγούμενον should 
not be read as a challenge to Stoic orthodoxy. The relationship between 
Pneumatism and Stoicism is not, for reasons I articulate below (iii), 
straightforwardly antagonistic. The αἴτιον προηγούμενον was born of the 
conjunction of Stoic causal analysis and the manifest complexity of human 
physiology. It could, I maintain, be incorporated into Stoic causal theory; that is 
was not – as the extant testimonia suggests – attests to its limited, technical 
appeal. By diligently clarifying, through selective adoption, the boundaries of his 
technical epistemology, Athenaeus – and therefore the medical τέχνη – can claim 
ownership of the αἴτιον προηγούμενον, the adaptation, as a formal causal 
category. The disparity between how Asclepiades and Athenaeus’ adapt the 
philosophies they draw upon can be accounted for by the nature of their 
respective mother-doctrines (iii). 
     Accommodation refers to the alliance of independently originating schools of 
thought which, in a manner that evokes a juxtaposition of ingredients (as opposed 
to a ‘fusion’), preserves their independence. It is made possible, in the case of 
the Pyrrhonian Empiricists, because the allied schools – which share an anti-
theoretical complexion – are oriented towards distinct τέλη; the two schools, 
though imperfectly compatible (V.3.1-2), are seldom directly opposed to one 
another. The Pyrrhonist philosopher, through ἐποχή, acts in pursuit of ἀταραξία 
(V.2.1); the Empiricist physician, through attendance to ἐμπειρία, acts in the 
pursuit of the production of (physiological) health (V.2.2). Pyrrhonism is a 
philosophy; Empiricism is a productive science. The Pyrrhonist’s τέλος does not 
obstruct the physician’s pursuit of bodily health provided the physician can 
achieve his goals without succumbing to belief (V.3.3). Medicine, for the 
Pyrrhonian Empiricist, is not a generative epistemology in the sense that it seeks 
to produce new ideas; it is an occupation (V.4.1), one which can, in its non-
dogmatic formulation, be reconciled with the Pyrrhonist’s regime for the ordinary 
life, free of belief (V.3.2.2 & V.3.3). The affiliation of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism 
never amounted to straightforward assimilation, to the generation of a third, 
unique sect. As we saw at V.3.2, Sextus Empiricus, expounding the sceptical 
credentials of medical sects in his Pyrrhonist persona, can write critically of 
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Empiricism as a separate entity. The possibility of such reflection requires that 
the boundary between the sects remain intelligible. 
    The term ‘juxtaposition’, however, might not fully capture the nature of the 
Pyrrhonist-Empiricist alliance. At V.4.2 I considered the evidence for an Empiricist 
influence on the development of Pyrrhonian scepticism in the first century BC. 
The Empiricists, in their rejection of λόγος as the instrument of inquiry, developed 
a method of argumentation, grounded in memory and experience, which 
Aenesidemus could reformulate sceptically, preserving the mechanism of 
Empirical inquiry while ridding its epistemological foundation of its claim to 
interface with the Truth. I argued at V.3.2 that, for the Pyrrhonists, the appeal of 
Empiricism over Methodism lay in the body of arguments the former school had 
collected against Rationalist inquiry over the course of its existence. 
Aenesidemus located in Empiricism a selection of anti-doctrinaire hypotheses. In 
adapting those hypotheses for his own ends – preserving their form but denuding 
them, we are led to suppose, of their negative dogmatism – he permits arguments 
constructed with technical intent to influence the dialectical character of his 
philosophy (V.3.1.3 & V.4.2). That later Pyrrhonists were drawn to their school’s 
medical antecedent should not surprise us. Pyrrhonism’s accommodation of 
Empiricism may describe a qualified alliance with an intellectual ancestor. 
iii) The structure of the mother-doctrine  
Returning to doctrinaire philosophy and Rationalist medicine, I argued throughout 
chapters I-IV that the structure of the mother-doctrine determines the nature of 
its adoption/adaptation. Let us deal, in this concluding section, with Stoicism and 
Epicureanism in turn.  
     I sought, throughout chapter I, to emphasise the unity of physics and ethics in 
Stoicism, the correlative affinity between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be 
engendered in the human’. The Stoic cosmos is the paradigm, identified with the 
Stoic God, from which the Stoic discerns his moral τέλος, virtue (ἀρετή) – ‘living 
in accordance with experience of what happens by nature’.2 The Stoic cosmos is 
a unified continuum, a blend of mutually coextensive principles, and (to a degree) 
structurally self-similar (I.3); the harmony exemplified by the whole can be 
realised at different scales, conceptualized as individual ‘goods’ or as morally 
 
2 Stob. 2.75, 11-76, 8 (LS 63 B). 
333 
 
neutral (though, in orthodox Stoicism, nonetheless innately preferable) micro-
harmonies, all with a physical signature characterised by ‘correct proportionality’ 
(I.3.1 & III.3.3). The moral status of the cosmos is contingent upon its 
psychophysiological peculiarity (I.4-5); the human shares his/her 
psychophysiological topography with that of the whole (esp. I.5.4). He/she can 
thus behave in a manner that reflects, most completely, divine/cosmic harmony 
in microcosm. The harmonious soul is a corporeal body, identified with the 
proportionate blend of its constituents. The Stoic philosopher, who analogises his 
administrations to soul to those of the physician to the body (III.5.2), seeks to 
cause this state in himself and in others, to rid the corporeal soul of its physical 
affections, its deviations from ‘correct proportionality’, its pathologies.  
     At III.5 we examined the relationship between Athenaeus’ theory of health and 
Chrysippus’ conception of psychological pathology in the extant fragments of his 
work On Affections. I argued that Chrysippus’ model of psychophysical pathology 
is structurally affinitive with Athenaeus’ theory of physiological pathology (esp. 
III.5.3.1); pathology is the deficit/surfeit of a particular constituent (of the body or 
soul) which throws the system into disarray. (The role of all-penetrative πνεῦμα 
is of less explanatory utility to localised psychological pathologies, which perhaps 
explains the most significant structural discrepancy between the mechanism of 
disharmony in the two systems). The Stoic ethicist (the Stoic proper) seeks to 
restore harmony to the constituents of the soul; the Stoicising physician (the 
Pneumatist) seeks to restore harmony to the constituents of the body. The 
Chrysippean and Pneumatist analyses of the soul/body respectively are 
dependent on the same physical system. If the Pneumatist, in his adherence to 
a technical epistemology, is more dogmatic than the Stoic-as-‘productive 
scientist’ – one who utilises medical analogy to signify the practical value of his 
physics (III.5.3.3) – this does nothing to invalidate the correlative affinity of the 
therapeutic mechanism in both cases. Stoicism, having rigorously physicalised 
psychological health and pathology, provided the Pneumatist with a template for 
a bone fide theory of bodily health. Because of Stoicism’s self-similarity – the 
isomorphism of good/preferred patterns – the model of psychological health can 
be repurposed (i.e. adopted) into medicine. The continuous nature of the Stoic 
cosmos, as well as the mutual coextensivity of its elements, allows for technical 
epistemologies (i) to be delineated within its structure, oriented towards the 
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pursuit of (otherwise neglected) localised micro-harmonies. The Pneumatist, 
motivated to distinguish his craft from Stoicism per se (III.3.3 and i above), can 
achieve this through selective adoption; his adaptations are the fruits of 
Pneumatism; they are not themselves mechanisms by which Pneumatism and 
Stoicism are distinguished. That health is most commonly categorised as a 
‘preferred indifferent’ in Stoicism, reflective of but not (necessarily) instrumental 
to the realisation of εὐδαιμονία/ἀρετή, necessitates Pneumatism’s status as a 
separate sect despite its consistency with Stoic physics. 
     To reproduce my language from II.5.6, where Stoic physics provides a 
template for its ethics – for the mechanism of ‘healing’ –, Epicurean physics 
provides a justification – a sequence of premises from which to draw conclusions 
about appropriate conduct; the model of the world Epicurus offers is designed to 
quench our fear, but the model is remarkably recalcitrant when we seek 
understand, in material terms, what fear’s dissipation entails. The final goal of 
ἀταραξία is nowhere explicitly identified with the atomic constellations in 
Epicurean sources/testimonia, nor do we find anything more than a cursory – and 
largely unsatisfactory – analysis of bodily pain (II.5.6). I argued throughout II.5 
that Epicurus developed his physics only as far as was necessary to 
accommodate its role as a psychological medicament; Epicurus’ attitude towards 
physical pain was that one should recognise its causes and avoid them; if pain is 
unavoidable, one must cultivate the appropriate outlook such that pain may be 
endured. For all that Epicurus, like Chrysippus, found rhetorical utility in medical 
analogy, it is plausible that he perceived the medical τέχνη per se – with its 
pragmatic accommodation of uncertainty – to run contrary to his philosophy’s 
τέλος. I noted at II.5.3 Lucretius’ peculiar aversion to the medical τέχνη in De 
rerum natura. This is an intriguing counterpoint in a poem that presents itself as 
the honey-sweetened vessel of Epicurean true-medicine. 
     Asclepiades, then, is afforded no physicalised ethical template upon which to 
model his medical theory. Though I argued at IV.2.2 that his theory of pathology 
is broadly consistent with the cursory analysis of pain at DRN II.963-967, it is 
nonetheless a pronounced rigorization of the Epicurean antecedent. Asclepiades, 
whose thought wanders independently of Epicureanism’s τέλος, is free to settle 
his attention on underexplored physical questions. If Epicureanism had presented 
itself as a superior ‘medicine’ to that which was produced by the medical τέχνη, 
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then Asclepiades would have further cause to emphasise his art’s generative 
potential by correcting Epicurus’ mistakes (e.g. IV.2.4.2). Moreover, as I argued 
at IV.5.2, Asclepiades did not inherit a physical system that allowed for the 
delineation of internal technical epistemologies. Epicurean epistemology has two 
distinct tiers: 1) the world as it is known to reason; 2) the world as it is known to 
the senses. To terminate medical inquiry at the limits of perception – to assume, 
as Athenaeus would, the epistemological constraints of Asclepiades’ other great 
influence, Erasistratus of Ceos – would be to entirely disconnect his theory from 
its Epicurean roots (IV.2.1) and whatever medical utility was identified therein. 
With few opportunities for selective adoption, Asclepiades was further motivated 
to adapt Epicurean doctrine (ii). 
     Where Stoic ethics provided the template for Pneumatist therapeutics, and 
Stoic causal theory the basis for the Pneumatist’s aetiology of disease, Epicurean 
epistemology, to Asclepiades, provided a physical account of the sense-
mechanics whereby inferences from the evident to the non-evident-by-nature via 
λόγος –  the central Rationalist stratagem for accumulating knowledge about the 
world – could be defended from Empiricist critique. The Epicureans share with 
the Empiricists two key premises: 1) sense-impressions are non-illusory; 2) the 
application of reason and the receipt of sensory data are meaningfully distinct 
processes. I argued at IV.5.2.3 that the Rationalist, adopting Epicurean scientific 
methodology, could defend the medical necessity of λόγος – and the insufficiency 
of ἐμπειρία alone as the basis of medical inquiry – on empirical grounds, thus 
confronting Empiricist arguments on something close to their own terms. 
Epicurus’ epistemology was inextricable from his physics (II.2-3); the former 
justifies the latter as the latter justifies the former. Our sources firmly indicate that 
Asclepiades’ epistemology was adopted more or less intact from Epicureanism 
(IV.5). To exploit the medical utility of Epicurean epistemology is to assume 
responsibility for the physical system upon which Epicurean sense-mechanics 
depend. Adaptations – which, for Asclepiades, are a requirement of intellectual 
emancipation (ii) – must be negotiated around an inseparable, cyclically 
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